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ABSTRACT 
 
Atomic Governance: Militarism, Secrecy, and Science 
In Post War America, 1945-1958 
 
by 
 
Mary D. Wammack 
Dr. David S. Tanenhaus, Examination Committee Chair 
Associate Professor of History 
James E. Rogers Professor of History and Law 
William S. Boyd School of Law 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas 
 
This history of America‘s post-World War II atomic program examines the institutional 
impulses that drove its evolution from 1945 through the 1958 moratorium on atmospheric 
weapons testing. Based on archival research and methodologies borrowed from 
sociologists and legal theorists, it focuses on the motivations of and decisions made by 
military officers, program managers and affiliates in the private sector, their relationships, 
and the alliances they formed with congressmen. This analysis identifies a two-stage 
process of self-interested decision-making through which the armed forces, seeking to 
mitigate postwar loss of funding and influence, gained de facto control of the atomic 
program that it maintained throughout the atmospheric era.  
During Militarization (1945-1948), officers capitalized on the political 
instrumentality of weapons testing at Operation Crossroads and benefited from the 
organizational expertise of Manhattan administrators, consolidating their authority and 
monopolizing program resources and production. This culminated in Atomic Governance 
(1949-1958), when officers, pro-military program officials, affiliates, and congressmen 
combined their institutional and political influence to marginalize the civilian authority of 
iv 
 
the Atomic Energy Act. During both phases, officers used strategies of control adopted 
from the Manhattan Project to deceive elected officials and the public about the hazards 
of testing and the utility of nuclear weapons.  
These findings significantly revise the standard Cold War narrative of atomic 
testing. First, the significant turning points and officers‘ use of strategies of control 
demonstrate that it was not national security imperatives, but the combined effects of 
self-interested behavior by historical actors with their own institutional goals that most 
influenced the program‘s development. Second, the way the armed forces used the 
program shows that it was the engine, and not an aspect, of Cold War mobilization. 
Third, the hazards of the program were not due to ignorance but rather understanding of 
the boundaries between dosages known to cause acute injury and those expected to cause 
illness only in the long term. Officers and officials used that scientific knowledge to 
conduct tests they expected would cause illness years later, but would not result in 
immediate, acute injury.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The horrific devastation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki changed the world. The use of 
atomic weapons ended the war with Japan, drove a wedge into the wartime alliance, and 
elevated the United States to the most powerful nation on earth. Advanced technology, 
and the wherewithal to use it, not only shifted the balance of international power 
relationships, but it also profoundly transformed American society and politics.
1
 
Maintaining nuclear superiority helped to fuel anti-communism,
2
 chiseled away at the 
notion of government transparency and at traditional liberties such as freedom of the 
press and privacy,
3
 and instigated an expansion of defense facilities and capability that 
                                                 
1
 For the longstanding ideological and political factors that shaped diplomatic efforts and the consequences 
of early Cold War failures to forestall the arms race, see Michael J. Hogan, A Cross of Iron: Harry S. 
Truman and the Origins of the National Security State, 1945-1954 (Cambridge, UK; New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998). See also Gregg Herken, The Winning Weapon: The Atomic Bomb in 
the Cold War 1945-1950 (New York, NY: Knopf, 1980). For the most recent analysis of how the early 
thinking about the bomb, particularly as it was considered the penultimate weapon, constrained diplomacy 
throughout the arms race, see Gerard J. DeGroot, The Bomb, A Life (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2005). For the Cold War‘s effect on the profession of history; administrative history, and the rise of 
―public‖ history, see Peter Novick, That Noble Dream, the “objectivity question” and the American 
Historical Profession (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 511-514.  
  
2
 David Caute, The Great Fear: The Anti-Communist Purge Under Truman and Eisenhower (New York: 
Simon & Schuster, 1978), 17-22, 54-81.  
 
3
 Early analysts argued against extremism and drew from American political philosophy in their efforts to 
strike a balance between liberty and security. For a legal and social perspective on the ramifications of 
security regulations on scientific collaboration and potential progress, see Walter Gellhorn, Security, 
Loyalty, & Science (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1950). For a sociopolitical perspective on the 
consequences of overreaction and the rhetorical political strategies that fueled it, see Edward A. Shils, The 
Torment of Secrecy: the Background and Consequences of American Security Policies (Glencoe, IL: The 
Free Press, 1956). For a journalist‘s perspective, see James Russell Wiggins, wartime intelligence officer 
and later executive editor of the Washington Post, who drew correlations between the public‘s right to 
know and freedom of the press in Freedom or Secrecy (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1956). 
See also Daniel Patrick Moynihan who assessed the tradeoff of liberty for security during the Cold War and 
argued that it had been excessive and permanently detrimental, see Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Secrecy: The 
American Experience (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998).  
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altered everything from regional economies to family life.
4
 Between 1945-1962, the U.S. 
detonated 259 aboveground nuclear weapons, including at least 100 at the Nevada Test 
Site, and others at various sites in the U.S., the Marshall Islands, Christmas Island, 
Johnston Atoll in the Pacific, and in three areas over the South Atlantic.
5
 All but thirty of 
these resulted in radioactive fallout that extended beyond the boundaries of the testing 
facility.
6
 The costs of nuclear development that began to tap the treasury at the end of 
                                                 
4
 A confluence of fear and security initiatives led one historian to portray the U.S. during the early Cold 
War years as ―The Insecurity State‖. See H. W. Brands, The Devil We Knew (New York, NY: Oxford 
University Press, 1993), 31-58. Such insecurities cannot be separated from the bombings that led to Japan‘s 
surrender. For the psychological effects, and particularly for the cultural underpinnings of Cold War hopes 
and anxieties, see Spencer R. Weart, Nuclear Fear: A History of Images (Cambridge, MA; London: 
Harvard University Press, 1988), 103 ff.; for the fears and controversies of the post 1949 era of above-
ground testing, see Allan M. Winkler, Life Under a Cloud: American Anxiety About the Atom (New York, 
NY: Oxford University Press, 1993). The best analysis of how the Cold War affected family life remains 
Elaine Tyler May, Homeward Bound: American Families in the Cold War Era (New York, NY: Basic 
Books, 1988), 9-15. For the anti-communist movement in universities generally, see The Cold War and the 
University, Andre Schiffrin, ed. (New York, NY: The New Press, 1997); for the influence of state-funded 
science on universities, see Stuart W. Leslie, The Cold War and American Science: the Military-industrial-
Complex at MIT and Stanford (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1993) and Big Science: The 
Growth of Large Scale Research, Peter Galison and Bruce Hevly, eds. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University 
Press, 1992).  
  The expansion of the military into the West was more akin to empire by invitation than it was to a 
takeover. For a case study that examines the fundamentals and intricacies of patronage and lobbying by 
boosters, see Roger Lotchin, Fortress California, 1910-1961: From Warfare to Welfare (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1992). For the West generally, see Ann Markusen, The Rise of the Gunbelt: the 
Military Remapping of Industrial America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991). For the 
transformative effect of the Manhattan Project on its surroundings in New Mexico see, Hal Rothman, On 
Rims and Ridges: The Los Alamos Area since 1880 (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1992), 
207-257; and, for Colorado‘s Rocky Flats facility, see Ken Ackland, Making a Real Killing (Albuquerque, 
NM: University of New Mexico Press, 1999).  
   For some consequences of the program on the West and its people, see Mike Davis, Dead Cities (New 
York: The New Press, 2002), 33-35; Ward Churchill, Perversions of Justice, Indigenous Peoples and 
AngloAmerican Law (San Francisco: City Lights Books, 2003), esp. 153-200; Gregory Hooks and Chad L. 
Smith, ―The Treadmill of Destruction: National Sacrifice Areas and Native Americans,‖ American 
Sociological Review 679 (2004): 558-575.  
   For the fetishization of the program and testing, see Joseph Masco, The Nuclear Borderlands: The 
Manhattan Project in Post-Cold War New Mexico (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 
2006), esp. 20-23. 
 
5
 I use the terms ―above-ground‖ and ―atmospheric‖ interchangeably. Both describe those atomic and 
nuclear explosions that were designed to be detonated above the surface of the earth, whether they were 
tower, balloon, airdrop, or surface detonations.  
 
6
 United States Department of Energy,
 ―Announced United States Nuclear Tests, July 1945 through 
December 1988,‖ September 1989, Office of External Affairs, U.S. Department of Energy, Nevada 
Operations Office, NO-209, 2-13. 
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World War II have continued to mount. Postwar development and production combined 
have exceeded $5.5 trillion,
7
 and remedying the environmental wreckage in and around 
production facilities will likely cost $179 billion.
8
 The human costs are, of course, 
impossible to measure in dollars alone. Nevertheless, a rough estimate of the extent of 
injury and death believed to have been caused by the program is illustrated by the at least 
$1.2 billion paid to downwinders, uranium miners and millers, and on-site participants.
9
  
Since 1989, the program‘s history has become part of the national narrative 
celebrating the fall of the Soviet Union. Historians, political scientists, lawyers, 
journalists, and participants have all contributed to furthering our understanding of the 
program‘s rise. They have also considered the issues at the heart of this dissertation: the 
military‘s influence on the program‘s development, including how secrecy shielded the 
program (and its history) from scrutiny. They have explained those factors in the same 
way that they explain the program itself: as attributes of the Cold War. As for the 
program, it is overwhelmingly understood as a single strategic thread in the matrix of 
national security policies; its human and environmental costs explained, and often 
criticized, as Cold War artifacts. It is through the lens of policy—as the corpus of 
executive and legislative-level initiatives to direct the program in accordance with the 
                                                 
7
 A 1996 estimate made ―in constant 1996 dollars‖. Stephen I. Schwartz, ed., Atomic Audit: The Costs and 
Consequences of U.S. Nuclear Weapons since 1940 (Brookings Institution Press, Washington, D.C., 1998), 
3. For a discussion of the hazards, injuries, and funds spent to address them, see also Arjun Makhijani and 
Stephen I. Schwartz, ―Victims of the Bomb,‖ Atomic Audit, 395-431. 
 
8
 ―A Report to Chairman Hobson and Ranking Minority Member Visclosky, Subcommittee on Energy and 
Water Development, Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives‖ GAO-05-764, July 2005, 
45. 
 
9
 My use of the term ―program‖ refers to the postwar atomic weapons complex and is intended to include 
administrative-level governmental agencies, their administrators, both civilian and military, together with 
the influential private laboratories and entities that partnered with the government to produce atomic 
material and weapons. For the figures on compensation, see the Government Accountability Office Report 
to ranking members of the Senate and House Committees on the Judiciary, September 7, 2007. 
Government Accounting Office, ―Radiation Exposure Compensation Act Status‖ GAO-07-1037R, 3.  
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preservation of national security—that nearly all, including those most critical, explain 
the evolution and hazards of the atomic program. According to the conventional wisdom, 
the best way to understand both the direction and consequences of the postwar nuclear 
program during the atmospheric era is in light of its role in the Cold War.  
This dissertation challenges the assumptions and the conclusions of this body of 
Cold War scholarship. It argues that based on the domestic history of the program, its 
political value in the early postwar years, and what we have learned from scholars in 
other disciplines about the operation of institutions and the behavior of individuals 
involved in them, that the expense, hazards, and influence, of the postwar program cannot 
be explained by geopolitics alone. Accordingly, the questions that drive this analysis are: 
How did the program‘s wartime history, and its relationship with the military then and 
afterwards, affect the postwar, peacetime, program? How did the program‘s relationship 
with the military influence how bombs were produced and tested? What factors caused 
that production and testing to become, as some experts at the time believed them to be, 
exceedingly and unnecessarily hazardous? And, what were the program‘s effects on 
American society? Finally, this analysis provides insight into why the bomb was so 
readily accepted as an instrument of national authority, an issue raised more than fifty 
years ago by the respected author and essayist for The New Yorker, E. B. White. In 1954, 
when the stakes of the arms race reached into the possibility of human extinction, White 
was less concerned with superpower politics and the potential for nuclear war than he 
was with the process that had preceded it. ―The terror of the atom age is not the violence 
of the new power,‖ White wrote, ―but the speed of man‘s adjustment to it.‖10 The 
                                                 
10
 E.B. White, ―The Age of Dust,‖ Second Tree from the Corner (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 
1954), 115. 
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adjustment that bedeviled White cannot be found by viewing the program through a Cold 
War lens, but it can by coming to terms with the program in light of its origins and 
evolution, by understanding the centrality of the program and of the bomb to domestic 
politics, the extent to which the Cold War provided a rationale for atmospheric testing, 
and recognizing the atomic program and the atom bomb not only as products, but as 
engines, for postwar state building.  
This new way of understanding the 1945-1958 program finds that domestic 
institutional imperatives did more to shape the direction—militarization—and to establish 
the nature of the postwar program than did diplomatic failures and Cold War objectives. 
It deals with the development of the national security state, the political and economic 
influence of the military-industrial complex, as well as the expansion of military 
authority in peacetime society, to show that all were concentrated in and found 
expression through the postwar atomic program. There are no smoking guns in this 
analysis. Instead, it re-evaluates the historical record in light of uncustomary (insofar as 
the history of the atomic program is concerned) methodological and theoretical 
approaches. It draws on a multidisciplinary range of secondary literature, the findings of 
historians and sociologists who have evaluated institutional culture and human behavior, 
and is grounded in the archival collections of Presidents Truman and Eisenhower; records 
of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), National Security Council (NSC), and the 
Manhattan Project; manuscript collections of scientists associated with the program; 
Nevada Test Site records, and documents submitted as trial evidence.
11
  
                                                 
11
 Especially Prescott vs. United States, consolidated, Civil Action No. CV-8-80-143 PMP, United States 
District Court, District of Nevada [Prescott v. U.S.]. Also, Allen v. United States, 588 F. Supp. 247, 258 (D. 
Utah 1984), 816 F.2d 1417 (10th Cir. 1987), [Allen v. U.S.]; Bulloch v. United States, 95 F.R.D. 123 (D. 
Utah 1982), 721 F.2d 713 (10th Cir.1983) [Bulloch v. U.S.].  
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I make two substantive diversions from convention. First, I have abandoned the 
traditional division separating World War II from the postwar era, and thus between the 
wartime and peacetime programs, to evaluate how the program‘s wartime origins 
influenced its peacetime history.
12
 Second, because this analysis is focused on the 
motivations and goals of individuals, and because individual preferences align in ways 
that are not well defined by occupation or professional affiliation, I have broadened the 
definitions of ―military‖ and ―civilian‖ to extend beyond the usual connotation of 
profession to include categories of interest.
13
 Given that one characteristic of the period 
was the merging of civilian and military interests, this re-conceptualization makes 
analytical sense. It also makes practical sense. Civilian administrators and program 
managers routinely supported goals that might be considered to be strictly ―military‖ in 
nature. And, according to the self-reporting of military officers, boundary shifting and 
blurring across the lines of prerogative and responsibility are common practices, and 
routinely contingent on individual interpretation of circumstances.
14
   
I have limited this examination to the period between the end of the war and the 
unofficial moratorium on aboveground testing reached between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. 
in 1958. Although part of my argument rests on the connections between the wartime 
                                                 
12
 As Elizabeth Borgwardt has pointed out, one of the lessons drawn from World War I was the importance 
of planning for peace before the end of war. A New Deal for the World (Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press: Oxford, MA; London, 2008), 14.  
 
13
 The term ―military‖ is admittedly too broad to describe the non-monolithic armed forces. Nevertheless, 
within the context of this analysis there are enough commonalities between service goals—desire for 
postwar influence and budgetary concessions, for example, and the effort to capitalize on World War II‘s 
technological advances. In this dissertation, ―U.S. military‖ refers to uniformed officers charged with 
authority that will become clear from the text. References to specific services—as in ―U.S. Navy‖ or 
―Army officers‖—should pose no difficulties.  
 
14
 I have made every effort to make my meaning clear from the context, or by way of reference, ―military-
style‖, for instance. For the studies on civil/military relationships and responsibilities, see Peter D. Feaver, 
Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2003), 128-133, esp. 132. 
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Manhattan Project and the peacetime program, I have not made an effort to re-evaluate 
the wartime history of the program. The characteristics of Manhattan that are integral to 
this argument are, in fact, already well developed in the vast secondary literature. While I 
do make some assertions about the wartime program based on archival research, my 
investigations into Manhattan‘s archives were limited and far from comprehensive. And, 
although the U.S. did not discontinue atmospheric weapons tests until July 1962, the 
endpoint of my study is 1958 and the unofficial moratorium on weapons testing. The 
reason for this is that from a domestic perspective, weapons tests conducted prior to the 
1958 moratorium had domestic political value as instruments of persuasion or 
demonstration, whereas experiments conducted after September 1961 were 
unquestionably provoked by national security objectives following the decision by the 
Soviets to resume atmospheric weapons tests and thus to break the unofficial agreement 
reached in 1958. Beginning with Operation Crossroads in 1946 and especially after 1951 
with the advent of testing in Nevada, the military‘s elaborately staged weapons tests and 
troop maneuvers became routine events that generated excitement and enthusiasm. By 
1958, however, they paid diminishing returns as the American public, politicians, and 
members of the press corps, became increasingly wary about the dangers of radioactive 
fallout and skeptical about the continuation of aboveground testing.  
This is a history that includes scientists—not a history of science, technology, nor 
a study of knowledge production.
15
 My primary concern with science and scientists is to 
                                                 
15
 Though not directly, this study engages with themes in the history of technology and technological 
culture—literature in the tradition of Arnold Pacey, Culture of Technology (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
1983); Thomas P. Hughes, American Genesis: A Century of Innovation and Technological Enthusiasm 
(New York, NY: Penguin, 1989); Bryan Pfaffenberger, ―Social Anthropology of Technology,‖ Annual 
Review of Anthropology 21 (1992): 491-516; and David E. Nye, Technology Matters: Questions to Live 
With (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006).  
8 
 
show how the military‘s interest in atomic science divided experts into cooperative and 
dissenting groups. This distinction was an important one, I argue, because those members 
of the expert community that held, and expressed, opinions that supported military goals 
became the sole arbiters of program safety. Oppositional experts were at first 
marginalized and then, for most of the period examined here, left out of the official 
decision-making process altogether. Military officers and supporters disregarded the 
opinions of experts who disagreed with cooperative scientists, ridiculed them in the press, 
and attacked their integrity by calling into question their competence and loyalty. While 
aware that scientists hardly comprise a unified group, I use the term ―scientists‖ in a 
general sense to refer to those experts who by education or experience were uniquely 
qualified to evaluate technical, theoretical, or practical aspects of the program.
16
 Where I 
do discuss individual scientists, I have identified them with reference to their field of 
expertise. I have not overlooked the possibility that scientists who cooperated with 
procedures that were known at the time to pose long-term risks to participants and 
downwinders may have been influenced in part by ―technological optimism,‖ the notion 
that problems expected to arise in the future would be prevented from occurring because 
of scientific or technological developments.
17
 It was, however, not a phenomenon 
reflected it in the private or public comments of those scientists investigated for this 
study. At the time, those scientists who endorsed risky or hazardous weapons testing 
differed little from their precautionary brethren among the program‘s advisors and 
                                                 
16
 As Ian Hacking has recently pointed out, except for administrative ―educational purposes,‖ exactness as 
it pertains to the sciences is misleading: the sciences are ―always crossing borders and borrowing from each 
other.‖ ―Making up People,‖ London Review of Books 28 (August 16, 17, 2006): 23. 
 
17
 James E. Krier, Clayton P. Gillette, "The Un-Easy Case for Technological Optimism," Michigan Law 
Review 84 (1985): 405-429. 
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experts, admitting the potential for future illness while publicly downplaying the dangers 
and arguing that they were necessarily imposed in the interests of national security.  
Although I argue that national security policy was less important than the 
military‘s domestic goals in establishing the direction and character of the atomic 
weapons program, policy does make an occasional appearance in this argument. 
However, I have made no attempt to re-assess the findings included in the vast literature 
on Cold War national security policy that already exists and have purposefully 
disentangled my study of the program from Cold War policy concerns.
18
 From a practical 
level, substantial documentation about the program and military planning remains 
classified and it would be impossible at this time, even for teams of researchers, to render 
meaningful a comparison between domestic and diplomatic impulses. More importantly, 
however, the decision to de-emphasize the national security policy side of the story is a 
logical one. There is, for example, abundant archival evidence that reveals the routine use 
of exaggeration, euphemism, and deception, to mask individual or institutional goals with 
national security rationales. Logically, none of these less-than-forthright tactics would 
have been necessary had the interests of the military and its supporters been anchored in 
genuine efforts to achieve policy objectives. 
One final qualification: my goal has been to get at the history of atmospheric 
weapons experimentation as it unfolded. Thus, I have adopted the viewpoints and 
opinions of historical actors as they were expressed at the time. This means that I have 
generally not taken into account the growing collection of latter day recollections of 
program participants nor tried to evaluate the continuing controversies about radioactive 
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exposure and illness/injury.
19
 The problems of trying to recapture history through 
remembrances can only have been made more difficult by the attention drawn to the 
program and the atmospheric weapons testing era by lawsuits, congressional 
investigations, and compensatory legislation. provided for participants, contract 
employees, and downwinders. As much as any other historical issue, the program‘s 
participants, contract employees, and downwinders, have all had reason to ―appeal for 
popular support by claiming the sanction of the past‖ and have certainly ―form[ed] and 
re-form[ed] conclusions.‖20 Similarly, the danger of radioactive fallout and weapons 
production remain topics of considerable debate. But the historical question is not what 
we now can prove, or disprove, about the effect of radioactive exposure on human health, 
but rather what experts at the time believed the dangers were.  
Following the critical assessment in this Introduction, the historiographical essay 
in Chapter Two examines the character and reasons for the resilience of the policy-
centered explanation of the program—the Cold War Narrative. The remainder of this 
study divides the program‘s history into two parts. The first—Militarization—examines 
the pre-1950 process through which military officers and their supporters gained control 
over the program and its resources. The second—Atomic Governance—analyzes the use 
of the program and weapons testing by military officers and AEC officials, evaluates the 
consequences of the autonomous authority they wielded, and the implications of what 
amounted to extra-constitutional overreach. I conclude this critical study by summarizing 
                                                 
19
 Among the most recent compilation is the digitized collection of interviews at The Nevada Test Site Oral 
History Project at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas. Available at http://digital.library.unlv.edu/ntsohp/. 
 
20
 David Thelen, ―Memory and American History,‖ Journal of American History 75 (1989):1117-1129, 
quote at 1127. For an expanded discussion, see Kerwin Lee Klein, ―On the Emergence of Memory in 
Historical Discourse,‖ Representations 69 (2000): 127-150.  
11 
 
the significance of the institutional motivations, relationships, and wartime strategies of 
control that contributed to making the atomic program the engine for post World War II 
mobilization. The Conclusion includes a discussion of the distortions of the typical Cold 
War Narrative and the present-day significance of recognizing and correcting them. This 
analysis demonstrates, for example, that it was not ignorance, but what AEC officials and 
military officers knew, about the hazards of radioactive exposure that gave them the 
ability to conduct unnecessarily hazardous weapons tests during the 1940s and 1950s. 
Understanding that officials and officers during the earliest years of the Cold War arms 
race relied on the boundaries known to exist between radiation dosages that would cause 
short-term illness and those expected to produce illness and death in the long term to 
mischaracterize the value of nuclear bombs and tactical nuclear weapons has the potential 
to provoke contemporary discussions about issues that range from the importance of 
independent oversight to the direction of national security policy.  
―Militarization‖ begins with an analysis of the domestic institutional and political 
factors that allowed military officers and their supporters to first monopolize and then 
assert autonomy over the program and its resources (Chapter Three). Chapter Four 
(Integration) examines the 1945-1947 phase of Militarization during which the military‘s 
efforts to retain control of atomic science corresponded with the Navy‘s Operation 
Crossroads. During those maneuvers, military officers set a precedent for the peacetime 
employment of wartime-style, Manhattan Project strategies of control—including 
military urgency, secrecy, and manipulation of media and scientists. Using them, officers 
at Crossroads established a model for the use of the program and testing to achieve 
domestic political goals that continued through the atmospheric weapons testing. After 
12 
 
the Atomic Energy Act stripped the military‘s Manhattan Project of its monopoly over 
the program and its resources, military officers from all branches united in the goal to 
reclaim the authority it had lost. As explained in Chapter Five, provisions in the AEA and 
in the National Security Act, organizational expertise supplied by former Manhattan 
Project administrators, and support from pro-military congressmen, AEC member Lewis 
L. Strauss, and influential backers in the private sector, all helped the military 
monopolize atomic resources and expand a network of industry and university affiliates 
dependent on military development and production. Chapter Six examines Consolidation, 
the final phase of Militarization during which military officers and their congressional 
supporters accumulated enough political and institutional power to influence foreign and 
domestic policymaking.  
The era of Atomic Governance began when Truman acquiesced to the goals of the 
JCS, pro-military congressmen and AEC affiliates within the AEC‘s network. His retreat 
from his earlier commitment to civilian authority contributed to the H-bomb decision and 
was marked by his decision to elevate pro-military Gordon Dean to AEC Chairman 
(Chapter Seven). The implications of this turning point are the subject of Chapter Eight, 
which examines the formation of a partnership between the AEC and the DOD and 
Dean‘s use of Manhattan-style strategies of control to secure permission for continental 
weapons tests. It reveals the significance of those same strategies to AEC officials and 
military officers who conducted weapons tests as demonstrations to generate support for 
self interested, institutional, goals. But neither the AEC nor the DOD would have been 
able to capitalize on the political instrumentality of weapons tests without the support of a 
pro-military cadre of scientists and the selective use of Atomic Secrecy to restrict the 
13 
 
flow of information about atomic science. Chapter Nine examines the 1945-1958 history 
and significance of Atomic Secrecy and a community of scientists who cooperated with 
the military‘s exploitation of the program. As described in Chapter Ten, the insularity and 
coherence of that community became especially important during President Eisenhower‘s 
first term when the fallout controversy erupted and threatened the authority and 
autonomy of AEC Chairman Lewis Strauss and his military partners. To protect his 
authority over the program and atmospheric weapons testing, Strauss relied on that 
community of AEC affiliated scientists to downplay the hazards of radioactive fallout. 
Simultaneously, he consolidated his authority within the administration and drew the 
State Department into the AEC/DOD alliance to discredit disarmament proposals and 
postpone a moratorium on atmospheric tests until 1958, when Eisenhower, influenced 
from advisors outside his cabinet and pressure from the international community, agreed 
with Soviet Premier Khrushchev to halt atmospheric weapons tests.  
The history of aboveground nuclear testing verifies what historians learned long 
ago: that there are many ways to explain the past. In presenting a new way to understand 
the program and its history, I hope also to encourage the timeworn notion that the past 
offers some lessons for the future. Under a veneer of celebratory accounts, the suspicions 
expressed during the early Cold War years by those who witnessed and found reasons to 
be skeptical of the military‘s postwar ambitions, of increasing governmental secrecy, and 
of the safety of above-ground nuclear testing, are becoming harder to recognize. In the 
familiar telling, the ―Wise Men‖ who were ―Present at the Creation‖ made the tough 
choices that allowed America to win the early Cold War ―race‖ for nuclear supremacy 
and set the stage for the Soviet Union‘s 1989 collapse. In one sense, it is unsurprising that 
14 
 
the history of the aboveground nuclear program and its role during the early Cold War 
years have been shaped by selective perception. The Cold War and the mushroom clouds 
that characterized the conflict‘s early years have, after all, assumed significance in the 
stories Americans tell themselves about their nation‘s role in shaping the post World War 
II world. And yet, while the impulse to gloss over some of the more uncomfortable or 
even sordid details of the past is a natural one and not necessarily deliberately deceptive, 
such glorification is not without its drawbacks. Casting the past in such a positive light 
may, as Nietzsche explained of the French Revolution, rob future generations of the 
lessons that might have otherwise been learned: 
[t]hough noble and enthusiastic spectators from all over Europe 
contemplated [it] from a distance and interpreted it according to their own 
indignation and enthusiasms for so long, and so passionately, that the text 
finally disappeared under the interpretation—could happen once more as a 
noble posterity might misunderstand the whole past and in that way alone 
make it tolerable to look at.
21
 
 
In the conventional history of the postwar nuclear program, there are no lessons to 
be learned. If we accept what has become the conventional analyses, then we must 
acknowledge that the program was shaped solely by national security objectives; that 
within the context of their presidencies and in consultation with a handful advisors each, 
Truman and Eisenhower had no alternative but to direct that the program proceed with 
the development of an ever-larger class of nuclear weapons and to expand production and 
above-ground experimentation. Moreover, we must also accept that both Truman and 
Eisenhower knew that doing so would involve a number of known radioactive risks that 
would likely threaten the health and lives of thousands (if not tens of thousands) of 
uninformed production workers and unwary American citizens. This stark summary is 
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what the conventional Cold War narrative boils down to. But we are not stuck with it. 
The history in this dissertation offers an alternative. 
In the standard portrayal, the atomic program began to unfold at the close of 
World War II and evolved in close alignment with national initiatives, postwar 
diplomatic failures, and subsequent arms escalation.
22
 The immediate postwar period was 
one of unprecedented challenges and uncertainty as national leaders, scientists, and a 
large percentage of the American public discussed the atom‘s potential and debated 
international and domestic options for atomic weapons.
23
 As diplomatic negotiations got 
underway, Congress took up the problem of domestic control. The central issue was 
whether the military should retain its authority over the program or whether civilians 
should be assigned to control it. After nearly a year of negotiation and in the midst of the 
broader postwar effort aimed at coordinating and strengthening the nation‘s defenses, 
Congress passed the Atomic Energy Act in August 1946. It established a five-member 
civilian commission, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), to replace the wartime 
Manhattan Project and, on January 1, 1947, the AEC assumed authority over atomic 
resources and science. The Act reduced the military‘s role to a consultative one and 
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minimized presidential authority by directing that the AEC would answer to Congress.
24
 
The Act closed the book on the wartime Manhattan Project, codifying the hopes of many 
in Congress as well as President Truman that atomic science be put to beneficial use by 
―improving the public welfare.‖25 Before long, however, the fall of China to communists, 
the Soviet‘s successful detonation of an atom bomb in 1949, and the North Korean 
invasion of South Korea the following year stimulated military expansion.
26
 Truman 
approved the development of a hydrogen bomb, and the AEC‘s primary focus officially 
shifted to weapons development. To streamline that development, Truman eliminated the 
logistical and economic burdens posed by Pacific testing with the approval of a Nevada 
site for the continental testing of nuclear weapons on December 18, 1950.
27
 As the arms 
race gained momentum through the 1950s, the atomic weapons program became central 
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to Cold War posturing and mobilization: the keystone to the Eisenhower administration‘s 
concept of Mutual Assured Destruction.
28
 Atomic development then proceeded in tandem 
with Cold War mobilization until Dwight D. Eisenhower and Nikita Khrushchev agreed 
in 1958 to a moratorium on aboveground weapons testing.
29
 
This policy-centered narrative forms the backbone of nearly all of the histories of 
the program, its evolution and Cold War role, and the ways it affected communities 
around which its complexes were located as well as broader American society.
30
 The 
Cold War narrative‘s endurance is surprising, even for a program so shrouded in secrecy, 
given the changing historiographical trends of the last thirty years and the critical 
attention spawned by revelations of its many hazards. Its stability would be more 
understandable if it accurately portrayed the forces that drove the program‘s evolution or 
if it explained, or provided some mechanism for understanding, why atomic development 
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and experimentation were such dangerous ventures. But it does neither. In fact, when 
used as an explanatory mechanism, the Cold War narrative lends an air of inevitability to 
the program‘s evolution and one of unavoidability or necessity to its hazards, obscuring 
rather than shedding light on the program‘s history.  
The conventional explanations seem to make sense because, as John Passmore 
noted in his discussion of the varieties of historical narrative, they ―refer to modes of 
connection which have come to be familiar to us.‖ 31 To borrow his words, we have ―got 
used to‖ understanding the hazards of atomic development through a Cold War lens. The 
historians, journalists, and sociologists interested in the ramifications of atmospheric 
atomic testing who have greatly expanded our understandings of the program‘s 
intricacies have relied, for the most part, on a common explanatory framework. Almost 
all have taken what is generally known about radioactivity—that it is inherently 
harmful—and linked it with what is generally known about the Cold War—that it 
increased in intensity after 1949. Moreover, most have idealized the Atomic Energy Act 
(AEA), taking for granted the principle of civilian leadership written into it and assuming 
that the civilian commissioners or the president effectively exerted their authority over 
the military. The resulting narrative sequence and the apparent correlation between the 
program‘s expansion and the intensification of Cold War animosities have affirmed the 
assumptions about both. It is a scenario that depends simultaneously on (a) avoiding the 
fact that known safety precautions could have reduced the risks of production and testing 
and (b) the appeal of patriotism and national self-sacrifice. Thus, for the program‘s 
apologists and its critics alike, the big question—Why was the atomic weapons program 
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of the postwar 1940s and 1950s so hazardous?—receives an answer firmly rooted in 
national security imperatives: that surviving and winning the Cold War security depended 
on developing, accumulating, and testing a dangerous class of weapons. The result is a 
teleological explanation that the creation of the post World War II atomic program itself 
simultaneously explains its evolution, administration, and hazards.  
The following discussion presents an alternative for understanding the program 
and its consequences, analyzing the program‘s evolution in light of its domestic history 
and relationship with the military, the political affiliations and influence of individuals 
within the program and its supporters without, and the goals and aspirations of officers 
and others who achieved authority over its human and material resources.  
A Critical Assessment 
 
This traditional line of reasoning should be abandoned as a mechanism for 
understanding the atomic program, its evolution, and its hazardous nature. One element 
of the policy-centered interpretation that is beyond dispute is that the Cold War was 
relevant from an authorizational standpoint: that the program was funded to meet the 
challenges of the Cold War. Beyond that, however, evidence from the history of the 
program calls into question the Cold War justifications for key aspects of the program‘s 
evolution and its attributes. As Rosenberg pointed out in 1983, during the program‘s 
formative years there was little correlation between the policy of the Truman 
administration and the atomic program. In fact, Truman‘s failure to develop a 
comprehensive atomic policy in the immediate postwar years meant that the 
incorporation of atomic weapons into the nation‘s arsenal by the National Security 
20 
 
Council and the Joint Chiefs of Staff was often an uncertain, ad hoc, affair.
32
 Also, the 
conventional analysis is silent about why the 1945-1958 program so often diverged from 
the prescriptives of Cold War policy as laid out by elected officials. Similarly, it does not 
take into account the suspicions expressed at the time that the military was capitalizing on 
the program for reasons other than national security. Finally, it neglects entirely the 
cultural, institutional, and domestic political influences that contributed to the 1945-1958 
aboveground era.  
First, the Cold War narrative fails to explain the disjunctions between policy 
objectives and defense initiatives during the era of aboveground weapons testing. For the 
1945-1958 era that is the focus of this analysis, the legendary problems that Presidents 
Truman and Eisenhower had in trying to limit military spending can be added as one of 
the disparities between policy and the program‘s growth.33 Also, before late 1949, and in 
accordance with the AEC‘s charge to develop peacetime, and not solely military, 
applications for atomic energy, both President Truman and the Joint Committee on 
Atomic Energy (JCAE) sought to curtail the military‘s monopolization of atomic 
resources. Truman‘s preference and support for peacetime development can be inferred 
from his refusal to grant the military‘s requests for custody of the atomic weapons and 
components, and those it routinely made in 1946, 1947, and 1948 for a continental testing 
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site.
34
 Additionally, in 1948 Truman rejected the Joint Chiefs‘ ―atomic war plan,‖ 
insisting instead that they re-evaluate their strategies and prepare war plans that relied 
upon conventional methods and troops.
35
 Finally, Truman‘s support for AEC 
Commissioner Lilienthal against oppositional military leaders and their supporters in 
Congress was absolute.
36
 The JCAE likewise sought to rein in the military‘s atomic 
enthusiasm by resisting demands that would have stifled peacetime development. In 
response to a 1947 estimate that the military required 400 ―Nagasaki-type‖ bombs, Brett 
Hickenlooper, Iowa‘s conservative Republican Senator and JCAE Chairman, asked the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff to explain a demand that would require ―a preponderant part of the 
Commission‘s activities and expenditures.‖37  
Nor does the policy-centered narrative address the fact that some military leaders, 
acquainted with defense potential and national security requirements, cast suspicion at the 
time about the armed forces‘ designs for the atomic program. President Eisenhower‘s 
warnings about the military/industrial complex are well known, but he was not the only 
esteemed military officer to cast a wary eye at the military‘s designs for atomic energy. It 
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is extremely difficult to account for 1945-1949 demands for military development given 
the authoritative opposition to those demands raised by leaders of the era familiar with 
the civilian and military sides of national security and policymaking. Generals George C. 
Marshall and Omar Bradley both opposed expanding the military‘s authority in the 
postwar years, and each expressed doubts that civilian leaders would be able to prevent 
the defense establishment from capitalizing on atomic science to increase its own 
influence.  
The conventional analysis also neglects the cultural dimension through which the 
program achieved, and ultimately lost, prominence. This is a significant oversight in light 
of the importance of electoral politics during the early Cold War and the related tendency 
of leaders during the early Cold War years to inflate or exaggerate diplomatic crises to 
suit domestic purposes.
38
 It is also a surprising oversight given the attention historians in 
other fields have paid to the persuasive power of aboveground weapons experimentation. 
To historians of foreign policy, ―atomic diplomacy‖ is commonly used to describe the 
diplomatic utility of experimentation in studies of the Cold War and its arms race.
39
 As 
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one historian has concluded, it was not the numbers of weapons possessed by either side, 
but rather the awe-inspiring detonations that mattered most during the early Cold War 
years.
40
 And, just as the electorate could be persuaded, it could be dissuaded: domestic 
anxieties raised by scientists who warned of the dangers of H-bomb fallout provoked 
politicians to launch a congressional inquiry;
41
 and the controversy that culminated in the 
1958 moratorium on above-ground testing. During the early postwar years, however, it 
was easier to demonstrate that American scientists were making progress on the atomic 
front with mushroom clouds than with medical or industrial applications that took place 
on the molecular level. As Brian Balogh pointed out in a study examining the drive for 
nuclear power generation, the continued support for any large-scale endeavor in postwar 
America depended on its potential to produce visible, demonstrable, results. Balogh 
found that AEC Chairman David E. Lilienthal was unable to generate enthusiasm for a 
number of intriguing peacetime applications for atomic energy because they did not lend 
themselves to exciting demonstrations.
42
 That Lilienthal himself sought ways to 
overcome this failing provides yet another reason to examine the evolution of the 
peacetime program in light of its domestic political utility to the military.  
An example from 1956 shows how domestic politics, institutional goals, and the 
affiliation of program managers, influenced a decision to continue atmospheric testing 
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after respected scientists and experts had come to the conclusion that fallout posed health 
hazards, particularly to children. The decision to continue testing was made despite 
knowledge of the hazards and involved deceiving the chief policy maker, President 
Eisenhower. In June of that year, Newsweek reported that a National Academy of 
Sciences (NAS) found that fallout from nuclear weapons testing posed long-lasting 
threats to public health.
43
 The Academy announced that the Strontium 90 present in 
fallout was potentially lethal even in minute quantities if ingested. Because it imitated 
calcium and concentrated in growing bone, Strontium 90 posed the highest danger for 
children, whose calcium requirements and consumption exceeded those of adults. In light 
of these preliminary findings, Academy scientists and other scientists unassociated with 
the AEC warned that continued testing spelled potential disaster.
44
 The issue rapidly 
achieved political prominence during election-year volleys. With Dwight D. Eisenhower 
at the helm and weapons testing continuing unabated, the Democrats accused the 
Republicans of ―smug scientific optimism.‖ The GOP countered that the Democrats were 
alarmist, arguing that they were trying to frighten the electorate ―out of its skin.‖45 
Behind the scenes, AEC Chairman Lewis Strauss, one of the chief opponents of an 
international arms control agreement that would have put an end to aboveground 
weapons testing, reassured President Eisenhower that atomic weapons experiments were 
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safe.
46
 Before the year ended, the controversy prompted Congress to schedule hearings 
into the activities of the AEC and the United Nations to expand its ongoing studies of the 
environmental and health effects of radioactive fallout.
 47
 Nevertheless, Newsweek 
reported in November that former AEC scientist William F. Newman anticipated little 
change in governmental policies: ―There is a grim possibility that we will gain this 
information from human data.‖48  
On November 26, 1956, the AEC‘s Division of Biology and Medicine, a scientific 
advisory group assembled under the authority of the five-member Commission, met to 
reassess the environmental effects of Strontium 90 and the prevailing limits for exposure. 
Based on the incomplete studies launched by AEC scientists into the dispersal and effects 
of Strontium 90 and the Academy‘s findings, the Division considered whether to 
recommend that the AEC limit the number of above-ground explosions to reduce fallout 
and thus keep Strontium 90 exposures within safe parameters. Before they could 
complete those discussions, AEC Commissioner Thomas E. Murray joined the group 
briefly. In one sentence, Murray rendered the potential hazardous effects of Strontium 90 
irrelevant, effectively stripping the Division of its advisory responsibility. He told them 
that he would not consider limiting aboveground weapons testing: ―I would not want 
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anything … to disturb the going ahead with those tests in the spring.‖49 Thus pre-empted, 
the members of the Division of Biology and Medicine unanimously agreed to forestall 
making recommendations to limit Strontium 90 releases in accordance with the National 
Academy of Sciences‘ study. Instead, during the remainder of the meeting the members 
compiled what was known about the effects of Strontium 90, assessed those facts in light 
of the expected number of weapons tests, and made predictions about the consequences. 
Without taking into account that those who would be exposed to radioactive fallout 
comprised an involuntary cohort and had not accepted the risks of their exposure,
50
 the 
Division made a correlation between fatalities occurring because of automobile accidents 
and those caused by radiation exposure and reached the conclusion that the number of 
individuals killed annually by Strontium 90 would ―come to somewhere about half of 
what we kill with automobiles.‖ As for the effect of exposure on children, the Division‘s 
deputy chief, Charles L. Dunham, observed that the correlations between increasing 
levels of environmental Strontium 90 releases and childhood disease would not, after all, 
become immediately apparent: ―I think in another two or three years we will be able to 
have a much further concept of what the relation between milk and bone in children is 
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really likely to be.‖51 As Dr. Newman predicted, evidence about the hazards of increasing 
levels of Strontium 90 had no effect on the 1957 testing schedule. That spring, the 
Nevada Test Site was the location for a record-setting season of thirty weapons 
detonations with a combined yield in excess of 340 kilotons—the equivalent of more than 
twenty-two Hiroshima-type bombs.
52
  
This episode demonstrates that policy had not provoked the 1956 decision to 
continue testing. Instead, the one individual responsible for the formation of national 
security policy and the only individual who could approve the use of nuclear material for 
weapons experiments, President Eisenhower, had been told they were being safely 
conducted. We cannot know whether he would have considered canceling or limiting 
aboveground testing had Strauss told him what the AEC knew—that fallout, and 
especially Strontium 90, posed an incontrovertible hazard to human health. We can 
assume with some confidence, though, that since Eisenhower had turned to Strauss for 
answers about the hazards of testing, that he was not only aware of the NAS study but 
also that he considered its findings significant. 
There are problems with the overdependence on policy to explain the program 
and weapons testing. First, to understand the program as one unwaveringly subservient to 
the dictates of policy requires the unavoidable attribution of a pristine totalitarian model 
of governance, implying that the post-war state imposed a rigid model of top-down 
decision-making where state actors had little, or no, agency or responsibility for their 
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actions.
53
 Second, the reliance upon policy to explain the trajectory of atomic 
experimentation conflates authorization and implementation. A national policy to develop 
and experiment with atomic weapons as fortification against the Soviet Union offers only 
a superficial explanation of how program managers and others associated with the 
program carried out that mandate. Policy, as an explanation, has masked the processes 
that characterized the program‘s development, misconstrued its consequences, and 
obscured the dissimilarities in the understandings of managers and policymakers.
54
   
Underneath the veneer of Cold War policy as an explanation for the atomic 
program lies a history of day-to-day decision-making by program managers and military 
officers, who, gathered in government facilities, private and public affiliates, and 
consultancies, comprised an institution that survived the end of World War II and, with 
only minor accommodation to postwar legislation and maintained its integrity as an arm 
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of the military throughout the atmospheric era.
55
 Appreciating the momentum generated 
by institutional culture and bureaucratic impulses upon the program reveals that the way 
military officers and their supporters used atom bombs to build domestic support for 
expansion also contributed to the development of the national security state itself. That an 
approach focused on the domestic political dimension of foreign policy can yield useful 
insight into the evolution of the atomic program is suggested by the work of historians 
who, working outside official circles, have studied aspects of the program and the 
postwar military within the context of institutional development and domestic politics. 
One of the most significant contributions to postwar history has been Michael J. 
Hogan‘s A Cross of Iron. Hogan evaluated the ideological and political tensions of the 
immediate postwar period before the antagonisms between U.S. and the Soviet Union had 
yet to become acute. He re-evaluated the conventional trajectory and impetus for the Cold 
War and located its origins not in Soviet or communist aggression, but in the Truman 
administration‘s efforts to wrestle with competing domestic interests and Truman‘s 
attempts to reach common ground with an antagonistic Congress, one made stronger 
through the formation of a partnership between influential congressional members and 
military leaders. For Hogan, that partnership muted the traditional ideological and 
constitutional proscriptions against the presence of a strong peacetime military that had 
arisen during the postwar debates about a peacetime draft and the form of military 
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unification. It was, he argues, this partnership that was primarily responsible for setting 
militarization in motion.
56
 Hogan found that, under the terms of the NSA, Congress 
bargained away traditional mechanisms of military subordination in exchange for limiting 
executive authority. The Act put the military in a position where it could capitalize on the 
diplomatic failures of the 1940s and on the outbreak of the Korean War and thereby 
claim an unprecedented share of the national economy. For Hogan, the formation of a 
civil/military alliance strong enough to transcend the aversion to peacetime military 
authority that had held sway since the nation‘s founding amounted to a turning point in 
American history. Interest group coalitions such as the congressional/military alliance 
Hogan studied were an especially powerful in postwar politics. But such interest groups, 
however, have been part of the American political scene since long before the beginning 
of World War II.
57
 In the words of one historian, ―once entrenched‖ such groups were 
―impervious to assault.‖58  By combining Hogan‘s findings with studies of wartime 
administration and institutional relationships, it seems likely that wartime circumstances 
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contributed to the ―entrenchment‖ of Hogan‘s civil/military alliance and lent it 
transformative energy as well. 
Historians of state development and science who have pieced together the 
wartime connections between the military and private enterprise have demonstrated that 
the war contributed to the creation of mutually dependent bonds and that those bonds had 
a lasting effect on the business of government and on postwar political alignments. Their 
studies can be read as complementing Hogan‘s, showing that although the 
congressional/military coalition came to express itself politically after the war, it drew 
strength and influence from a pre-existing economic alliance: one formed between the 
armed forces and private industry during the war. Such interest groups emerged from an 
amalgam of trends that had been in play before the bombing of Pearl Harbor, including 
the government‘s interest in science and technology and its dependence on an 
increasingly large network of administrative bureaus and agencies and that came together 
during World War II and drew energy from mobilization. In what Brian Balogh has 
called the ―pro-administrative‖ state, officials and professional administrators assumed 
much of the responsibility for the operation of government while experts, including 
economists and scientists, played increasingly influential advisory roles.
59
 The wartime 
Manhattan Project, itself a product of these two trends, spawned a revolution in the way 
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that large-scale military research and development were conducted and brought about an 
acceleration of the authority enjoyed by administrators and experts.
60
 The program‘s 
influence extended well beyond the war, invigorating the armed forces‘ postwar 
commitment to innovation and stimulating increased investments in scientific and 
technological research and development.
61
 That continuing interest translated into 
economic incentives for those public and private institutions which sought to extend their 
wartime contracts after the end of the conflict.  
Wartime connections with the military, however, were not enough; the institutions 
that desired to profit from postwar military contracts necessarily made accommodations 
to the military‘s new demands with changes in approach and focus that necessarily 
caused transformations in their traditional ways of doing business.
62
 They became, in 
Michael A. Dennis‘s words, ―hybrids‖ of their former selves.63 Private concerns believed 
that military contracts, if not already in hand, would be forthcoming. They also projected 
that those contracts would be lucrative enough to warrant the transformations, especially 
for universities.
64
 For the Daniels Project, a Navy plan to develop a nuclear power plant, 
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for example, General Electric, Westinghouse, Babcock & Wilcox, and Allis-Chalmers, 
began competing for Navy (―government‖) dollars in spring 1946.65 Because of 
experience during the Manhattan Project, the Navy sought to award two contracts and 
argued that the project was a matter of utmost ―urgency,‖ believing that parallel efforts, 
when combined with time constraints, would produce better results in the least amount of 
time.
66
 Such industries and institutions sought out ways, including political engagement, 
to protect the value of the investments they had already made and their future prospects.  
This study of the atomic program and its relationship with the military draws 
upon the political/ideological analysis of the early postwar period Hogan explored and 
the administrative/economic studies of wartime affiliations. It offers two correctives to 
current understandings. First, it disputes the almost universal assertion that the bomb was 
a peripheral aspect of militarization. In Hogan‘s interpretation, the ―drama of state 
making‖ took place simultaneously on different planes of experience. This study 
demonstrates, instead, that the atom bomb and the program were integral and not 
ancillary aspects of the political relationships that built the national security state.
67
 One 
of the hallmarks of the modern state is its ability to harness technology to political 
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purposes,
68
 and it is equally evident that there was no more persuasive political 
instrument than the atom bomb, whether in the hands of a president desirous of flexing 
foreign policy muscle or, as is argued here, in the hands of military officers and their 
supporters interested in achieving domestic influence and funding. Thus, the military‘s 
ability to monopolize the program and its resources, and to devise weapons experiments 
for media and public consumption, meant that it enjoyed a significant advantage at the 
end of the war and throughout the atomic era over those who (a) opposed weapons 
development and military buildup; or, (b) those who supported the development of 
peacetime, and often less demonstrably dramatic, uses for atomic energy such as with 
medicinal tracers or other clinical applications. As the first Chairman of the AEC 
lamented in 1962, ―The Atom has not revolutionized industrial society … not produced 
revolutionary advances in medicine or industry.‖69 Because of this, the atom bomb and 
the program itself were critical to the military‘s ability to achieve postwar influence and 
cannot be considered apart from militarization.  
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In addition, this study shows that while the aura of civil-military conflict that 
dominated the postwar public sphere lends understanding to political tensions and 
settlements, the focus on conflict leads to an underplaying of the collaboration and 
cooperation that underpinned subsequent legislation and the outcomes of that legislation 
as it affected atomic science. One of the planks in Hogan‘s argument is, in fact, based on 
the significance for postwar legislative settlements of the cooperative alliance formed 
between congressmen and military leaders that undermined executive privilege. He 
asserts that the political, congressional/military, alliance was fostered and sustained 
throughout the era of atmospheric weapons testing by the atomic program and through 
the institutional and economic alliances formed among military leaders, program 
managers, and the administrators of private institutions. In much the same way as the 
laboratories Dennis investigated became ―hybrids‖ with ―researchers … deploying their 
respective strategies to create new institutional spaces, permitting similarly novel forms 
of boundary crossing,‖ the military can be said to have used a hybrid approach at the end 
of the war by making its accommodation with peacetime by enfolding wartime 
experiences and ways of doing things into its peacetime institutional structures.
 70
 The 
military used the program to refashion itself in much the same way and for the same 
reasons that the laboratories did, and its successes can be measured in the extent to which 
it monopolized and achieved authority over the postwar atomic program. One of the key 
elements in the militarization of atomic science was the agreement among officers from 
every branch of the armed forces that the military was the appropriate authority to have 
control over all aspects of atomic weapons production and experimenting. The military‘s 
efforts to maintain authority over atomic science through postwar legislation strengthened 
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the alliance. Losing out to civilian authority under the Atomic Energy Act meant only 
that armed forces officers collaborated to control atomic resources operationally—by 
monopolizing resources, directing production, and controlling the terms of 
experimentation. The creation of official advisory groups—the Military Liaison 
Committee (MLC) under the Atomic Energy Act and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) 
formed with the passage of the National Security Act—provided mechanisms for the 
formal expression of this alliance through official administrative and legislative channels 
and lent heft and authority to armed forces demands for atomic resources and expertise. 
The solidarity exhibited among the members of the armed forces regarding atomic 
science meant that except for disputes about abstract issues such as whether the air force 
should be charged with the responsibility for first response to atomic attack, no rivalries 
emerged to call into question the unequivocal stance of the group that the armed forces 
should have absolute authority over all facets of atomic science. The formation and 
stability of this cooperative alliance meant that the intra-service rivalry that often 
operated as a unofficial check—even during the era of Cold War extravagance—on 
excessive military spending or national security claims for the production of material 
such as battleships and planes did not emerge when the issue involved atomic weapons 
production or experimentation.  
The centrality of atomic weapons to the national security state and the 
significance of the collaborative alliance formed among military branches becomes 
evident when the program is disentangled from an analysis shaped by national security 
and is examined, instead, as a product of its wartime origins, its domestic history, and its 
relationship with the U.S. military. This study rejects the conventional division separating 
37 
 
the Manhattan Project from its postwar counterpart to argue that the institutional 
affiliations, interpersonal relationships, and organizational norms of the wartime program 
were determinative upon the peacetime program, integrally shaping its evolution and 
characteristics. While in the traditional narrative the program is so closely aligned with 
the Cold War that its evolution resembles nothing less than a process of punctuated 
equilibrium, this analysis reveals a steady expansion of the program from the end of 
World War II through 1958. The nation‘s atomic weapons program is best understood as 
a single governmental regime that began during the war and became fully entrenched by 
the 1950s, surviving relatively unchanged until (at least) the unofficial moratorium on 
above-ground testing of 1958.
71
 From a structural perspective, at the end of the war the 
military secured postwar contracts by building out from the foundational networks of 
industrial and professional affiliations established within the Manhattan Project; 
solidified additional public and political support by using atomic secrecy to shield its 
excesses and radioactive hazards; and used the media to promote fear and to champion 
military applications of atomic energy. What the history reveals is a process of expanding 
military domination that was for all practical purposes immune from policy shifts, 
diplomatic objectives, and meaningful civilian oversight. Exploiting atomic science for 
its own domestic purposes, the military undermined safety and thwarted diplomacy.  
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Michel Foucault‘s ideas about government and the modern state are especially 
helpful in understanding this history. Of particular interest is his sense of 
―governmentality‖ as an active force combining totalitarianism with individuality that 
bears on the management of state forces and the modulation of relationships within and 
without the system. The postwar state and those individuals administering the nation‘s 
nuclear program certainly employed ―tactics rather than laws … and laws themselves as 
tactics – to arrange things.‖72 This study reveals that the peacetime nuclear program grew 
steadily under the continual dominance of the U.S. military from the end of World War II 
forward, and that because of its relationship with the U.S. military and the influence of 
officers and program managers, the program‘s expansion continued for all practical 
purposes immune from policy shifts, diplomatic objectives, and meaningful civilian 
oversight. From this perspective, the Manhattan Project is a formative starting point not 
only for scientific and technological expertise that outlived the war, but also as the site 
for the creation of a network of institutional and interpersonal relationships that fostered 
strategies by which military officers and program managers achieved and then 
maintained their control over the peacetime program.
73
 Exploring what Foucault called 
―tactics‖ to avoid legal and constitutional responsibilities, military officers, program 
managers, and their supporters, used the program as a lever to increase their political 
influence. This process culminated in what I term Atomic Governance: a shift in 
constitutional prerogatives that limited the ability of the American people to participate 
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politically and denied presidents and congressional leaders alike the opportunity to gauge 
the effectiveness and potential consequences of weapons production and experimentation.  
I have built upon this re-conceptualization of the state with methodological 
approaches inspired by scholars in other fields who have fleshed out the mechanics of 
statemaking and policy formation. Because of the towering mushroom clouds it 
produced, the atomic program stood as a dynamic symbol of the expanding capacity and 
authority of the postwar state. At the same time, it was also the most secretive and insular 
endeavor undertaken by the federal government. To understand this paradox, I have 
drawn on the work of Theda Skocpol.
74
 In particular, her concept of the state and its dual 
roles—one, as an actor in its own right; and, two, as a matrix through which policies are 
initiated, implemented, and that subsequently restructure political possibilities and social 
identities—provides useful tools with which to grasp the program‘s fundamental nature 
and to explain the uses made of its attributes by both the state (elected leaders) and by 
those administrators and military officers granted authority over the program‘s 
direction.
75
  
This brings us to the division between the ends and means of policy, that is to say 
the difference between the authorizational impetus of Cold War policies and the ways 
that those same policies were articulated—the administrative decisions made and 
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practices followed that influenced the way the program evolved and what it came to be.
76
 
The approach I adopted to tease out of the historical record the factors that bore upon 
decision-making and practice was inspired by J. Garry Clifford‘s findings about the 
significance of bureaucratic politics in policymaking. His examination of the 
interpersonal dynamics of policy formation and articulation demonstrates that ―policy,‖ 
even the profoundly transformative ones of the postwar state, is first writ small. Decision-
making at any level and scale of consequence is, as Clifford advises, complex, 
contingent, and interpersonal: ―an amalgam of large organizations and political actors 
who differ … and who compete to advance their own personal and organizational 
interests.‖77 
My methodology and analysis are also informed by the insights of sociologists 
interested in institutions, behavior, and ethics. Their findings have been helpful in my 
efforts to make sense of the history of a program that has been shrouded in secrecy since 
its inception, where much of the documentary evidence remains classified and 
unavailable for review, and where controversies have caused much of the record that is 
accessible to be muddled with justification and obfuscation. This alternative way of 
examining the program brings to light influences on the peacetime program that have 
been overlooked. One example can be drawn from the periodization imposed on the 
program‘s history. Historians have tended to skirt the relationship between the peacetime 
atomic program and the World War II Manhattan Project with the result that similarities 
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between the strategies of control employed during the peacetime program and the 
Manhattan Project are assumed to have resulted from similar national security safeguards 
necessitated by World War II and the Cold War. But what of those historical instances in 
the history of the program when no national security imperative existed? Navy officers, 
for example, directed the 1946 Operation Crossroads as though they were still at war. 
They disregarded the safety of their troops and ordered that radioactive ships be boarded, 
and also operated, if at all possible. Though they were charged with preventing disclosure 
of information that might lead to discovery of the ―atomic secret‖ and some control of the 
many reporters they invited to attend the Pacific tests was to be expected, but Navy 
officers sequestered the media on a special ship and exerted wartime-like authority over 
the press by limiting the information the reporters received to that delivered in daily 
briefings and by monitoring their submissions. Why? While we know that Crossroads 
was extremely well organized and can imagine that the hundreds of officers in charge 
heeded military command, that alone does not fully explain the uniformity of intensity 
the officers exhibited; nor is it enough to explain the obedience of the press corps. 
Historical practice by itself does little to shed light on the behavior of officers and the 
press during Operation Crossroads.  
The concept of duality of structure formulated by William H. Sewell, Jr., offers a 
way to understand both.
78
 This approach makes it possible to recognize both the 
carryover of wartime Navy discipline to the peacetime Navy and the influence of the 
Manhattan Project and Army-devised strategies of security on the planning and 
production of Operation Crossroads. Similarly, it sheds light on how routine wartime 
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censorship, the secrecy surrounding the Manhattan Project, and the extension of that 
project into the peacetime era fostered the quiet acquiescence exhibited by the reportorial 
press and media long after war‘s end. Sewell opens up intellectual and conceptual 
avenues to understanding the continuities across a revolutionary moment: the change 
from pre-atomic weapon to the atomic weapons era, from wartime and peacetime phases 
of the program, as less transformative and more evolutionary than has previously been 
appreciated. And, after the program gathered steam, his concept of structuralism as 
embodying schemas and resources provides a mechanism for understanding why the 
program expanded in a persistently linear fashion despite (a) the passage of the Atomic 
Energy Act and the goals for peacetime development it embodied and (b) changes in 
national security policy prompted by international events and the different opinions of the 
Truman and Eisenhower administration about the utility of atomic weapons. Moreover, 
structuralism offers a way to understand one of the conundrums of postwar defense 
policy—namely, why weapons as complex and unsuited to anything other than aerial 
bombardment and wholesale destruction and so hazardous to troops employing them, 
became the cornerstone of national defense—a process that foreclosed the development 
of more effective and more easily deployed weapons or defensive systems.
79
  
The importance that Sewell attributes to historical precedent, and the mutability of 
his concept of structure, leaves room for a complementary appreciation of this process at 
the individual level that is equally irrespective of context. The French social theorist 
Pierre Bourdieu found that people make most of their decisions unconsciously, based on 
the historical reception of a similar, earlier, decision. In his analysis, a choice that had a 
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favorable result in the past is likely to be repeated, even if the circumstances surrounding 
the second decision are vastly different. In a process he termed ―habitus,‖ individual 
history and culture are determinative components of choice.
80
 In this way, behaviors 
considered appropriate are replicated and become routine. Such routinization within an 
institutional context results in the reproduction and transfer of cultural norms and an 
institutionally supported resistance to change.
81
 To draw yet another example from 
Operation Crossroads, habitus provides a way to understand the wartime sense of 
urgency that Navy officers brought to the peacetime operation and to explain the 
responses of officers and crewmen alike when presented with damage to vessels that 
superficially resembled the results of a conventional attack but which was, as the 
presence of radiation monitors and medical officers made clear enough, was vastly 
different and exceedingly more dangerous. The threat that those officers perceived and 
sought to overcome during Crossroads did not come from an enemy, but from the 
possibility that atomic science could delimit the national security value of the postwar 
Navy. In this way, the Operation was a battle of survival for Navy officers, one that once 
underway and surrounded by burning and mangled ships, elicited from them a response 
that, despite being unsuitable and excessively and unnecessarily dangerous for a 
peacetime maneuver, was precisely the type of response that had been honed during 
World War II.  
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Personal history exerted one influence on the choices made by military officers 
and program managers; institutional affiliation and professional ethical standards exerted 
another. In an examination of institutional decision making within the judicial system, 
Robert Cover sought to learn why judges or prison wardens who were morally opposed to 
killing could, within the context of their professions, sentence a man to death or lead him 
to a gas chamber. Cover found that institutional contextual factors served to legitimate 
violations of personal moral constraints. In Cover‘s analysis, a judge interpreting law, 
acting through the hierarchical legal system from the state, through law, to individual 
victims institutes, authorizes, and legitimates acts of violence against individuals. 
Collaborators such as wardens and executioners, components of that same hierarchical 
system, perform unquestioningly in a manner that might otherwise be morally repugnant 
to them.
82
 That Cover‘s findings are equally applicable to those participating in the 
nuclear weapons program would seem to have been demonstrated by a sociological study 
of weapons developers at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory who perceived no 
contradiction between their anti-nuclear personal opinions and their professional duties.
83
   
Taken together as a unit, the insights of Sewell, Bourdieu, and Cover, provide a 
multidimensional model that gives us the conceptual tools to combine what we know 
happened during the program with what we can surmise given subjective evidence and 
the context from which it emerged, toward a goal of discovering why the program 
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evolved as it did and how the characteristics of that program contributed to, and in some 
sense became indicative of, what has come to be known as the national security state.  
This dissertation makes three substantive contributions to the literature. First, my 
analysis disputes the primacy of Cold War antagonisms to the structure and evolution of 
the peacetime atomic program. Evaluating the historical circumstances under which 
individuals affiliated with the military, atomic laboratories, and government contractors 
operated opens a window into the bureaucratic mechanisms that drove and governed 
experimentation. This is especially true of militarism, secrecy, and the appropriation of 
scientific expertise, all of which were strategies employed during Manhattan and, at war‘s 
end, by military officers who—with the help of congressional leaders eager to reassert 
their peacetime authority—sought to mitigate the effects of post-war demobilization and 
reorganization. To be sure, militarism, secrecy, and the application of science to a 
military objective, the themes upon which my argument rests, are not typically 
considered extraordinary phenomena, especially during wartime. But, as articulated 
during wartime by the Manhattan Project‘s director Major General Leslie Groves and 
others after the war, those attributes and techniques became tools for the expression of 
unauthorized control. As my analysis points out, Manhattan began to draw criticism from 
inside the Roosevelt and Truman administrations during the war. Critics complained that 
Groves disingenuously applied arguments of military necessity and secrecy to avoid 
accountability, abused his authority within the chain of command, and put in place 
mechanisms of control that hindered progress and shielded him from criticism. Those 
wartime strategies became constitutive, shaping the evolution of the program and 
characterizing it throughout the atmospheric testing era.  
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Second, this study illustrates that the military successfully circumvented the 
civilian authority of the Atomic Energy Commission and ultimately co-opted it. At the 
end of World War II, Army and Navy officers capitalized on domestic disorganization 
and national security fears to maintain authority over the use of atomic weapons. Despite 
the complaints that some civilian commissioners directed to Congress, the military drew 
the lion‘s share of material resources and production facilities, and employed a relatively 
free hand in the choice of proving grounds as well as establishing the conditions for 
atmospheric atomic tests. Further, I show that the AEC ultimately became a cooperative 
partner in this effort. Instead of the guarantor of civilian authority, my research shows 
that in a process streamlined by: (a) the centrality of weapons development to the AEC‘s 
post-war operation; (b) the devolvement of authority to satellite managers; and, (c) 
changes in agency administration that strengthened the bonds between the AEC and 
military officials and supporters, the AEC substantively relinquished its congressional 
mandate to provide civilian oversight and regulatory authority. 
Third, I overturn the longstanding assumption that scientists, military officials, 
and program managers were ignorant of the health effects of radiation and thus believed 
that the parameters they established for experimentation were safe. In fact, my research 
indicates that many of the hazards of radiation and the risks attendant to production and 
experimentation were well known. Had military officers not marginalized and worked to 
discredited scientists who expressed opinions that worked against their goals, it is likely 
that some of the hazards of production and experimentation could have been prevented or 
their magnitude reduced. The stifling of oppositional scientific opinions occurred as a 
result of a number of inter-related factors: the military‘s ability to select a congenial pool 
47 
 
of scientific expertise and thus promote favorable scientific opinions; post-war 
anticommunism and the influence of required loyalty oaths and investigations upon the 
willingness of scientists to express their opinions openly; and, finally, through the 
insulation of cooperative scientists serving on advisory boards to the Atomic Energy 
Commission. The opinions available to Presidents Truman and Eisenhower, as well as 
those upon which the public was asked to rely, were those which suited the aggressive 
testing agenda of the military, cooperative program managers, and that were additionally 
modulated by the expression of institutional culture upon members of scientific advisory 
boards. 
48 
 
CHAPTER TWO 
THE COLD WAR NARRATIVE 
The extraordinary nature of atomic science, the importance of the endeavor to Cold War 
aspirations, and the government‘s commitment to secrecy have all influenced the history 
of the atomic program and reinforced conventional ideas about its evolution. Timing and 
access to the record go a long way toward explaining the prevalence and resilience of 
policy-centered interpretations. Culturally, researchers have been unable to avoid the 
influence of a lifetime steeped in Cold War experiences. As John L. Gaddis noted, 
―historians fell into the unusual habit of working within their own chosen period rather 
than after it … [confusing] the Cold War with the stream of time.‖1 Another factor relates 
to the subject matter itself. Official historians, those employed by the government, 
especially the AEC, its successor the DOE, and the DOD, together with other official 
insiders have held, and continue to hold, what amounts to a monopoly over the highly-
classified documentary record and thus have secured a virtual lock on the ability to 
claim—as AEC managers responded to critiques during the 1950s—that their‘s are the 
only ―authoritative‖ accounts. For these historians, atomic weapons development and 
atmospheric experimentation begins and ends with national security policy.
2
 But 
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classification calls into question not only their policy-centered narrative but also their 
claims to comprehensiveness. There is, probably, no satisfactory way of coping with 
fragmentary classified records, but the dismissal of the problem by these historians is not 
reassuring: ―Even with deletions,‖ a government historian wrote, having ―seen all the 
evidence … our narrative accurately portrays the context of decisions; all the important 
factors in decisions have been explained or at least hinted at.‖3 Non-affiliated historians 
and others have little choice but to work with these official narratives and piece together 
additional fragments of the record that have been declassified. 
Throughout the Cold War, the most revealing accounts were biographies of 
scientists and other participants who offered insight into the intellectual progression and 
achievements of those responsible for the bomb‘s development.4 The scientists‘ 
experiences provided readers with some of their first glimpses into the components and 
characteristics of the atomic complexes themselves—facilities that, with the exception of 
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the generalized and self-promotional story of the Manhattan Project, remained largely 
hidden behind a shield of governmental classification.
5
 They also modulated the anxieties 
produced by popular works, bestsellers all, that told of the horrors of atomic energy, such 
as One World or None, a compilation of articles written by scientists urging international 
agreements to control atomic weapons that sold 100,000 copies, and Hiroshima and No 
Place to Hide, accounts of the first atomic bombing in Japan and the first peacetime 
experiments of atomic weapons at Bikini Atoll.
6
 In the 1950s, Soviet atomic successes 
hardened Cold War parameters and atomic history was subsumed into a body of policy-
oriented and anti-communistic literature.
7
 When combined with Cold War loyalty oaths, 
such pro-U.S. fervor resulted in more strident document classification schemes and the 
regulation of any and all articles and manuscripts related to atomic weapons, stifling 
attempts to authoritatively critique the program. As a result, assessments of the program 
itself were based on a combination of official statements and conjecture and were 
rendered highly suppositional.
8
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This remained the case throughout the fallout controversy that erupted beginning 
in the mid-1950s and that ultimately provoked the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. to agree to a 
moratorium on testing in 1958 and the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963. Prominent 
scientists, non-governmental experts, and members of the international community all 
argued that fallout from both countries was reaching hazardous levels.
9
 The claims led to 
a series of congressional hearings concerning radioactive health effects, hearings that 
directed attention to the program and its operation. They also provoked commentary by 
scientists who, dependent on the military-supportive AEC for funding, found ways to 
balance their professional integrity with arguments for continued testing. In 1955, for 
example, the head of the radiobiology section of the National Cancer Institute, Howard 
Andrews, wrote in a Science article that although the genetic effects of fallout were ―most 
controversial‖ it was ―certain‖ that radiation could ―readily produce both gene and 
chromosomal changes‖ and ―certain that radiation can produce changes leading to genetic 
death in several generations.‖ Still, Andrews argued that ―hysterical banning‖ of weapons 
tests was unnecessary and would endanger national defense. Instead, Andrews cast the 
complaining scientific community in a bad light by discrediting scientists in general, 
writing that the testing facilities should not be used ―as playgrounds for the amusement of 
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bomb-happy scientists.‖10 Generally, however, the revelations by the National Academy 
of Scientists and other outside scientists were not enough to overcome the claims by the 
AEC and experts affiliated with the program that testing was being safely conducted. The 
most significant impact of the fallout controversy was that it breathed new life into the 
immediate postwar arguments for international control of atomic energy to encourage 
national leaders to find diplomatic solutions to the nuclear arms race. While the problems 
of radioactive fallout were absorbed into the discussions about national policy, 
international diplomacy, and a broader movement promoting peace, the AEC‘s support 
for continued weapons testing often went unexamined.  
Linus Pauling‘s No More War was indicative of the types of literature that raised 
public awareness and led to a moratorium and ultimately a ban on aboveground testing. 
Pauling summarized what scientists believed the health effects of radiation exposure to 
be, outlined the likelihood that fallout would cause genetic mutations and projected the 
possible effects of those mutations on the human population over time should testing 
continue. His analysis began with a forceful plea: ―the facts are now at hand … our own 
future and the future of the human race depend upon our willingness and ability to 
cooperate.‖11 Karl Jaspers, another outspoken intellectual, contributed a philosophical 
argument. Originally published in German, the American edition of Jaspers‘s Die 
Atombombe und die Zukunft des Menschen, perhaps because of the requirement that 
anything published about atomic weapons undergo a preliminary review, omitted the 
reference to the bomb and was titled simply The Future of Mankind. Jaspers asked 
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whether, ―under the threat of total doom‖ there was a chance that humans would survive, 
and insisted that arms control proceed and treaties be negotiated with the danger of 
extinction in mind. With a goal of preventing nuclear warfare, Pauling and Jaspers did 
not take into account the autonomy of the program as it was managed within the U.S. or 
the possibility that elected officials were more likely to depend on scientific advise 
delivered by the program‘s scientists—those with a vested interest in atmospheric 
weapons testing and its perpetuation—than they were to heed the warnings of non-
affiliated experts. This changed over time, but it illustrates how successfully the military 
and its AEC supporters were during the 1950s at discrediting oppositional scientists. 
Together, the two men painted a dismal scenario in which the prospect of nuclear 
cataclysm in the short term could somehow be avoided, genetic abnormalities and disease 
in the long term certainly could not.
12
 Their recommendations were directed at the 
world‘s leaders, to the international plane where states were the primary actors. Their 
efforts contributed to deflecting attention from the program. Consequently, the state (or 
the government) as an actor or as a culprit remained the primary focus of the polarized 
interpretations that emerged from the social and political turbulence of the late 1960s and 
early 1970s.  
Amidst the skepticism about the environmental and ethical consequences of 
atomic science, the first official history of the Manhattan Project and postwar program 
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appeared.
13
 The familiarity with the inner-workings of their institutions and access 
afforded to Richard G. Hewlett and his co-authors, who began in the 1960s to corner the 
market on the history of the nation‘s atomic program, and David Alan Rosenberg, who 
focused on the military‘s postwar atomic planning, made their work indispensable.14 
Nevertheless, the unlimited access to the records and resources of a single institution and 
privileged bureaucratic intimacy also limited these historians‘ perspective. Failing to 
recognize how Cold War assumptions had shaped their own scholarship, they 
exemplified the Cold War mindset that George Kennan discussed in 1983: ―Millions of 
people in this country now have a personal stake in the maintenance and cultivation of 
this vast armed establishment, and of the Cold War psychology by which it is 
sustained.‖15 These historians overlooked the larger question of why military 
development dominated the program in favor of explaining how it had done so. The 
authors of the first official history of the program, Atomic Shield, for example, remarked 
that despite an ―idealistic‖ potential for peaceful uses for atomic energy, the first 
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commissioners came to the ―grim realization that for reasons of national security atomic 
energy would have to continue to bear the image of war.‖16  
Convinced that the AEC‘s shift in emphasis from peacetime development to 
weapons was an ―inexorable‖ one, these historians introduced their readers to the first 
five civilian commissioners seated in 1947 by singling out Lewis L. Strauss for special 
attention. ―There was something special‖ about Strauss, they provocatively wrote. But 
that was reading history backwards: what was ―special‖ about Strauss came to light only 
after he was seated. Strauss, who began establishing ties with the founder of the 
Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, Ernest O. Lawrence, as early as 1940 when he helped 
Lawrence receive a $1,150,000 grant from the Rockefeller Foundation for his cyclotron 
project, and who likely owed his appointment to his friendship with and service under 
Secretary of State James Forrestal, consistently promoted military development.
17
 During 
his service on the AEC, Strauss undermined the Commission‘s civilian mandate by 
working behind the scenes with members of Congress who opposed civilian control and 
by launching an attack against the majority decision of the Commission (and other 
scientific advisors) to promote H-bomb development.
18
 He also attracted enough 
attention to himself that Eisenhower asked him to serve as his special Advisor for atomic 
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energy and then appointed him to be AEC Chairman. The authors of Atomic Shield 
appear to have been unable to acknowledge that the development of peacetime 
applications for atomic energy, if the Atomic Energy Act can be held as authoritative, 
were priorities shared by Congress and President Truman.
19
 The ―inexorability‖ of 
weapons development they perceived and the implication that in January 1947 the newly 
seated commissioners, save perhaps for Lewis Strauss, were unreasonably idealistic, 
maybe even delusionally so, is confirmation of a blinkered failure to look behind the 
Cold War to explain the atomic program‘s history. 
The issue comes down to a distinction between national defense and weapons 
development. Hewlett and other official historians have taken provisions in the Act that 
established the government‘s monopoly over atomic science and strict penalties for 
violators to support their view that ―[t]he government‘s first priority was to maintain 
strict control over atomic technology and to exploit it further for military purposes.‖20 
This is an unwarranted reductionist conflation of national defense with weapons 
development and a melding together of national policy, agencies, divisions, and 
contractors of the federal government to offer a viewpoint that is not borne out by the 
AEC‘s early history or the Act itself. Even without getting into the tangle of who, and 
what, constitutes ―the government,‖ history does not support the claim. For example, as 
the time neared for the AEC to assume authority over the program, Manhattan officials 
sought to prevent the newly-formed AEC from taking charge of weapons-related 
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resources. Military managers of the Manhattan Project, for example, transferred material 
and expertise for weapons development from the Los Alamos lab to a military base and 
omitted weapons related items from the inventory provided to the new commission.
21
 
Additionally, the monopoly the AEA created over essential atomic material and the 
penalties it established for security breaches, when contextualized, reflects the postwar 
significance of preserving the ―secret‖ of the atom bomb; not that the ―first priority‖ was 
weapons development.  
The significance of the atom bomb for military purposes is evident. … 
Accordingly, it is hereby declared to be the policy of the people of the 
United States that the development and utilization of atomic energy shall 
be directed toward improving the public welfare, increasing the standard 
of living, strengthening free competition among private enterprises so far 
as practicable, and cementing world peace.
22
 
 
The briefest of qualifications—that national security became a way to ―justify, or perhaps 
to rationalize‖ the program‘s expansion—betrays a sense that even the program‘s 
historians may have been themselves slightly uncomfortable with the official account, 
cognizant of the fact that, with the AEC, appearances could be deceiving.
23
  
The findings of David Rosenberg, a Navy historian, contradict some of the AEC‘s 
official history. Rosenberg‘s study of strategic policy and nuclear weapons demonstrated 
that for all the importance of both during the early years of the Cold War, there was little 
or no coherence between the policies formulated by the Truman administration and those 
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of the armed forces.
24
 Relying primarily on declassified portions of the official record 
produced by the JCS and National Security Council (NSC) to research the history leading 
up to Truman‘s decision to develop an H-bomb, Rosenberg argued that the detonation of 
the Soviets‘ first atomic weapon was a turning point only for civilian policymakers; 
military planners had been developing strategies for dealing with Soviet aggression since 
the end of the war. While Rosenberg was inclined to critique the motivations of civilian 
officials, he took for granted the military‘s devotion to national security and strategic 
planning documented in the JCS record. Rosenberg accepted that the military‘s ―anxiety‖ 
about postwar demobilization was generated solely by the relative strength of Soviets. In 
his words, ―[t]he American military was deeply concerned about the power of Soviet 
conventional forces in the 1945-1950 period‖ and ―from 1945 on, the realization that the 
United States was unprepared to counter Soviet conventional forces shaped military 
strategy.‖25  
But it was not only military strategy, or the Soviets, that concerned upper echelon 
officers at the end of World War II. Despite the level of planning that Rosenberg found 
documented in the files, the armed forces‘ repeated claims that they were inadequately 
prepared to defend more than the Western hemisphere, especially when used to argue for 
increased appropriations, higher force levels, and increasing the pace of atomic weapons 
production, are insufficient grounds on which to base an argument that national security 
was the military‘s sole, or even chief, motivation. To be sure, national security was one 
of the factors motivating armed forces‘ officers. But, what their repeated appeals for 
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more defense resources best illustrates is that the JCS were understandably conscientious 
in preventing their self-interested anxieties, including those concerned with unification 
and branch autonomy as well as the potential loss of influence in relation to other 
branches of the armed forces, from becoming part of the official record.  
Leveling criticism at these narratives may seem less than generous, particularly in 
light of the fact that the first two volumes of the AEC history were published in 1962 and 
1969 during the heyday of consensus and before the implausibility of objectivity had 
become one of the tenets for the majority of professional historians in America.
26
 And 
yet, the DOE has made no effort to supplement the original volumes to reflect recent 
declassifications, issued no new editions, or addressed (except in critical book reviews) 
the alternative findings included in the un-official literature. In fact, the historicist 
flavoring and Cold War determinism of those original volumes appear in more recent 
publications as well.  
The difficulties of reconciling a set of underlying Cold War assumptions with the 
historical record and shaping that to fit into the foreign-policy model of atomic history 
favored by the government are evident in an example drawn from Roger M. Anders‘s 
introduction to his collection of declassified portions of the diaries of the second AEC 
Commissioner, Gordon E. Dean. There, if Anders recognized in 1987 any discordance 
between his portrayal of the program as one isolated from the rest of the state and his 
implication that it was directed solely by foreign policy objectives—a factor outside the 
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initiative of even the Chairman—he failed to address it. In his words, ―Secrecy combined 
with the complexity of nuclear technology tended to separate and isolate [the AEC from 
the Truman] administration, Congress, and the American people.‖ And yet, Dean‘s 
initiative and leadership qualities (somehow) gave him the ability to position the AEC 
precisely for what was to come: ―The stage would be set for the Eisenhower 
administration, the New Look, and massive retaliation.‖27 Dean was also, according to 
Anders, a champion of the civilian authority written into the Act. In what amounts to a 
case-study of how the conventional differences between ―civilian‖ and ―military‖ have 
been used to shape understanding, Anders notes that Dean not only opposed the 
military‘s continual requests for custody of atomic weapons, but also objected when 
President Truman indicated that he was considering a transfer of some weapons to the 
military. By highlighting Dean‘s ―civilian‖ credibility, it seems likely that Anders was 
responding to Dean‘s well-known reputation as a strong supporter of military 
development. Just as Lewis L. Strauss‘s claim in 1962 that prior to his assumption of the 
Chairmanship, the AEC had to ―tacitly accept‖ the military‘s direction appears as an 
attempt to gloss over his own enthusiastic support of the military, and the claim that Dean 
should be remembered as a champion of civilian authority is unwarranted.
28
 For instance, 
Truman appointed Dean as a political compromise in the wake of political antagonism 
and congressional inquiries into the integrity and loyalty of then-AEC Chairman David E. 
Lilienthal; Dean was the only AEC commissioner to join Strauss in delivering to 
                                                 
27
 ―Introduction‖ Forging the Atomic Shield: Excerpts from the Office Diary of Gordon E. Dean, Roger M. 
Anders, ed. (Chapel Hill, London: University of North Carolina Press, 1987), 14; for the mention of 
civilian control, see 23. See also, Anders, ―The Atomic Bomb and the Korean War: Gordon Dean and the 
Issue of Civilian Control,‖ Military Affairs 52 (1988):1-6. 
 
28
 Lewis L. Strauss, Men and Decisions (New York, NY: Popular Library, 1963), 407. 
 
61 
 
President Truman a minority recommendation that he proceed with H-bomb 
development; and Dean supported the creation of the Nevada Proving Ground as an 
affordable way to escalate weapons development and testing. An example from 1950 
further illustrates Dean‘s militaristic stance as AEC Chairman. Barely a year after 
assuming the Chairmanship and, presumably at his own initiative, Dean bypassed the 
ordinary advisory channels and paved the way for military experiments two years hence. 
In a letter to Truman, Dean suggested that those experiments would be ―of great value to 
the Armed Forces in preparing their budgetary and operational plans for 1952.‖ While 
trying to force the military to assume some of the costs of those experiments, Dean lent 
encouragement to and fostered the notion within the administration that atomic 
experiments were events that the military could, and should, exploit.
 
In a response 
marked ―personal,‖ Truman politely discouraged Dean‘s attempt to place himself, as 
AEC Chairman, in a position to direct military policy, suggesting that Dean ―should 
notify the Military‖ of his proposals.29 Given this, and other historical incidents contained 
in Anders‘ collection, Dean‘s opposition to a shift in custody was not so much an attempt 
to prevent the military from seizing control over atomic science as it was a matter of turf 
protection. In addition, Dean approached fallout not as a safety problem, but as a public 
relations issue. Unlike his predecessor, Lilienthal, for whom the differing opinions of 
about the risks of fallout warranted accelerated scientific study, Dean accepted at face 
value the most optimistic opinions and recommended, instead, an educational campaign 
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to alleviate public concerns.
30
 The differences of opinion between the two men had less 
to do with what the dangers of radioactive exposure was known to be during their 
chairmanships than it did with the priority each assigned to their responsibility to 
discharge their responsibilities under the AEA. Lilienthal, unlike Dean, placed a high 
priority on program safety. How the history of the program is understood reaches beyond 
a differing historical perspective. One of the reasons why official histories have achieved 
the status of convention is that Anders and other official historians had the luxury of 
drawing from a complete record, while outside historians had limited access to a record 
fragmented by classification.  
Thus, during a period that in most historical fields was known for its energetic 
questioning of the status quo and prolific revisionism, critical analyses of the program 
itself were nonexistent. Historians unaffiliated with the government or the program 
channeled their revisionist energies into avenues where documentary evidence was more 
available: the wartime Manhattan Project and Truman‘s decision to drop atom bombs on 
Japan; the legitimacy of anticommunist and anti-Soviet maneuvers; and, the secrecy, and 
other issues indirectly related to atomic development.
31
 The program itself remained 
relatively immune from sustained critique.  
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Paradoxically, nuclear accidents that book-ended the 1970s, claims by veterans, 
and lawsuits, caused presidential-level, national security policy to become more 
prominent as both the grand justificatory scheme and the ultimate scapegoat. The 1972 
radioactive venting of the Baneberry detonation at the Nevada Test Site; The China 
Syndrome, the 1979 hit movie based on accidents at Dresden II reactor near Chicago in 
1970 and the Browns Ferry Reactor in Alabama in 1975 that dramatized the 
precariousness of dependence on nuclear power; and the Three Mile Island incident that 
began eleven days after The China Syndrome’s release, all drew attention to the 
radioactive hazards of nuclear weapons experimentation and power generation and 
stimulated new discussions about the dangers of radioactivity. Divisions between those 
scientists who held that weapons testing and atomic energy were safe and worthwhile and 
those who argued that both posed serious health hazards became public. Some 
scientists—particularly those who had participated in the program—further fueled 
antagonisms by lending credence to claims that past radioactive exposures had resulted in 
disease and death. One, John Gofman, who developed the method for refining plutonium 
used during the Manhattan Project and who was involved with postwar programs at 
Berkeley and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, argued that legal and moral 
boundaries had been crossed. In 1970, he said that he and other AEC scientists had been 
criminally liable, ―candidates for Nuremberg-type trials for crimes against humanity for 
our gross negligence and irresponsibility.‖32 Gofman‘s complaints were directed squarely 
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at the program‘s management—at how the program was being conducted—but they were 
not enough to dislodge the notion that it was not the management of the program, but 
national security policy, which was significant.  
The revelations of the 1970s, the lawsuits that began to be filed and written about 
in the nation‘s newspapers, and the response from the program and Justice Department 
attorneys all shared a common theme: that the direction and articulation of the atomic 
weapons program hinged unilaterally, for good or ill, upon the prerogatives of the 
executive branch and the administration of its policies. They solidified the concept of a 
monolithic government. In part, this was due to the fact there were no other targets: the 
federal government assumed, for legal and contractual reasons, liability for its 
contractors.
33
 Thus, those companies that managed the program‘s complexes received 
immunity from liability and, as a result, endured little criticism. In the same way that the 
management and operational standards of the atomic program escaped scrutiny during the 
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fallout controversy of the 1950s, so too at this time did the operational and managerial 
complicity of contractors such as Dow Chemical, Edgerton, Germeshausen, and Grier (E. 
G. & G.), Reynolds Electrical and Engineering Company (REECo), and others, become 
less visible than the federal government that defended their actions in the public sphere 
and in courts of law. All of this funneled more resentment toward the federal government 
and plowed the field for ―we versus them‖ histories.  
Beginning in the early 1980s, legal claims of victims and witnesses became the 
focus of journalists and lawyers who broadened the field of inquiry but repeated and 
reinforced the policy-centered arguments of the government‘s critics by targeting a 
nebulous, yet extremely potent ―government.‖34 The focus on the victims of weapons 
production and testing corresponded with the emergence of the New Western History that 
took into account previously ignored facets of historical experience, including gender, 
environmentalism, and racism. These historians‘ critiques of the program focused on the 
disproportionate burdens borne by downwinders, Native Americans, and western 
communities during the Cold War arms race.
35
 Over time, the romanticism of the earliest 
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works that had tended to over-idealize western landscapes and peoples began to give way 
to more intricate studies of the program, the people who worked within its institutions,
36
 
and those who historically supported it.
37
 As the numbers of lawsuits increased and the 
limits and burdens of congressional remedies such as the Radiation Exposure 
Compensation Act (RECA) became known, the ―government‖ not only received the 
blame, but it was held by some to be criminally complicit.
 38
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All of this re-invigorated the government‘s interest in telling its own story. It 
enlisted its own historians and contracted with another to chronicle the growth of nuclear 
agencies in the Cold War period and the safety procedures of the wartime and post war 
programs through the 1970s.
39
 One of these historians for hire, Barton Hacker, a 
University of Chicago trained historian interested in military history and the military 
application of science and technology, caused a shift in the terms of the argument that 
had lasting historiographical consequences.
40
  
Hacker reinforced the AEC‘s policy-centered narrative while contributing another 
dimension: that radioactive hazards were ―little understood.‖41 In what remains the most 
comprehensive review of the administration of health safety in the Manhattan Project and 
the peacetime AEC-administered one, Hacker addressed both prongs of the assault that 
critics had leveled at the program: that it had jeopardized the health and safety of workers 
and that secrecy and document restrictions had prevented analysts from getting at the 
truth. Emphasizing that he had relied on an unclassified record available to all 
researchers, Hacker detailed the program‘s interest in safety and found that although 
accidents had occurred, they were for the most part unforeseeable and unavoidable. 
Additionally, because both the Manhattan Project and its successor the AEC had 
maintained an energetic emphasis on safety, officials and employees were ―diligent and 
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competent‖ and ―performed a difficult job honorably.‖42 Hacker‘s approach was a 
sympathetic one, as can be seen from his recounting of one piece of history from the 
atmospheric era of weapons testing. Explaining the efforts the AEC made to reduce the 
risks posed to those in Southern Utah by an unusually highly radioactive fallout cloud, 
Hacker says that officials stuck to the ―literal‖ truth: 
they misled by what they omitted or downplayed, not by what they stated. 
Probably no one thought of that as lying … but powerful officials found it 
easy to … mislead as a matter of course.43   
 
Inadvertently, Hacker‘s conclusion that program participants ―found it easy to … mislead 
as a matter of course‖ provides support for the lines of argument pursued in pages to 
follow. The primary issue now, however, is Hacker‘s influence on how the history of 
atomic experimentation is understood.  
With historians on both sides of the critical/apologist divide in agreement that 
Cold War policy was primarily responsible for the program (and its consequences,) the 
historiographical controversy devolved into whether radioactive exposures were 
sufficient to cause harm. From Hacker‘s standpoint, the program‘s history was subsumed 
entirely into an issue of causation: ―The real question is whether or not very low levels of 
exposure have had disproportionately great health consequences.‖44 In this way, Hacker 
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sidestepped the historical questions (among them, under what authority and under what 
guidelines did military officers and program managers believe the hazards were at the 
time testing was being planned and conducted?) leaving the impression that the history 
was settled. The causation issue, as Hacker noted, was ―unanswerable‖ because no 
medical or scientific consensus exists about the effects of exposure to radiation. This 
resurrected an argument nearly as old as the program itself, one that Army officers and 
others used during atmospheric testing to devalue scientific opinions because they 
differed and to dispute safety precautions for permissible dose levels established for troop 
participation in experiments.
45
 Scientists continue to disagree about such fundamental 
aspects of radioactivity as whether there is a ―safe‖ threshold of exposure. In all but the 
most acute radiation exposures, individual and environmental variables infinitely 
complicate the efforts of experts to trace disease causation to exposure incidents.
46
 
Specially commissioned epidemiological studies of participants at the first peacetime test, 
Operation Crossroads, have shown little or no statistically significant difference in 
radiogenic disease between participants of 1946 Pacific atomic tests and the incidence of 
certain cancers in the general population. What those studies failed to take into account, 
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however, is the possibility that it may be impossible to establish a non-exposed cohort. 
Independent researchers suggest that aboveground weapons testing caused widespread 
exposures and increases in the incidence of radiogenic cancers and disease throughout the 
general population.
47
 Additionally, lawsuits have muddled the picture, with a 
proliferation of experts hardening the lines between opposing opinions.
48
 According to 
University of Utah‘s Dr. Joseph L. Lyon, the interweaving of liability and science has 
made it difficult to ―[sort] out the scientific, objective research from the compensation 
problem‖ because the ―government … doesn‘t seem to talk science without being able to 
talk compensation simultaneously.‖49  
The controversy emerges in the literature in a variety of ways. Most historians 
unaffiliated with the program take causation at face value, adopting the viewpoints of the 
downwinders, uranium miners, workers, (and their physicians, lawyers, and experts) that 
exposure to radiation in the workplace or in the environment was responsible for illness 
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and death. Those affiliated with the program consider these claims from the perspective 
of the program and approach the issue differently. Some lean on the scientific 
uncertainties to make a moral/ideological argument in favor of the Cold War objective. 
An official historian writing about Hanford Nuclear facility in Washington argued that 
the facility‘s central focus on Cold War production precluded attention to environmental 
contamination; moreover, whatever the ultimate cost to the region and its residents, it will 
be less than that paid by the former Soviet Union, and thus will have been ―worth it.‖50 
Others, such as Hacker, argue that the AEC and its program managers took all possible 
precautions and believed at the time that ―testing could be conducted safely.‖51 For him, 
the notion that it was not, absent definitive scientific proof of a correlation between 
health and radiation exposure, is dismissed as nothing more than an uneducated 
perception traceable to unfounded anxieties and apprehension embodied in changing 
social attitudes.
52
 In the midst of all this uncertainty, the policy-centered, Cold War 
narrative of the program‘s evolution has achieved the level of conventional wisdom, all-
but-disappearing as a subject of serious inquiry.  
One explanation for the resilience of the policy-centered narrative is that it is 
something of a historical artifact. The Cold War narrative has remained relatively free of 
criticism because of secrecy and national security precautions, the diversion of critique 
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into the controversy over the health effects of exposure to radiation, and routine 
reinforcement through bibliographic repetition. So, too, has it been reinforced through 
Congress‘s efforts to deal with the program‘s politically charged controversies in a way 
that would satisfy outraged constituents but limit governmental liability. Beginning in 
1990, Congress embedded the policy-centered explanation into legislation that (a) 
apologized and authorized compensation for some downwinders, production workers, 
and veterans who contracted radiogenic diseases; and, (b) found the program had been 
conducted solely in the interests of Cold War national security—a statement that 
effectively shielded the government and, in combination with the Warner Amendment 
passed in 1984, its contractors from legal liability.
53
 The Radiation Exposure 
Compensation Act of 1990 (RECA) has undoubtedly alleviated some of the burden for 
individuals who fit the Act‘s requirements—at least 26,550 civilian production workers 
and downwinders have filed claims since the Act‘s passage.54 Simultaneously, however, 
Congress‘s determination that the program was conducted entirely in the interests of 
national security has lent authority to the conventional narrative, immunized the program 
and its contractors from liability, and, because RECA discouraged the filing of lawsuits 
under the Federal Tort Claims Act, eliminated the possibility that the program‘s health 
and environmental record might have come under renewed and beneficial scrutiny. 
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Litigation has historically prompted significant revelations as, for example, during trial 
preparation for Prescott vs. U.S. when investigation into the government‘s medical and 
scientific expert witnesses found that some of them had participated in human radiation 
experiments.
55
 When the report on those experiments was released in 1995, President Bill 
Clinton elevated the significance of the wrongdoing above national interests: ―When the 
government does wrong, we have a moral responsibility to admit it.‖56 It was a sensibility 
that was not adopted where the development and testing of nuclear weapons was at issue. 
Even in the face of evidence of human radiation experimentation, Hazel O‘Leary, then 
Energy Secretary, derided people who complained about adverse health effects as 
―crazies.‖57 In fact, although Prescott vs. U.S. contributed to provoking the investigation 
into the history of human radiation experimentation and stimulated a discussion about 
ancillary issues such as informed consent, the case itself became a mechanism through 
which government officials reinforced the national security justification for atomic 
weapons development and experimentation. As Larry C. Johns, one of the plaintiffs‘s 
attorneys in the Prescott trial, explained after the trial and only a month before President 
Clinton‘s statement, ―The court said the acts relative to testing were made at levels where 
judgment was exercised and essentially the courts are not going to second-guess the 
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executive branch in deciding to test and expose those people.‖58 Thus, the program, its 
evolution, and its characteristics have escaped the types of inquiry and analysis that has 
become the norm with other Cold War era efforts, such as the covert activities of the 
CIA, controversies about the Vietnam War, and the domestic spying practices of 
Hoover‘s FBI.59 In fact, the policy-centered narrative has endured so little scrutiny that it 
has remained relatively unchanged since it was summarized by the Justice Department‘s 
Rex Lee in congressional testimony delivered in 1981: ―Decades ago,‖ Lee explained, 
―federal policymakers decided to run some enormous risks. Innocent American citizens 
were involuntarily and unwittingly made the subjects of those risks.‖60  
In sum, the conventional wisdom, though doubly suspect, endures—tethered on 
one side to a conception of the program‘s history that delves no deeper than the external 
justifications for the program that sustained it as it evolved, and on the other to a 
politically-motivated and superficial finding, one designed to appease constituents while 
limiting the government‘s liability. While the interest expressed by congressmen, 
historians, journalists, and victims, into the program‘s operation might have stimulated 
analytical insights and produced revisions to the policy-centered narrative, the exact 
opposite has been the case. The prominence of the issue and the interest it has stimulated 
has resulted in the repetition of the Cold War rationale and its reinforcement as an 
                                                 
58
 Larry C. Johns, quoted by Keith Rogers, ―LV attorney who lost test site case sees little hope for veteran‘s 
case,‖ Las Vegas Review Journal, September 1, 1995, B-9.  
 
59
 Hugh Wilford, The Mighty Wurlitzer: How the CIA Played America (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2008); Jeffrey Kimball, Nixon’s Vietnam War (Lawrence, KS: University Press of 
Kansas, 1998); Douglas M. Charles, J. Edgar Hoover and the anti-interventionists: FBI Political 
Surveillance and the Rise of the Domestic Security State (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 
2007). 
 
60
 United States Senate, Committee on Labor and Human Resources, Radiation Exposure Compensation 
Act of 1981, Hearings on S. 1483, October 27, 1981-April, 1982; 97
th
 Cong. 1
st
 Session, 11. Lee had served 
as President of Brigham Young University and was Solicitor General during the Reagan Administration.   
 
75 
 
explanatory mechanism to so great an extent that the contours of the Cold War that 
shaped the earliest interpretative histories of the atomic program have continued to 
determine the direction of scholarship.
61
 Because the remit of President Clinton‘s 1994 
Advisory Committee on the Human Radiation Experiments was narrowed to ferret out 
the victims of those experiments without investigating responsibility, Committee 
members ignored the findings of its staff that national security imperatives were absent in 
a documentary record that was instead replete with evidence that program and military 
officials feared embarrassment or public outcry about the practice and allowed their own 
assumptions about the significance of national security to color their conclusions.
62
  
One additional explanation for its stability is that it has been and remains the most 
palatable explanation for the two primary stakeholders in the ongoing debate. For the 
federal government, as already discussed, the rubric of national security is more than a 
way to justify the program‘s hazardous record; it also immunizes the government from 
liability—an effective bar, especially at the appeals court level, to the awarding of 
compensatory damages to victims able to link illness, death, and environmental damage 
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to failures in the program‘s administration.63 It has also become the favored explanation 
for those who believe that the program caused them, or a loved one, to become ill. This 
was not always the case. Prior to the passage of the RECA, those who claimed injuries as 
a result of the program were much more likely to identify themselves with ―guinea 
pigs‖—as individuals who had been unknowingly experimented upon.64 This assumption 
was in close alignment with the perspectives of government insiders who began in the 
1970s openly to criticize managers, administrators, and others in the program for criminal 
negligence.
65
 Since the Act‘s passage, however, claimants have come to use the language 
of sacrifice, and frame their suffering as contributions made toward the greater good.
66
 It 
is beyond the scope of this study to examine whether this interesting shift in perspective 
has been caused by the routine use of policy as a rationale, by individual re-evaluations of 
experience or the significance of their role, or by the re-shaping of memory as a result of 
continuing controversy. True, the argument at the heart of this analysis is that many of 
the hazards and thus much of the suffering caused by the program were not inevitable and 
could have been prevented. Yet, there is no reason to disturb whatever comfort might be 
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afforded by believing that one‘s illness came about in the interests of a higher good—the 
preservation of national security, or in the interests of Cold War necessity—merely to 
point out that it may have been generated, instead, by routines that subordinated safety, or 
by carelessness, greed, or lethal shortsightedness of military officers and program 
managers. 
This analysis demonstrates, however, that the program was more than a product of 
Cold War imperatives and that the production and testing of nuclear weapons could have 
been a safer endeavor. The Cold War narrative, like the program itself, cannot be 
separated from the domestic context from which it grew. And, like the program, its 
evolution was shaped by a range of institutional, professional, and political motivations 
that provoked countless little day-to-day decisions. The following chapters focus on some 
of the many decisions that shaped the program‘s direction from the end of World War II 
through 1958. For a variety of self-interested reasons, military officers, program 
administrators and officials, affiliates in the private sector, congressmen, Presidents 
Truman and Eisenhower and members of their administrations, made decisions that, in 
sum, gave military officers and their supporters the ability to assert authority over the 
peacetime program, to control the conditions for atmospheric weapons testing, and to use 
the program and tests politically in furtherance of their institutional, political, or personal, 
goals. Given all of this, it is not only reasonable, but ethically and morally obligatory to 
ask, as Michael J. Hogan did in his Cross of Iron: Might America‘s victory in the Cold 
War could have been gained at less cost? Unlike the Cold War narrative, the answer that 
emerges from this critical analysis of the atmospheric era program is: yes.  
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PART ONE 
MILITARIZATION 
80 
 
CHAPTER THREE 
INSTITUTIONAL IMPERATIVES 
If we, as a Christian nation, feel morally free to use atomic energy in that way, 
Men elsewhere will accept that verdict. [T]he stage will be set for the 
sudden and final destruction of mankind. 
John Foster Dulles, August 20, 1945
1
 
 
At the end of World War II, it seemed highly unlikely that within a decade John Foster 
Dulles would become the architect of the doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction or that 
the military would become the center of gravity for the American state. The atom bomb‘s 
potential for security at little cost, the pull of American tradition against standing armies, 
public opinion supportive of de-mobilization, and President Truman‘s vow to re-organize 
and streamline the military, meant that drastic reduction of military influence was all but 
certain. These forces came together in the two most significant pieces of legislation 
passed in the immediate postwar period, the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 and the National 
Security Act of 1947. Both Acts codified the principle of civilian leadership, strengthened 
congressional oversight and limited the military‘s ability to operate under presidential 
authority alone.
2
 The Atomic Energy Act [AEA] took effect on January 1, 1947, and 
replaced the Army‘s Manhattan Project with a five-member civilian Atomic Energy 
Commission that was answerable to the president and Congress‘s Joint Committee on 
Atomic Energy. The National Security Act of 1947 [NSA] reconfigured the armed forces, 
put in place mechanisms for the coordination of the newly formed intelligence and 
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defense establishments, and strengthened congressional oversight.
3
 Congress also began 
to cut the military‘s budget, reducing it from 37.5 percent of GDP in 1945 to 3.5 percent 
in 1948, and the number of men in uniform shrunk from nearly twelve million at war‘s 
end to one-and-a-half million.
4
 Thus, even after the tensions erupted internationally, 
Winston S. Churchill‘s famous Iron Curtain speech, and failures to reach an international 
agreement for the control of atomic energy, neither Congress nor the president believed 
that a stronger military presence was necessary. Both had taken precautionary steps to 
ensure that they would be the ones to determine the size and influence of the military.
5
 
Yet, by the early 1950s, the trend was reversed. 
Communist aggression—the fall of China and the outbreak of the Korean War—
thwarted their plans to contain military spending. Following the 1948 low, defense 
expenditures climbed to 4.8 percent GDP and by 1953 had nearly tripled, reaching 14.2 
percent.
6
 Despite international turmoil, Eisenhower railed in frustration at military 
spending: ―Every gun that is made‖ he said, ―signifies … a theft from those who hunger 
and are not fed. … This world in arms is not spending money alone. … It is spending 
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the…hopes of its children.‖7 Over the same period of time, atmospheric nuclear tests 
proceeded apace, from two in 1946, three in 1948, and another 188 before 1958s 
moratorium temporarily halted atmospheric experimentation.
8
 By then, plans were in the 
works to test nuclear weapons in outer space and nearly every American had been 
touched in some way by the military‘s phenomenal expansion.9 The primary engine for 
the expansion of military influence as well as Cold War dependence on nuclear weapons 
was located at war‘s end and at the intersection of a synergistic relationship that 
developed between the armed forces and the atomic program.
10
  
In 1952, Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas pointed out the importance 
of World War II and the immediate postwar period on the character of the Cold War 
state. ―There is an ominous trend in this nation,‖ Douglas said in an article he wrote about 
the destructive effects of anti-communism and the suspicion it had generated. ―The drift 
goes back, I think, to the fact that we carried over to days of peace the military approach 
to world affairs.‖11 In what follows, I show that the ―military approach‖ Douglas referred 
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to was inseparable from the relationship that developed between the military and the 
atomic program in the immediate aftermath of World War II. Douglas‘s ―drift‖ was a 
consequence of the continuation of the Manhattan Project into the postwar period, the use 
of atomic secrecy, and the use of the atomic program in the immediate aftermath of the 
war by Navy and Army officers interested in helping their branches achieve postwar 
domestic goals. This investigation of the nature of the relationship between the atomic 
program and the armed forces, the context for its formation and evolution, and the factors 
that energized it, discusses the centrality of that relationship to the Cold War state. It 
focuses on what I argue were key ingredients in postwar military expansion and their role 
in creating the conditions that caused the atomic program to become unnecessarily 
hazardous, a set of techniques, or strategies of control, that gave military officers and 
their supporters the tools they needed to monopolize the atomic program and to use it, 
without interference, to achieve their postwar domestic goals.
12
  
Beginning at the end of the war, military officers piggybacked their short-term 
domestic goals onto national security, using strategic necessity as a rationale to 
monopolize atomic science and the program itself to build a militarily-supportive 
constituency. This was a classic case of militarization. In his 1950s era study, sociologist 
C. Wright Mills criticized the military‘s postwar influence. He argued that a troika 
composed of military, industrial, and political elites had come to dominate American 
politics and society. There, Mills defined ―militarism‖ as: 
‗[A] case of the dominance of means over ends‘ for the purpose of heightening 
the prestige and increasing the power of the military. This is, of course, a 
conception from the standpoint of the civilian who would consider the military as 
strictly a means for civilian political ends. As a definition, it points to the 
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tendency of military men not to remain means, but to pursue ends of their own, 
and to turn other institutional areas into means for accomplishing them.
13
 
 
Mills‘s examination of mid-twentieth century power brokers and their 
interrelationships showed how the upper echelon used their standing and connections to 
shape national politics in mutually advantageous ways. Historians of the military and of 
the atomic program have, like Mills, focused on the significance of the elite and 
politically prominent, but have been less likely than Mills to attribute their behavior to 
self interest. Instead, they have portrayed them as either prescient or obedient to Cold 
War policy objectives. Both approaches help to explain the mechanics of empowerment 
and of a political field where an individual‘s ambition and political connections, 
howsoever motivated, were often enough to guarantee achievement. But individual 
achievement provides only a starting point for understanding how those achievements 
were sustained over time. One key to that sustainability was the relationship itself. As 
Charles Tilly argued in another context, to understand social change, ―we must find the 
means of placing relationships rather than individuals at the center of the analysis.‖14 The 
melding together of the military‘s institutional structure with that of the atomic program 
in the aftermath of World War II fostered a continuity of not only the structures, but also 
the character of and the affiliations that comprised the Manhattan Project. That continuity 
provided stability for the relationship and for the achievement of common goals that 
otherwise would have been fractured by the efforts of elected leaders to restrict the 
military‘s influence and the plans some had to develop alternative, peacetime, uses for 
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atomic energy. Over the longer term, the military‘s ability to benefit from the atomic 
program and weapons testing depended on a coalition between (a) the program, both as 
an organizational whole and as an amalgam of private and public interests, (b) those 
segments of the armed forces interested in the production and experimentation of 
weapons and the program, and (c) the militarily-supportive constituency that developed 
within the AEC. If this tri-partite arrangement is broken down into categories of interest, 
the result is not a dichotomous civilian/military alliance, but a partnership of program 
administrators and military officers cooperating together for independent but mutually 
beneficial reasons to develop and produce atomic weapons.  
Synergy 
The most significant threads in the fabric of the Cold War state came together 
during the immediate postwar period when a handful of Army and Navy officers first 
began to use atomic science for domestic political purposes. The expansion of the armed 
forces, their increasing reliance on nuclear weapons, and risky nuclear experimentation 
are factors that began with a synergistic relationship that developed at an institutional 
level between the U.S. military and the atomic program. The relationship was one that 
provided the industrial concerns and public institutions which had contracted with the 
Manhattan Project the chance to continue benefiting economically from those 
connections after the war and simultaneously gave military officers a pipeline to the 
atomic program‘s resources, including material support that helped offset diminished 
appropriations as well as access to a network of influential private supporters.
15
 It was 
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this relationship that gave the military a chance to build up the slim base of political 
capital it had at the end of the war, to weather legislative reversals of fortune and 
antimilitary sentiment, and to acquire the political influence it needed to make the most 
of postwar circumstances, including anticommunism, the political tug-of-war between 
Congress and the president, and the growing belligerence of the Soviet Union. And, it 
was the military‘s use of the program for domestic purposes that caused it to become 
needlessly hazardous to human life and destructive to the environment. The extra-legal 
and extra-constitutional authority military officers and their supporters came to wield 
over atomic energy (a) nullified the civilian authority established under the AEA; (b) led 
to accelerated and unnecessarily-high production requirements and reckless 
experimentation; (c) interfered with the ability of elected leaders to exercise oversight 
and to make knowledgeable decisions about the program; and (d) fueled the arms race by 
undermining diplomacy during the Eisenhower administration. 
The formation of that relationship, its viability, and its implications for the future 
went practically unnoticed by elected leaders who were preoccupied at war‘s end with the 
diplomatic consequences of the bomb, the possibilities for international control of atomic 
weapons, and the pursuit of domestic agendas, not the least of which was the need for 
legislation to manage the peacetime program. In the seventeen months before the AEA 
became law and the Manhattan Project relinquished its authority to the civilian AEC, 
Navy and Army officers received approval for, and conducted, maneuvers that involved 
the detonation of two atom bombs. The Navy called its experiment Operation Crossroads 
to symbolize the importance of atomic weapons to its future.
16
 That experiment was a 
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turning point for the nation‘s atomic program too. Operation Crossroads steered the 
peacetime atomic program down a weapons-oriented path and established the conditions 
through which the military monopolized atomic resources even as Truman and members 
of Congress were settling authority over the atomic program in the hands of a civilian 
commission.  
There are two likely objections to this line of argument. One, related to the 
national security justifications previously discussed, is that without an existing arsenal of 
weapons on hand, national security objectives required that the program be dedicated to 
weapons production from the outset. Official historians have used the fact that the 
objective to develop weapons remained little changed when the AEC assumed authority 
over the program to make this assertion. But that observable continuity, especially in the 
absence of any formal or officially articulated directive, was also the result of the 
continuance of General Leslie Groves‘s authority into peacetime and the de facto 
continuance of the Manhattan Project well into the peacetime years because of 
continuities in personnel between the Manhattan Project and the postwar armed forces. 
To cite just one example, when Admiral Ernest King established the Navy‘s Division of 
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Special Weapons to investigate atomic potential, the Division‘s chief, William H. P. 
Blandy, brought in Rear Admiral T. A. Solberg, who had been a liaison officer with the 
Manhattan Project during the war, and also Commodore William S. Parsons, who had 
worked at Los Alamos, ―[tying] the division … to General Groves and the Manhattan 
Project.‖17 Manhattan‘s influence also continued through the postwar formalization of 
contractual relationships among the program‘s wartime constituents, private industry, and 
public institutions and laboratories. Between August 1, 1946, when the AEA was signed 
and January 1, 1947, when it took effect, Groves continued to direct work at Los Alamos, 
sending a letter that September to the laboratory to begin development of a penetrating 
weapon that would detonate underground.
18
 When the AEA took effect in 1947, the AEC 
assumed those contracts and directives that Groves had initiated. In a coincidental but 
telling example, on August 1, the same day that Truman signed the AEA, the Army 
invited a group of physicists to Los Alamos to acquaint them with the laboratory‘s 
ongoing projects and their plans for the future.
 19
 And, simultaneous with the Act‘s taking 
effect, key Manhattan personnel, especially Groves and his assistant Kenneth Nichols, 
took positions with the AEA‘s Military Liaison Committee and its defense establishment 
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parallel, the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project.
20
 Through continuities in 
responsibility and personnel, the AEC formalized and institutionalized for peacetime 
purposes the wartime structure. The Manhattan Project was not replaced—it was 
absorbed. With ex-Manhattan administrators husbanding the AEC program from the 
inside out, and with Manhattan affiliated officers embedded in the divisions the armed 
forces created to explore the potential of atomic science, a focus on weapons 
development and the monopolization production facilities and resources was all but 
guaranteed. In the year following the Act‘s passage, the JCS‘s weapons and material 
demands were so large that one militarily-supportive member of the JCAE wrote asking 
the Chiefs to substantiate their request for 400 Nagasaki-type bombs.
21
 By 1950, seven 
defense-related facilities had gone into production and the number of bombs in the 
arsenal had increased from 11 to 369.
22
 Any notion that this buildup of atomic weapons 
was a product of the policy objectives of the Truman administration or JCS defensive 
strategies has already been dismissed by historians who have shown that neither Truman 
nor the JCS had yet engaged in long-term strategic planning that included atomic 
weapons.
23
 This, and the objective for peacetime development written into the AEA, have 
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tended to support the view that Truman‘s 1950 decision to proceed with H-bomb 
development was a transformative moment, one that caused an escalation in weapons 
production and caused the AEC to focus its attention on the weapons side of the 
program.
24
 Given the history of weapons production, and evidence in this chapter that the 
program‘s resources were already being monopolized by military production, it makes 
sense to consider that from an operational standpoint, Truman‘s H-bomb decision and the 
Korean War were not transformational events but instead were ones that justified the 
acceleration of a process of militarization of atomic science and a virtual military 
monopoly over atomic science that had been underway since the end of World War II. 
Additional evidence that atomic science had already been commandeered by the military 
by 1949 is provided by the fact that the one transformation that did occur after the 
Soviet‘s development of a nuclear weapon was that recommendations approved under 
NSC-68, a re-analysis of national security policy, called for the military to move ―away 
from sole reliance upon nuclear weapons.‖25  
Another anticipated objection is that weapons development and experimentation 
were scientifically necessary. Just as they had with their appeals to national security, 
military officers and their supporters—beginning in 1945 with planning for Operation 
Crossroads—exaggerated the scientific necessity for detonations. The scientific necessity 
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for weapons testing became a useful hedge against the possibility that national security 
would not be enough to justify the public testing of weapons. Science, in fact, could have 
been served with secret, or non-public, experiments conducted at the Pacific Proving 
Grounds, as was done at Eniwetok in 1948. The military‘s weapons tests seem, in fact, to 
have been more of a hindrance than a help. In 1953, scientists at Los Alamos complained 
that the military‘s use of the Nevada Test Site for, among other things, maneuvers and 
detonations staged for media consumption, was, in fact, jeopardizing nuclear weapons 
development. Norris E. Bradbury, the Director of Los Alamos, argued that the military 
was monopolizing the Nevada Proving Ground to hold ―civil defense effects tests, troop 
… maneuvers, and for the reportorial press.‖ If ―the trend continued,‖ Los Alamos 
scientists, he said, would ―abandon this site … because … the military [had] taken it 
over.
26
 The scientific argument, like the national security one, that the military and its 
supporters used, when viewed in light of the resistance of elected officials and scientists 
alike, lends support to the argument that it was the military and its supporters‘ desire for 
publicity that increased the number of military weapons tests and, consequently, 
hazardous production and fallout. Throughout the atmospheric era, the military used its 
authority over the program to test weapons as exercises in the accumulation of political 
influence.
27
  
Such ―experiments‖ were more than experiments in the usual sense, they were 
spectacles staged to serve the domestic goals of the armed forces and their supporters.
28
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From conversations that President Eisenhower conducted during April and May 1956 we 
know that bomb tests were not serving the national security goals that he had in mind. On 
at least two different occasions, Eisenhower expressed exasperation with the Army and 
with the AEC and their emphasis on building bigger bombs. What was needed, he said on 
April 23, were smaller tactical type weapons, ―of less danger to humanity,‖ weapons that 
made ―the most efficient use of fissionable material‖ and that were suited to ―present‖ 
security.
29
 As Eisenhower made those remarks, the AEC and the military were finalizing 
arrangements for Operation Redwing in the Pacific, a series composed of seventeen 
shots, including the first airdrop of a thermonuclear device, Cherokee. Cherokee was 
planned as a military effects test that would also provide an opportunity to explore 
airborne delivery of an H-bomb—a feat accomplished by the U.S.S.R. the previous 
year.
30
 With a Special Observer Group that included sixteen reporters and seventeen civil 
defense administrators, it may have been successful politically as a response to the 
U.S.S.R., but it failed the practical test. Because the Air Force‘s B-52 that was delivering 
the weapon mistook another island‘s buildings for the targeting site, Cherokee landed 
more than four miles from the specially-constructed buildings and instrumentation 
installations that would have provided the weapons effects data that was the experiment‘s 
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purpose. On May 24, three days after the Cherokee mishap, and presumably aware of the 
targeting error, Eisenhower reiterated his belief that it was not bombs, and especially not 
those in the thermonuclear class, but small tactical weapons, that should be the focus of 
atomic weapons production. He despaired of accomplishing this shift in focus from the 
inside—suggesting instead that an outside advisory group should be formed to work on 
devising new strategies that would employ small, tactical weapons.
31
  
By 1957, the military and the AEC were engaged in an effort to elicit public 
support for a course of action that elected leaders were increasingly finding untenable. 
That year‘s regular testing series was held from May to September in Nevada, and 
tactical weapons were included in the twenty-nine tests of the Plumbbob series. Because 
of the large number of tests, and the detonation of thermonuclear devices, Plumbbob 
released more than twice the amount of radioiodine as fallout than any other testing 
series. At least 16,000 personnel participated in troop maneuvers, maneuvers that shared 
billing with individual Plumbbob shots in the stories of reporters invited to cover aspects 
the tests. At a time when atmospheric testing was becoming more controversial and 
testing was threatened, Plumbbob became a way for the military to remind the public of 
the national security implications of atomic weapons. The AEC and the military used the 
series to fuel public anxiety and confidence simultaneously: reinforcing the fearsomeness 
of atomic weapons while demonstrating military mastery over them. Plumbbob alone, 
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according to a recent National Cancer Institute study, likely caused 38,000 cases of 
thyroid cancer and 1,900 deaths.
32
  
There was nothing inevitable about this process. Had the Truman administration 
pursued with more rigor the proposal for domestic legislation that an Interim Committee 
had formulated during the final months of the war, or had Congress or the administration 
refused the Navy‘s request to experiment with atomic weapons until after the problem of 
domestic control had been solved, the history of the atomic program might have taken a 
different path. As it turned out, however, legislation was delayed, President Truman 
extended the Manhattan Project‘s authority in the interim, and the Navy received 
approval for its experiments and began a yearlong process of planning its atomic 
maneuvers. The experiences and events that occurred during those seventeen months 
gave military officers confidence in asserting their authority during peacetime, and they 
did so in ways that not only immunized them against the assertion of civilian authority 
that would be established under the AEA but also tested the tolerance of the public and 
elected leaders to the peacetime expression of military authority.  
This critique of Crossroads as a significant moment in the peacetime history of 
the program differs from the typical portrait of Crossroads. The Operation is generally 
considered something of an anomaly in atomic history, the last gasp of the Manhattan 
Project, completed before the AEC took charge of the program in January 1947, it 
contributed to a fundamental shift in peacetime expectations. As a conduit between the 
wartime Manhattan Project and the peacetime program that funneled Manhattan-style 
techniques of control into peacetime, Crossroads was a first step in the indoctrination of 
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elected leaders, members of the media, and the American public to the peacetime 
expression of military authority. By approving the Operation, and by failing to scrutinize 
the way it was conducted, elected officials tacitly acquiesced to a postwar increase in 
military influence and paved the way for the militarization of the atomic program and 
Cold War mobilization.  
Officers seeking to gain domestic advantages from the program and authority 
over it benefited at the outset from the ability to draw, during the immediate postwar 
period, upon the wartime Manhattan Project for material and technological resources. 
Some of the most useful of the resources they adopted at war‘s end were strategies of 
control that had given Groves the ability to solidify his own autonomous authority over 
the Manhattan Project. Two of these strategies—atomic secrecy and dependence on 
congenial scientific expertise—are discussed in Chapter Nine, below. The focus of 
Chapter Three is on another set used by Groves and other influential military officers 
such as James E. Forrestal, Secretary of the Navy and later Secretary of Defense: appeals 
to national security, exaggeration of military urgency and necessity, the use of subterfuge 
and deceit, and manipulation of the media. With these, officers garnered private support, 
secured appropriations, avoided civilian oversight, and shaped public opinion to further 
the goals of their respective branches in ways that would have been significantly more 
difficult, if not impossible, without their use.  
This is not the first time that the Project and Groves‘s management style have 
been implicated as a ―prototype‖ for the national security state, but earlier histories have 
done little more than benignly mention Groves‘s lasting influence.33 Others have 
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examined Groves‘s stature as a postwar advisor and his influence on postwar policy.34 
This is, however, the first study to hone in on the practical influences that flowed from 
the wartime project into the peacetime one and the first to adopt a multidisciplinary 
approach to investigate specific techniques of control, to consider the self-conscious and 
unself-conscious mechanics of their integration and use. It also evaluates their effect on 
the program and military expansion, and, thereby, to demonstrate that policy—
understood as the national security objectives of elected officials—was irrelevant except 
as an authorizational umbrella for a program that, operationally, played by its own rules.  
From the vantage point of William Sewell‘s structural theory, Manhattan-style 
strategies of control can be understood as historical artifacts: strategic and operational 
resources no different than the material ones used in the building of the bomb and as 
transposable into the peacetime program as the production facilities at Hanford, the 
laboratory at Los Alamos, or the techniques used by engineers and scientists to build the 
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bomb.
35
 The perpetuation of the structural organization of Manhattan, as well as the use 
of wartime strategies long after the war had ended, meant that for workers there was so 
little difference between wartime and peacetime that conflicts between the use of such 
strategies of control and peacetime constitutional principles must have been hardly 
evident.
36
 The strategies were ―effects‖ of the ―schema,‖ the structural organization of the 
Manhattan Project, with their use determined by the motivations that generated them and 
their value, a conceptual measure based on their worth to the schema.
37
 To Groves, 
atomic secrecy was a resource valuable enough to outlive the schema that initially 
generated it. Groves drew upon Atomic Secrecy during the war to dodge congressional 
scrutiny of the wartime project and again, many years later during Eisenhower‘s term, to 
persuade the president not to include Manhattan records in a blanket de-classification of 
World War II documents.
38
 Because of (a) the continuation of the Manhattan Project and 
Groves‘s authority over it during the seventeen months between the end of the war and 
the takeover of the program by the AEC, and (b) the Navy‘s dependence on Manhattan 
and Groves‘s strategies of control to receive approval for and to hold Operation 
Crossroads in 1946, it was not only the ―effects‖ of the schema that survived, but the 
schema itself. As valuable as the strategies of control investigated here were to Groves 
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and his administration of atomic science during the war, they were even more so after the 
war when political expression opened up new reasons for using them.  
Employed after the war, wartime strategies of control became the primary means 
for the military to begin using the program and the bomb to generate support for military 
expansion. An example of how ―military urgency‖ was used illustrates the importance of 
such strategies during the politically fertile months following the war and offers a 
glimpse into how significant Crossroads was as a mechanism for the transmission of 
such strategies into the administration of the peacetime program. Though military 
urgency would have been the one practice that might have been expected to lose its utility 
and evaporate once it became clear that Japan would surrender, it did not. Instead, Navy 
officers began to employ it within days of the bombing of Nagasaki in their campaign to 
secure approval for Operation Crossroads. As part of that campaign, military urgency 
was so effective that it not only helped to ensure that the Navy would receive approval 
for the Operation but it gave the Navy what it needed to overcome the objections of 
Groves himself, who argued against the Operation on the grounds that the experiment 
would be impossible to secure and liable to reveal state secrets.
39
 This example not only 
illustrates differences between among officers over what was necessary, but also 
demonstrates that a technique used legitimately and sometime illegitimately by Groves 
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during wartime and amidst the pressures of wartime could successfully be employed 
during peacetime, when a national goal was not at stake but rather an institutional one. 
When Navy officers used ―military urgency‖ to receive approval for Crossroads, they did 
so in response to the threats of demobilization, reorganization, and the possibility that 
atomic weapons could marginalize the Navy as a defensive force. Their persuasiveness 
demonstrated, at least to the officers who used military urgency as a justification, that 
atomic experiments could be, in a sense, packaged and sold. Thus, even Atomic Secrecy, 
ostensibly the most important national defense issue at the end of the war, was not an 
insurmountable hurdle to the use of atomic science for political gain.  
Over time, military urgency and the other strategies embedded within the 
program‘s structure contributed no less to the program than its material inventory did and 
became increasingly consequential at the operational, administrative, and finally at the 
cabinet level. The linear increase in the consequences of these practices reflects, on the 
one hand, the routinization of their use up the chain of command; and, on the other, the 
successful modulation of their use by military officers and their supporters who, sensitive 
to changing circumstances, employed them during Militarization in different ways to 
achieve their goals. To explain that aspect of the process, the following chapters tie these 
practices and their significance to the political field (Chapter Five) in two distinct phases: 
Integration (Chapter Four) and Consolidation (Chapter Six).  
The phase of Militarization began before the end of the war and continued 
through 1946 when the military ostensibly handed over control of the program to the 
AEC‘s civilian commission. During this seventeen-month period, Navy and Army 
officers depended upon the moribund Manhattan Project as a material and strategic 
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resource for the planning, promotion, and execution of the first peacetime experiment 
with atomic weapons. By the end of those extravagant and highly publicized maneuvers, 
officers had gained experience in the tactical use of Manhattan-style strategies, and 
gained confidence in their ability to use them, the bomb, and the atomic program to 
secure political influence. A period of Integration followed, during which officers 
innovatively employed Manhattan techniques behind the scenes, and to greater effect, 
following passage of the Atomic Energy Act. With the cooperation and consolidated 
support they received from the reconstituted Joint Chiefs of Staff and influential 
supporters in the private sector, military officers reinforced the continuities between 
wartime and peacetime by filling key advisory positions created under the Act with 
Manhattan veterans such as General Groves and his wartime assistant Kenneth Nichols. 
During this phase, the military cultivated enough support from the influential Joint 
Committee on Atomic Energy to monopolize atomic resources. By 1949, military officers 
and their supporters had successfully undermined and offset the AEC‘s civilian authority 
and established de facto authority over nearly all aspects of the program. The final 
phase—Consolidation—began as Army and Navy officers leveraged their now-
considerable congressional support to force the public transformation of the program. 
While waging a behind-the-scenes promotion for the rapid expansion of the military side 
of the program, officers and their supporters stepped up their efforts to discredit, and thus 
unseat or force the resignation of, AEC Chairman David E. Lilienthal, the most 
outspoken supporter of civilian authority and civilian application of atomic energy. These 
efforts paid off when paired with publicity that capitalized on domestic anti-communism, 
the anxieties provoked by communist expansion abroad, and the Soviets‘ atomic success. 
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They culminated in Truman‘s decision to begin development of a hydrogen bomb, a 
dramatic increase in funding—and a resulting increase in the value of being recognized 
as controlling or participating in the business of atomic science. It was at this time that 
Lilienthal complained that the AEC became ―nothing more than a contractor to the 
Department of Defense.‖40 What Lilienthal perceived as the beginning of militarization 
was, in reality, the final step in a process that had begun at the end of the war. With 
Consolidation came Lilienthal‘s resignation; the seating of his replacement, Gordon 
Dean, a favorite of the military‘s congressional supporters; the creation of the Nevada 
Test Site and with it, the beginnings of routine continental testing, military maneuvers, 
and fallout. With it, too, came Atomic Governance—an era during which the 
collaboration between the cabinet-level AEC Chairman and the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
resulted in an influential coalition that drove atomic weapons production and 
experimentation to unnecessarily risky excesses; undermined diplomacy and thwarted 
arms control negotiations; and used manipulation and deceit to prevent the president and 
Congress from performing their responsibilities under the constitution and, thereby, 
compromising the sovereignty of the American people. 
The point is not that these particular practices began with Groves and the 
Manhattan Project, for certainly they did not, or even that these and similar strategies of 
control cropped up in both wartime and peacetime programs. It is, instead, to identify 
some of the practical factors that energized the wartime program and to examine their 
influence upon the peacetime one; to evaluate the mechanics of their integration and how 
their routine use influenced the decision-making that caused the program to become such 
a hazardous one; and to explain how their use at the policy-making and cabinet level 
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affected the ability of elected leaders to discharge their responsibilities to the American 
public. When measured alongside the standards of the time—the social values, available 
scientific information, and laws—militarization of the atomic program was wasteful of 
the program‘s resources, caused it to become unnecessarily hazardous, and led to the 
erosion of constitutional parameters of authority, responsibility, and rights. 
Officers and Officials 
 
This relationship drew its energy from connections between military officers and 
civilian administrators that were more collaborative than the dominant Cold War thesis 
allows. Generally, the domestic dimension of the Cold War is understood to have been 
one shaped by conflict and a disruption of the civilian-military balance of power brought 
about by partisanship and provisions included in the National Security Act that gave the 
military new opportunities for political expression.  
Most historians interested in the postwar era agree that although some military 
expansion and atomic weapons development were necessary, there were in reality a 
number of political, economic, and systemic factors besides Cold War exigencies that 
contributed to the scale of military expansion and atomic development.
41
 During the early 
years of the Cold War, when the posturing of military officers at congressional hearings 
and at public events had become commonplace and the domestic agenda was being 
sacrificed to defense, scholars began to look back to World War II and to postwar 
legislation for reasons why the military had grown so influential. Sociologist C. Wright 
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Mills was one of the first to argue that the escalation of the armed forces was not strictly 
military in nature, but was an expression of the influence concentrated in a class-based 
troika of elite businessmen, politicians, and military officers who had risen to such 
influential positions that they had begun to take over the government.
42
 Samuel P. 
Huntington, a political scientist, argued that the war had contributed to the de-
professionalizaton of the armed forces and that it was this loss in status that had driven 
officers into the political field. Huntington pointed to the opportunities for political 
engagement written into postwar legislation and found that those opportunities allowed 
military officers to undermine executive and congressional authority.
43
 For that reason, 
Huntington concluded that postwar legislation to limit the authority of the armed forces 
had been only ―partially successful.‖44 In hindsight, that 1957 assessment was 
overgenerous. In fact, so much subsequent attention was paid to understanding why 
elected leaders had been so unsuccessful in limiting military expansion and authority that 
out of the ―Realist‖ school of International Relations a field interested in domestic history 
was born: ―civilian-military relations.‖45 Though the dynamic that gave the field its name 
                                                 
42
 C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite. 
 
43
 Because of the Hatch Act of 1939, upheld by the Supreme Court in 1947, military officers had more 
opportunity to participate publicly than did civil servants and administrators employed by the federal 
government.  
 
44
 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations 
(Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957), 317. The Soldier and the State is a 
classic in the ―realist‖ school of political science where conflict is a given whether between states or the 
institutions of a state. This brief gloss is about all that a historian can say with certainty given controversy 
in the field about how far realism can be stretched. See Jeffrey W. Legro and Andrew Moravesik, ―Is 
Anybody Still a Realist?‖ International Security 24 (1999): 5; Peter D. Feaver, et al, ―Brother Can You 
Spare a Paradigm? (Or Was Anybody Ever a Realist?),‖ International Security 25 (2000): 165. 
 
45
 Huntington argued that the best way to achieve an effective balance of civilian authority and military 
effectiveness would be to re-adopt a system of military organization that was guided by ―authoritative 
policy guides‖ to professionalize the military. Mills, on the other hand, can be seen to have found military 
officers altogether too ―professional‖ and who, as members of a brotherhood that they participated in along 
104 
 
is broad enough to encompass a wide range of topics, it was anchored in the controversy 
over postwar control of atomic science and the contention by some lawmakers that the 
legislative options amounted to a straightforward choice of ―civilian versus military‖ 
control.
46
   
Through the 1960s and 1970s, atomic weapons remained in the background as 
scholars studied the armed forces and military influence. Those analyses explained 
expansion as a result of relationships established between congressmen and officers; and, 
as some would have it, the military‘s incursions into the ostensibly ―civilian‖ realm of 
political engagement.
47
 The high water mark for criticism of this sort occurred during the 
Vietnam War. In a 1972 review essay, William Appleman Williams launched a defense 
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of the military, supporting in particular a core of officers who had remained disengaged 
from the political arena and blamed civilian policymakers for the heavy handedness of 
the armed forces.
48
 In an analysis that overlooked the extent to which military officers 
had contributed to helping Americans decide what they did want, Williams argued that 
policymakers were primarily responsible for crisis escalation: the military had done no 
more than to ―put their backs into giving U.S. what we said we wanted.‖49 Several years 
later, Bernard Brodie, one of the founders of RAND and the nation‘s pre-eminent 
authority on nuclear strategy, agreed with Williams that the military had been unfairly 
singled out. In the wake of arms control negotiations, Brodie argued that whether from an 
ideological or technological standpoint, the military had been ―with no significant 
exceptions, strictly consumers‖ while civilians, ―working quite independently of the 
military‖ made ―virtually all‖ of the practical, ideological, and strategic decisions.50 
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Implicit in this statement is an assumption that the military‘s purchasing power was 
provided by civilians through congressional appropriations.
51
 
The fall of the Soviet Union and the declassification of Cold War documents 
contributed to bringing atomic history back into the civilian-military fold and the military 
came under the spotlight again. Practitioners, primarily political scientists, adapted their 
theories to investigating, among other issues, how technological advancements 
influenced decisions about the custody of atomic weapons, the effectiveness of 
organizational strategies developed to prevent nuclear accidents, and a Cold War history 
of the civilian-military balance of authority based on the decisions made during that time 
to use force.
52
 They, like other scholars who will be discussed presently, agree that (a) the 
most significant issue for policymakers concerned with postwar defense was the problem 
of achieving and maintaining an effective balance between civilian and military 
authority; (b) that except for the fact that the creation of the atom bomb made national 
defense a priority, nuclear weapons and the atomic program were of peripheral 
significance, on the sidelines of the competition for authority that arose between military 
officers and elected officials; and (c) that during the Cold War when imbalances 
occurred, it was primarily military officers, and not civilian officials or administrators, 
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who were the transgressors. The underlying assumption of these studies has been that, 
with a default preference for autonomy and an inherently opportunistic outlook, it was the 
military and its officers that needed to be corralled then monitored. Whether stated or 
merely implied, personality and behavior figure prominently on the military side of the 
equation and hardly at all on the civilian side. In such approaches, civilian responsibility 
has generally been held to be limited: a matter of drawing the appropriate boundaries 
between civilian and military authority through law or administrative regulation and then 
establishing organizational mechanisms so that those boundaries could be effectively 
policed.
53
  
In this field, just as it was for elected leaders at the end of the war, the distinction 
between civilian and military is understood as an organizational principle that reaches 
across ideological, constitutional, professional, and political lines. There are 
―irreducible…inherent‖ differences between the military and civilians that break down to 
different responsibilities.
54
 As Peter D. Feaver put it, ―civilians and the military are both 
imperfect judges of what is needed for national security … [yet] in a democracy, civilians 
have the right to be wrong.‖55 Because of this, civilians have escaped the types of 
scrutiny directed at military officers. In what might be considered a ―the king can do no 
wrong‖ approach, one measure of the civilian-military balance is evaluated according to a 
principle/agent theory that measures whether military officers ―work‖—do what civilians 
tell them to do—or ―shirk‖—act in a way that operates against or does not fulfill civilian 
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desires.
56
 No such straightforward formula has been devised to evaluate the performance 
of civilian policymakers and administrators and thus the extent to which they carried out 
their responsibilities has been left out of a perspective that is anchored in an assumption 
that if civilians did not make the ―right‖ decisions, then the most that can be said of them 
was that they were ―wrong.‖ Though historically valid—both the AEA and NSA embody 
the assumption that one way to restrict military autonomy and influence was to 
subordinate the military to civilian authority, whether congressional or, in the case of 
atomic energy, to a civilian commission—the assumption has had historiographical 
ramifications, limiting how the history of the atomic program is understood.  
In a field ostensibly devoted to figuring out how civilian policymakers and the 
military elite balance their responsibility and authority, the analysis of this balance of 
power has stopped on the civilian side where it begins: with a determination of what 
policymakers sought to achieve through legislation or policy changes, the decision by 
elected officials to grant a civilian commission authority over atomic energy or with 
subsequent decisions to authorize shifts in custodial control of weapons, for example, and 
then evaluating whether the procedures civilians adopted to achieve their goals were 
―right‖ or ―wrong‖ based upon what the military elite subsequently did. It is a one-sided 
approach that has been useful for explaining breaches of responsibility on the military 
side of the equation.  
But the atomic program was one that encompassed civilian and military purposes 
and to figure out how that program evolved requires recognizing that civilian 
responsibility did not stop with policymakers, congressmen, or even the AEC. Instead, its 
system of satellite management devolved authority onto administrators, who were 
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responsible for everything from allocating atomic resources to managing weapons design, 
production, and experimentation. Setting aside that facet of the program has reinforced an 
artificial divide between civilian administrators and the armed forces and has contributed, 
if only in a passive way, to perpetuating the misunderstanding that the atomic program 
can be explained in light of policy. Moreover, it has helped to reinforce a conceptual 
division between the evolution of the atomic program (as administered by civilians) and 
the expansion of the armed forces (as fostered, in part, by the ambitions of military 
officers.)  Just as Mills sought to understand Cold War mobilization by analyzing the 
factors that united disparate groups of individuals, the methodological solution is to set 
aside the categorizations based on assumptions that (a) military officers and civilians 
differ in their approaches and goals and (b) that the end of the war and the passage of the 
AEA erased the atomic program‘s wartime history. By focusing on the program itself and 
the groups of individuals that it brought together, more similarities than differences 
emerge—ones that reveal continuities between wartime and peacetime components of the 
program and among those individuals united during the war that contributed to its 
successes and who maintained their affiliation with the program at war‘s end. From this 
perspective, it becomes evident that by the time the Act was passed, the civilian/military 
dynamic had become a distinction without a difference.  
The circumstances of the bomb‘s creation, the way it was managed and protected 
during the war and afterwards meant that the distinction between ―civilian‖ and 
―military‖ all but evaporated at a functional level. Here, I am not referring to the ordinary 
ambiguities of language or the euphemistic use of words, though both became routine 
enough over the course of the military‘s use of the atomic program. Instead, what is 
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necessary is the same sort of conceptual shift that took into account the fact that neither 
―war‖ nor ―peace‖ adequately described the Cold War. ―Civilian‖ and ―military‖ were 
similarly inadequate for the purposes of dividing authority and responsibility after the 
Manhattan Project, the adoption of atomic secrecy, the formation of associational 
relationships between uniformed and non-uniformed personnel, the involvement of 
private enterprise; and, significantly, after the realization that atomic weapons could be 
politically persuasive on the domestic front. Military officers such as General George C. 
Marshall and General Omar Bradley were less likely to homogenize the categories of 
―civilian‖ and ―military‖ than were elected officials. Under different circumstances, both 
Marshall and Bradley expressed their belief that, consciously or not, America‘s elected 
leaders had underestimated the significance of the atom bomb and overestimated their 
own ability to maintain the chain of command and keep the armed forces in check.
57
  
Respected as an experienced leader on both sides of the civilian/military fence 
and described as a ―statesman‖ in the opinion of members of the Senate‘s Special 
Committee on Atomic Energy in 1946, Marshall was one of the foremost opponents of 
postwar military expansionism.
58
 As Truman‘s secretary of state in 1947, he objected to 
the terms of the National Security Act because he believed it would increase the 
military‘s influence over the executive branch and would grant the military unwarranted 
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control over non-military, national assets.
59
 Later, as Secretary of State during the Korean 
War, Marshall signaled that he would guard against the Joint Chiefs‘ attempts to 
overreach by emphasizing that he would not violate his own conscience to satisfy their 
perceived needs. In that 1951 meeting, Marshall told the Chiefs that although he would 
meet the statutory requirement to relay JCS recommendations to the president, he was 
under no burden to agree with those recommendations and intended to offer his own 
opinions at meetings in accordance with the importance he alone attached to an issue.
60
  
For Bradley, the atom bomb had raised the stakes of military expansionism. In a 1948 
Armistice Day Speech, Bradley lamented that man—whether military or civilian—was 
neither morally nor ethically prepared to deal with atomic weapons. ―We have grasped 
the mystery of the atom and rejected the Sermon on the Mount. … The world has 
achieved brilliance without wisdom, power without conscience. Ours is a world of 
nuclear giants and ethical infants.‖61 These viewpoints illustrate the caution that two 
preeminent military men considered important at a time when the level of military 
entitlement was one of the most pressing dilemmas. They also highlight an important 
distinction in the extent to which individuals may be held accountable. In contrast to the 
deliberate accretion of power that Marshall believed threatened to disrupt the nation‘s 
civilian/military balance, Bradley pointed to a problem more profound: the cognitive 
inability of officers and civilians alike to perceive, let alone address systemically or 
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legislatively, the potential and pitfalls of atomic science and atomic weaponry. Theirs 
was a perspective lost on lawmakers.  
The content of the NSA and the AEA illustrate that after the war, elected leaders 
failed to take into account the uniqueness of atomic science and the circumstances of the 
bomb‘s creation, and thus failed to recognize that the conventional distinction between 
―civilian‖ and ―military‖ no longer held. Just as the goal of winning the war had unified 
civilian and military personnel within the Manhattan Project and elsewhere during the 
war, so too did the continuation of the military‘s desire for weapons production and 
experimentation depend upon similar cooperative alliances with public and private 
industry after the war. With atomic science, the significant division was not one of 
profession—one that separated uniformed armed forces personnel from civilians—but 
one of interest—a line that divided individuals supportive of military-style development 
and military projects from those who promoted peacetime applications of atomic energy.  
Placing the atomic program in the hands of a ―civilian‖ Atomic Energy 
Commission was, at best, only marginally effective as a means of restraining the 
military‘s use of atomic science. During the era of atmospheric testing and especially 
after the resignation of David E. Lilienthal in 1950, the Commission participated as a full 
partner with the military, allowing it to dictate the terms of production and the conditions 
of experimentation, minimizing the hazards involved, and justifying the military‘s use of 
the program before Congress and the president.
62
 Consider, for example, how the career 
of Lewis L. Strauss problematizes the conventional civilian/military dichotomy. As a 
Navy officer, and prior to the official surrender of Japan, Strauss was the first to propose 
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that an experiment with atomic weapons might serve to boost the Navy‘s share of 
postwar appropriations, in Strauss‘s words, ―to preserve a postwar Navy of the size now 
planned.‖ Strauss became a member of an inter-service committee on the future role of 
atomic energy and, six months after Operation Crossroads, the maneuvers he had 
instigated, wrapped up in the Pacific, he took his place as one of the first five civilian 
commissioners to sit on the AEC. As a commissioner, Strauss consistently supported 
military-style development; diverged with other members of the commission to 
recommend in a letter to Truman that he favored proceeding with H-bomb development; 
and, as Chairman of the AEC from 1953-1958, vigorously defended the continuation of 
atmospheric weapons experimentation, deceived Congressmen and President Eisenhower 
about the safety of those experiments, and interfered, though ultimately unsuccessfully, 
with diplomacy aimed at reaching an agreement with the Soviet Union that would have 
curtailed or eliminated atmospheric weapons testing altogether. Convention would have it 
that during the postwar era, Strauss was a civilian. And it was as a civilian that Truman 
nominated him for a position on a commission that, according to AEA mandate, was 
charged with the responsibility to manage the program and to devote at least some of the 
program‘s resources to the development of peacetime applications. It is impossible to 
know whether Truman would have nominated Strauss if he had based his decision on 
whether or not Strauss supported peacetime or military-style development instead of on 
his recognized status as a ―civilian.‖ What can be known, however, is that Strauss‘s 
involvement as a commissioner and later as AEC Chairman contributed to the program‘s 
devotion to military-style development and weapons experimentation from its 1947 
beginnings until 1958. At that time, Strauss‘s continual defenses of atmospheric weapons 
114 
 
testing during the fallout controversy put him in the political spotlight. Strauss drew 
congressional ire and lost the confidence of Eisenhower, who began to consider 
alternative opinions, such as those of Nobel Prize winning physicist, Isidore Rabi, that 
fallout was hazardous. 
63
 
Although in the entirety of Cold War civilian/military interaction the instances 
where a ―civilian‖ adopted a pro-military stance have been found to be rare,64 that was 
not the case with the atomic program during the atmospheric era. Moreover, atomic 
secrecy, the complexity of atomic science, and the insidious nature of radioactive 
hazards, all factors that lawmakers took into account when they stripped the Army‘s 
Manhattan Project of its authority over the program and turned it over to a ―civilian‖ 
commission, were precisely the reasons why it became all but impossible for Congress 
and the president to exercise meaningful oversight. Because of their confidence in the 
salience of the civilian/military distinction, they failed to particularize lines of authority 
and expectations that, in the absence of that assumption, they might otherwise have 
included in both the AEA and the NSA. But they did not, and the result was 
misunderstanding and disagreements at the time about how authority was distributed 
under the Acts,
, 
two factors that ended up consuming congressional energies.
65
 For 
instance, in the twenty defense-related hearings held publicly during the first seven 
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months of 1947 alone, Congress took testimony from sixty-seven military officers and 
twenty-six civilian officials.
66
 Similarly, under the AEA, and aside from hearings to 
confirm nominations of commissioners, the Chairman of the AEC was not only required 
to report to Congress but was routinely called to testify, especially during the tenure of 
David E. Lilienthal, a lightning rod for Truman‘s opponents.67 Subsequent revisions to 
the NSA reinforced the civilian authority written into the originals. A 1949 Amendment, 
for example, gave the civilian Secretary of Defense more power over individual branches 
and the service secretaries. Nevertheless, with so much attention committed to 
maintaining and policing the lines of authority at the congressional and cabinet level, 
there was scant energy for oversight to occur below the upper echelon. Thus, although the 
Joint Committee for Atomic Energy (JCAE) had substantial official power over the 
atomic program and its administrators, it paid little attention to those operational issues 
that, under the AEA, fell into its circle of authority. Under one AEA provision, the JCAE 
would independently review the program—―shall make continuing studies of the 
activities of the [AEC] and of problems relating to the development, use, and control of 
atomic energy.‖ That ambitious scenario was unworkable, as Senator Edwin C. Johnson 
from Colorado pointed out during hearings held in January 1946. Responding to 
comments by Harrison Davies, a representative of the Federation of Atomic Scientists 
who argued that Congress and the president were best prepared to ensure that military 
officers were not allowed to establish atomic policy, Johnson commented upon the 
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limitations of congressional oversight: ―there are virtually tons and tons of reports made 
to the President and to the Congress by the different agencies‖ and thus the ―safeguard 
which [Davies] deems important is of little or no importance.‖68 As Johnson anticipated, 
reviews of the AEC were not independently launched by the JCAE, but occurred only 
when an issue had already reached political proportions and had come to their attention 
from outside sources.
69
 Because of this, the opportunities for grandstanding, the 
channeling of political tensions, and partisanship, that have been repeatedly addressed in 
the literature were not the only by-products of postwar legislation aimed at strengthening 
lawmakers‘ authority over the military and atomic science.  
One overlooked consequence of the strict subordination of the postwar armed 
forces to civilian authority written into the AEA and the NSA, in the form of the AEC or 
congressional oversight of the atomic program or the defense department, was that it 
could be used as an authorizational umbrella. After passage of the Acts, military officers 
as well as the atomic program‘s managers and their supporters proceeded under an 
incontrovertible civilian imprimatur. To a greater degree than the administration‘s budget 
allocations and congressional appropriations, and especially since neither the executive 
branch nor Congress was able to adequately monitor operational activities, that 
imprimatur gave officers and administrators a way to justify all their activities and 
insulated them from criticism that they had stepped beyond the scope of their 
responsibility.  
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The testimony Martha Bordoli Laird gave to a congressional committee in 1979 
and later reiterated in a television documentary illustrates how program managers used 
this imprimatur. Laird lived within 80 miles of the test site on a small farm with her 
family. Like others in the area, they drew their water from a shallow well, played in a 
nearby spring, drank milk from the family‘s cow and ate vegetables from a backyard 
garden. When someone from the testing program visited, Laird asked about the fallout 
clouds that lasted, sometimes, ―all day.‖ He told her that the clouds were no worse than 
an x-ray and were harmless. In 1955, Laird‘s son, a first-grader, died of cancer. Shortly 
after that, she suffered a late-term miscarriage and delivered a still-born, legless child. 
After learning from her doctors that fallout could have been responsible for her son‘s 
leukemia and her miscarriage, she circulated a petition asking that atmospheric testing be 
stopped and in early Fall sent it to her congressional representatives and to President 
Eisenhower. In reply, AEC Chairman Strauss—who took it upon himself to speak in the 
name of President Eisenhower, as revealed in a memorandum he wrote to Eisenhower in 
July 1957 informing him of the practice
70—first emphasized the national security 
necessity for continued testing by referencing statements made by Eisenhower and 
quoting from one made by former President Truman that fallout was being kept to a 
minimum and any dangers that might be occasioned amounted to ―a small sacrifice‖ 
when compared to the ―greater evil‖ of nuclear warfare. Only then did Strauss include the 
information that he himself had used to allay the concerns of those presidents, that 
scientists from around the world had ―in essence‖ concluded that the risks were 
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exceedingly small ―when compared to other risks that we routinely and willingly accept 
every day.‖ Though Laird testified that she objected to being part of a small population 
asked to make the largest sacrifice, (one still keenly felt years later, as she explained in a 
television documentary, after her daughter contracted thyroid cancer) she did not—nor 
did congressmen who accepted for the record the responses she received from Strauss 
and her congressmen—notice that one of the scientific authorities Strauss quoted had 
given a carefully worded qualification to his opinion on the dangers of fallout.
71
  
Shields Warren, the first Director of the AEC‘s Division of Biology and Medicine 
who before he resigned his post had consistently sparred with military officers and 
program managers about their refusal to conduct experiments within the boundaries of 
standards developed to ensure that testing proceeded safely, testified during hearings 
about fallout that risks of testing were ―low‖ provided they resulted from ―a reasonable 
program of weapons testing.‖ The evidence suggests that while Warren was Director he, 
for one, believed that the weapons testing was not being conducted reasonably. 
Nonetheless, the imprimatur Strauss received as AEC Chairman gave him the ability to 
leverage the authority of two presidents, presidents whose opinions about fallout were 
shaped by Strauss himself, in support of continued testing and in support, too, of the 
notion that all nuclear experiments were being conducted solely in the interests of 
national security.
72
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The civilian imprimatur also strengthened the collaborative relationship between 
the armed forces and the program by giving officers the opportunity to engage with 
program administrators behind the scenes and use the program to further their own 
institutional goals. One such point of interaction was within the Military Liaison 
Committee (MLC). The Committee was made up of officers from the Army, Navy, and 
Air Force. Its Chairman was officially a civilian who functioned as a deputy for atomic 
energy matters to the Secretary of Defense. The MLC was established under the AEA to 
act as a point of intersection between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the program and 
officially charged with ensuring that the military‘s needs were incorporated into the 
program‘s goals. During the deliberations about whether to pursue development of a 
hydrogen bomb in 1949, however, the MLC gave advice to the JCS. Their position was 
one shaped by Major General Kenneth Nichols, Groves‘s right-hand man during 
Manhattan and then head of the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project, who was ―under 
pressure from [E.O.] Lawrence,‖ the entrepreneurial Director of Berkeley‘s Radiation 
Laboratory and soon-to-be founder of Lawrence National Laboratories. As a historian of 
the JCS points out, it was not the JCS, or military strategy, that informed the MLC 
position, but civilian promoters of H-bomb development, including Lawrence, who 
sought development for economic reasons; Strauss, who supported the militarily-
intensive atomic development preferred by Senator Brien McMahon; and others who had 
urged Nichols, a Manhattan veteran, to sway the MLC away from its ―military mission‖ 
in favor of promoting development of a weapon that was primarily in the interests of 
industry.
73
 The JCS subsequently approved the MLC‘s recommendation and so did 
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President Truman. This decision lent even more momentum to the program‘s expansion 
and, as with earlier decisions, allowed officers and managers to foster the sense that all of 
this was occurring because of the national security objectives established by elected 
officials.  
Nonetheless, one of the chief advantages of investigating individual initiative and 
practice is that it offers a way to pierce through the emotionally charged political rhetoric 
and secrecy that has clouded atomic history and to test the genuineness of claims to 
national security made during the early years of the Cold War. Many of those claims to 
national security were no doubt genuinely felt, others perhaps only marginally so; but the 
historical record demonstrates that most, if not all, were persuasive. This examination of 
the atomic program practices that military officers and supportive program managers 
engaged in helps to reveal the distinction between ―national security‖ and ―defense‖ that 
Robert Steel argues was, and is, too often overlooked. ―Defense is a policy, national 
security is an attitude; defense is precise, national security is diffuse; defense is a 
condition, national security is a feeling.‖74 Particularly when used routinely under an 
umbrella of national security claims, the practices examined here achieved a significance 
that went well beyond their use by Groves in his management of the Manhattan Project, 
beyond their initial use by Navy and Army officers interested in gaining domestic 
political advantages from Operation Crossroads, and beyond the contributions they made 
to creating an unnecessarily hazardous program of atomic weapons development. The use 
of secrecy, media manipulation, deception, and other wartime-style practices of control 
by military officers and their supporters within the atomic program likely lent confidence 
to others outside the program‘s confines, contributing to their proliferation, and to the 
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disregard for civilian authority and Cold War defenses policies that General Curtis 
LeMay exhibited in 1957. That year, two members of Eisenhower‘s Gaither Committee, 
a group of scientific and technological experts charged with evaluating civil defense 
capabilities, visited the General, then Commander of Strategic Air Command, at his 
headquarters. On his wall they noticed a chart that outlined the strategic plan that experts 
and policymakers had devised to coordinate what they believed would be the most 
effective military response should the United States come under nuclear attack. When 
they asked LeMay whether he thought the plan—a symbol not only of elected leaders‘ 
commitment to national security and to coherence in defensive strategies—would be 
effective, LeMay said that the official plan was irrelevant. When they volunteered that 
the early warning system set up in Canada might not provide SAC with enough time to 
respond, they learned that, for LeMay, that possibility was irrelevant: ―I will know from 
my own intelligence whether or not the Russians are massing their planes [and]…if I 
come to that conclusion, I‘m going to knock the shit out of them before they get off the 
ground.‖ When one of them advised him his solution went against national policy, 
LeMay said ―No, it‘s not national policy, but it‘s my policy.‖75 It is not possible to know 
whether LeMay‘s own plan to pre-empt a Soviet attack would have worked as he 
supposed it would or whether it would have failed and in that failure, would have also 
doomed the coordinated response that was articulated on his wall chart and that held 
some promise, at least in the imaginations of the policymakers who arrived at it, for the 
                                                 
75
 Robert C. Sprague and Jerome Wiesner, cited in Newhouse, War and Peace, 280.  
 
122 
 
repelling of a nuclear attack. It does, however, reveal that LeMay had achieved a 
staggering level of autonomy.
76
  
Some of the self-conscious disregard for authority that was indulged in by 
military officers such as LeMay as well as those upper-level AEC officials was no doubt 
anchored in what they believed necessary to preserve national security. Still, the 
prevalence of such disregard suggests that it was provoked by multiple and complex 
motivations. Some of these would include a lack of faith in the competence of 
policymakers, commitment to institutional goals, self-interested ambition, or hubris. And 
yet, there are only two ways to explain why officers and their supporters resorted to using 
wartime-style techniques of control, including claims to national security: Either military 
officers and program managers believed that elected officials and their advisors did not 
fully appreciate the risks to national security and were unable to provide evidence to 
convince them otherwise; or, that their claims were disingenuous, or at the very least 
were unsupported by persuasive factual evidence. In either case, military officers and 
their supporters who used such strategies undermined, consciously or unconsciously, the 
authority of civilian superiors and elected officials.  
The socio-historical insights of Bourdieu and Cover allow us to understand these 
practices as a product of institutional culture as well as ambition; to understand the 
varieties in the ways they were employed, from the deliberate to the unself-conscious as a 
function of habitus; and to appreciate the extent to which such practices were engendered 
by and reproduced within an insular atomic workplace. The concept of habitus 
contributes a dimension absent from the analyses of conformity found by C. Wright Mills 
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and William H. Whyte to have developed within American business, and especially 
within the managerial class, after the end of World War II.
 77
 From a workplace 
perspective alone, it might seem as though the hyper-conformity of the mid-twentieth 
century business class could explain why, for example, a test director at the Nevada Test 
Site would approve the scheduled detonation of an atomic bomb even after weather 
conditions suggested it would cause dangerous levels of fallout to downwind 
communities. But the atomic worker—at all levels of responsibility—was quite unlike 
―The Organization Man,‖ whose dedication to workplace responsibilities caused 
transformations in his world view and relationships outside the workplace. The program 
also operated under a different set of circumstances than did conventional businesses and 
bureaus. Atomic secrecy and the hazards inherent in production and experimentation 
made the atomic program and decision-making by administrators and frontline personnel 
unique. Cover‘s studies of systems of justice and Hugh Gusterson‘s investigation of 
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and the socio-cultural aspects of its workplace 
environment shed light on the ideological and ethical conflicts inherent in those 
environments and the ways that workers resolve those conflicts. Administrative 
regulations (including those involving atomic secrecy and managerial responsibilities) 
combined with the physical and psychological isolation of the atomic workplace caused 
employees—at all levels of responsibility—to operate with dual sets of norms: one set 
fostered by their participation in society, and another fostered by their profession.
78
 Thus, 
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as Cover discussed, their decision-making must be considered not only in light of its 
conformity with workplace expectations, but also in light of its divergence from social 
and ethical standards.  
The atomic worker, especially one in a position of authority, was forced to 
reconcile conflicts between two sets of norms. For instance, in his position as Director of 
Los Alamos from 1945-1970, Norris E. Bradbury publicly defended atmospheric 
weapons test as safe and argued that radioactive fallout was not, at the levels dispersed, 
hazardous. Bradbury‘s personal identity as a father and grandfather, however, trumped 
his professional one as Director. During the years that atmospheric testing was being 
conducted at the Nevada Test Site, Bradbury‘s son and daughter-in-law relocated with 
their children to St. George, Utah, an area that was routinely showered with fallout during 
testing season. According to his daughter-in-law, Bradbury advised them to leave, saying 
―St. George was not a good place to stay.‖ She continued, ―He didn‘t want anything to go 
wrong with his grandchildren.‖79  More than a way to understand administrative level 
decision making, Bourdieu‘s habitus and Cover‘s findings open channels for 
understanding behavior and judgment calls that took place at multiple levels of 
responsibility during the atmospheric program‘s history. 
The frequency of what was, at the very least, questionable decision-making by top 
AEC officials that is contained in the historical record has contributed to the mistaken 
belief that illegitimate, or ill-advised, behavior, if it existed at all, was limited to top-level 
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administrators. The result is that there has been no effort to examine, let alone try to 
explain, the activities of the intermediate level experts, professionals and managers, 
military officers far removed from the upper echelon, and skilled technicians and the 
ways they approached their tasks. In the words of one of the government‘s historians who 
studied radiation safety within the program, a line of responsibility should be drawn 
between an elite tier of decision-makers and the thousands of people working below that 
upper tier. Among ―powerful officials‖ it was so ―easy to deny, dissemble, or mislead‖ 
that it became a ―matter of course.‖ There, the workforce below the upper, 
administrative, level has been absolved; congratulated in fact for having ―performed a 
difficult job honorably.‖80 This misses the point that one of the reasons why over-
exposures did occur was because people who had reason to believe that they were 
occurring did not give voice their opinions. There were certainly many employees who 
did no more than do what they were told. But, there were legions of others: scientists, 
managers, and technicians, who knew that safe levels of exposure were being exceeded 
but who, despite that knowledge, failed to speak out.
81
 Without launching a quest to 
discover who might have done no more than follow orders and who did not, habitus 
offers a way to step outside the boundaries of right/wrong and to consider the silence as 
something besides ignorance of the hazards or complicity. There were, as one Utah judge 
found in 1984, many people who were knowledgeable about the dangers but who failed 
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to speak out. Their silence was so widespread that the only way that Judge Bruce Jenkins 
could explain it was to posit some sort of fundamental breakdown had occurred. 
―Responsible persons‖ Judge Jenkins wrote ―neglected an important, basic idea: there is 
just nothing wrong with telling the American people the truth.‖82 Studies of institutional 
culture that extend back into the early decades of the twentieth century, as well as more 
recent ones by Bourdieu and Cover, suggest that it was not merely individual negligence, 
but also systemic reasons behind some, if not most, of the failures by insiders to warn 
those who were being exposed and others that testing was posing known hazards.
83
 
Similarly, there were likely systemic reasons behind the persistent claims by officers that 
atmospheric weapons tests were essential and those that led to the dependence upon a 
nuclear class of weapons, a dependence that drew energy away from other defensive and 
offensive capabilities. While institutional culture cannot excuse nor explain all of the 
program‘s hazards or the military‘s use of it, it does open up a space for understanding 
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how routine, duty, and ambition combined may shape behavior and lend momentum to a 
workforce.  
Conditions for Militarization 
 
Militarization of the atomic program was contingent upon a number of internal 
and external factors, including the political climate of opportunity that emerged during 
the immediate postwar period, the ingenuity and initiative of Navy and Army officers 
who believed that the atomic program and weapons testing could help them preserve the 
status of their institutions after the war‘s end, and their ability to tap into the 
technological and material resources of the wartime Manhattan Project. On a macro level, 
those officers benefited from the military‘s position in the governmental framework, from 
the adaptable organizational structure and administrative capacity of their respective 
institutions, from affiliations formed during wartime with the private sector, and the 
ability to draw upon those resources for political leverage while remaining relatively 
immune from the pressures of electoral politics. Each of these gave military officers 
opportunities to build networks of support that insulated them in a number of ways from 
legislation designed to restrain the postwar military. The armed forces, for example, 
responded to congressional budget cutting by channeling expenses for military projects 
into other government programs, such as those borne for the military by the atomic 
energy program. This was a significant resource stream and one that was as dedicated to 
weapons as its wartime predecessor. Though reliable figures are not available for the 
immediate postwar period when the Manhattan Project remained in control, AEC 
expenditures for atomic weapons, excluding the costs of production, were approximately 
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$1.6 billion per year in 1948-1950.
84
 Moreover, though the military bore some of the 
costs, the program provided the weapons as well as the technological and scientific 
expertise for two substantial military experiments held in 1946 and 1948, Crossroads and 
Sandstone.
85
 Similarly, when Congress sought to expand its own authority over the 
military by requiring officers to regularly appear and testify on capital hill, officers turned 
those hearings to their advantage and used the witness stand as a forum for political 
engagement, influencing legislators and the public in ways that had not previously been 
possible.
86
  
Success at the macro level of political engagement was contingent, in turn, upon 
micro level factors and more subtle forms of persuasion to convince the American public 
that a large, atomized, military was necessary to preserve national security. To use atomic 
weapons experiments for public relations purposes meant that the military had to walk a 
fine line between nurturing the fear of nuclear weapons and fallout that might occur from 
an enemy bombardment and convincing the public that the radioactive fallout from 
military detonations posed no hazards. The importance of taking an accurate sounding of 
the political climate and responding to changes in public opinion was a lesson the 
military learned early. The publicity generated by 1946‘s Operation Crossroads, 
according to one officer, had undermined the military‘s efforts to get approval for a 
continental testing site. Commanding Lieutenant General J.E. Hull argued in a 
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memorandum to the Army Chief of Staff in 1948 that using radioactive hazards to justify 
the enormous expense of Pacific testing had worked against the Army‘s desire to have a 
less costly continental testing site dedicated for atomic detonations. ―It is high time to lay 
the ghost of an all-pervading lethal radioactive cloud that can only be evaded by people 
on ships, airplanes and sandpits in the Marshall Islands.‖ Conceding that continental 
testing would pose ―public relations difficulties‖ he believed those would be ―offset by 
the fundamental gain from increased realism in the attitude of the public.‖87 While Hull‘s 
Memorandum was limited to addressing the detrimental effect he believed publicity from 
Crossroads had had on the military‘s desire to gain approval for the continental testing of 
weapons, it illustrates that, as an exercise in public relations, Crossroads had given Hull 
confidence that atomic weapons experiments could be used to sway public opinion and 
confidence, too, that the Army could overcome the fear that weapons testing was 
dangerous. For Hull, it was not safety, but inadequate attention to publicity that was the 
primary obstacle to the Army‘s goal to achieve approval for stateside weapons testing, 
where experiments would be less expensive and could be routinely used—as they were at 
the Nevada Test Site—to promote military projects before audiences of invited 
dignitaries, congressmen, and throngs of reporters.
88
 The significance of public opinion 
was again brought home in 1958 when the combined efforts of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
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and of the Chairman of the AEC, Lewis Strauss, to stem anxieties about the dangers of 
fallout and the escalation of the arms race failed. In the face of overwhelming public 
opposition at home and abroad, Eisenhower agreed with Khrushchev to suspend 
atmospheric nuclear testing. Before that setback, however, the military had effectively 
used the program and weapons testing to build support for military projects and had 
prospered from its relationship with the program. 
Origins of Militarization  
 
Exaggeration of military necessity, appeals to national security, using secrecy to 
deceive and mislead superiors, and the manipulation of scientific expertise and the 
media—all factors that caused the peacetime program to become such a hazardous one—
were strategies Groves used to secure his authority over the far-flung empire that was the 
Manhattan Project.
89
 They were tactics that might have drawn far more criticism, and 
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perhaps a congressional investigation, had the project not been successful.
90
 Groves, well 
known for ―compartmentalizing‖ all aspects of Manhattan to keep workers in the dark 
about the project‘s purpose, was equally adept at keeping his superiors in the dark. He 
used the dual imperatives of secrecy and military necessity, for example, to avoid both 
congressional and administrative scrutiny. Rather than participate to any extent in the 
appropriations process, Groves persuaded Henry L. Stimson to intercede with a few 
members of the appropriations committee who agreed to ―bury‖ the project‘s costs in the 
Army‘s budget.91 In Spring 1945, when the Secretary of State James Byrnes suggested an 
―impartial investigation and review‖ of the project to President Roosevelt, Groves 
avoided it by misleading Stimson, telling him that an investigation would be 
―impossible‖ because there ―were no American nuclear physicists not connected in some 
way with the project.‖92 Groves insisted afterward that such extra-constitutional 
maneuverings and authoritarian measures were necessary: ―Because of it‘s [sic] 
magnitude and ramifications … because of extreme secrecy, it was not possible for the 
business to be handled in the usual manner … it was normal for General Groves to report 
verbally to his superiors.‖93 According to an aide who worked beside Groves, he 
―reported to Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall to the degree he reported to anyone, 
but Marshall gave him plenty of freedom. … He set the agenda, and he wasn‘t second-
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guessed.‖94 Because Groves had complete control over what was written about the 
program, he cast his routine use of strategies of control in the best possible light. 
Calculatingly packaged, the disregard Groves expressed for authority, when combined 
with the program‘s success, became expressions of managerial mastery, on a par with his 
accumulation of property, material, and expertise, and as vital to his role in the war effort 
as were the ―creeps‖ he directed as part of his own intelligence service.95 It was for these 
reasons, and not because elected officials considered them innocuous, that the strategies 
that Groves used to avoid the civilian chain of command never became the focus on 
congressional of presidential investigation. Groves‘s use of such strategies to secure 
authority over the program and his use of atomic secrecy to make those strategies of 
control relatively impervious to congressional or administrative scrutiny, set an example 
for other officers and established precedents that influenced the management of the 
peacetime program.  
After the war, a handful of officers who believed that exploiting atomic science 
would yield domestic advantages adopted and employed them. They, and other officers 
and their supporters in the years to follow, drew upon their own administrative ability, 
political acumen, access to influence, and wartime strategies of control to assert their 
authority over the peacetime atomic program. Except for a general interest in maintaining 
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a steady increase in appropriations, and thus influence, there was no grand design or 
long-term strategy that guided officers and administrators in the use of these practices, 
the program, or the bomb. They used them all in much the same way, and for similar 
reasons, that Navy and Army officers did at the end of the war did: for the limited 
purpose of achieving one or several short-term goals. Moreover, in the tens of thousands 
of individual decisions that moved the process of militarization along, the percentage that 
resulted from conscious deliberation was likely very small. Militarization of the atomic 
program was only partly the result of ambition and the deliberate use of wartime 
practices. It was also energized by a combination of dedication and routine that operated 
as a force, one capable of modulating, or stifling altogether, conscious deliberation.  
The following example drawn from a discussion that took place at the Trinity site 
on July 16, 1945, will illustrate the significance of such mundane factors as ambition and 
routine in the history of something as phenomenal as the atom bomb. On that day, while 
the scientists who had been working on the atom bomb were celebrating the successful 
detonation of the first atom bomb, Richard Feynman, a group leader in Manhattan‘s 
theoretical division, noticed his friend and mentor Robert Wilson had separated himself 
from the excitement. Wilson was a Princeton physicist who had lured Feynman to 
Manhattan and who had, in addition to drawing experts into the program, secured for the 
project Harvard‘s cyclotron.96 Wilson would become Director of Cornell‘s Laboratory of 
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Nuclear Science but never again worked on any project that required a security clearance. 
On that July day when ―the sun rose twice,‖ Feynman intimated the reasons for Wilson‘s 
quietude and recalled telling him, ―It‘s a terrible thing that we made. But you started it. 
You got us into it.‖ Explaining later, Feynman wrote: ―You see, what happened to me—
happened to the rest of us—is we started for a good reason, then you‘re working very 
hard to accomplish something and it‘s a pleasure … excitement. And you stop thinking, 
you know: you just stop. Bob Wilson was the only one who was still thinking about it, at 
that moment.‖97  The accumulation of little decisions, made without much thought by 
military officers and program managers ―to accomplish something,‖ brought about a 
revolutionary change in peacetime America—one that allowed the military to exercise an 
unprecedented measure of authority over the atomic program, authority that undermined 
the ability of elected officials to carry out their responsibilities, and contributed to the 
development of the Cold War‘s National Security state.98   
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CHAPTER FOUR 
INTEGRATION 
In the first seventeen months after World War II, the military fought and lost its battle for 
legislative authority over atomic science but achieved enough influence over the program 
and its assets to render the civilian authority established under the Atomic Energy Act of 
1946 irrelevant. It did so by integrating wartime behaviors of control from the Manhattan 
Project, by building on wartime connections and ways of doing business, and by 
exploiting postwar political instability to gain approval for Operation Crossroads, the 
first peacetime experiment with atom bombs. Using subtle deceit, exaggerating military 
urgency, appealing to national security, and manipulating the media, military officers and 
their supporters commandeered the atomic program and funneled its resources into 
military projects. Though primarily a Navy operation, Crossroads—with 250 support and 
target ships, 150 aircraft, 43,000 military personnel, 500 cameramen, 168 reporters, and 
60,000 experimental animals—benefited each branch of the armed forces, establishing 
military authority over atomic development and engendering a broad set of parameters 
for weapons experimentation that held sway throughout the atmospheric era. Integration 
was the first, formative, stage of Militarization: seventeen months during which wartime 
methods for managing the program became normative even as the program and atom 
bombs became, for the first time, instruments for the military‘s accretion of domestic 
political influence.  
When the war came to an end, the atom bomb and the program were far from 
being sources of strength for the military. In fact, in the hands of budget conscious 
officials, the atom bomb was one of the greatest threats the traditional military had ever 
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faced. For the first time in five years, military institutions were vulnerable to cutbacks, 
forced to compete for resources on an agenda crowded with domestic needs while 
contending also with the president‘s plans for streamlining the nation‘s armed forces. 
Pearl Harbor had, of course, long since obliterated any notion that the United States could 
afford to remain militarily complacent, but whether because of anti-statism or economics, 
few outside the military believed that permanent mobilization was in any way affordable. 
For some, the atom bomb seemed a tailor made solution: one that could guarantee 
national security at far less cost than standing armies and conventional munitions.
1
 The 
New York Times put this sensibility into print between the bombing of Hiroshima on 
August 6 and Nagasaki on August 9 with phrasing which, from a military perspective, 
was nothing short of apocalyptic: ―all of these armed forces as we now know them, 
become obsolete. Mass conscript armies, great navies, piloted planes have … become 
part of history, the slow, long, tortured history of man‘s ascent from the mud.‖2  
It would be a short-lived notion. Amidst the political and administrative 
disorganization of the first seventeen months following the end of the war, media savvy 
and politically connected Navy officers exploited the Manhattan Project—a rare source 
of stability between August 1945 and throughout 1946—for the resources to preserve the 
Navy‘s postwar integrity.3 For any branch of the armed forces, the ability to assert 
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authority over the atomic program and atomic weapons was a matter of critical 
importance. As Henry A. Kissinger wrote in 1957, ―possession of nuclear weapons was 
the prerequisite to any claim to be able to contribute to the strategy of an all-out war and 
was, therefore, the best support for budgetary requests.‖4 The military‘s insecurity about 
its own future, anxieties about unification, and the centrality of the atom bomb to both of 
these postwar issues made control over atomic science significant on the legislative and 
on the practical level. During Integration, officers strove to secure enough political 
support to maintain authority over the postwar atomic program even as they were taking 
charge of atomic science at the operational level. Operation Crossroads was an critical 
ingredient in this political and operational process—one that, although perhaps not 
recognizable at the time, set precedents for the peacetime exploitation of atomic science. 
The Navy did not undertake Crossroads to commandeer atomic science, but instead to 
make a case for the maintenance of a powerful peacetime Navy during a transitional 
period when the future of the conventional forces, especially the Navy, hung in the 
balance. In the words of Navy historians, Crossroads was ―almost … an act of 
desperation.‖5 Its scale offers an idea of its significance: Crossroads was four times 
larger than the wartime invasion of Guadalcanal. Its operational plan was, according to its 
official historian, ―so vast and detailed as to suggest the Book of Fate itself.‖6 Operation 
Crossroads was a fateful turning point in the history of the atomic program, one that gave 
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the military the ability to monopolize the program and its resources, transforming the 
atom bomb from a liability into an asset.  
Crossroads might not have taken place if, as the war came to a close, the Truman 
administration and elected officials were as prepared to incorporate the atom bomb into 
their postwar planning as Navy officers were to incorporate it into theirs. Recalcitrance 
and indecision on behalf of the Truman administration as well as disunity and 
disorganization between the administration and Congress delayed the passage of 
legislation and led to a prolonged extension of the Manhattan Project and Groves‘s 
responsibility over it. Truman‘s decision to extend the Project‘s authority pending the 
passage of legislation was a well intentioned but fateful one. By authorizing the 
Manhattan‘s continuance, Truman and his advisors hoped to avoid setbacks in production 
and achievement by making it more likely that that private and public universities, 
laboratories, and industry, would be willing to re-establish during peacetime the 
affiliations they had formed with the Manhattan Project and the armed forces during the 
war. But, in reaching for a temporary way to maintain the status quo, Truman gave 
military officers opportunities to secure internal and external support for military 
exploitation of atomic science and to offer economic incentives that contributed to the 
peacetime militarization of the program. 
Congressional disunity and the Truman administration‘s failure to follow through 
on a pre-arranged course of action meant that the Navy‘s ability to formulate and 
implement a coherent postwar strategy for atomic science was especially effective. Most 
congressmen, entirely surprised by the atom bomb, were unable to assess what to do 
about it or about the Manhattan Project quickly or meaningfully. The war came to a close 
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while they were in recess and the bomb was but one of many domestic issues on their 
agendas when they returned. The continuing investigation into the bombing of Pearl 
Harbor and the impact of demobilization were among the matters competing with atomic 
energy for congressional attention.
7
 Yet, there was little reluctance on the part of many 
congressmen to do what they could to take charge. By early September, multiple 
committees had claimed jurisdiction over atomic energy and at least six different bills 
emerged, ranging from granting absolute control to the military to the outlawing of any 
military use of nuclear fission.
8
 For his part, Truman did not address the issue of 
domestic legislation until September 21, three weeks after Japan‘s formal surrender on 
September 2 and just as negotiations in the United Nations were getting underway.
9
 
Within the administration, domestic legislation took a back seat to the debate about 
whether, and if so in what way, the United States should rely on an international 
organization to control the use of atomic science.  
This was precisely the sort of scenario that some cabinet-level officials in the 
Truman administration had anticipated and worked to prevent. In May 1945, Secretary of 
War Henry L. Stimson convened the Interim Committee, a group of scientists, Manhattan 
administrators, and members of Truman‘s cabinet and explained that the president 
expected them to consider and seek solutions for the problems that would arise with the 
bomb‘s use. Speculation has surrounded the purpose of the Interim Committee since 
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Stimson wrote about it in early 1947.
10
 To those who later claimed that it was primarily 
involved with evaluating and deciding on targets for the bombing of Japan, Stimson‘s 
biographer disagreed, arguing that it only symbolically performed those tasks, giving 
―ordered form‖ to ―attitudes already developed.‖ 11 In official literature it is credited with 
developing postwar strategies for the international control of atomic energy and for 
―considering a draft atomic energy bill.‖12 Recent analysts have continued the practice of 
conflating aspects of the Committee‘s work with decision-making that took place after 
the war.
13
 A strict reading of the Committee‘s log and notes of the meetings illustrate, 
however, that although the Committee discussed a variety of issues, its primary purpose 
was neither targeting nor the consideration of international control of atomic science, but 
to find ways to ease the transition of the program from wartime to peacetime. In 
Stimson‘s words, the Committee‘s goal was to ―study and report on temporary war-time 
controls and later publicity‖ and to evaluate and make recommendations for the 
peacetime domestic future of atomic energy, including postwar ―research, development, 
and control, and on legislation necessary for these purposes.‖14  
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With no peacetime equivalent for either the Manhattan Project or the atom bomb, 
this was a challenging task. Atomic production and its implications were more 
scientifically complex and technologically demanding, and held more peacetime promise 
as a source of energy and for medical applications, than either the Norden gunsight and 
radar, two other technological marvels made possible through government funding.
15
 
Stimson and other members of the committee were thus not only circumstantially 
constrained by a program that had enormous implications for national security, but also 
imaginatively constrained.
16
 In fact, the only conceptual model Stimson could think of to 
draw upon when he addressed the committee was a fictional one. The atom bomb, he 
said, was not just a weapon but an instrument that represented a ―revolutionary change in 
the relations of man in the universe … it might be a Frankenstein that would eat us up.‖17 
Stimson‘s strategy to prevent some future catastrophe was to build legal safeguards and 
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to secure, first and foremost, suitable legislation for the domestic control of atomic 
energy. 
As Secretary of War and the Committee‘s Chairman, Stimson was as aware as 
any other individual of the importance of incorporating the bomb into postwar diplomatic 
policy and the Committee‘s role in framing that policy. Meeting formally eight times 
between May 9 and July 19, the Committee discussed everything from bombing Japan 
―without warning,‖ to securing Sweden‘s supplies of radioactive ore, postwar 
international control, and post-use publicity. But the most important task facing the 
Committee, from Stimson‘s point of view, was to devise a legislative solution to postwar 
domestic control. During some of the Committee‘s earliest meetings, Stimson asserted 
that ―first priority be given to legislation for domestic control‖ so that the ―problems of 
international relations and controls‖ could be dealt with under postwar law. Stimson‘s 
response to a Committee proposal to form an advisory ―Military Panel‖ suggests that at 
least one of the reasons he desired a quick legislative solution was to avoid duplicating 
Manhattan in peacetime and to eliminate as soon as possible the military‘s authority over 
atomic science. While welcoming the creation of an advisory Scientific Panel, he rejected 
a Committee proposal for an advisory ―Military Panel‖ of upper echelon Army and Navy 
officers, opposing from the outset the possibility of military unduly influencing 
Committee deliberations.
18
 On June 21, the Committee outlined its recommendations and 
directed that a bill be drafted and submitted to them for consideration.
19
 During a mid-
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July meeting, the Committee addressed postwar control of atomic material and secrecy, 
and discussed and made revisions to the draft legislation that they had requested. The 
Committee decided that until legislation was in place, the Manhattan Project should 
continue under Groves‘s direction. Nonetheless, the revisions they made to the draft bill 
left no doubt that they intended, through the legislative process, to prevent the peacetime 
control of atomic science from falling into the hands of the military. The Committee 
eliminated four  military positions—two Army and two Navy—that Manhattan officials 
had envisioned for the nine-member Commission. The members decided instead on a 
wholly civilian commission and replaced the military‘s presence on the commission with 
a ―Military Board‖ that would serve in an advisory capacity between the Commission and 
the service branches.
20
 The ―Atomic Energy Bill‖ was revised and finalized accordingly 
and by August 18, Stimson‘s Special Consultant George L. Harrison had begun to refer to 
it as ―our proposed bill.‖21 
But the bill never made it out of the administration. On September 2, a Sunday, 
Harrison met with Secretary of State Byrnes to discuss getting it into congressional 
hands. Also attending the meeting was Dean Acheson, Byrnes newly promoted Under 
Secretary of State. Byrnes agreed that his office should, in Harrison‘s words, ―carry the 
ball‖ and turned it over to Acheson. Acheson was the likeliest choice to take the bill 
forward. Not only was he second-in-command to Byrnes, but he had also, while Assistant 
Secretary, made repairing relations between State and Congress his goal. In his own 
words he had made every effort ―to bridge … gaps in values and understanding‖ through 
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―hours of tramping the halls of the House and Senate office buildings, innumerable 
gatherings and individual meetings, social occasions of all sorts at which all the arts of 
enlightenment and persuasion were employed.‖22 Acheson‘s most recent biographer 
explains that his relationship with congressmen was so intimate that Acheson wrote 
speeches for them and made ―them look good to their constituents by feeding them 
department information.‖23 But Acheson, who described himself in his memoirs at this 
time as ―Chief Lobbyist for State,‖ carried the bill only as far as his desk.  
Over the next four days, Harrison contacted Acheson twice, ―urg[ing] upon him 
the necessity of prompt action,‖ and on September 6, ―called to his attention the fact that 
the newspapers were already talking about Members of Congress introducing their own 
bills and that … it was very important that we proceed as fast as possible.‖ Acheson told 
Harrison that ―he would look into it and see what he could do about hurrying it.‖ On 
September 8, John McCloy, Under Secretary of War, visited Acheson in his office in 
hopes that he might be more successful in persuading Acheson to fulfill the Interim 
Committee‘s request and to perform as directed by his boss, Secretary of State Byrnes. 
McCloy‘s efforts were as fruitless as Harrison‘s had been. Meeting afterward, Harrison 
and McCloy came to the conclusion that Acheson was in over his head: ―Acheson was 
very timid about it … he doesn‘t know what committee to turn to or to whom he should 
go for the introduction of the bill.‖24  
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The proposed ―Atomic Energy Bill,‖ a document that Stimson made his highest 
priority and that had been the primary goal of the Interim Committee, one that the 
combined expertise of the Interim Committee believed essential to the responsible 
transition of authority over atomic energy into the peacetime workings of democratic 
government, went unsubmitted and unconsidered because Acheson failed to move it 
forward. Harrison summarized this history in a September 11 memorandum, wherein he 
urged President Truman‘s secretary to let the president know that Acheson was ostensibly 
holding it up because he feared repercussions on the international front. Harrison 
disputed that stance with reference to the Interim Committee‘s commitment to get 
domestic legislation passed because it would expedite international agreements, noting as 
well that it was also a commitment shared by Secretary of State Byrnes and the primary 
reason why Secretary Byrnes, McCloy, and Harrison had decided that the State 
Department should be the one to deliver the bill to Congress—immediately—in the first 
place.
25
 Discussions about moving the bill forward continued: on September 12, 
Secretary of War Stimson discussed the issue with the president and aides gave 
Acheson‘s assistant a briefing he had requested on the background of the bill—a 
conversation that ended with the assistant saying that the next step would be for the 
president, the secretary of war, and Acheson to discuss the matter; on September 13, after 
Harrison had again met with Acheson, one of Acheson‘s aids phoned Harrison to ask if 
the Secretary of the Interim Committee, R. Gordon Arneson, could be assigned to help 
him ―handle the bill,‖ a request that Harrison said would be unnecessary since Harrison, 
McCloy, and the War Department were already on record with Secretary of State Byrnes 
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as ready and willing to assist moving the bill forward in any way that the State 
Department desired.
26
 On September 15, Acheson ignored the bill entirely in the 
recommendation he made pursuant to Truman‘s requests for input during his first cabinet 
meeting on the issue held on September 21. Acheson suggested that, concurrent with the 
beginning of talks with the Soviet Union, the president ―might‖ send a message to 
Congress explaining the foundations of the U.S. proposal and ―recommending‖ that, at 
that time, Congress proceed with its own full consideration of atomic energy. Nowhere in 
those four pages did Acheson mention the Interim Committee‘s draft bill; nor did he 
recommend that the president make note of the bill in his message to Congress.
27
  
Acheson‘s account of the Interim Committee‘s bill does a disservice to the 
history. In his memoirs, he discusses the concerns he had at the time for international 
control, but fails to mention the work of the Interim Committee or the draft bill, referring 
to it only in passing and diminishing its significance as though it were a formless idea 
floated by insiders. Because the liberties that Acheson took with the history of the Interim 
Committee and its proposed bill have led to distortions in the domestic history of the 
peacetime program,
28
 it will be useful to compare the account detailed in the Interim 
Committee Log and Notes discussed above with Acheson‘s:  
For some weeks … Harrison, Governor of the Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York, and John J. McCloy who had been collaborating with Colonel 
Stimson on atomic energy matters, had been urging Mr. Byrnes and me … 
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to support with the President the May-Johnson bill on domestic control. 
Mr. Byrnes had agreed to this before his departure. However, I had 
become impressed by the complications that might arise if the 
Administration went too far with domestic legislation before formulating 
any approach to international problems.
29
  
 
It was, of course, not a ―May-Johnson‖ bill until October 3, after the Interim 
Committee‘s bill, as well as a presidential statement to accompany it, had been discussed 
and agreement reached in a meeting between congressmen and administration officials, 
including Acheson, Secretary of War Patterson, and George Harrison on October 2. By 
that time the bill had undergone some revision, including the re-addition of the four 
military officers to the nine-member commission that the Interim Committee had 
removed from the proposed bill in July, and, according to Harrison‘s report of the 
meeting, it had become impossible for any congressional discussion of domestic control 
to be separated from the issue of international control.
30
 Had Acheson, as the Interim 
Committee had planned, coordinated the introduction of the bill among congressional 
leaders in August or early September, it would have allowed the administration (by 
reason of the work of the Interim Committee) to frame the terms of the debate over 
domestic control before lines had been publicly drawn in the sand over secrecy, the 
extent of military authority over ordinance or atomic science generally, and before the 
issue of international control became an issue for congressmen to deliberate on at the 
same time that they were considering what to do about domestic control. It is impossible 
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to know whether the problem of domestic control would have been settled earlier had 
Acheson acted promptly and in accordance with the direction he was given; but it is 
reasonable to assume that all of the issues that were raised in the press prior to the bill‘s 
final submission did complicate congressional deliberation and did, therefore, cause an 
unnecessary delay in passage of atomic energy legislation. 
Acheson‘s mischaracterization of the history in his memoirs suggests that by 
September 11, Acheson, though justifiably concerned about the international implications 
of atomic energy, was reaching for an excuse to explain his failure to move the bill 
forward. There are three possible explanations for Acheson‘s inactivity: Harrison and 
McCloy were correct in their initial suspicion that it was timidity that froze Acheson‘s 
hand; Acheson did not want to become involved in any controversy before the hearing 
had been held on his confirmation as Under Secretary—a hearing Acheson expected 
would be held following Truman‘s nomination of him on September 19 or because 
Acheson preferred to set his own pace. According to Acheson‘s biographer, this was 
something Acheson did out of respect for his own ability to sense when the time was 
right: ―His skill at letting matters rest and returning to them later came from his matter-
of-factness and a nice sense of timing.‖ Acheson believed that it was ―as important to 
know when to sit and wait as it is to know when to push ahead.‖31 R. Gordon Arneson, 
then a staff member to the Delegation to the United Nation‘s Atomic Energy 
Commission, recalled that Acheson was not one of the ―best advocates‖ because he had 
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unresolved doubts about the legislation until sometime in Spring 1946 when he put forth 
a State Department position that the two military seats on the commission proposed in the 
McMahon bill be dropped.
32
  
From the standpoint of the peacetime atomic program, however, Acheson‘s 
tentativeness was significant: it put the future of domestic control up in the air, where it 
became a focus for political grandstanding, the playing out of tensions between the White 
House and Congress, between pro- and anti-military scientists, between those who 
desired full international cooperation on atomic matters and defenders of the status quo. 
As Groves testified, ―We are flirting with national suicide if this thing gets out of 
control.‖ Even those opposed to May‘s bill agreed with the danger. Vannevar Bush, head 
of the Office of Scientific Research and Development desired ―rigid‖ control lest careless 
experimenters set up laboratories that would ―sterilize everyone who passed by.‖ The 
administration‘s failure, for whatever reason, to take the initiative at the very end of the 
war over atomic legislation meant that, in the words of a Time reporter, ―Congress would 
just have to do its frightened best.‖ 33 The result was a year of bi-polar debate over 
civilian versus military control—debate that gave the military time to forge a cooperative 
alliance to secure authority over atomic science, in whatever way was possible; and gave 
the military, and especially the Navy, the opportunity to plan and receive approval for 
and to conduct Operation Crossroads. In sum, Acheson bought time for the military to 
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exploit the program; to continue consuming and to begin monopolizing peacetime atomic 
resources; to establish postwar contracts with private and public entities and to begin 
building a network of external, civilian, support for military atomic projects; and, to 
begin using atom bombs as instruments of domestic political influence. 
While Acheson stalled on the Interim Committee‘s bill and before the JCS had 
taken up, and approved, Operation Crossroads, the military had already allied for the 
purposes of investigating their atomic possibilities, creating a ―Joint Committee on New 
Weapons and Equipment‖ and authorizing it to enlist Groves and the Manhattan Project 
for new military projects. On September 4, 1945, two days after Japan‘s formal 
surrender, the Joint Committee sent a letter to Groves questioning production capacity. 
The specificity of that request suggests that at the very least at an operational level 
officers had already identified specific targets and also that there was an expectation that 
wartime production schedules would be maintained or increased. ―How long a period of 
time will be required to stockpile 123 bombs if production is continued on the same scale 
and priority as at present?‖ And what, they asked, was the ―maximum rate of delivery 
from storage in the United States … using present personnel and facilities?‖34 Such 
questions demonstrate that the Committee had not yet had time to imagine atomic 
weapons that were not bombs and, possibly, that unlike the editors of the New York 
Times, they had not yet considered the implications of their request: that bombs of the 
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Hiroshima/Nagasaki type could render conventional forces irrelevant. This assumption is 
supported by a request sent six weeks later from another newly created entity—the War 
Department Atomic Energy Board—that shifted the emphasis away from a strict ―bomb‖ 
model and toward conventional, ―atomized,‖ tactical weapons. Such weapons would be 
dependent, as had those of World War II, upon servicemen. The Board asked for atomic 
energy ―to use as the explosive in the warheads for all missiles and projectiles‖ including 
bombs, artillery projectiles and shells, and an assortment of short, medium, and 
hemispheric-range ground-to-ground, ground-to-water, and ground-to-air missiles. 
Expecting that servicemen might be exposed to radioactive hazards, the request included 
countermeasures such as ―neutron escape‖ warning and detection devices, ―simplification 
of the mechanisms of the warhead and associated bombs,‖ and ―prophylactic treatment‖ 
for injured personnel. One enthusiastic general required ―development to perfect the 
loading and detonating techniques so that the carrying vehicles for atomic energy can 
penetrate the earth‘s crust.‖35  
These memoranda complicate the picture of military planning portrayed by JCS 
historian David Alan Rosenberg, who relied upon the post-National Security Act files of 
the JCS to find that the military‘s planning for an atomic attack was something that began 
in earnest only in 1947. In his words, ―the JCS did not collectively or formally review or 
approve any plan contemplating the use of atomic bombs. … The first operationally 
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oriented atomic target list was prepared in the summer of 1947.‖36 Admittedly, the 
requests of the two committees may not have risen to the level of operational planning 
that Rosenberg had in mind, but they do demonstrate that officers were beginning to 
include atomic weapons in their planning in the immediate aftermath of the war.
 37
  
Though it would take another eight years before an atomic cannon, a weighty, 
multi-ton affair that was so large it required trucks fore and aft to get it into position and a 
partially buried telephone pole to hold it in position, was ready to test,
38
 requests such as 
these provided the vital first imaginative step in the development of tactical weapons and 
the ideological conventionalization of atomic weapons that occurred during Eisenhower‘s 
administration.
39
 The first step in establishing atomic weapons experiments as political 
instruments was Operation Crossroads. Crossroads gave military officers a precedent for 
the staging of elaborate atomic demonstrations to suit domestic agendas—demonstrations 
that made explicit the use of atomic weapons as theatre that downplayed radioactive 
dangers by anointing tactical weapons with cartoonish nicknames such as ―Amazon 
Annie.‖40 Over time, public demonstrations of weapons‘ effects—such as those carried 
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out at the Nevada Test Site—resulted in dereliction of established testing protocols and 
safety procedures, and unnecessarily high levels of off-site fallout.
41
 
Truman‘s decision to continue Groves‘s authority gave the armed forces the first 
inter-governmental opportunity to write new contracts—contracts that encumbered the 
atomic program and committed, for the long term, the nation‘s atomic resources to 
military projects. In 1946, for example, the Army and Navy provided in the neighborhood 
of $90 million dollars to universities and industrial laboratories performing general 
research and investigating nuclear physics.
42
 And, in early February 1946, eleven months 
before the Act became law, K. D. Nichols, Groves‘s chief assistant, reminded Groves to 
tell General Eisenhower that ―to avoid disintegration of our research organizations, it is 
absolutely essential that we make commitments‖ to spend ―20 to 40 million during 1947. 
… Commitments must be made in the immediate future prior to the passage of atomic 
energy legislation.‖43 Though Nichols‘s proposal amounted to only a fraction of the 
approximately $13 billion that Truman had planned for the military‘s budget, it was a 
substantial amount given the interim nature of Groves‘s authority. It also gave the 
military the opportunity to control atomic resources beyond the interim period. It is likely 
that expedience alone prompted the writing of such contracts. But in at least one instance, 
(and probably more,) Groves approved a contract in a deliberate move to avoid the 
                                                 
41
 The best-known example may be ―Harry‖, of the Upshot Knothole Series, detonated at the Nevada Test 
Site on May 19, 1953. Weather had caused the Test Director to postpone the shot and disappoint the 
assembled observers (including congressmen) over the course of several days. Adverse wind conditions 
persisted, but ―Harry‖ was detonated as re-scheduled on May 19 to avoid additional delay.  
 
42
 Louis N. Ridenour, ―Military Support of Atomic Science: A Danger?‖ Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 3 
(1947): 221.  
 
43
 Nichols was briefing Groves for a meeting with General Eisenhower to take place on February 4, 1946. 
―Memorandum to Major General L. B. Groves‖ 2 February 1946, TSCMED. 
 
154 
 
possibility that the newly seated AEC would not. After Truman signed the AEA, but 
before the AEC took charge of the program, Groves guaranteed that the Navy would not 
be hindered by the possibility that the AEC would not cooperate with the Navy‘s plans by 
approving a contract with General Electric. That contract provided funding to study 
development of a nuclear powered reactor for a Navy destroyer.
44
 So, even as 
congressmen were deciding that the management of the atomic program should be in 
civilian hands, the Navy and other branches of the armed forces were taking steps that 
reduced the resources available for future civilian development and stifled the options 
available to the civilian authority that elected officials would establish under the Atomic 
Energy Act of 1946.  
Truman‘s extension of Groves‘s authority also provided time for advisory-level 
officials of the Manhattan Project to downplay the perception within government circles 
that Groves had overreached as manager of the Manhattan Project in an effort to generate 
support for continued military control over atomic energy, for Crossroads, and indirectly 
for the militarization of atomic science. Why? While some no doubt sincerely believed 
that only the military was capable of corralling atomic science, one example suggests that 
internal support for military control was not necessarily the result of a decision that the 
military was the appropriate authority to control atomic science, but was prompted by a 
combination of factors, including: (a) a belief that the speedy passage of domestic 
legislation was necessary to neutralize the possibility of atomic warfare; (b) confidence 
that elected officials would have no difficulty restraining the military‘s enthusiasm for 
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atomic weapons during peacetime; and, relatedly, that (c) the heavy-handedness that 
those opposed to continued military control found so objectionable during Manhattan had 
not been the result of military authority, but had, instead, been circumstantially anchored 
in the pressures of wartime and Groves‘s businesslike authoritarian manner.  
One of these officials was Stafford Warren, Medical Director of the Manhattan 
Project, soon to be Chief Medical Officer for Operation Crossroads. Warren had 
prepared the safety plan for Trinity, analyzed and reported on the radioactive damage that 
first atom bomb had caused, and had been among the first investigators into Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki. From his perspective in December 1945, passage of the dominant military-
oriented, May-Johnson, atomic energy bill was urgently necessary, the first step to 
international control and agreements to prevent atomic warfare and a necessary 
preliminary to funding studies of beneficial uses of atomic energy and those that would 
lead to new ways to reduce or mitigate the hazards associated with exposure to 
radioactive material. Warren took advantage of a position on a State Department 
―Working Committee‖ convened to advise the Top Policy Commission on international 
control to massage Manhattan history, endeavoring to leave the impression that Groves 
(and by extension, the Army) had been appropriately subordinate to civilian authority 
during wartime; and, that if given the opportunity during peacetime, military officers 
would likewise defer to civilian authority, direction, and policies. Warren‘s handwritten 
list of factors that led to the successful development of an atom bomb, and the corrections 
he inserted, illustrate that his default assumption about the project was that military 
autonomy was the key to Manhattan‘s success. Only as an afterthought did Warren 
decide—for the Working Group‘s consumption—to distinguish between civilian and 
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military responsibility and to minimize the extent of Groves‘s authoritarianism. Warren 
originally wrote:  
(1) Proper vision & overall concept of AB [atom bomb] importance:  
 (a) military authority (b) financial support & 
 (c) proper concept of relationship to the war in the  
  Manhattan District organization from the top down. 
Warren‘s revisions, made with insertions on his original copy, indicate that he 
was not only interested in protecting Groves‘s reputation, but also in the identification of 
a set of circumstances that he believed important for the peacetime program:  
(1) Proper military vision & overall concept of AB importance: 
 (a) military and civilian administrative authority (b) financial support & 
(c) proper concept of its relationship & importance to the war in the  
Manhattan District organization from the top down 
(d) pooling all nuclear research under one organization, ie., 
 Manhattan District.
45
  
This revision illustrates that Warren was motivated by sympathy for Groves and 
the dilemmas he had faced during the war as manager of Manhattan, but also was 
concerned with the makeup of the peacetime program and especially the creation of a 
coordinated research program. In Warren‘s estimation, such coordination would prevent 
fragmentation of data and misplaced assumptions about exposure limits and human 
tolerance that occurred when, as he later put it in a ninety-minute lecture that summarized 
what he had learned from the bombings of Japan and at Crossroads, ―chemists and 
                                                 
45
 Undated. The notes were included with others made for the State Department‘s Working Group meeting 
on December 1, 1945. Stafford Warren, ―Assorted Notes and letters December 1945-January 1946.‖ 
Stafford Warren mss, Coll. 987, Box 57, Folder 4, UCLA.  
157 
 
physicists‖ misunderstood the ―biological problems. They use a slide rule and diffuse 
things evenly and then come up with figures that are fantastically low or safe.‖46 Thus, it 
seems most likely that it was not out of support for a militarily controlled program that 
Warren sought speedy passage of a bill that would have put the military in charge of 
atomic science, but because he believed—not unlike the members of the Interim 
Committee—that settling the issue of domestic control was an essential first step toward 
the achievement of greater scientific understanding of the possibilities and hazards of 
radioactive materials as well as for the erection a system of international control that 
would limit the possibility for atomic warfare.  
Toward a goal of domestic legislation, Warren tried during the same period of 
time to broker a détente between Groves and the scientists he had antagonized during 
wartime and who were the most outspoken opponents of continued military control over 
atomic energy. To the scientists, Warren cast the problems they remembered at 
Manhattan as generated by wartime—not military authoritariansm—and pointed out the 
control that the president and Congress would be able to exert during peacetime. The real 
problem, Warren argued, was neither Groves nor the Army, but the war: ―strain and 
fatigue,‖ ―security regulations,‖ and, not unlike the ―rest of the country,‖ scientists were 
―restless,‖ tired of ―restraints‖ and ―eager to get back to civilian occupations and back 
home.‖ As evidence that it had been war, and not the Army, that was the problem, 
Warren reminded them that since the end of the conflict, Groves had encouraged 
―freedom of research.‖ At the same time, Warren tried to convince them their opposition 
to the military bill was counterproductive, undermining scientific progress. Their 
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outspoken opposition had caused the senate committee to become ―badly confused and 
afraid to make decisions‖ and had negatively affected scientific prestige. Warren 
explained to them that indecision was contributing to ―apathy‖ which would lead to ―less 
support of scientific research‖ when a bill was finally passed. He argued for speedy 
passage of a stopgap bill, urging them to unite, get ―something passed … which can be 
tried out‖ and decide on safeguards they wanted added as amendments and to ―get the 
right men to serve in key positions.‖47 
Warren was less blunt with Groves. With a mixture of admiration and sympathy, 
it took Warren nine pages to sum up his assessment of the oppositional scientists‘ 
frustrations and to give the cantankerous Groves a friendly lesson in the art of intra-
personal political persuasion. Explaining the ―spade work‖ Groves needed to do, Warren 
told him to ―mend all the fences possible … eliminate friction and jealousy without 
losing military control.‖ Warren suggested that Groves take the younger scientists into 
his confidence, use actual cases of suspected espionage to explain the importance of his 
security measures, and show his appreciation to the scientists by throwing a party. The 
significance of this final recommendation, and the gentle prodding that Warren included 
to ensure that Groves not botch the reconciliation, demonstrate not only that Warren 
believed Groves to be particularly inept at camaraderie, but more importantly that Warren 
genuinely believed that much of the opposition to continued military control was 
grounded primarily in Groves‘s personality. Among his recommendations for the party, 
Warren told Groves to have his second-in-command Nichols set it up ―with all the 
trappings … get everybody there … and have fun.    Make it like an alumni meeting. It‘ll 
work without liquor but will need strong coffee.‖ Apparently wary that even Nichols 
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might not get it right, Warren suggested that proper seating arrangements would 
encourage co-mingling between civilian and military: ―arrange the seating with alternate 
military and civilians.‖ Warren encouraged Groves to make the most of the occasion, to 
elicit appreciation and sympathy from the scientists by admitting his ―embarrassments in 
dealing with them‖ and showing appreciation for the scientists‘ work and sympathy for 
their hardships. In this way, Warren argued, Groves would be able to turn ―their fear of 
you into loyalty.‖48  
Thus, in the winter of 1945, and before Congress or the president had given their 
approval to Operation Crossroads, Warren—perhaps unknowingly because he clearly 
believed that elected officials would be the ultimate guardians of atomic energy—
contributed to militarization of the atomic program. Warren‘s admiration for the wartime 
effort and the success of the Manhattan Project, his belief in the peacetime value of 
atomic science, and his faith in America‘s democratic system, led him to minimize the 
extent of autonomy exercised by the Army and Groves during Manhattan and, in the 
process, to diffuse at least partially the wariness within a high-level government advisory 
committee about what the military might be expected to do if given authority over atomic 
energy. Warren‘s opinions carried weight: the respect that he commanded outside of the 
Manhattan Project is evident from his inclusion in a powerhouse of consultants, including 
such leading figures as Henry Smyth and Vannevar Bush, brought together to analyze the 
prospects for international control over atomic energy and to devise the rudiments for 
inspection that would best protect America‘s interests and security. Their 
recommendations were to be presented in a package to the War, State, and Navy 
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Departments for negotiations with the Russians and for presentation to the United 
Nations Security Council.
49
 It is, of course, impossible to know how influential Warren‘s 
suggestions, recommendations, and portrayal of the military‘s command of the 
Manhattan project were. It is reasonable to assume that the combination of the respect he 
commanded within high-level administrative circles, his support for Operation 
Crossroads, and his willingness to serve as its Chief Medical Officer, played a role in the 
assent the president and Congress gave the Operation.  
Truman‘s indecisiveness and his administration‘s failure to follow through with 
the atomic energy bill drafted by his Interim Committee did not merely maintain the 
status quo, it created opportunities for the armed forces to begin exerting their authority 
over atomic science. As Warren had within the Working Committee, military officers and 
their supporters used the delay to combat antimilitarism within government circles, to 
diffuse objections and build support for the peacetime exploitation of atomic science by 
the armed forces among congressmen and officials for peacetime research and, for the 
expansion of military control over atomic energy. Simultaneously, Army and Navy 
officers generated additional external support for military projects during peacetime by 
contracting with private industry and universities for research and development. And, 
military officers who had begun planning for and requesting additional atomic bombs and 
development of new types of atomic weapons were also causing money and material to 
be commandeered for military projects and tied up atomic resources for military use far 
into the future.  
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Over the same period of time, Navy and Army officers allied in support of 
Operation Crossroads in an effort to begin drawing public support for the maintenance of 
a strong peacetime military. The discussion that follows demonstrates that Crossroads 
was not, as historians have suggested, merely an anomaly in the history of atomic 
weapons or the last gasp of the Manhattan Project; but, because it operated as a bridge 
between wartime and peacetime ways of doing business, giving military officers practical 
experience in the use of wartime strategies of control during peacetime and in the use of 
atomic science for domestic political purposes, was, instead, one of the most significant 
turning points in postwar history.  
Operation Crossroads was put in motion by Secretary of the Navy James V. 
Forrestal and his Assistant, Lewis L. Strauss. Strauss‘s interest in atomic development 
had begun before the war when, as one of New York‘s prestigious financiers, he began to 
invest in the production of radioactive isotopes because of the promise they held for the 
treatment of disease.
50
 Forrestal‘s immediate goal was to wrest attention away from the 
Army to ensure that the Navy would prevail in upcoming legislative battles about 
appropriations and military reorganization.
51
 As the New York Times put it, the end of the 
war was all that was needed to bring to the fore intra-service rivalry. The military had ―a 
green light to resume their campaign, and Navy leaders are preparing for the coming 
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fight.‖52 Forrestal‘s long-term plan was both more complex and ambitious: nothing less 
than the mobilization of peacetime America, the erection of a national security economy, 
and securing policymaking authority for military leaders. By August 1945, Strauss had 
made Forrestal‘s vision his own. In contrast to officers in other branches who began to 
press Groves for additional atom bombs and for development of a range of conventional 
atomized devices, Strauss took into account the ways that the atomic program could be 
used to help the Navy secure its future. Strauss sought to use atom bombs to demonstrate 
that the Navy was the only branch of the forces that would be able to withstand and 
effectively respond to an atomic attack. On August 16, one month to the day after 
Feynman and Wilson considered their role in the Trinity bomb and one week after the 
bombing of Nagasaki, Strauss wrote a memorandum to Forrestal recommending that the 
Navy waste no time in holding maneuvers that would show that Navy ships could 
withstand an atomic attack. Strauss‘s interest was not with national security but with the 
Navy‘s postwar viability and prestige. In his own words, the goal of this experiment was 
to maximize the Navy‘s share of the defense budget: to avoid the possibility that ―loose 
talk … that the fleet is obsolete‖ might gain political traction and ―militate against 
appropriations to preserve a postwar Navy of the size now planned.‖53 Though Strauss‘s 
proposal for maneuvers pitting ships against atom bombs would be a tremendously 
expensive way to test vessel design against radiation and blast and was implausibly based 
on the possibility that an enemy would use a weapon as expensive and as terrifically 
effective at land-based devastation as the atom bomb against targets as scattered and as 
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resilient as ships and vessels; and, may have amounted to what one columnist called 
another example of ―the piecemeal improvisation which represents the daily evolution of 
our post-war defense policy,‖54 it nonetheless dovetailed perfectly with Forrestal‘s 
methods of political engagement and with his postwar goals.  
Forrestal‘s enthusiasm for Crossroads reflects the confidence he had in its 
potential to position the Navy at the forefront of peacetime planning. He created an 
Office of Special Weapons, staffing it with four top Navy men, three of whom had 
worked on the Manhattan Project.
55
 He arranged with Connecticut Senator Brien 
McMahon to propose the experiment during a speech he made on August 25, publicly 
launching Operation Crossroads.
56
 By the end of August 1945, Forrestal had achieved 
his short term goal by stealing some of the limelight that had been occupied by the 
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Army‘s Manhattan Project,57 and had taken the first steps toward achieving his long term 
ambitions.  
For the peacetime atomic program, McMahon‘s introduction of Crossroads was a 
turning point: national security had successfully been used to mask a self-interested 
military use of atomic energy. August 6 and 9, 1945, the first and last times that the atom 
bomb was used in war, will forever account for two of the most significant dates in the 
history of atomic weapons. August 25, the day that McMahon introduced the Navy‘s 
plan, deserves a place on the timeline of atomic history as the first time that the military 
and its supporters used atomic science to achieve a domestic political goal. That it was 
not the last time was partially due to the institutional and operational antecedents set by 
Forrestal. As Secretary of the Navy, Forrestal engaged in strategies similar to the ones 
that Groves used to control atomic energy: he endorsed media manipulation, the use of 
military urgency, and operational methods that sidestepped the constitutional 
subordination of the military to civilian authority.
58
 In the process, Forrestal contributed 
to increasing the military‘s influence, establishing the imaginative space for postwar 
militarization, for what has been described elsewhere as a reconciliation between the 
traditional wariness of peacetime military influence and acceptance of a mobilized 
America.
59
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The ways that Forrestal influenced the atomic program have been mired in the 
larger and interesting history of a man whose passions and patriotism took him from a 
prosperous Wall Street career to service as Secretary of the Navy, then as first Secretary 
of Defense, and finally into paranoia and Walter Reed General Hospital, where he 
committed suicide in 1949. As Under Secretary of the Navy throughout most of the war, 
as Secretary from spring 1945 until 1947 when he became the first Secretary of Defense, 
Forrestal was dogged by failure. He was unable to earn the respect of career officers 
under his command and was thus unable to achieve cohesion among the Navy‘s upper 
echelon during the war. Afterward he was equally incapable of persuading the JCS to 
accept his recommendations or to make any adjustment in their traditional roles; was 
unable to secure the military dominance that he had planned for the National Security 
Council; and, ultimately, was unable to achieve the policymaking revolution that seems 
to have been his primary goal.
60
 As one historian wrote, ―It is … difficult to find 
distinction, or wisdom, in the life and work of James Forrestal.‖61 The loftiness of 
Forrestal‘s ambitions account in large measure for his inability to achieve them. 
Motivated by a belief, by all accounts genuine, that elected policymakers had 
underestimated the threat Soviets posed to American security during the war and fearing 
that they would continue to do so afterward, Forrestal envisioned a revolutionary change 
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in policymaking, one that would have positioned the military at the very center of policy 
formation. It was a plan that was not only at odds with the Constitution and American 
tradition, but also went against the grain of elected officials and civilian advisors who 
believed that whatever the threat from Soviet style communism, they should continue to 
be the arbiters of policy.
62
 Truman‘s reluctance to share policymaking authority was 
particularly acute. ―Under our system, he wrote, ―the responsibility rests on one man—
the President. To change it, we would have to change the Constitution, and I think we 
have been doing very well under our Constitution.‖63  
It seems likely that Forrestal‘s failure to achieve the policymaking authority he 
sought actually contributed to the influence he had in shaping the direction of the postwar 
atomic program. Had Forrestal, for instance, been confident that the military would be 
allowed to participate in policymaking after the war without the use of atomic weapons as 
instruments of political persuasion, he might not have been so receptive to Strauss‘s 
proposal for the expensive Operation Crossroads. But he did not, and his inability to 
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receive that authority seems to have done little more than harden his resolve to secure it 
by whatever means necessary, including the use of atomic weapons for publicity 
purposes. One incident suggests that Forrestal was quick to imagine, in fact, that he was 
deliberately being shut out of high-level deliberations. On October 4, 1945, and on the 
basis of a comment made by then-Commodore Lewis Strauss, Forrestal complained to 
Secretary of War Patterson that the Navy had not been allowed to review the atomic 
energy bill before it had been submitted to Congress on October 3. Forrestal dropped his 
complaint when informed that it was not the Navy, but Strauss who had been left out of 
the loop. Former Under Secretary of the Navy, Ralph A. Bard, had represented the Navy 
on the Interim Committee, had received a copy of the draft bill on July 25, and had 
returned it without comment or objection.
64
 Forrestal‘s inability to participate in 
policymaking to the extent that he believed necessary gave him reasons to use atomic 
weapons in an effort to achieve that authority.  
A review of Forrestal‘s operational and administrative methods, together with 
their significance for Operation Crossroads and their relation to future atomic 
experimentation, illustrates not only the centrality of the atomic program and atom bombs 
to the military‘s postwar goals but also the significance of the wartime sense of 
responsibility for national security that Forrestal carried into peacetime. The following 
summary of Forrestal‘s use of the program for domestic political purposes, the 
effectiveness of his arguments for postwar mobilization, and the influence he had over 
Strauss, who supported the military throughout his years of service as an AEC 
Commissioner and later Chairman in ways that were reminiscent of Forrestal‘s, 
demonstrates that Forrestal was more successful in revolutionizing policymaking than has 
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previously been recognized. Forrestal established the conditions for the militarization of 
atomic science and for the military to use atomic science and weapons testing to exert 
policymaking force.  
This force would ultimately be expressed at the institutional and at the cabinet 
level. During the 1947-1949 period of Consolidation, the military influenced AEC 
decision-making. After Consolidation, the AEC actively supported and enlarged the 
military‘s authority over atomic resources and experimentation. At the cabinet level, 
Strauss, as Chairman of the AEC and as Eisenhower‘s Special Assistant for Atomic 
Energy beginning in 1953, partnered with the military to resist diplomatic efforts aimed 
at arms control, fearing that they would limit or prevent continued atmospheric weapons 
testing and the military‘s atomic projects. Moreover, he subordinated civilian applications 
to those of the military. Strauss, for example, objected to the use of AEC resources for 
peacetime applications and refused to comply with the NSC mandate approved by 
Eisenhower in Spring 1955 that directed the AEC develop a ―small-output power reactor 
… most promising for uses abroad.‖ The AEC was to develop the reactor ―as soon as 
possible‖ so that a form of ―U.S. aid‖ could be used to counter Soviet influence, a move 
that held the promise of building links between small countries and American industry. 
Strauss‘s first response was to balk; then in October, to stall, claiming that he believed he 
had satisfied the directive‘s intent, citing ―tacit approval‖ from the Council for his 
announcement the previous July that he intended to postpone acting on the directive 
because of an ongoing Army reactor project that could potentially lead to the 
development of a reactor suitable for civilian use. Finally, in January 1956, Strauss 
substituted the AEC‘s, or his, judgment for that of the NSC and the president, reporting 
169 
 
that the AEC ―considers that independent AEC action to construct a small-output reactor 
with public funds is not economically justifiable.‖ Eisenhower‘s interest in the project‘s 
success seems to have been the reason why Strauss ultimately did make one concession 
to the directive by ―inviting‖ private companies to participate or to use development 
contracts from other countries, as Westinghouse was doing for Belgium for the Brussels 
World Fair, to provide Eisenhower‘s civilian reactor.65   
Interestingly, one of the reasons why the administration aggressively pursued 
development of a small power reactor was because Strauss had emphatically argued 
during a NSC meeting and in support for increased funding that the U.S. was losing the 
civilian reactor race—that the Soviet‘s had ―astonished us‖ with their advances, having 
put their first civilian reactor into use in 1954, and that the British had a six-month lead 
on the U.S.
66
 NSC records show, however, that Strauss avoided using the funds that had 
been allocated for civilian applications and avoided, also, using non-weapons grade 
uranium that the president had allocated for civilian reactor development. Instead, Strauss 
diverted resources for civilian applications to military programs.
67
 Just as Groves had 
with Manhattan, Strauss used his authority over atomic science in a self-serving way, 
deferring only superficially to executive authority and directives, and used deceit and 
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subterfuge to avoid taking responsibility, and in the process avoided carrying out a 
policy-level directive. In this instance, Strauss combined the wartime strategies of control 
used by Groves with another wartime tactic employed by Forrestal, namely, using an 
insider, ―civilian,‖ status to shape national policy in the interests of the military.  
Forrestal‘s operational approach—including his relentless cultivation of the media 
to promote anticommunism and his anti-Soviet ideology and his inducement of 
prominent civilians into administrative positions within the Navy and other military 
branches—allowed him to build long-lasting support for the military expansion and 
contributed to establishing a number of the conditions for the militarization of atomic 
science. As others have noted, Forrestal‘s ―political/military‖ philosophy transformed the 
Navy. Forrestal modernized it, reconfiguring departments and personnel in ways that 
helped it to meet its wartime challenges and enlarging its footprint, leaving it ―infinitely 
larger in terms of ships, planes, and men [and] better organized to support the new 
responsibilities in the international scene.‖68 One of the ways that Forrestal accomplished 
this was by incorporating successful civilians into Navy administration. Unlike career 
officers, Forrestal came from outside the Navy, having achieved fame, and wealth, as a 
financier and was a believer in the value of professional expertise—a trend already 
evident in non-military government agencies and departments. The civilian talent that 
Forrestal brought in gave him a network of support outside the military community and, 
within Navy ranks, one that was not dependent upon the traditional officer corps. This 
helped him to rise above the resentment of powerful career officers such as Admiral J. E. 
                                                 
68
 Albion and Connery, 286. For the Navy‘s influence over the science of oceanography from the 1930s 
through the 1950s, see Ronald Rainger, ―Science at the crossroads: The Navy, Bikini Atoll, and American 
oceanography in the 1940s,‖ Historical Studies in the Physical and Biological Sciences 30, Part 2 (2000): 
349.  
 
171 
 
King. In part, Forrestal‘s methods amounted to the realization of a version of 
Corporatism that he and his friend and colleague Ferdinand Eberstadt had envisioned 
when they sought to bring together organizational professionals with the government and 
thereby to create an administrative structure that benefited business and government.
69
 
For Forrestal, however, the practice was also an essential first step to securing authority. 
By incorporating like-minded and successful private individuals, some of them men from 
a list of sympathetic professionals—a list that Eberstadt called his ―Good Man List‖—
and granting them rank and status, Forrestal fashioned his own devoted cadre of within 
the Navy‘s officer corps.  
Those loyal supporters became avenues to influence after the war. As, for 
example, when Forrestal sought to diffuse Truman‘s support for the Army‘s unification 
plan in favor of his own ―integrated‖ alternative. At that time, Forrestal turned to two of 
his supporters who were among Truman‘s most trusted advisors: Clark Clifford, his naval 
aide and later Chief of Staff, and George Elsey, a presidential aide and speechwriter.
70
 
Forrestal‘s dependence on ―civilian‖ talent and his methods for rewarding loyalty 
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affected the peacetime atomic program, too. Under Forrestal‘s tutelage, Lewis L. Strauss 
rose from Reserve Lieutenant Commander in the Bureau of Ordinance to Reserve Rear 
Admiral.
71
 After passage of the AEA, Forrestal‘s patronage and promotion of Strauss led 
to his nomination and appointment as one of the first of the ―civilian‖ AEC 
commissioners—an event that benefited Strauss and gave Forrestal a militarily-
supportive acolyte on the Commission. As significant as these loyalties were, Forrestal‘s 
dependence on professional, civilian, expertise achieved significance beyond the intra-
personal level; it allowed him to prevent non-Navy civilian interference with Navy 
projects and to circumvent constitutional principles. 
Forrestal used civilian administrators within the Navy‘s hierarchy as a means of 
subordinating civilian authority to military projects. It was a strategy that would become 
especially important with atomic science, where the chief issue was one of civilian vs. 
military authority. In contrast to Ernest J. King, Commander of Naval Operations during 
the war and Forrestal‘s most powerful rival among career officers, who was willing to 
draw the ire of Roosevelt by acting purposefully to limit civilian authority over the 
Navy‘s administration,72 Forrestal employed a strategy that Michel Foucault attributed to 
the modern state—the use of ―tactics rather than laws‖—and maintained an illusion of 
―civilian‖ oversight without suffering its restrictions.73 Forrestal‘s administrative strategy 
was to operate in accordance with the letter, but not the spirit, of the military‘s 
subordination to civilian authority. During a wartime administrative reorganization, for 
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example, Forrestal guaranteed that there would be no non-Navy interference with the 
Office of Naval Research (ONR) by insisting that ONR remain under the auspices of the 
Assistant Secretary of the Navy.
74
 In this way, he asserted his authority over this 
important division while perpetuating the illusion that ONR was under ―civilian control,‖ 
insulating it from outside oversight and protecting it from claims that it was operating 
strictly in the Navy‘s interest. This is not to say that such conduct was unique to 
Forrestal, but rather to point out that within the history of atomic science, Forrestal was 
uniquely positioned to influence the uses the Navy made of the atomic program after the 
war and especially influential over the peacetime program‘s administration. As Secretary 
of the Navy and later as Secretary of Defense, Forrestal was in charge of the Navy and its 
projects, but he was strictly a civilian, and his responsibilities extended to preventing 
such conduct. By practicing and endorsing administrative techniques that allowed the 
Navy to avoid civilian oversight, Forrestal sidestepped his responsibilities, violated 
constitutional principles, and provided the means for the military officers and their 
supporters to use the atomic program to achieve self-interested goals. As the peacetime 
program matured, military officers were as careful as Forrestal had been to prevent 
drawing the wrong sort of attention: they paid superficial, but not meaningful, deference 
to the civilian authority of the AEC and elected officials.  
Forrestal‘s sensitivity to creating favorable impressions can be seen in the way he 
went about receiving approval for and eliminating Army opposition to Crossroads. 
Forrestal understood that if Crossroads had any chance of being approved, it would have 
to be portrayed as serving the nation‘s and not the Navy‘s interests. Senator Brien 
McMahon was ideally suited to introduce the Navy‘s plan, having already gone on record 
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as opposed to continued weapons development and monopolization of atomic secrets. As 
reported in the New York Times on August 19, McMahon had sent a telegram to Truman 
urging generosity with regard to atomic science, arguing that the best way to find some 
sort of ―constructive‖ use for atomic science would be to share the secret, so that ―the 
united energies of scientists of the world be combined in some effort to discover causes 
and cures for the deadly diseases of mankind.‖75 McMahon‘s authority and integrity were 
not enough to diffuse the suspicions that Crossroads was primarily a media event staged 
to bolster the Navy‘s influence during military reorganization. But McMahon‘s 
endorsement was enough to create the belief, at least in the minds of some, that 
Crossroads was also, and perhaps primarily, a national security imperative. In sum, it lent 
heft to the Navy‘s arguments that Crossroads would be a valid military experiment, and 
an altruistic one at that, benefiting not just the Navy and the nation, but also all of 
mankind by providing a venue and logistical support for a broad range of scientific 
studies.  
Political acumen of a similar sort, and no doubt endorsed by Forrestal, allowed 
the Navy to diffuse the Army‘s opposition at the earliest stage of the Operation’s 
planning, a move that established a precedent for the use of atomic science to build an 
intra-service cooperative alliance. The Army‘s opposition to Crossroads arose during a 
September meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff when General H. H. Arnold asked the 
Chiefs to deny the Navy‘s request to hold atomic maneuvers. Arnold argued that the 
captured Japanese vessels the Navy planned to use should be reserved for the AAF for 
atomic bombing practice. His Navy counterpart, Admiral J. E. King, Commander-in-
Chief of the United States Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations, eliminated Arnold‘s 
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objections by inviting the AAF to drop the first bomb at Operation Crossroads and 
agreeing to portray it as a cooperative Army-Navy Operation.
76
 Renamed officially Joint 
Task Force ONE, the Chiefs signed off on the Navy‘s plan and Operation Crossroads 
began to take shape.
77
 Given King‘s documented uncooperative nature and lack of 
subtlety, the proposition bore all the hallmarks of a Forrestal solution. It also offers one 
of the first examples of how the ability to mobilize atomic energy for domestic political 
purposes operated as a mechanism that generated cooperation among the armed forces.  
Though rivalries persisted, the military‘s right to use the atomic program and 
atomic weapons and to monopolize atomic resources for any reason that advanced 
military ambitions were goals shared by officers of every branch. Atomic science thus 
became a point where the potential for mutual benefit trumped intra-service rivalry. This 
unofficial cooperative alliance represented a departure from the usual practice of 
competition between the branches, competition that Presidents Truman and Eisenhower 
alike criticized as counterproductive and inefficient but that had, as atomic history 
illustrates about armed forces‘ cooperation, operated as an unofficial check on militarism. 
King‘s acquiescence to Arnold‘s ambitions led to the recognition by the upper echelon 
that there was utility in cooperation, and the JCS‘s approval of Crossroads paved the way 
for an era of cooperative exploitation of atomic science. After Crossroads had entered the 
planning stages, Groves‘s advisors, because of their interest in maintaining military 
authority over atomic science, provided avenues for the expression of this cooperative 
ethos that aligned officers from other branches with the Army‘s Manhattan Project, 
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encouraging officers to ―work in unison…to climb aboard the bandwagon before they get 
to the point of crashing aboard,‖ offering meetings and programs designed to familiarize 
them with atomic weapons and warfare, and suggesting studies that the Project could help 
them perform.
78
  During the era of atmospheric weapons testing, and despite the 
contentiousness expressed in the media about issues such as which branch should be the 
first to respond to atomic attack, the armed forces—through the JCS—were allied where 
it mattered: at the level of domestic authority over atomic science. The JCS agreed that 
the armed forces should have priority, and authority, over atomic resources, production, 
and experimentation. The unified and coherent nature of their stance about atomic 
science during the atmospheric era meant that elected officials had no authoritative—
militarily generated—reason to call into question JCS claims that the use of atomic 
science, including monopolizing its resources and engaging in risky experimentation, was 
excessive or unnecessary. In this way, cooperation allowed all branches to avoid 
restrictions imposed by civilians, whether elected or appointed.  
Crossroads was an important ingredient in the JCS atomic alliance, instigating it 
and providing a foundation for cooperation that was strong enough to withstand the 
differences of opinion that occasionally arose within it over ancillary atomic issues.
79
 
Because of the alliance, no authoritative opposition to Crossroads emerged that might 
have kept Truman and congressmen from approving the Operation. Because of it, too, the 
Navy faced few obstacles in its ongoing efforts to leave the impression that the 
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Operation’s primary goal was the preservation of national security. Even without 
significant interference or objection from the other branches, however, the Navy 
reiterated its position that the Operation was in the nation‘s, and not just the Navy‘s, 
interests to prevent the possibility that either the president or Congress would withdraw 
their support. In April 1946, almost four months after the president had signed off on the 
Operation, Navy officers were still preoccupied with efforts to correct the notion that 
self-interest drove the Operation by emphasizing that it was a national security 
imperative. In a memorandum to the president, one argued that the tests were ―essential 
… now‖ because ―designers, tacticians, strategists, and medical officers‖ would 
otherwise be ―groping their way along a dark road which may lead to another and worse 
‗Pearl Harbor.‘‖80 As Groves had during Manhattan, Navy officers combined that sense 
of urgency and imperative with statements that minimized the project‘s projected expense 
in vague and even deceptive terms. To congressmen, Navy officers estimated the expense 
of the maneuver at $3.7 million, the value of ships at ten dollars per ton for scrap, and the 
remainder ―absorbed in current appropriations and …finishing off the war.‖81 To the 
president, and included within the April memorandum that reiterated the importance of 
the Operation, the Navy responded to higher estimates of the program‘s cost as ―gross 
exaggerations‖ and used percentages instead of hard numbers to minimize the expense. 
For example, ―90%‖ of the ships were surplus, scrap or obsolete and, given the ―high 
labor costs of scrapping,‖ the value of those ships would ―be only a few percent of the 
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original costs of the ships.‖ In its summary to the president, the Navy reported that the 
―total cost of the tests will only be a few percent of the annual naval appropriation, and 
will probably not exceed the total cost of one large new ship.‖ In a practice that would 
become routine as the peacetime atomic program matured, the Navy discredited 
unofficial statements as unauthoritative. An outside estimate that Crossroads would cost 
$100 million had, according to the Navy, ―no foundation whatsoever‖ because ―neither 
the War and Navy Departments nor the joint Army-Navy Task Force…has ever 
published an estimate of the operating costs.‖82 (Right after the Operation, however, the 
official historian for the Operation validated the $100 million figure as an approximation 
of its ―actual cost.‖)83 But for the Navy to benefit from Operation Crossroads, it needed 
more than assent from the JCS; it required convincing suspicious congressmen and 
engaged private citizens that the maneuvers were not only necessary but also that they 
were urgently so. Here, at a time when the Truman administration and Congress had 
barely had the opportunity to discuss the future of atomic science and while the America 
people, too, had had little time to digest the bomb‘s implications, the Navy had the upper 
hand thanks to Forrestal‘s determination, the institutional capacity for promotion that he 
had built into the Navy during the war, and his use and endorsement of subtle deceit to 
convince congressmen and others that the Operation was in the best interests of national 
security.  
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While Forrestal‘s administrative and operational methods helped secure additional 
layers of support for the Navy and for the Operation within government circles, his 
promotional expertise and tenacity helped secure the support of the American public and, 
through them, enough political support to receive approval for Crossroads.
84
 In the 
process of bolstering the Navy‘s position relative to the Army, Forrestal raised his own 
profile, ingratiating himself with influential members of Congress and, through his 
contacts with the Fourth Estate, with the public. After the war and during the unification 
debates, Forrestal cultivated supporters and engaged in what for most people would have 
been an exhaustive campaign to press his agenda with Congress. From January through 
July 1947, for example, Forrestal met socially or formally with congressional members 
on at least sixty-nine occasions, and from March through July testified before or attended 
hearings at least twenty-five times.
85
 No less a political animal than Truman recognized 
that Forrestal enjoyed so much respect and popularity that, despite disliking him, he had 
no other option after Secretary of War Patterson had turned him down but to nominate 
Forrestal as the first Secretary of Defense.
86
  
Forrestal, as convinced of the value of publicity as he was committed to the 
Navy‘s future, turned promotion into an institutional imperative. At his first press 
conference as Secretary of the Navy, Forrestal made it clear that publicity was now Navy 
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policy, he would ―tell what the Navy was doing and let the facts speak for themselves.‖ 
Thereafter, he ordered the Navy‘s top Intelligence Officer to hold weekly press 
conferences, despite the fact that the officer‘s position meant that he might, inadvertently, 
reveal knowledge of future operations that could compromise the war effort.
87
 To ensure 
that the Navy received credit in the popular imagination for what it was doing to win the 
war in the Pacific, Forrestal created a Public Information Office and appointed a PI 
Officer with the authority to hire and coordinate teams of journalists and photographers 
to generate stories for print, radio, and newsreels about the Navy‘s Pacific 
accomplishments. By establishing a photographic studio on Guam where pictures could 
be instantly processed and transmitted to print outlets via radiophoto, Forrestal brought 
the Navy‘s war home. Because of Forrestal‘s efforts, the picture of the Iwo Jima flag 
raising on February 23, 1945, an event that he arranged to witness, made it into 
newspapers across America within two days, just in time to appear in Sunday editions. 
For Forrestal, the importance of capturing that event photographically had less to do with 
its historical importance than with its significance for future funding possibilities. It 
meant, in Forrestal‘s own words, ―a Marine Corps for the next 500 years.‖88  
The importance that Forrestal attached to photography, and the influence he had 
on the Navy at large, is reflected in the emphasis during Crossroads of establishing a 
photographic record. To supplement the 328 automatic cameras that it installed in planes, 
for example, the Navy hired 500 photographers to record the event, a number of 
cameramen that was a bit shy of the number necessary to handle the 700 cameras it had 
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purchased, but nonetheless enough to have used up half of the world‘s supply of film 
within minutes of the first shot, ―Able.‖89 For Operation Crossroads, the Navy relied on 
Forrestal‘s media connections, but most importantly, upon the institutional support for 
public relations that he had created. Though the media and the public would have been 
interested in anything having to do with atomic weapons, Forrestal‘s public relations 
machine was the primary reason that Operation Crossroads received more print and radio 
coverage than any other event of 1946.
90
 One measure of the significance of the 
Operation’s publicity machine is that in a poll asking respondents to rate the military 
officers they admired most, a list that included Eisenhower, McArthur, Marshall, and 
others who had distinguished themselves and been featured prominently in the media 
during World War II, Admiral King—who became a household name only after he was 
placed in charge of Operation Crossroads—ranked just below Omar Bradley.91 
The Navy portrayed Operation Crossroads, conducted between July and August 
1946, as a experiment to investigate the effect of atom bombs on ships, but, as some 
suspected from the beginning, the Navy‘s primary interest was with the promotional 
value of atomic weapons detonations. For the influence it had on the uses made of the 
peacetime atomic program and from the precedent it set for the use of the media, it can 
also be understood as an experiment in media relations. How many ways could the 
Operation be used to promote the Navy‘s significance? Could the Navy sustain media 
attention throughout the approval and planning phases of the Operation? How much 
interference with traditional freedoms would the media tolerate? During the year that 
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Operation Crossroads was in the production phase, barely a week went by that some 
aspect of the Operation, one that the Navy positioned during this period as an essential 
step in tailoring ship design and material to the atomic age, did not appear in the New 
York Times and other influential newspapers. By March, after the Operation had received 
official sanction, the Navy‘s message shifted from the significance of the Operation to 
the significance of the Navy to the nation‘s security. It was not the Operation, but the 
Navy, that was essential for national defense. When some of the 250 support and target 
ships, 150 aircraft, 6,000 ―experimental‖ animals, and 43,000 men, began to stage at 
Bikini Atoll, the Navy was ready to employ war-weary and homesick sailors in their 
public relations scheme. Men writing home chose from a wide selection of promotional 
postcards and envelopes and became what might as well be considered the bottom tier of 
the promotional effort. The mail-borne advertisements ensured that postal workers, 
family members, and friends from all corners of the United States were reminded of how 
vital the Navy was to their future. To herald the decommissioning of the U.S.S. Nevada, a 
ship destined as a target for ―Able,‖ the ―Last Day P.O. Service‖ for March 14 left little 
doubt about the fact that the maneuvers were more about demonstration and promotion 
than about the gathering of scientific information:   
THE SEA SPECTACLE OF THE CENTURY 
ATOM BOMB vs 100 WARSHIPS. 
In the place where a return address would ordinarily appear, the Navy had printed 
an image of a donut-shaped life preserver, adorned with four stars, lettered with ―U.S. 
Navy,‖ and flanked by two American flags. To prevent the possibility that the symbolic 
message might be overlooked, the Navy added lettering below its new seal, ―The 
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Nation‘s Life Buoy.‖92 The U.S.S. Nevada postal imprint continued to appear through 
June on envelopes, some simply embellished with ―Target Ship Bikini Atoll,‖ others 
were more elaborately decorated, linking romanticism and patriotism. One portrayal, for 
example, consumed one-half of the envelope, with a picture of the ship on a cloud-
banked horizon, foregrounded by five sailors sitting dockside and between palm trees as 
if for a sunset farewell, all superimposed on a scene picturing a flotilla of ships in the 
background. Above them, the wings of a soaring eagle spanned the width of the diorama. 
Above it all, a banner of printing reinforced the pictograph message: ―OUR NAVY—
FIRST LINE OF DEFENSE.‖93  
The Navy‘s second promotional tier was composed of popular newspaper 
correspondents and radio broadcasters. Unwilling to count on the natural infatuation of 
the nation‘s press corps for the Operation and recognizing that the considerable expense 
of the assignment to cover the first peacetime atomic experiment would likely limit 
participation, the Navy transported and billeted the most influential print and radio 
commentators at Bikini for the duration. Except for the fact that they volunteered, these 
reporters were in all other respects commandeered. As a press corps designed to serve the 
military‘s interest, they lived in relative isolation and filed their stories from the U.S.S. 
Appalachian, a retrofitted ―press‖ ship. Explaining in advance what the reporters could 
expect, the military stressed that they would be able to write about ―all that they could 
see, without censorship.‖ Though seemingly satisfying a notion of freedom of the press, 
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the statement continued with language that betrayed its superficiality. In the interests of 
security, an issue of ―great concern‖ to congressmen and the JCS, the military stated that 
it could be ―controlled best by careful indoctrination and briefing.‖94 Though during 
Crossroads, the reporters so constrained did express frustration with the Navy‘s 
conditions and the requirement that reporting be limited to that which the Navy provided 
during press briefings, it appears that there was only one instance where reporters did not 
obey the rules.
95
 Such acquiescence can be explained as stemming from a combination of 
curiosity with what the bomb would do; professional pride at being chosen from the 
thousands who applied for credentials to witness the first peacetime atomic experiment; 
and by the operation of habitus—the ease with which reporters, familiar with censorship 
from recent wartime experiences, fell back into a routine of subordinating their rights to 
the military restrictions.
96
  
The restrictions the military placed on the media during Crossroads reinforced the 
routines of censorship to which reporters had become accustomed during the war and 
contributed to the acquiescence of reporters to military censorship throughout the era of 
atmospheric testing. Secrecy was, perhaps, the only excuse the Navy needed to protect 
itself from the possibility that reporters would uncover and report anything that varied 
from the Navy‘s scripted performance. But the Operation’s proximity to wartime 
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censorship and the effect of reporters‘ familiarity with that censorship helps to explain 
why reporters failed to challenge the terms and boundaries of censorship during 
Crossroads, making it easy for the military and its supporters to use atomic 
experimentation to suit their domestic needs. When viewed in light of James Scott‘s 
analysis of strategic representation, this amounted to the creation of a ―dual culture,‖ a 
strictly political and purposeful distortion of reality during the first peacetime weapons 
experiment that allowed elites to manage the public stage through censorship and the 
employment of rhetorical and ritual strategies. Crossroads was theatre and reporters the 
audience. Officers used secrecy not to preserve atomic secrets but to obscure from the 
view of subordinates that which was ―negatively valued‖ or embarrassing. Officers 
presented a consistent ―flattering self-portrait‖ to maintain their dominant position by 
avoiding criticism.
97
  
From a reporter‘s perspective, it seems reasonable that Atomic Secrecy would be 
enough to prevent reporting of any facet of Crossroads that could unintentionally 
jeopardize the effort to protect the nation‘s atomic secrets. It would not, however, have 
prevented them from making an effort to gather their own information about the 
Operation’s participants or facets of their experiences at Bikini that would not have 
jeopardized national security aspects. Nor does it seem unreasonable, given that the two 
bombs of Crossroads were not enough to occupy all of their time, to suppose that 
reporters at Bikini might have been interested in elaborating on topics that were different 
than the ones the Navy wanted promoted about the experience but that were nonetheless 
newsworthy and relevant in the summer of 1946: military re-organization, for example, 
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or intra-service rivalry. Instead, reporters sequestered at Kwajalein between the two 
bombs of Operation Crossroads were prevented from reporting on anything except that 
which was permitted, ―sitting in the heat … drinking and tearing the air for something to 
write up.‖98 At least one of the reasons why so many reporters generally failed to 
challenge the type of censorship the Navy imposed at Bikini was because of the similarity 
of that experience to the restrictions imposed during wartime. In fact, the military itself 
mentioned that reporters would be familiar with restrictions at Crossroads because ―the 
responsibilities and restrictions for correspondents will be approximately the same as that 
accorded war correspondents.‖99 Those reporters asked to attend Crossroads had already 
become accustomed to wartime restrictions and were likely more comfortable with the 
same type of restrictions placed on their movement and commentary. But it was not only 
the fact that the restrictions were similar, but that they were so similar to ones recently 
experienced that reporters, finding themselves within a familiar routine, consciously or 
unconsciously obeyed them. Had correspondents been barred from Crossroads, or had 
more time passed between the war and the first peacetime experiment with atomic 
weapons, reporters likely would have voiced their objections and, perhaps, would have 
forced a public discussion about what types of information could, and could not be, 
reported about atomic weapons experimentation.  
Operation Crossroads did stimulate discussions about personal liberty and rights, 
but instead of invigorating debate about the ways that atomic secrecy and 
experimentation would affect the rights of Americans, the conversation about Crossroads 
was channeled into a discussion of the rights that Americans enjoyed, paradoxically 
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recently abridged by atomic secrecy, and how they could be expressed on the 
international front. During a radio broadcast special in late May 1946 when Harold E. 
Stassen, former Governor of Minnesota and a man who served later as Eisenhower‘s 
Special Assistant for Disarmament, suggested at that time that the U.S. consider granting 
some sovereignty over atomic weapons to an international organization, Supreme Court 
Justice William O. Douglas reminded him that ―sovereignty was not something you could 
surrender but something you exercised.‖100 With Crossroads, however, reporters 
seemingly overlooked, or had forgotten, their sovereignty—as citizens and as 
commentators. Unaccustomed to exercising their rights during wartime, they failed to 
exercise them during peacetime. Because Crossroads was held so soon after the end of 
the war, with restrictions for media coverage laid down only seven months after the end 
of the war, the military and its supporters were able to exact obedience from reporters. 
The lesson that military officers and their supporters took from Crossroads was that 
Freedom of the Press was easily suspended—that atomic experiments could successfully 
and profitably be staged as media events. Members of the media learned that if they 
desired to witness and report on atomic experimentation they would need to cooperate 
with the military and limit the content of their stories to that which the military wanted 
reported. Crossroads thus established a precedent for media manipulation by the military, 
a practice that would become even more significant over time with the creation of the 
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Nevada Test Site, increasing numbers of atmospheric experiments, and increasing 
numbers of military experiments staged as promotional events.
101
  
The issue is not that reporters subordinated their personal and professional rights 
to the restrictions surrounding atomic science, but that they failed (consciously or 
because of habitus) to challenge the boundaries of Atomic Secrecy that the military 
claimed existed during Crossroads and after and, in that failure, became unknowing 
partners in helping the military—and with testing in Nevada, the AEC—use 
experimentation to serve political goals. The significance of the media‘s malleability, and 
the factors that created the conditions for it in the first place and led to its continuance, is 
that it indirectly contributed to the injurious nature of atmospheric testing. Because the 
military was able to control the media, opposition to atmospheric testing based on well-
founded anxiety about health hazards went unreported or was discredited, failed to gain 
popular attention, and failed to gain political traction, until after atmospheric testing at 
the Nevada Test Site had become routine. During the era of atmospheric atomic testing, 
and particularly at those times when concerns about the safety of experiments at the 
Nevada Test Site arose, the military‘s control over the national press corps meant that the 
questions about safety were few in number or easily dismissed. In general, safety issues 
were raised by reporters who were independent or failed to cooperate with the military, 
individuals the military easily marginalized, discrediting them as ill-informed or 
suggesting that they were members of a radical, perhaps even treasonous, fringe. In 1953, 
for example, newspapers in Las Vegas not only carried reassurances from the AEC that 
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radioactive fallout from a test that had fallen on a public highway and settled on the 
nearby community of St. George was not hazardous, they also followed the lead of public 
relations personnel and responded to concerns raised by a Utah congressman and 
residents by trivializing their anxieties.
102
 Although the AEC later admitted in 1960 that 
on May 19-20, 1953, St. George, Utah, registered the ―highest measured concentration of 
radioactive fallout in the air over [a] populated area,‖ reporters at the time followed the 
AEC‘s lead and minimized the incident.103 Comments such as ―fewer than 100 
automobiles required washing,‖ ―information men yesterday were working like 
proverbial one-armed paper hangers trying to deflate the mass hysteria‖ appeared under 
headlines that ranged from expressing skepticism to the mildly threatening: ―AEC Men 
Deflate Reports of Utah Radiation Illness‖ and ―AEC Takes Dim View of Utah Atom 
Protests.‖104 As if in league with the military officers who argued during an AEC meeting 
that it was not the radioactive fallout from the experiment, but the remedial measures 
such as car washing and radiation monitoring that was the problem,
105
 a Las Vegas 
newspaper argued that the experimentation should continue.
106
 The local calls for 
continued testing were no doubt anchored in the economic benefits for Southern Nevada. 
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It seems likely, however, that the enchantment with that particular brand of prosperity 
would have evaporated at the local and at the national level had reporters not been subject 
to military indoctrination and conditioned through the routinizing effect of wartime-style 
restrictions from Crossroads forward that fostered acquiescence and kept them from 
investigating and reporting the hazards of radioactive fallout that atmospheric tests in 
Nevada produced.  
Such docility is not easily dismissed. Reporters cannot be said to have been 
ignorant of the possibility of danger, for knowledge about the potential for illness and 
injury had been in the news since the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and 
precautionary measures such as the washing of exposed sin and foodstuffs before eating, 
had been reported in The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists and elsewhere. Reporters could 
have, then, without much difficulty investigated the hazards, if only by extrapolating 
rudimentary information about the risks from the interest in attack generated fallout 
raised in discussions about civil defense.
107
 Nor can it be said that in pre-Vietnam, pre-
Watergate, and pre-Silent Spring days, reporters were simply less suspicious and less 
inquisitive. For example, while the Southern Nevada press was dismissing radioactive 
fallout as inconsequential, an editor criticized a nearby manufacturing complex for 
emitting unhealthy levels of ―dust and smoke.‖ He demanded an investigation so that 
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Southern Nevadans would ―be protected against future industrial operations with the 
same sort of smoke menace.‖108 Media acquiescence and cooperation with the military 
was so complete that it took a groundswell of opposition from scientists and the 
international community for the American media to begin to voice the questions that 
might have justifiably been asked during Crossroads or after. In the mid-1950s, after 
both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. had developed and begun experimenting with hydrogen 
weapons, members of the scientific elite unassociated with the AEC began drawing 
attention to the health effects of radioactive fallout; and the international community, 
especially Japan, complained so forcefully and persuasively about the dangers posed by 
the nuclear arms race that elected officials were forced to find ways to experiment 
underground.
109
 The rapidity with which an alternative to atmospheric testing was found 
once opposition forced a political solution leads to a conclusion that the military‘s 
manipulation of the media, and the media‘s cooperativeness—in Southern Nevada and 
elsewhere, was at least part of the reason that opposition did not gain momentum before 
the number of atmospheric nuclear detonations in Nevada climbed to 100 and fallout 
increased exponentially.  
The combination of media complicity and a national security imperative to justify 
testing had its origins in the Manhattan Project, but the peacetime manifestations began 
with Forrestal. The publicity surrounding Crossroads coincided with and supplemented 
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Forrestal‘s behind-the-scenes efforts to nurture a climate of receptivity within 
government circles and without for an increase in the military‘s peacetime presence. He 
relentlessly sought out, commissioned, and circulated, studies and reports about 
communist ideology, the strength of the Soviet state and its military, and the threats both 
posed to American security, all in an effort to convince those inside and outside 
government that demobilization would be ruinous and that the military should share 
space at the policymaking table with civilian leaders. After Forrestal‘s death, a former 
Assistant Secretary of War, Howard C. Peterson wrote that ―as much as anyone in the 
Government, [Forrestal] kept this Nation alive to the possibility of Russian 
aggression.‖110 Forrestal‘s relentless generation and circulation of studies that comported 
with his own beliefs established a model for the use of academic, or academically styled, 
treatises and reports to generate political and public support. Forrestal‘s method of 
generating anti-communism to support peacetime mobilization, one that involved the 
selective use of professional opinion and expert reports in what would now be termed a 
media ―blitz,‖ was adopted by the Truman administration to build consensus for the 
Truman Doctrine as well as for generating political support for the development of the 
Hydrogen bomb. During atmospheric testing at the Nevada Test Site, the AEC‘s military 
supporters duplicated Forrestal‘s selective use of expertise, relying solely on expert 
opinion that suited their interest in continued testing, and on his use of anti-communism 
to court public favor. They also relied upon a cooperative media to denigrate those who 
opposed testing as ―simpleminded;‖111 to refer to distinguished scientists as ―so-called‖ 
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experts; and to reinforce the military‘s claims that testing was essential to national 
security: ―There are a lot worse things than death. Trying to live in a communist-
dominated country is most of them.‖ 112 Comments such as these mimicked the military‘s 
promotional efforts and can be traced to Forrestal and the success he had at the end of the 
war in using media outlets in his unsubtle and pernicious strategy of coercion.  
As was the case with the April memo written by one of Forrestal‘s aides about the 
significance of Crossroads and transmitted to President Truman, it was typical for 
Forrestal to draw on material written by others, though often commissioned by him, to 
promulgate his opinions. The Eberstadt Report and George Kennan‘s Long Telegram 
were two studies that received a wide readership because of Forrestal and that have long 
been understood as ones that helped to shape attitudes and responses during the early cold 
war. But there were many more. Forrestal commissioned one on ―Dialectical 
Materialism‖ from Edward F. Willett of Smith College and countless journal and 
magazine articles. He then arranged to have them delivered to fellow officers, 
government administrators, congressmen, and newspaper publishers.
113
 Between October 
1945 and June 5, 1946, Willett alone wrote or summarized fifty-four studies for 
Forrestal.
114
 In this way, Forrestal appeared to be the bearer, but not the producer, of 
information that accorded with his own vision for the refashioning of the American state 
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and which was also likely to portend doom should it be disregarded. Forrestal‘s barrage 
of anti-communist tracts meant that the evidence that Stalin was engaged in finding ways 
to cooperate with the west, such as disbanding the Comintern in 1943, making it clear 
that socialism could take hold without Soviet intervention, limiting his assistance to 
Chiang Kai-shek, and other instances of a temporary softening of a hard line, Bolshevik 
approach, went unnoticed and underappreciated.
115
 There was nothing new in Forrestal‘s 
use of the media to manage public opinion. Shortly after World War I, Walter Lippman 
wrote that ―the manufacture of consent‖ had become a ―self-conscious art‖ necessary to 
the business of ―popular government; and, by the 1930s, it had become a commonplace 
among elites to recognize, in Reinhold Niebuhr‘s words ―the stupidity of the average 
man‖ and believe that it was necessary for leaders to shake ―the masses‖ out of their 
―ignorance and superstition‖ with ―emotionally potent oversimplifications.‖116 But, in the 
same way that Forrestal tapped into the trends that elevated the value of professional and 
specialized expertise and made them his own, elevating the significance (and 
consequences) of the practices themselves, Forrestal put his own twist on the using the 
media to generate support. In the hands of the tenacious Forrestal, the distribution of 
these studies amounted to more than the promotion of a certain point of view, more than 
an attempt to educate the ―notoriously short-sighted‖ masses.117 Through them Forrestal 
sought to bring about a transformation of government and the press.  
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In circulating reports and studies of the Soviet menace to newspaper publishers 
and owners, Forrestal expected to remake the American press into an informal organ of 
state control. As early as 1940, Forrestal was seeking a merger of all radio and cable 
services into a ―communications syndicate‖ that would, with ―limited government 
supervision … ensure enlightened operations.‖118 The significance of the media in 
delivering an ―enlightened‖ version of events explains why, according to the editor of his 
diaries, Forrestal was sometimes ―oversensitive‖ to public opinion and newspaper 
reports, was ―always in touch with newspapermen and commentators,‖ and paid 
―considerable attention to the Navy‘s and later the Defense Department‘s public 
relations.‖119 Faulting the press for harboring what he considered ―pro-Russian‖ 
sympathies, Forrestal sought to remake the American press along a model set by the 
British, which, he believed, granted ―solid support‖ to its government‘s foreign policy 
decisions.
120
 In a discussion with Under Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., 
whose disagreements with Molotov during the San Francisco Conference in Spring 1945 
had become the focus of an editorial, Forrestal compared diplomacy to a ballgame and a 
critical Washington Post reporter to a fan of the other team. Forrestal told Stettinius that 
the reporter‘s comments were a ―savage attack‖ against a ―pitcher‖ who was entitled to 
―support and cheers rather than brickbats and pop bottles from the American 
grandstand.‖121  
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Forrestal was apparently sincerely worried about the future of America and so his 
use of the media to promote the changes he believed necessary may have been provoked 
solely by national security imperatives, but he was, nonetheless, aware of the duplicity 
embodied in artful media manipulation. On at least one occasion he admitted the 
disingenuineness and self-interest inherent in promotional tactics and media 
manipulation. In the midst of a battle in the Mediterranean, Forrestal and a Saturday 
Evening Post reporter discussed the unassuming character of the commander, Vice 
Admiral Kent Hewitt. During that discussion, the attribute that Forrestal pointed out that, 
for him, demonstrated Hewitt‘s ―genuine selflessness‖ was the fact that he avoided the 
media, seemingly oblivious to its presence. ―Never in his life has it ever occurred to him 
to seek publicity.‖ Forrestal told the reporter, ―And if it had, I don‘t think he would have 
had the faintest idea how to go about it.‖122 This statement amounts to a concession by 
Forrestal, by all accounts a master of promotion, that officers who sought publicity were 
not acting selflessly and were thus motivated by more than national interest. It also offers 
an example of the significance of habitus as an explanatory tool. While arranging to 
position himself on the busy bridge of a ship engaged in battle to chat with a reporter 
about the qualities of the ship‘s captain, Forrestal was seemingly oblivious to the irony of 
the fact that in the process of making sure that Hewitt received notoriety not only for his 
accomplishments but for his self-effacing modesty, he himself—a Secretary of the Navy 
with the resources to draw attention to Hewitt in many different ways—was engaged in 
an act of self-interested promotion.  
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Forrestal had perfected the art of media manipulation and his relationship with 
influential publishers gave him the ability to practice it. His diaries reflect that one of his 
first inclinations when informed of a problem during discussions with other government 
officials or during cabinet meetings was to recommend a media campaign or promotion 
to generate public support. Forrestal‘s enthusiasm for generating support through the 
press could be ill-considered, as Byrnes pointed out during a cabinet meeting in October 
1945 after Forrestal had recommended that Truman ―acquaint the people with the details 
of our dealings with the Russians … and with [their] attitude.‖ Byrnes alone seemed to 
have recognized the potential for Forrestal‘s use of the media to ignite a self-fulfilling 
prophecy: He ―demurred‖ because it ―would give the Russians an excuse for claiming we 
had furnished provocation which justified their actions.‖123 Truman, and his cabinet, 
however, had reasons to be grateful for Forrestal‘s connections a few months later. When 
tens of thousands of military men angry about the slow pace of demobilization rioted in 
Paris, Frankfurt, and Manila, during the first week of January 1946, Forrestal 
recommended meeting the mutinous situation with a public relations barrage, ―getting the 
heads of the important news services and the leading newspaper … and state to them the 
seriousness of the present situation.‖ Forrestal‘s quick cataloguing of those he called 
―reasonable and patriotic‖ men offers a sense of the scale of his familiarity with the 
national media. Forrestal suggested ―Sulzberger of the New York Times, Roy Roberts 
[Kansas City Star], Palmer Hoyt [Denver Post], the Cowles brothers [Minneapolis Star-
Tribune], John Knight [Knight Newspapers, Inc.], plus Roy Howard and Bob McLean of 
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the AP … heads of the broadcasting systems be called in … a canvass be made of the 
important radio commentators‖ using ―the Association of Radio News Analysts—H.V. 
Kaltenborn, Lowell Thomas, John Vandercook, George Fielding Eliot, Bob Trout, Robert 
St. John, Johannes Steel, Raymond Gram Swing, and other representative men of that 
profession—which has a weekly luncheon in New York.‖124  
One of the ways that Forrestal endeared himself to influential members of the 
Fourth Estate was to take them into his confidence, even if that meant revealing classified 
information. Forrestal‘s handling of Eberstadt‘s Report to the Secretary of the Navy, 
generally referred to as the Eberstadt Report, provides an example of Forrestal‘s behind-
the-scenes method for circulating an ideology that held the promise of substantially 
increasing his own influence, as well as the military‘s policy-making authority even as he 
shifted the attention away from his influence over its creation. The Report itself 
amounted to an encapsulation of the principles for mobilization that Forrestal and 
Eberstadt had formulated over their years of friendship and collaboration. Forrestal made 
sure that his congressional allies received copies of the report before it was brought to the 
attention of the president. And yet, once it had drawn administrative attention, Forrestal 
pled ignorance. As Alfred D. Sander noted, in this way Forrestal preserved his ―flexibility 
and freedom to maneuver‖ by claiming that he had not had ―an opportunity to give Mr. 
Eberstadt‘s report sufficient study.‖125 And yet, despite the fact that the report‘s 
comprehensiveness caused the White House to classify it Top Secret until its implications 
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for reorganization could be sufficiently studied,
126
 Forrestal‘s diary reflects that he used 
the report—one he claimed not to have analyzed—to elicit support from the reportorial 
press. Lunching with Arthur Sulzberger, the publisher of the New York Times, Forrestal 
accepted praise for the Top Secret Report. When invited by Sulzberger to submit more 
material that supported the Report‘s recommendations, responded that he had already 
invited ―Patterson, Eisenhower and Nimitz‖ to lunch the following week, a comment 
likely taken by Sulzberger to mean that Forrestal would be encouraging them to provide 
additional statements for the Times. Forrestal wrote that Sulzberger had been ―very much 
pleased‖ to learn that, presumably, he would be receiving more content about the 
innerworkings of military reorganization for his Times.
127
  
For Forrestal and those Navy officers who supported him, Operation Crossroads, 
with its legions of photographers and reporters, was little more than an extravagant 
manifestation of the existing and institutionally supported impulse to use the media to 
achieve the Navy‘s goals. The significant difference was that, with Crossroads, 
promotion underplayed the dangers inherent in experimentation, dangers that presented 
considerable anxiety to the Operation’s Medical officers and radiation monitors but that 
were easily underplayed by Navy officers because radioactive contamination was 
unobservable. In the event, the Navy‘s narrative carried the day: atomic science provided 
a dramatic display that reinforced the fears provoked by Hiroshima and Nagasaki; atomic 
secrecy ensured that the Operation met the Navy‘s promotional ambition to demonstrate 
its resilience in the face of atomic bombardment. As the drama unfolded and afterward, it 
became all too easy for the press corps, for participants, and perhaps even for upper-
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echelon Navy officers as well, to believe only that which was observable. Because of 
Crossroads, perception was the reality.  
Remembering that those who participated in Crossroads carried with them vivid 
memories of Pacific warfare makes it easier to understand the cavalier and sometimes 
swashbuckling attitude of Navy commanders who ignored the warnings of science 
officers and boarded, and ordered sailors to man, ships with dangerously high levels of 
radioactivity. Wartime conditioning had more of an influence on participants‘ behavior 
than did the possibility of potential danger from radiation—something that could neither 
be seen, smelled, nor felt. For men such as the commander of the submarine Skate and 
his crewmen, the important fact was not that the Operation’s radiation monitors had 
deemed the ship off limits, posting it with signs that said ―DANGER! VERY 
RADIOACTIVE! KEEP CLEAR!‖ but that the Navy‘s image of invincibility had been 
preserved, and that invincibility could be demonstrated and photographically recorded. 
The Skate had survived ―Able‘s‖ blast effects and, though heavily damaged, was 
operational enough to receive a salute from Admiral Blandy and his flagship as it cruised 
the lagoon.
128
 The Operation’s proximity to the war and the personal history of its 
participants meant that instead of the health and safety regulations that the Navy had 
prepared in advance of Crossroads and that radiation monitors sought to impose, the 
operative norms were wartime ones: it was habitus, and not the considered opinion of 
experts, that guided the behavior and responses of participants to the atom bomb. But it 
was not only officers with publicity in mind who reacted as though they were still at war. 
Warren wrote to his wife about the strong pull of wartime experience on Navy men and 
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the difficulties he and his 400 radiation monitors had stopping them from trying to save 
their ships. ―Mostly‖ he said ―they are too dangerous yet to board and everybody is 
sitting around … staring us in the face. …It gets a little rough when a vessel starts to get 
critical and then sinks and I have to say it is not safe to pull her out.‖129 Crossroads may 
have, as one historian wrote, turned into something of an embarrassment for the Navy,
130
 
but it set precedents for how atomic science could be mobilized for domestic political 
purposes and established a pattern for risky practices during future peacetime 
experimentation.  
Nearly a decade later, for example, the Marines took advantage of maneuvers at 
the Nevada Test Site much as the Navy had with Crossroads. Marine officers magnified 
their soldiers‘ competence with atomic weapons and warfare through media promotion. 
The publicity, especially when combined with the efforts of local boosters to maximize 
the economic benefits of testing, resulted in the trivialization of atomic experimentation 
and radioactive exposures. In 1955, front-page news stories in Las Vegas echoed the 
game-like atmosphere of Crossroads: It would be an ―all-Marine show‖ with ―Baby‖ 
devices and the ―Battle of Midgets.‖ As with Crossroads, the Marine‘s maneuvers 
included a series of weapons effects experiments on animals.
131
 In what seems to have 
been an obvious effort to diffuse an animal-rights backlash, the Marines made sure that 
the press saw their tender side, introducing their English Bulldog mascot Maggie to the 
press. Maggie‘s contribution to the Marine‘s publicity machine was insignificant 
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compared to the experimental animals: she suffered only the confusion that may have 
been involved in answering, if only for the duration of the maneuvers, to ―Sergeant 
Roentgen.‖132 As with Crossroads, no detail of the operation was so small that it could 
not become front page news: ―Mess Hall, Garbage Cans Used As Guide To Weather‖ the 
Las Vegas Sun reported of Captain Williams‘s unusual barometer.133 Anxiety about the 
hazards, as when a tourist to Las Vegas remarked that his wife had worried that traveling 
here would affect his ―procreative processes‖ were dismissed by a local newspaper editor 
as nonsense, ―there is danger of losing one‘s potency in Las Vegas but it wouldn‘t 
necessarily come from radiation.‖134  
There were a number of reasons why what occurred during Crossroads became a 
model for the use of military experimentation for publicity. First, it occurred while 
wartime memories and experiences were fresh in the minds of participants and reporters. 
For participants, the peacetime experiment was, on a practical level where orders are 
obeyed, little different from their wartime experiences. Similarly, wartime-style 
censorship was something with which reporters had become accustomed to take in stride. 
Second, radiation exposures, even overexposures, were not immediately apparent to 
either participants or reporters. The maneuver ended, in fact, by leaving the impression 
that safety officers had been unduly alarmist and overcautious about the dangers of 
radioactivity. When reporters asked about the about the fate of the experimental animals, 
for example, so important to the mission were they that the Navy retrofitted one ship to 
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serve as a floating barn, the Navy said nothing about the number of deaths, only that 
scientists expected to ―learn much by observing the effects of the rays‖ on animals.135 
When combined with fears that had been amplified by pre-maneuver publicity, tactics 
such as these had the effect of diminishing in the public‘s mind the dangers of nuclear 
experimentation. Polls conducted in August and September, after the Navy hastily 
cancelled Crossroads because of the widespread contamination caused by ―Baker,‖ 
showed that 53 and 58 percent, respectively, of those asked responded that the bomb‘s 
destructive power had been less than they had expected.
136
 Third, and as will be discussed 
more fully in the following pages, atmospheric atomic experiments became an ideal 
promotional vehicle for officers who demanded authority over the methods, conditions, 
and observers granted access to detonations. The autonomy the military enjoyed over 
atomic science allowed it to benefit from atomic secrecy, using it as a means of 
controlling the flow of information to generate favorable publicity; and to benefit from 
the selective exploitation of professional and scientific expertise, choosing only those 
opinions that suited the military‘s purpose and devaluing, through publicity, dissenting 
viewpoints. While the Navy was, with Crossroads, establishing some of the practical 
boundaries for atomic experimentation and for the use of the media to promote military 
objectives, Forrestal continued his efforts to transform the American media into a 
promotional machine that would support national security objectives; or, given 
Forrestal‘s objections to the president when officers from other branches adopted his 
methods, to achieve his own objectives.  
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Forrestal‘s efforts to transform government were aimed at his superiors as well as 
at the general public and involved (a) generating and circulating material that bore the 
trappings of intellectual and academic rigor and (b) ensuring that key positions in the 
postwar state went to friends and protégés who supported his vision for a mobilized 
society. In these ways, Forrestal contributed to laying the ideological terrain and 
structural foundations for the militarization of the atomic program and for cold war 
mobilization. In contrast to the top-down initiatives to generate consensus through 
―oversimplification‖ that conservative intellectuals and realists such as Lippman and 
Niebuhr proposed during the 1930s, Forrestal operated from a middle tier of influence. 
From his position as Secretary of the Navy and later of Defense, he used his platform, 
and intimacy with media elites, to position himself and military advisors as intellectual 
powerhouses, all in an effort to build political influence and to coerce elected and 
appointed policymakers—his superiors—to grant policymaking powers to the military. 
One of his strategies was to inflate the intellectual acuity of military officials while 
casting doubt and derision on elected officials. During a speech before the Senate‘s 
Committee on Military Affairs, Forrestal stopped just short of saying that congressmen 
were incapable of understanding the complexities of national security. He expressed 
dissatisfaction not only with Senate proposals for unification, but also with elected 
officials‘ intellectual ability to create what Forrestal envisioned was ―a mechanism‖ to 
guarantee ―that this Nation shall be able to act as a unit in terms of diplomacy, its military 
policy, its use of scientific knowledge and finally in its moral and political leadership.‖ 
Forrestal compared the approaches of elected leaders and the Navy, and emphasized that 
the Navy‘s proposal was an intellectually rigorous one. ―Many months … of earnest 
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study‖ Forrestal said, had shown that legislative initiatives were, unlike the military‘s 
―study and other studies of the subject,‖ ill-conceived: ―the approach proposed in the 
legislation that you are now considering is an erroneous approach to a fragment of the 
intricate and complex problems that confront us.‖137 Forrestal‘s method for discrediting 
the cognitive capacity of elected officials was one that AEC officials would use to argue 
that they, and they alone, had the intellectual and advisory capacity to determine the 
necessity, and safety, of atmospheric weapons testing.  
Inaugurating a method of persuasion that was not so much designed to win over 
as to pummel into shape the thinking of the public and elected leaders, Forrestal 
contributed to transferring wartime momentum into peacetime, a process that Peter 
Novick has explained as a relocation of the ―apotheosis of evil‖ from the Nazi enemy to 
Soviet Communism. In Novick‘s analysis, the engine for this relocation was the repeated 
use of the term ―totalitarian‖ throughout the popular press as a ―rhetorical weapon‖ that 
homogenized America‘s enemies and galvanized popular support against them. In a 
representative example, Novick writes that Time, in blaming totalitarianism for 
concentration camps instead of German fascists, drew the ―appropriate anti-Soviet 
moral.‖138 The seeming appropriateness of that moral in the public sphere was due in 
large part to Forrestal.
139
 In January 1946, in response to mounting publicity that favored 
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rapid demobilization and to a suggestion by Walter Lippman that it was up to statesmen 
to find a way for ―democracy and Communism‖ to exist simultaneously, Forrestal wrote 
to Lippman and also to Henry Luce. To Lippman, Forrestal enclosed a copy of Willett‘s 
―Dialectical Materialism,‖ a study that discussed the incommensurability of Communism 
and democracy in the bluntest possible way, alluding to an atomic Armageddon and 
anticipating ―push-button warfare.‖ In Willet‘s phrasing, if  
a true Communist could destroy the United States by pushing a button, he 
would do so. … [It is] tantamount to suicide to do anything that tends 
either to strengthen the power of Communism or to weaken our powers to 
withstand it.
140
  
 
Forrestal sought to drive home Willett‘s points, writing in a cover letter to Lippman that 
Russia was not a ―state‖ in the ordinary sense, and that the problem the U.S. faced was 
that it was, instead, a ―religion.‖ The notion might not have carried much weight with 
Lippman, but it echoed down the years to influence how military officers portrayed 
threats to American security. In its 1951 ―Review of the Current World Situation,‖ the 
JCS resurrected Forrestal‘s language in a survey that has been described as presenting 
―an apocalyptic vision … a crisis of religious proportion.‖141 To Luce, who had already 
received a copy of ―Dialectical Materialism,‖ Forrestal sent another, and in a letter 
invoked Hitler in an unmistakable appeal to national security. Aware, perhaps, that his 
persistence was becoming irksome, Forrestal wrote that although ―it is easy to ridicule‖ 
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the need for such a study, he cautioned Luce, ―in the middle of that laughter we always 
should remember that we also laughed at Hitler.‖142 Publicity for Crossroads drove 
Forrestal‘s points home: ―Atom Bomb Test Need. Large Political-Military Problem, Fear 
of ‗Another Pearl Harbor‘ Involved.‖143 Forrestal‘s anti-communism, his circulation of 
anti-Soviet material, and his wielding of national security arguments as a means of 
persuasion demonstrates that he played an integral role as an inter-governmental link 
between what one historian has found to have been an informal and temporary coalition 
between the conservative pessimists and liberal intellectuals that, together, contributed to 
the creation of the national security state.
144
  
Forrestal‘s modus operandi was effective, and as adopted by others with their 
own reasons for fueling anti-communism, it became a means of policymaking-through-
politics that limited the options from which elected officials could draw, tying their hands 
and constraining their ability even to consider, let alone establish, policy that interfered 
with military expansion. That Forrestal was unable to force the legislative changes that 
would have caused civilian leaders to share their policymaking responsibilities with 
military officers is not as important as the fact that he successfully wrested some of that 
responsibility from those civilian leaders by limiting the choices they could make. By 
creating and circulating a catalog of reasons for expanding the military‘s influence and 
footprint, one that other officers and their supporters could draw upon to suit their own 
purposes, Forrestal and those who followed his lead amplified the military‘s voice to such 
                                                 
142
 Forrestal Diaries, 127-128.  
 
143
 Hanson Baldwin, New York Times, April 10, 1946.  
 
144
 For a discussion of how these two groups influenced the postwar state, and for how the fundamental 
tensions inherent in their ideological stances operated as limitations on the degree of conformity that the 
national security state ultimately engendered, see Hogan, A Cross of Iron, 420-474.  
 
208 
 
a level that elected leaders could not fail to hear, and to heed, it.
145
 Forrestal‘s operational 
and administrative methodology amounted to a way of doing business that allowed the 
military to play an indirect role in shaping national policy to accord with the perceptions 
and objectives of the military‘s upper echelon.  
Operation Crossroads cannot be considered apart from this process. Forrestal‘s 
methods of coercion became more effective, and consequential, when they were backed 
up by atomic experiments deliberately staged to portray not only the frightening potential 
of an enemy attack but of the American military‘s resilience in the face of it. Forrestal 
was instrumental in establishing the two essential conditions for the political use of 
atomic weapons: (a) the development of a sensibility that America‘s place in the world 
and its security required a powerful peacetime military presence, and (b) intra-
governmental support for the ideological and economic commitment that such a 
sensibility would require. Forrestal established both by fostering during peacetime the 
wartime practice of drawing successful professionals from the private sector to serve in 
administrative positions and rewarding their loyalty—to himself and, indirectly, to 
military goals—with rank and prestige; and, by using the media to cultivate support. 
Neither tendency originated with Forrestal and neither allowed him to garner a level of 
political influence that would have granted him a legislative fiat to set policy, but both 
allowed him, and the military officers who adopted his methods as a model, to have a 
greater influence over policymaking than had previously been possible.  
The continued development of atomic weapons systems required political and 
economic support—support that Operation Crossroads was designed to generate (and by 
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establishing a model, would help to sustain)—by building upon fears of atomic 
devastation while simultaneously providing a reassuring demonstration that the military, 
or at least the Navy, could with enough resources prevent atomic catastrophe. Thus, while 
the military‘s Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and its War Department Atomic 
Energy Board probed behind-the-scenes into the possibilities for atomic weapons, the 
Navy, through Admiral J.E. King, Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Fleet and Chief of 
Naval Operations; and Vice-Admiral W.H.P. Blandy, Commander, Joint Task Force One 
reached out to the American public, capitalized on atomic anxiety, and began to convince 
congressmen and their constituencies that atomic weapons experimentation was vital—an 
urgent, national security imperative.
146
    
The most compelling and significant strategy that Navy officials used to gain 
approval for Crossroads was their appeal to national security. It was certainly the most 
widely used: King, Blandy, and the Navy‘s congressional supporters emphasized time 
and again that the Operation was crucial to America‘s offensive and defensive 
capabilities and threatened that another Pearl Harbor might be the result of postponing 
Operation Crossroads.
147
 Employed in conjunction with the assessments of Navy 
engineers and technicians, this rhetoric proved unassailable by critics—even those as 
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prominent at the time as J.R. Oppenheimer—who claimed smaller-scale or laboratory 
experiments could achieve the same results.
148
 In the midst of the Navy‘s press for 
approval, Robert Thompson of the House Military Affairs Committee complained that 
even common sense seemed to have gone missing: ―With everything chaotic, why all the 
haste?  We ought to talk a little about peace.‖149 Fear, however, tipped the balance in the 
Navy‘s favor—trumping objections as stubborn as those concerning the Operation‘s 
costs.
150
 It is impossible to assess whether the arguments by Navy officials and their 
supporters generated new fears or merely fueled existing ones, but people were afraid. A 
study conducted in June 1946, a month before the maneuvers began, found that 64 
percent of those surveyed believed that there was a ―real danger‖ that atomic bombs 
would be used against the United States.
151
 Appeals to national security, made through 
media outlets, were persuasive—giving officers who made them the upper hand in 
receiving approval for projects that used atomic resources and contributing to building 
public consensus. As one of the strategic resources used by King and Blandy during the 
planning and implementation of Operation Crossroads, appeals to national security 
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allowed them to neutralize objections to the program and to avoid civilian oversight and, 
thus, to assert broad discretionary power over the use of atomic energy.
152
   
As additional validation to its national security argument, the Navy positioned 
Crossroads as a legitimate scientific experiment—a feat it accomplished by inviting 
participation from the nation‘s scientific community and by using the media to de-
legitimize the opinions of oppositional scientists. Those scientists who came out against 
the Operation did not suggest that the material and biological effects of radiation were 
not worthy of study, but instead argued that blast effects could be duplicated with non-
nuclear explosives and that more could be learned of radioactive effects under controlled 
laboratory conditions than at Bikini Atoll. Scientists who opposed Crossroads were not 
part of a lunatic fringe, but members of the nation‘s scientific elite. Their numbers 
included J. Robert Oppenheimer, who not only objected to the necessity of the Operation 
but also turned down a request from Truman to serve as an advisor, Lee DuBridge, 
president of the California Institute for Technology, and, H.S. Uhler, Professor Emeritus 
at Yale.
153
 The significance of their standing was such that the Navy made discrediting 
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those opinions one of its first priorities. In the official history of the Operation, W. A. 
Shurcliff discussed this process in a way that illustrates the vigor with which the Navy 
went about devaluing the expertise and experience of oppositional scientists and the 
importance of the media to that effort. His choice of words betrayed the extent to which 
the Navy considered oppositional scientific opinion primarily an issue of public relations 
and illustrates how language minimalized and rendered superficial legitimate and 
reasonable scientific differences of opinion. ―The majority of the misconceptions‖ 
Shurcliff wrote, ―were gradually dislodged by the steady stream of facts issued to press 
and radio.‖154 The effect this had upon the AEC‘s use of expertise, upon the scientific 
community, and the public‘s sense of the safety or danger of atomic weapons testing is 
discussed in a later chapter. For present purposes, the significant fact is that by March, 
the public relations effort had been so successful that an internal assessment found that 
the only ―strong‖ opposition left to the project was from the Society for the Prevention of 
Cruelty to Animals.
155
 Along with the Humane Society of America, that small segment of 
the population remained committed in their opposition to Crossroads, reacting with 
sympathy and anger at the sacrifice of 6,000 animals. The society launched protests in 
New York and Los Angeles in late July. Marching down Broadway and around Times 
Square with a rented stuffed goat adorned with a tart warning, ―Today me. Tomorrow 
you,‖ the thirty-five protesters in New York were joined by the Harlem Ashram Center, 
two groups of Socialists, and the War Resisters League. In Los Angeles, the protest was 
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held as the feature presentation of the San Fernando Goat Fanciers‘ tenth annual show, a 
venue that gave protestors an advantage the New York group had not had: a live goat. 
They also faced opposition that New York protesters had not: complaints from a veterans 
group which was not necessarily voicing support for Crossroads but were objecting to 
the group‘s use of symbolism: the bugling of ―taps‖ and a ceremonial flag lowering in 
honor of the sacrificed animals.
156
 In hindsight, opposition from animal groups may have 
played right into the Navy‘s efforts to marginalize objectors. 
The Navy‘s intentions were limited to gaining public support for maneuvers that it 
considered critical to its survival, but both the publicity the Navy generated for the plan 
and its simultaneous suppression of scientific information about fallout and radioactive 
hazards that would have drawn negative publicity were reasons why Crossroads became 
such an important training ground for the use of atomic bombs by military officers as 
instruments of public relations. Though analyzed in greater detail later in this dissertation, 
the Navy‘s manipulation of science and scientists increased the significance of 
Crossroads as an aspect of Militarization. In June 1946, one month before Crossroads, 
Rear Admiral Albert C. Read, Sr., professed an anti-scientific rationale and betrayed, if 
unconsciously, the superficial nature of the Navy‘s interest in the scientific value 
Crossroads. Read expressed disdain for oppositional scientists with an unlikely choice of 
words that suggested he no longer considered scientists members of the human race: 
―Scientists have their theories and they say this and thus can be done. But don‘t ever 
overlook the capabilities of man. He can do great things and undoubtedly he can defend 
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himself against the A-bomb, theories or no theories.‖157 Similarly, in regard to the second 
bomb at Crossroads—―Baker‖—a Navy official discounted the warnings that radioactive 
seawater would be the most dangerous component, saying simply that scientists ―had 
been wrong before.‖158 But they were not: radioactive contamination that rained down on 
the lagoon and everything in it when ―Baker‖ was detonated underwater, caused the 
postponement (forever) of a deeper underwater shot, ―Charlie,‖ and a hurried cancellation 
of the Operation. In Warren‘s description, ―several thousand tons of radium combined 
with dust and water … splattered over the target ships and the water of the lagoon.‖ After 
nearly a week, sailors were allowed to salvage instruments from the decontaminated 
ships, if they could do so in the ten to twenty minutes before exceeding what was 
considered at that time to be a safe tolerance dose. When they returned, they were tested 
for radioactivity, and showered and tested, and sometimes showered again. Lingering 
activity on their hands was eliminated by dissolving off the outer layer of their skin with 
―aqua regia.‖ Internal exposures to radioactive material posed the greatest hazard. If 
breathed into the lungs or taken into the mouth, ―a microgram of fission material, which 
is about the weight of one puff of cigarette smoke, can do serious damage.‖159 Warren 
also wrote about the insidious nature of the biological hazard of environmental 
accumulations of radioactive material and the hazards it posed across the food chain: 
Two weeks after the detonation, the little vegetable-eating fish of the 
lagoon began to die from radioactive material absorbed from the algae. If 
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you dried one of these fish and put it on a photographic film, it would take 
its own picture because of the radioactive materials deposited in its bones 
and stomach. At the end of the fourth week, the predatory fish died from 
eating the smaller fish. They disintegrated on the bottom, the algae 
absorbed their radioactivity and the cycle started all over again.
160
 
 
When Warren submitted his article to the AEC for the required review, the AEC 
distributed it to the Navy and defense officials for comment. Lilienthal‘s AEC approved 
the article‘s release, noting that it had no objection to the article‘s publication and, 
indeed, hoped that it would be published because it ―might reawaken the lagging interest 
of the international control of dangerous aspects of atomic energy.‖ Rear Admiral 
William ―Deke‖ Parsons, the Chairman of the Joint Crossroads Committee, disagreed and 
refused permission—the Military Liaison Committee concurred. Parsons‘s analysis 
contained echoes of those Read had made before Crossroads. He wrote that Warren‘s 
explanation was ―sensational,‖ contained a ―very pessimistic view … not … shared by 
other scientific and medical groups,‖ that it ignored ―the potential of an efficient civilian 
defense organization in minimizing the spread of contamination and panic,‖ and 
concluded: 
The public is entitled to receive from experts of Dr. Warren‘s standing not 
only the ―dark‖ part of the picture, but also the more hopeful aspects. Any 
campaign of public education should be aimed not at spreading fear but at 
enlisting public support for measures of passive defense, and at presenting 
the need for efficient organization and discipline among the public in the 
event of disaster.
161
  
 
By comparing the content to which the Navy objected and that which it permitted, it 
becomes clearer that the Navy was primarily interested in preventing the spread of 
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information that would have generated opposition to continued weapons testing—and 
perhaps would have, as the AEC official stated, reinvigorated interest in international 
control, a circumstance that would have stymied military expansion. In contrast to 
Warren‘s elaboration of the concentration and continual expression of radioactivity in the 
environment and its effect on living organisms, what can reasonably be said to have been 
a ―just the facts, ma‘am‖ discussion; David Bradley, a physician who served at 
Crossroads as a radiation monitor, and whose book No Place to Hide has gone down in 
history as a frank statement of the dangers that lingering radioactivity would present in 
the event of a nuclear war, took a tentative, ―the jury‘s still out‖ approach in the 
conclusion to his narrative of the same phenomenon:  
Almost all seagoing fish recently caught around the atoll of Bikini have 
been radioactive. Thus the disease is passed on from species to species 
like an epizootic ….What the immediate results of this situation will be 
cannot be predicted. I believe that there is enough radioactivity present at 
the bottom of this lagoon to kill fish … but it would take a careful study of 
the fish population extending over many months to prove it. I doubt that 
the amount of radiation carried away by migratory fish to other parts of 
the Pacific will constitute any hazard … but whether we would be safe in 
that assumption in the event of an atomic war … is another question.162  
 
Publicity that brought those and other facts about Operation Crossroads into the 
open stimulated debate and disagreements among scientists—disagreements that allowed 
the military, during Crossroads and after, to marginalize scientific opinion with self-
serving choices. The Navy benefited from both manifestations of this process: it 
capitalized upon the public‘s renewed appreciation for the accumulation of scientific 
information to bolster the importance of the maneuvers; it also relied upon and 
contributed to the disagreements among scientists by discrediting those scientists who 
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opposed Crossroads and marginalizing their opinions. In the years that followed, the 
division and politicization of scientists engendered by Crossroads gave the Navy, and 
other branches that would come to devise their own experiments with atomic weaponry, 
an opportunity to discount cautious scientific opinion and to select instead the scientists 
and opinions that best suited their interests. A year after his experiences at Crossroads 
and while on a trip to Washington, D.C., Stafford Warren, the Crossroads’ Radiation 
Safety Officer, wrote home to his wife Viola. In a self-professed ―tizzy‖ he explained that 
he had been denied permission to publish a number of studies relating to data he had 
collected at Crossroads. Those studies, evaluations of the unpredictability of downwind 
radioactive contamination were:  
too scary to publish now and they agreed to a panel of psychologists, 
psychiatrists, and social scientists with war experience to study this 
problem so that the info could be put out without causing mass hysteria 
…. There is a great deal more interest in the east now than ever before and 
it has the Navy and Army worried that the ‗hysteria‘ will go in the wrong 
direction.
163
  
 
The military‘s suppression of Warren‘s findings meant that, like other scientific studies 
he and others had performed before and after Crossroads, it could ignore the 
inconvenient fact that radioactive fallout could not be evaluated for safety based on 
general dispersal predictions and measurements. In planning the next round of tests under 
the authority of the AEC, for example, the JCS demanded that responsibility for the 
setting of radiation exposure limits rested with the commander alone: ―The task force 
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commander must have final responsibility in matters pertaining to hazards which may 
result in injury or death to personnel whether they be military or scientific.‖164  
 By the end of 1947, the Military Establishment was prepared institutionally and 
organizationally with Manhattan expertise and strategies to exploit the political climate 
and international events to establish complete authority over the atomic program.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
POLITICAL PATHWAYS TO CONSOLIDATION 
The Atomic Energy Act and the National Security Act became stepping stones to 
influence and autonomy for military officers. Provisions in both acts that established 
congressional oversight failed to guarantee accountability. Instead, they politicized 
defense and atomic administration, putting military officers and program managers alike 
in positions where their achievement mattered less than their ability to weather or exploit 
shifts in the domestic political climate. Because of their experience in the political arena 
and familiarity with congressional actors, and because they had been able to shape 
provisions of both Acts, military officers had advantages in the political arena that the 
AEC and supporters of civilian development did not. The military also derived more 
benefit than supporters of civilian control from an institutional standpoint: the NSA 
provided the armed forces with institutional support for coordination of military goals. 
On the civilian side of the equation, AEA provisions that limited the terms of the first 
commissioners to two years guaranteed that it would be difficult for them to generate 
confidence in their abilities and build the relationships necessary to gain support for AEC 
programs unrelated to defense. This became immediately evident when a coalition of 
Republicans and conservative Democrats, many of them supporters of the military who 
had opposed the civilian-directed AEA, achieved a majority in Congress and took aim at 
Truman and at the AEC.
1
 Although the cards were stacked against the AEC from the 
beginning, decisions that the AEC made in the first year to decentralize the operation of 
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the program before securing authority in its own right were also partially responsible for 
its inability to civilianize the atomic program after passage of the AEA.  
The Atomic Energy Act 
 
President Truman signed the Atomic Energy Act on August 1, 1946, while 
Operation Crossroads was entering its final stages at Bikini. After months of high profile 
hearings during which the issue of civilian versus military control was debated in 
Congress and throughout the press, the bill‘s supporters had included a provision for a 
military advisory panel. With that, General Groves and other supporters of military 
control, believing that the concession was the beginning of a trend and that amendments 
to the Act favorable to the military would be forthcoming, dropped their opposition to the 
civilian authority of The McMahon Act. The revision allowed the bill to pass 
unanimously in the Senate and with an overwhelming majority of the House. On its face, 
the Act reaffirmed the principle of civilian authority through the creation of an all-
civilian Atomic Energy Commission answerable to the president and to the Act‘s newly 
created Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (JCAE). The JCAE was an eighteen member 
committee composed of nine senators and nine representatives, with each house 
represented by five from the majority and four from the minority, and it was to be kept 
―fully and currently informed‖ by the AEC. By November of that year, Truman had 
chosen and appointed the men who would serve on the first Commission. He granted 
them interim responsibility in advance of their formal nominations in January so that they 
could begin to acquaint themselves with what was already an up-and-running empire. A 
brief overview provides a sense of what those commissioners had taken on. In what was 
called a ―small‖ liaison office in D.C., a staff of 535 coordinated the program‘s 
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operational arms. The program‘s headquarters was housed in facilities on 59,000 acres of 
restricted area in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, and other centers of operation were located in 
New York, Chicago, Los Alamos, and Richland, Washington. The program also had 
offices in Berkeley, Los Angeles, Schenectady, and Ames, Iowa. Nearly 4,200 full time 
staff worked outside of D.C., and the program employed another 40,000 as contractor 
employees, 235 military officers, and 2,500 enlisted men. By January 1, 1947 the budget 
for 1948 had been roughly estimated to be in the range of $683 million dollars.
2
  
The first Commission was a diverse and broadly skilled group. Its Chairman, 
David E. Lilienthal, drew opposition for his political and ideological viewpoints from the 
start. A full year before his appointment he had already run afoul of the Army by 
participating in a September 1945, conference on Atomic Energy Control at the 
University of Chicago. At that time, Lilienthal had helped thwart Army officers‘ plans to 
prevent that conference from taking place and had, moreover, antagonized officers and 
their supporters by advocating openness and the release of all information about atomic 
science except for that which could be shown to directly jeopardize national security. The 
only Democrat on Truman‘s slate and a seasoned New Dealer, Lilienthal was perhaps 
best known as the man who had built and managed the TVA. A Midwesterner, Lilienthal 
was a graduate of Harvard Law School and had experience with atomic issues, having 
worked with Acheson and Baruch on a plan for international control under the UN. 
Lilienthal‘s approach to domestic control was one that encouraged information sharing 
and public participation to generate what he called a ―broad public understanding and 
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Project and the transfer of some of Los Alamos‘s projects to Sandia. The figures included here were 
gathered at the time and published in 1948, and are likely to be accurate as any. Richard O. Niehoff, Public 
Administration Review 8 (1948): 91-102, esp. 94.  
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discussion of the issues involved.‖3 According to one associate who had worked with him 
while he served on Wisconsin‘s Public Service Commission, he was also a politically 
astute and crafty administrator: ―tough, stubborn, and ruthless.‖4 As Chairman of the 
AEC, Lilienthal drew an annual salary of $15,000, which would amount to about 
$140,000 today; and which at the time was slightly higher than a Senator‘s $12,500 
salary and $1,000 more than the $14,000 that each of the other Commissioners earned.
5
 
To round out the Commission, Truman appointed Robert Bacher, a forty-one year old 
scientist, who had been involved with the creation of the atom bomb and was head of 
nuclear research at Cornell; Lewis Strauss, fifty-one year old banker and philanthropist, 
who had invested in radioactive isotopes, appeared to outsiders as a shy, stylish dresser, 
and who, as a Forrestal protégé, was so proud of his rank that for the remainder of his life 
he asked to be addressed as ―Admiral;‖6 William Waymack, Pulitzer Prize-winning editor 
of the Des Moines Register and outspoken supporter of the McMahon Act; and, finally, 
Sumner Pike, an industrialist and bachelor at fifty-three.  
The Commission restructured the program, dividing responsibilities according to 
their own preferred methods of management and in accordance with committees and 
divisions established by Congress for research, engineering, production, and military 
applications. Under the Act, the Commission was responsible for establishing policy, for 
appointing division directors, and naming a general manager. The two most important 
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Committees established under the Act were the General Advisory Committee (GAC) and 
the Military Liaison Committee (MLC). GAC members were selected by the president, 
expected to serve six-year terms, and were civilians, primarily physical scientists and 
engineers with expertise in atomic materials and issues. They were already familiar to 
readers of newspapers and magazines who had taken an interest in stories about the bomb 
and the Manhattan Project.
7
 The MLC was made up of representatives from the War and 
Navy Departments who were charged with the responsibility to ―advise and consult‖ with 
the AEC on the military‘s needs. The Act contained provisions to deal with disputes 
between the MLC and the AEC, but did so with language that gave the MLC wide 
latitude and authority with the expectation that the MLC would be in a position to advise 
the military establishment as well as the AEC. Should the MLC ―conclude‖ that the AEC 
was operating in a manner that was ―adverse to the responsibilities of the Departments of 
War or Navy,‖ for example, it was to refer the matter to the Secretaries of those 
departments, and should one or both of them concur with the MLC‘s conclusion(s), they 
could then refer the issue to the president for a final decision.
8
  
The Act contained no provisions addressing health and safety precautions, an 
indicator of their peacetime marginalization. As a remedy, the Commission itself 
established an Interim Medical Advisory Committee and made Stafford Warren its 
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Chairman. Warren‘s first priority was to establish a biomedical research agenda for the 
AEC. By June of that year, a Medical Board of Review was meeting and ruling on 
procedural and ethical questions of researchers working under AEC contract who were, 
among other things, investigating the affect of radiation on human subjects.
9
 That 
Committee‘s successor, the Division of Biology and Medicine, was established in 
October 1947. The Commission chose Shields Warren, no relation to Stafford Warren, as 
its Director. Shields Warren graduated from Harvard Medical School, broke new ground 
by using isotopes in his work with endocrine disease and cancer, and as a Navy officer 
and colleague of Stafford Warren, performed systematic studies of radiation effects at 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
10
 During its first year, the AEC also set up a Medical Division 
that operated out of the New York office. Instead of relying on contractor personnel, as 
was the case throughout the program, the Medical Division ran its own laboratory with 
AEC staff. A recently discharged radiologist with the U.S. Army Medical Corps, Bernard 
Wolf, established the laboratory and brought in Merril Eisenbud, then an industrial 
hygienist with Liberty Mutual Insurance Company and later became director of the 
AEC‘s Health and Safety Laboratory. In the 1950s, Eisenbud would be the one to 
implement the first worldwide fallout monitoring network.
11
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Lilienthal‘s strategy for structuring the organization reflected a combination of 
pragmatism and Jeffersonian idealism. With the Commission in the position of chief 
policy maker once held by Groves, the AEC chose Carroll Wilson to be General Manager 
and gave him responsibility over the day-to-day operations of the AEC. Wilson was an 
MIT graduate who had gained experience in government-funded science during the war 
working under Karl T. Compton and Vannevar Bush. Wilson remained in government 
service and after the war served as a secretary to the State Department board which 
prepared the Acheson-Lilienthal Report. At Lilienthal‘s suggestion, the AEC de-
centralized the authority for facilities and operations across America, situating it in 
regional offices and into the hands of Operations Managers who, for the short term at 
least, had been part of the Manhattan Project, and using military personnel in ―key‖ 
administrative positions.
12
 One of the goals of this strategy was to minimize disruption of 
the production schedule during the transformation. Another, at least from Lilienthal‘s 
perspective, was based on his experiences with the TVA. He sought to develop a system 
of satellite management as a strategy for democratizing the program, generating local 
interest and leading to the development of grass roots organizations that, he believed, 
would take an active interest in the atomic energy program and ensure that those people 
affected most by the program benefited from them. For Lilienthal, it promised an 
outcome that held ―the best promise for the progress of the atomic energy program as a 
whole.‖13 But the TVA‘s goal to produce and deliver power rurally differed 
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fundamentally from the atomic program because security regulations prevented locals 
from becoming involved in the program except as employees. The TVA model may have 
streamlined atomic production but the policy actually ran counter to Lilienthal‘s goals. 
During his tenure, Lilienthal‘s detractors pointed to his satellite system as one that would 
allow subversives to enter the organization; but the opposite occurred—the system itself 
prevented interference from subversives and locals alike, prevented Lilienthal‘s openness 
plans from taking hold, and resulted in the reinforcement of the (Manhattan) status quo. 
Because the AEC abandoned the consolidated, authoritarian, structure that Groves had 
wielded at the top of the Manhattan Project before it had managed to achieve its own 
authority over the program, decentralization resulted in the perpetuation of the ethos and 
culture of the Manhattan Project and the weapons-centric motivations and connections 
with private industry that had invigorated it.  
Moreover, some of the assumptions built into the Act itself also hindered its 
effectiveness. Participants in the program who later set down its history likened the 
structure of the AEC to a corporation, with the Commission operating as a full-time 
board of directors, the General Manager acting as corporate president, and the JCAE in 
the position of corporate stockholders.
14
 Their analogy highlights the influence of private 
business models on the administrative state, and on what historian Brian Balogh 
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identified as the pro-administrative state‘s reliance on professional expertise.15 The 
analogy also provides a framework for exploring what mid-1940s methods of 
administration meant for the development and organization of the AEC and how it was 
then, and is now, understood. From a historical perspective, the analogy tends to leave the 
impression that the AEA was more carefully crafted than it was. In fact, in establishing 
the JCAE under the Act, Congress did not address how the joint committee would 
manage confirmation of commissioners, which house would provide the JCAE chair, or 
how bills would be handled. Similarly, the Truman administration neglected to consider 
its relationship to the JCAE and the effect on its authority. Under the Act, for example, 
the JCAE gained access to executive branch resources, including staff, facilities, services, 
and information.
16
 Such inattention to detail might be construed as insignificant in light 
of how committed elected officials were to getting the bill passed. But, the mechanics 
that Truman and the bill‘s congressional supporters overlooked were ones that dealt with 
substantive issues of how authority and political power would be distributed and betray 
some fundamental assumptions built into the Act. Those assumptions, as with the 
assuredness in a civilian/military divide based on profession instead of interest, weakened 
the ability of the first Commissioners to assert the civilian authority over atomic energy 
that was the Act‘s aim. Among those assumptions were a shared confidence in the 
constitutional separation of powers, satisfaction that if traditional divisions of authority 
were not enough to safeguard executive and congressional prerogative that each would be 
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up to the task of policing and correcting infractions;
17
 that a business model was 
adaptable and suitable for administering a program as important to national security—and 
as fraught with hazard—as atomic energy; and, additionally, that a Commission could be 
found with the ability, wherewithal, and flexibility, to implement that model and carry 
out the Act‘s mandate.  
Confidence that the constitutional and democratic process would win out and that 
a corporate-type administrative structure was an appropriate way to manage the program 
failed to take into account two factors that stood in the way of an outcome that would 
have satisfied the provisions for civilian authority over atomic energy: (a) the political 
tug-of-war over control of the program, and (b) the militaristic nature of the existing 
program. The AEC‘s ability to secure its authority over atomic science was, in fact, 
stifled by the rabid partisanship that poisoned the confirmation process and challenged 
Lilienthal‘s ability and thus his right to authority from the start. In addition, the existing 
operational and managerial structure of Manhattan, one that the AEC adopted, limited the 
Commission‘s ability to substitute its authority for military leadership and to reorient the 
program toward a civilian, deconsolidated, hierarchy.  
As Chairman of an independent agency, Lilienthal was responsible for reporting 
to and satisfying the president while also answering to Congress. For Lilienthal, as later 
for Strauss, it was an unenviable position that put the AEC chairman at the intersection 
where the often competing ambitions of the president and congressmen met and clashed. 
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This was similar to the problems faced by other agency directors and officials, but the 
situation was exacerbated because the AEC—the board of directors in a ―corporate‖ 
formulation—had no control over the military side of the program. An example from 
early days of the AEC illustrates how little control the AEC and Lilienthal had. In early 
1947, Secretary of War Robert Patterson asked Lilienthal for his thoughts on the 
possibility of appointing General Groves to the Military Liaison Committee—the 
organization created under the Act to guarantee that the program would continue to 
provide military support. Lilienthal wrote that the suggestion ―flabbergasted‖ him, and he 
asked for time to consult with the Commission. An hour later, Lilienthal was advised that 
the appointment had already been made.
18
 In a single stroke, the Commission was thus 
prevented from contributing to the making of a decision that would, by its very nature, 
influence how atomic resources would be used. The incident also illustrates how 
provisions of the AEA operated as a mechanism for the institutionalization of the pre-
AEA military versus civilian conflict. In this instance, the AEC was put in the position of 
partnering, on a routine basis for purposes of national defense, with Groves, the man who 
had been in charge of the organization that the AEC replaced, who had personified the 
opposition to civilian management of atomic energy and, by extension, opposition to the 
Act itself. In this way Groves, who as the Director of the Manhattan Project had 
previously kept the program out of the government‘s bureaucratic structure, became part 
of it. Patterson‘s appointment of Groves guaranteed continuation of the conflict that had 
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stalled passage of the AEA. More importantly, however, it added legitimacy to the 
opposition to civilian authority that had been one of the defining characteristics of 
Groves‘s management of the Manhattan Project. Partisan politics also hobbled 
Lilienthal‘s and the AEC‘s authority.  
On the congressional side, the Chairman answered to the JCAE. In the abstract 
―corporate‖ administrative model, the JCAE assumed the responsibilities of a stockholder 
and was charged with protecting the government‘s investment. In reality, however, the 
attention of its members was divided. Unlike a group of stockholders, JCAE members 
could not count on their fortunes to rise and fall with the expansion and success of the 
corporation alone, but also on their individual political acumen, their party‘s electoral 
successes, and on the changing relations between Congress and the president. In addition, 
JCAE responsibility for oversight extended their responsibilities beyond those of 
business-world stockholders. To perform meaningful oversight, the JCAE would have 
had to gain a working knowledge of the extent of the program and its operation. It was a 
task that JCAE members seriously underestimated. These factors affected the relationship 
between the AEC and the JCAE, and made more difficult the job of the AEC. The 
Commission—the board of directors—was not judged in the way it might in the 
corporate world: on ability, administrative acumen, or demonstrable results recorded and 
routinely provided to the JCAE in a report that delineated progress in capacity and 
production. Instead, the Commission was as likely to be pilloried or praised because of 
partisan politics or other factors outside its realm of authority.
19
 Because of the 
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significance of the atomic program and because the leadership of the JCAE changed 
according to the majority party in Congress, JCAE members often discounted substantive 
oversight and used their positions as political platforms. Except for the two month period 
of time between their interim appointments and nomination, the members of the AEC 
were given no honeymoon to acquaint themselves with their responsibilities to establish 
the mechanisms and funding for the program. Passage of the AEA and the naming of 
Commission members occurred during the final months when Democrats controlled 
Congress and the liberal minded McMahon chaired the JCAE. During 1947 and 1948, 
when Lilienthal and the Commission were trying to establish their authority, the 
Republicans achieved the first majority they had held since the Hoover administration, 
and the Commission, Lilienthal, and the Act itself became prime targets.  
The character of JCAE inquiries during this period illustrate that the hearings 
were more important to the committee members as a venue for re-visiting historical 
antagonisms than they were for addressing topical concerns. Some of these were 
arguments and animosities left over from the controversies that had stalled passage of the 
AEA, some politically motivated, others ideological positions deeply felt and not easily 
abandoned.
20
 Others were certainly based in the simmering anxiety that some lawmakers, 
just as some people throughout the country, felt. As one 67-year-old Virginia farmer put 
it when asked after Crossroads whether he thought an atom bomb would hit the United 
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States, ―I couldn‘t tell you. Afeered it will.‖21 Divisive holdovers from Manhattan and 
debates over atomic energy legislation also contaminated post-AEA hearings. Some 
members of the JCAE asked questions aimed at resolving old as well as current issues. 
Brien McMahon, for example, used Lilienthal‘s confirmation hearings to validate his 
year-long commitment to the AEA, the bill that bore his name, by interrogating Lilienthal 
about the importance of civilian authority over atomic science. In doing so, McMahon 
lured Lilienthal into unintentionally taking sides in an older argument that arose during 
the final months of the war, about which Lilienthal was apparently unaware.
22
 It was 
widely recognized at the time that the most virulent innuendo-laden attacks made by 
Republican members of the JCAE had no legitimate basis in fact.
23
 Still, the persistence 
and inflammatory nature of those remarks during confirmation hearings planted seeds of 
suspicion and put the Commission‘s civilian leadership on the defensive from the 
beginning. In the words of Edward Teller, then one of the editors of the Bulletin of 
Atomic Scientists who opposed an amendment to the AEA that would have shortened the 
term of the AEC Chairman as a disingenuous way of replacing him without legitimate 
grounds for criticism, ―Old guard Republicans would like the chance of nominating the 
chairman. … They certainly are not enthusiastic about Lilienthal.‖24 Such attacks helped 
to reinforce the support Groves was already receiving from Truman and congressmen. 
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They lent encouragement to the general and others that Congress would revise the Act to 
re-situate control in military hands.  
Moreover, routine and sometimes baseless attacks meant primarily to keep 
pressure on the Truman administration drew the JCAE‘s attention away from their 
primary responsibility—oversight of the AEC and the program. The JCAE‘s 
preoccupation with incidental and partisan matters during the first few years meant that 
substantive issues went unaddressed. Only in 1949, for example, and only after a 
newspaper article drew attention to the possibility that the AEC was unable to locate a 
small amount of radioactive material did the JCAE learn how the program (and before it 
the Manhattan Project) secured, shipped, and accounted for the radioactive substances 
that were, under the AEA, owned solely by the U.S. government. In this incident, the 
Chicago Research Division had noticed that one bottle of U-235 enriched oxide shipped 
from the Division‘s laboratory in Chicago in September 1947 located at a secure AEC 
facility outside of town could not be located when the shipment was finally opened in 
February. After an internal search and investigation to establish if there had been an error 
in the quantities identified on the shipping label or if the bottle had simply been 
misplaced, the Chicago Division reported the material as missing to the Washington 
Division of Research on March 21. On March 28 the AEC authorized the Division to 
contact the FBI. On April 20, the AEC discussed the missing material at a meeting and, 
on April 27, with investigation by laboratory and AEC officials, as well as the FBI, 
continuing, notified the JCAE of the loss via a ―security violations report.‖ The JCAE 
took no action as a result of the report from the AEC. Only after the story appeared in the 
newspaper did the JCAE ask for an explanation from the AEC and schedule the May 18, 
234 
 
1949, hearing.
25
 Early in the hearing, one member of the JCAE interrupted Lilienthal‘s 
testimony to ask for an explanation of what was being discussed—he was unaware of the 
problem as well as of the newspaper article that had caught the committee‘s attention.26  
As the hearing got underway, the content of the AEC‘s explanations and the 
JCAE‘s questioning of AEC witnesses illustrates how little the JCAE, or at least some of 
its members, had learned about the program‘s operation and the management of 
radioactive material in the more than two years since the AEC took charge and began 
reporting to the Joint Committee. How radioactive material was measured and 
inventoried were among the operational facts about which the JCAE was ignorant. In 
particular, it was during that 1949 meeting that the JCAE found out that the Manhattan 
Project had not kept track of its radioactive material at all. It had produced only a partial 
inventory with a rough estimate of radioactive stock in July 1947 at the insistence of the 
AEC and in August 1947 supplemented that estimate. After that, it had taken the AEC a 
year to check the facilities and acquire some measure of confidence about material 
reserves. During the hearing, witnesses testified that it was in the process of ensuring the 
accuracy of the new accounting system that the loss that gave rise to the FBI 
investigation (and the JCAE hearing) came to light. As the hearing progressed, and as 
AEC witnesses discovered how rudimentary the understandings of some JCAE 
committee members were, the witnesses adjusted the sophistication of their answers to 
meet the elementary thinking of some Committee members. They explained how 
radioactive material was measured and inventoried, pointing out that it could not be not 
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measured in the same way as money, or as some other refined product such as flour 
might be. Instead of a quantity based solely in terms of value, volume, or weight, 
radioactive material was inventoried in terms of both quantity and refinement. The AEC 
representatives explained that once a refined quality was established, for the purity of a 
rod, for example, it was that measure that was henceforth used as a basis for establishing 
the quality of any shavings or scraps of material that was machined from it during the 
production process. Additionally, they tried to further the Committee‘s understanding of 
the innocent and unavoidable ways that losses occurred. No matter how intricate the 
measures and mechanisms put in place to account for radioactive material, witnesses 
explained that it was impossible to recover and account for all of it because some minute 
amount was inevitably lost at various stages in the production process when it became 
airborne and settled on walls, lodged in machinery, air ducts, and on the clothing of 
workers, or when it melded with other material during refining and machining.
27
 A 
segment of testimony delivered by Walter J. Williams, who was Director of the 
Production Division, illustrates the difficulty he had in explaining the accounting 
problems to a committee that was far less informed than he had anticipated:  
Williams: We are getting into more and more detail. There is some 
installation where we have to set a limit that we will strive for in 
accountability because the accounting is so uncertain. … In the K-25 
cascade, we have thousands of miles of pipe. We have to depend on a very 
complicated system of calculations to determine how much material is in 
this cascade. 
Senator McMahon:  What‘s the cascade? 
Williams:  The entire gaseous diffusion plant. This consists of many, 
many pipes. At the present time, we know—I think we know—within 8 
per cent—7 to 8 percent of how much material is unaccounted for. That is 
as close as we have been able to come and we have done a great deal of 
work on it. To understand why you have this loss, it is necessary to go 
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back to the construction of this plant. All of the equipment is nickel-plated 
to prevent irradiation from uranium hexafluoride, and the sides of the pipe 
and pumps have all been fluorinated. But you can‘t be sure you have done 
a perfect job. For that reason, if we put material in the bottom of that plant, 
you might not get any out at the top. Now in a year—a year‘s report 
showed that we have 7.9 percent of the material put into the K-25 plant 
that we think is in the plant.  
  How do you account for it? You have to take simultaneous readings from 
all over the plant. Many, many meters. You have to take all of these on a 
form; you have to put them through a calculating machine—it takes 
several weeks. Maybe the pressure meter is off a little—all of these add up 
to a discrepancy.
28
 
 
This testimony came after Williams had explained that in between the time when 
the JCAE was notified of the loss and the hearing, the AEC had re-analyzed the original 
source rod and discovered that because of an error in the purity of the source rod, all but 
4 grams of material that was thought to be missing had been accounted for.  
By the hearing‘s conclusion, McMahon expressed satisfaction that the missing 
material had neither been stolen nor lost as a result of administrative mismanagement. 
Another congressman, Senator William F. Knowland of California, was unwilling to let 
the matter rest. Knowland disagreed with McMahon‘s comment that he did not think that 
the loss had occurred because of a theft and that he did not ―think any particular harm 
will come of it.‖ Instead, Knowland, who later pushed for the elevation of E.O. 
Lawrence‘s California laboratory into a ―national‖ laboratory and the creation of the 
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory,
29
 directed a final attack on the AEC: 
Knowland: Certainly from the procedures which were shown in this case, I 
don‘t believe there is anybody in the Commission who knows whether the 
bottle was ever shipped, whether it was lost in transit, whether it was ever 
received and put in the safe and if it was withdrawn. I am utterly amazed. 
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… If a person in a banking institution, dealing with dollars, would take an 
unsupported certificate in this way, I don‘t know how they would protect 
the banking institution. Certainly the other thing may have happened—that 
there was deliberate effort to steal this material, that there were one or two 
people involved. … I don‘t know what control you have over your 
existing inventories. I am utterly amazed on the procedure.
30
 
 
Thus, even after the AEC‘s explanation of the incident and of how it accounted for 
material in the normal course of business, at least one committee member insisted on 
using the incident to criticize the AEC‘s administration of the program. Neither 
Knowland nor other members of the JCAE brought up their own committee‘s delay in 
responding to the report of the incident over the course of the hearing. 
One of the reasons Knowland and other AEC detractors launched baseless, vague, 
or anti-communistic attacks against the AEC was that, from a performance standpoint, 
there was little about which they could complain. As mentioned earlier, between 1947, 
when the AEC assumed responsibility and 1950, it had devoted almost all of its energy to 
weapons production. The AEC had taken what it received from Manhattan and used 
subsequent appropriations to put seven additional defense-related facilities into 
production and to increase the number of bombs in the nation‘s arsenal from eleven to 
369.
31
 The complaints against AEC administration can reasonably be said to have had 
nothing to do with national security and everything to do with the desire of armed forces 
officers and their supporters to re-gain the type of autonomous authority over the 
program that Groves and Nichols had wielded over the Manhattan Project. National 
security, and the role the atomic program—and the AEC—played in preserving it, 
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provided congressmen with a convenient means of attacking the Truman administration. 
National security was not what was at stake in the partisan battles for authority that took 
place before and after passage of the AEA. What brought military officers and 
congressmen together was the possibility of increasing their own influence at the expense 
of President Truman, his administration, and his domestic agenda.  
Control over the program amounted to a contest for political influence and 
entitlement, an issue that strengthened the partnership between Congress and the military. 
Forrestal‘s diary entries provide examples of the formation and solidification of this 
partnership. During a meeting on January 22, 1947, for example, five days before 
Lilienthal began the ordeal of Senate confirmation, armed forces officers and their 
congressional supporters were already pinpointing what they argued were dangerous 
influences in the AEC. At a meeting between Iowa‘s Senator Bourke B. Hickenlooper, 
Forrestal, and Rear Admiral Parsons of the Military Liaison Committee that Forrestal 
recorded in his diary, Hickenlooper complained of Lilienthal‘s ―tremendous power and 
responsibility‖ and a ―pacifistic and unrealistic trend‖ within the Commission.32 Having 
identified a ―trend‖ in a spanking-new Commission that had yet to be confirmed and that 
had a history merely a few months long, Hickenlooper remained on the lookout for more 
instances to verify what he had recognized as a consistent pattern of activity and 
continued reporting to Forrestal. After a month of confirmation hearings, he hinted to 
Forrestal that Lilienthal had been negligent and was possibly lenient toward communists, 
complained of Lilienthal‘s ―intransigence and inflexibility,‖ and asked Forrestal to advise 
the president that Lilienthal had hired appointees without having them screened by the 
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FBI. Forrestal wasted no time in using the information to discredit Lilienthal, contacting 
Truman and also AEC Commissioner Lewis Strauss that very evening.
33
 Forrestal 
continued to collect evidence against Lilienthal and his administration of the program that 
he gleaned from congressional and personal contacts. While using it as a way of turning 
President Truman against Lilienthal, Forrestal also kept Strauss in on the ―military‖ side 
of the loop, keeping him informed of the opposition that was building against Lilienthal 
from outside the AEC. After Lilienthal‘s confirmation, Forrestal noted in his diary that he 
had told Strauss that the MLC had complained to him that Lilienthal had been 
uncooperative.
34
 Simultaneously, opponents of Truman‘s policies within his 
administration, in Congress, and in the private sector, used the atomic program as a way 
to undermine the president‘s authority. In February 1948, Forrestal, Hickenlooper, and 
the president of Bethlehem Steel discussed their ―vague misgivings‖ about the direction 
of the AEC over lunch. Hickenlooper objected to the content of Lilienthal‘s public 
speeches, claiming that Lilienthal‘s repeated references to control by ―the people‖ of 
atomic energy smacked of ―statism.‖ A few days later, Forrestal wrote that the AEC‘s 
Director of Security, Rear Admiral John Gingrich, had said that Lilienthal had been lax 
about security, having distributed $40 million to Brookhaven Laboratories through which 
―nine universities‖ participated.35 It was not just security, but resources, that concerned 
Forrestal. In a letter that he wrote to Hickenlooper explaining the military‘s estimated 
atom bomb requirements, Forrestal explained that the calculation for the number of 
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bombs was based on strategic requirements as well as on a desire to prevent the use of 
―wasteful processes‖ and ―to avoid wasteful expenditure of funds.‖36 For Forrestal, then, 
expenditures that were not devoted to bomb-making were, in his own words, ―wasteful.‖ 
As Secretary of the Navy and Secretary of Defense, Forrestal worked with Truman‘s 
opponents in Congress, friends and associates in the private sector, and with former 
subordinates, to undermine the authority of the AEC from the top down, through Truman, 
and from the inside out, through Strauss.  
Additionally, all of Truman‘s opponents benefitted from decisions reached by 
Lilienthal and the AEC Commissioners themselves that, in hindsight, limited the 
Commission‘s ability to establish the type of authority they might have commanded 
under the AEA. Expedience and administrative principles caused the AEC to leave in 
place the functional organizational and material structures of Manhattan while de-
aggregating the authority that Groves had accumulated during the war. The AEC replaced 
Groves‘s consolidated, authoritarian, model with one that distributed authority into a 
satellite system of regional and operational managers. For Lilienthal, decentralized 
management was ideologically and administratively sound. He championed 
decentralization as a governing principle ―essential to the operation of democracy in a 
modern society,‖ and was most comfortable with administrative methods that he believed 
would foster, on a local and regional basis, support for the program by encouraging 
citizen involvement, stimulate grass roots interest, and which would provide for a better-
informed public that could then participate in future decision-making about atomic 
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resources and facilities.
37
 Arguing against a continuance of the wartime-style atomic 
secrecy in a speech delivered to a Community Public Meeting on the campus of Wabash 
College and broadcast over the CBS network, Lilienthal made it clear that he believed the 
American people had a duty to educate themselves about atomic energy and to prevent 
the repeated lowering of a veil of secrecy:  
Look upon this task of becoming familiar with the essentials of atomic 
energy as an obligation directly to your children—and if there are 
grandchildren, to your grandchildren; or to those nice likeable youngsters 
next door. This is at least as direct a way of doing your duty to your 
children as the sacrifices you make without hesitation to get them an 
education, or the right diet and good doctors. If schemers or fools or 
rascals or hysterical stuffed shirts get this thing out of your hands—it may 
then be too late to find out what it is all about. Do this for your children.
38
  
 
Lilienthal‘s diary entries reveal that he was not naïve about the difficulties he and 
the AEC faced in trying to open up an operation that had been built on the most strident 
security regulations ever imposed, a system that during the war had been so secure and so 
at odds with the constitutional system of government that a handful of enemy spies knew 
more about Manhattan than did congressmen or state officials, and remained vital to 
national security. Nor, as a seasoned New Dealer who was well aware of pro-military 
forces in Congress, was he naïve about the tenor of the approaching political battle. He 
did, however, underestimate, or perhaps not fully appreciate at the outset, how ineffective 
his efforts to build grass-roots support for a democratized atomic program—with monthly 
addresses, for example, to groups as disparate as the Civic Organizations of 
Crawfordsville, Indiana, the New York Herald Tribune Forum, and the American Farm 
Bureau‘s Annual Meeting in Chicago—would be against the military‘s behind-the-scenes 
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campaign to discredit him and the support it received toward that end from cooperative 
congressmen.
39
 Increasing material production and the number of bombs more than 
thirty-fold was not enough ammunition for Lilienthal to combat the insider attacks and 
political backbiting of self-interested military officers and the AEC‘s congressional 
detractors that undermined both his goals and national security.  
From a functionalist perspective, the AEC‘s decision to maintain the integrity of 
the working components of the Manhattan Project seemed to make perfect sense as a 
means of enlarging the program for the purposes of peacetime and military applications. 
While Lilienthal sought to develop peacetime applications, he was committed to, and did, 
increase the stockpile. It was Lilienthal, for example, who made Truman aware of how 
few bombs there were in the nation‘s arsenal and who then sought approval for increasing 
production. And it was Lilienthal who, paying more than lip service to the national 
security importance of bomb production, decided to keep reactors at Oak Ridge and 
Hanford online and in production while AEC managers and military advisers worked out 
their disagreements about whether and to what extent the reactors required repair, 
replacement, or updating.
40
  
From a structural perspective, however, the decision to leave so much of 
Manhattan intact prevented the AEC from achieving substantive authority over the 
atomic program. That decision allowed for the perpetuation of the wartime style of 
management of Manhattan and provided inroads for Groves and Nichols to reassert their 
authority over the peacetime program. Had the AEC secured its authority over the 
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program by dismantling the organization that Groves had begun establishing at the end of 
the war and the chain of command that he established leading directly to him, devised its 
own scheme aimed strictly at weapons production at Sandia, Los Alamos, or at some 
other facility, and appointed managers with clear lines of responsibility running up to the 
AEC General Manager and the AEC itself, it would have been less likely that Groves 
would have been able to insinuate himself so thoroughly into the Military Establishment. 
Inaction on the AEC‘s part during the crucial transformation phase allowed Groves, 
Nichols, and other officials to exceed their advisory authority and likely made more 
remote the possibility that civilian authority could be achieved at a later date. In one 
sense, the decision to assert civilian authority only at only the highest levels of the 
organization structure might have been predicted to fail because it duplicated Groves‘s 
organizational platform without incorporating what had given it its strength—namely the 
consolidation of authority secured at the top through the chain of command and 
adherence to strict codes of military discipline. More than a failure of comprehension, 
however, the decision was based on what seemed appropriate given the need to produce 
atomic weapons, administrative trends, and assumptions—some misguided—about the 
civilian/military divide, as well as the likelihood that locally managed facilities would 
lead to the democratization of the program and, thus, invigorate and generate support for 
civilian, peacetime, programs. From a historical perspective, the AEC‘s failure to sever 
military lines of authority at the outset made the prospect of civilianizing the program 
more remote over time, especially after passage of the National Security Act.  
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The National Security Act 
 
The aim of the National Security Act of 1947 was to coordinate and streamline 
national defense. The Act created the National Military Establishment, later transformed 
by way of the 1949 Amendment to the Act into the executive level Department of 
Defense (DOD); the National Security Council (NSC) to advise the president on all 
foreign or domestic matters; the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) to represent the armed forces 
and provide military advice; and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).
41
 Also 
incorporated into the new Military Establishment was the Armed Forces Special 
Weapons Project (AFSWAP) which had, with passage of the AEA, assumed the 
responsibility for coordinating the goals of the branches for the use and development of 
atomic energy.
42
 AFSWP‘s first two commanders were Manhattan‘s General Leslie 
Groves, and Kenneth D. Nichols, who had been Groves‘s deputy. Debate about how the 
armed forces should be reorganized had been controversial since before the end of the 
war and the issue of unification was one that pitted the branches, Congress, and members 
of Truman‘s own administration against one another. The Act has long been understood 
as a mechanism that contributed to the politicization of defense, increasing the political 
influence of military officers and the armed forces and the formation of an alliance of 
sorts between politicians and military officers that contributed to energizing the national 
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security state.
43
 That alliance, however, and the expansion of military influence that 
occurred after passage of the NSA, owed much of its vitality to Truman, who 
overestimated his ability to manage the armed forces as commander-in-chief and 
underestimated both the military‘s ambitions and the importance that it attached to the 
atomic program as a means of achieving them. Opposition to the Act within the 
administration, and the way that Truman sought to eliminate that opposition, sheds light 
on Truman‘s contribution to the military‘s increasing postwar influence  
There were two ways of looking at the proposed Act and its provisions. In 
Truman‘s view, the Act involved only one aspect of governance—defense. From the 
standpoint of Secretary of State George C. Marshall, it reached more deeply into the 
structure of government itself and threatened fundamental principles of civilian versus 
military authority. For Truman, the bill would help to protect national security and 
economize the defense budget, bringing the armed forces together in common purpose 
and reducing costly inter-service rivalries. Toward those ends, and as a result of his 
limited notion of the significance of the Act, he viewed opposition to the Act 
straightforwardly. For Truman, the primary problem was the longstanding Army versus 
Navy divide that had erupted because the proposed bill was more closely related to the 
Army‘s plan than the one that the Navy and its Secretary James Forrestal had developed 
and promoted since the war‘s end. Truman interpreted the Navy‘s chief argument against 
the bill, that it would ―weaken civilian control … [leading] to expanded military 
influence throughout American life‖44 in light of his own perceptions of military re-
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organization, and the Army versus Navy rivalry shaped by his own military experiences 
and what he had witnessed since taking office.
45
 That may be why Truman, ironically, 
seems not to have given much thought to the fact that although the Navy‘s argument 
against the bill was a self interested one that reflected Forrestal‘s administrative strategy 
to create a chimera of civilian authority where none existed, it was identical to Marshall‘s 
argument that the bill would sacrifice civilian authority to the military. Marshall feared 
the Act would give the military too much influence, allow it to direct the president‘s 
foreign policy choices, undermine the secretary of state‘s diplomatic efforts, and provide 
the military with unwarranted control over non-military, national assets.
46
 It was the 
Navy‘s opposition, however, expressed throughout well publicized hearings on the Act, 
that seems to have carried the most political weight for Truman.
47
 Truman bridged the 
impasse over re-organization by acquiescing to the Navy‘s concerns and (reluctantly) 
nominating Forrestal as the first Secretary of Defense.
48
 The politically expedient move 
was a concession on Truman‘s part to Forrestal‘s popularity and image as a levelheaded 
and responsible man, which Forrestal himself had cultivated through congressional 
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supporters and the press. The New York Times hailed Forrestal‘s appointment as ―the best 
guarantee that … unification of the services will be carried out intelligently and 
efficiently.‖49 It is unlikely that the vast expansion of military authority that Forrestal by 
turns engineered and fostered, one that was costly and duplicitous though not 
immediately apparent to outsiders, was what the Times had in mind.  
As with the military‘s relationship with the atomic program, Truman‘s belief that 
military authority was only an ancillary aspect of government meant that he 
underestimated the difficulty of corralling or controlling it within the sphere of defense-
related institutions—The Military Establishment, as it came to be called after passage of 
the NSA. That this is the case can be seen from the way that Truman chose to deal with 
the NSA‘s National Security Council—a committee whose permanent members included 
the president, the secretaries of state, defense, the Army, Navy, Air Force, and the 
chairman of the National Security Resources Board. For Truman, the Council was a 
congressionally-established committee that came too close to usurping the authority of 
the executive in matters of foreign policy and he chose to limit that interference with his 
prerogatives as president by refusing to participate in the NSC‘s meetings. He opened the 
first meeting, appointed then-Secretary of State Marshall to preside in his absence, and 
attended only a handful of meetings thereafter. Though apparently secure that he would 
have the final say in whatever plans the NSC formulated, Truman‘s absence from NSC 
meetings meant that his understanding of committee decisions was second-hand, limited 
to summaries of background information and justifications for action—justifications 
written by NSC members who had formulated the plans in the first place. Moreover, his 
refusal to attend meetings meant that he was unable to exert any influence over plans 
                                                 
49
 New York Times, July 27, 1947, 8.  
248 
 
while they were still in the developmental stage—before compromises to keep the peace 
among the Council‘s military members caused it to become an instrument of military 
expansion. With the NSC as a venue for the coordination of military authority, the NSA 
became, along with the AEA, a mechanism for the military to extend its reach into all 
other agencies and to affect policy at the highest levels—just as Marshall had 
prophesied.
50
  
With an imbalance between members supporting diplomatic or ―civilian‖ 
solutions and those preferring military involvement, the NSC did little to temper, and 
much to accommodate, armed forces ambitions and, in fact, rewarded intra-service 
competition. As Secretary of Defense, Forrestal adopted a conciliatory approach with 
branch officers and purchased appeasement at the cost of common sense and economy. 
An example from 1948, when Greece‘s civil war provided the opportunity for a 
scrimmage between capitalism and communism, illustrates the contributions Forrestal 
and the NSC made to postwar military expansion.
51
 In September 1947 the CIA reported 
that the Greek government was in danger of falling to communist guerrillas, advising that 
―U.S. armed intervention may be required‖ to salvage a strategic advantage in the Eastern 
Mediterranean and to prevent ―profound psychological repercussions throughout Western 
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Europe and the Near and Middle East.‖52 In January 1948 the Council discussed 
alternative methods to determine the extent of Soviet involvement. During the discussion, 
Secretary of the Navy John L. Sullivan, who has gone down in history for resigning in 
1949 after his plans for a flush-deck, super-super, carrier were scrapped, ridiculed a State 
Department proposal that all branches share in an intelligence survey. Sullivan argued 
―that the Council could get all the information it wanted from Admiral Sherman without 
any formal action.‖ The Council rebuffed that offer and introduced an item concerning air 
intelligence. Anticipating Sullivan‘s resistance, Forrestal diffused the confrontation by 
guaranteeing that the Navy would have a role in intelligence gathering—by air. Forrestal 
stated that although he had already issued a directive to the CIA giving the Air Force 
primary responsibility he had now decided to modify his earlier decision and intended to 
protect the Navy‘s interests in the field of air intelligence.53  
Truman‘s decision not to attend Council meetings, as well as his preference for 
turning to the advisors he had relied upon prior to the formation of the NSC, may have 
marginalized the group and kept it separate for a time from the privileged ranks of the 
administration, but the move amounted to little more than a symbolic gesture. Though 
Truman‘s decision to allow the Secretary of State (Marshall) to manage the meetings 
frustrated Forrestal, who had expected to be put in charge of the defense-oriented council 
and believed State had no authority over Defense. Forrestal, although technically a 
civilian, remained the highest ranking military officer and became the one who 
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negotiated the settlements over turf that led to duplication of effort and resources, and, 
thus, armed forces expansion. Moreover, Council decisions carried weight as policy 
decisions. So, with or without the president‘s imprimatur, when Forrestal soothed ruffled 
Navy feathers by directing its inclusion, along with the Air Force and the CIA, in 
intelligence gathering operations in Greece, it inevitably led to duplication and an 
enlargement of the entire apparatus. Truman‘s effort to minimize the importance of the 
NSC actually had the opposite effect, licensing autonomy and excess. When Forrestal 
made his decision about Navy intelligence in 1948, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, 
the Department of State, and the CIA, were each maintaining separate intelligence 
services.
54
 Among the consequences of the decision that Forrestal made in January 1948, 
and others made in the same way and for the same reasons, was overseas expansion: by 
1949, twenty-one different agencies, the armed forces among them, maintained overseas 
posts.
55
  
The NSC provided Forrestal with a venue for constructing an inefficient and 
insidious system that rewarded duplication of effort and stimulated and legitimized armed 
forces expansion, autonomy, and influence. NSC decisions such as the one described 
above illuminate the process that Ronald Steel characterized as the ―unmooring‖ of 
national security, where the replacement of ―defense‖ with ―national security‖ meant that 
decision-making ―became a function of power and an aspect of psychology‖ that was not 
conditioned by an objectively-situated appraisal but by abstraction. As Steel described it, 
the result was that ―the perimeter expand[ed] in relation to the amount of power 
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available.‖56 The atomic energy program, and the military‘s use of it, was the core around 
which the abstractions described by Steel were built. Whether through the battles for 
control of the program or because of fear of atomic warfare, atomic science was intrinsic 
to the ―unmooring‖ that Steel described; the issue that military officers, their supporters, 
and Manhattan veterans used to generate the political will necessary to expand the 
perimeter of the defense establishment, its resources and its influence.  
The Joint Chiefs of Staff organization created under the Act provided a 
mechanism for coordinating the common ambition of achieving control over atomic 
energy, for dealing with the varied needs of each branch in a way that kept animosity 
under wraps while pressing for ever increasing resources to suit the requirements of each 
branch. All this was to be done presumably in the interests of national defense and made 
the JCS a committee that was stronger than the sum of its parts. The man Lilienthal chose 
to serve as the Director of Military Applications, though not without seeking out and then 
failing to get alternative recommendations, was Kenneth Nichols, Groves‘s right-hand 
man during Manhattan. Lilienthal reluctantly deferred to the unanimous recommendation 
for Nichols‘s appointment, suspecting that he was either deliberately ―dense‖ or still 
working primarily for Groves.
57
 Along with the Director of Military Applications, two 
additional separate agencies also met the military‘s atomic needs and both contributed to 
the continuation of the authority and organizational approaches that became 
commonplace during Manhattan. Coordination for atomic development on the military 
side of the equation was managed through AFSWP, headed by Manhattan‘s General 
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Groves. Groves also served on the Military Liaison Committee (MLC), which under the 
Act was established as an intermediary between the AEC and the armed forces. In a 
postdated Memorandum that served as the MLC charter, the MLC became active on 
December 31, 1946,—the day before the Atomic Energy Act took effect—and absorbed 
all military personnel on duty with the Manhattan Project.
58
 MLC members were 
incorporated as part of the Atomic Energy Committee of the Joint Research and 
Development Board, the successor to the wartime Office of Scientific Research and 
Development, and envisioned as a mechanism for coordination of military development. 
The board was to serve as an arbitrator for resource allocations and divvying up projects 
to benefit the Army and Navy equally and, in the process, educating Pentagon officials 
about weapons and development.
59
  
Both the AEA and the NSA provided mechanisms that streamlined the 
continuation of Manhattan‘s managerial structure and for the continuation of an 
institutional culture distinguished by a high level of centralization and organization. 
Although it might be said that these are qualities that exist within any military or 
military-type organization, the practices carried over from Manhattan and adopted as an 
operational guide by the MLC appear to have been more stridently hierarchical than even 
the armed forces were accustomed to. Nearly a year after the creation of the MLC, it 
became necessary for the Committee to issue a directive to the armed services members 
appointed to the MLC, the JCS, the Executive Director of the Research and Development 
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Board and the Director of the Munitions Board, and to ASFWP‘s Chief, reminding them 
all that ―all communications … which establish or affect policy … the establishment of 
new projects … or are of a controversial nature‖ between them and the AEC were to be 
directed to the MLC for consideration, approval, routing, or information. After 
―establishment‖ of policies of projects, direct communication was allowed with the 
proviso that informational copies of all correspondence be provided to the MLC.
60
 Thus, 
for issues involving atomic weapons and other types of atomic development, the MLC 
operated as more than a conduit or coordinative body. It became an organization with 
authority (whether assumed or granted) over the JCS itself.  
As the overlapping tiers of military authority created under the AEA and NSA 
became more organized, Lilienthal and the AEC found it ever more difficult to assert 
civilian authority over the program and its resources. The process used by the MLC and 
AFSWAP to evaluate whether administrative decisions or agreements operated to the 
benefit of the military provides an example of how these tiers worked to stifle civilian 
authority. Groves and Nichols used the process established for reviewing decision-
making, one designed to prevent inadvertent releases of information that might have 
jeopardized national security, to elevate their authority beyond what might have been 
expected from their positions as advisors in the interagency channels established between 
the AEC and the military‘s upper echelon. In addition to providing the military with a 
mechanism for protecting its atomic energy interests as congressmen seem to have 
intended, Groves, Nichols, and their supporters, converted those positions into ones that 
resembled in practice and in effect the Manhattan Project, where civilian interest and 
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civilian authority were entirely subordinated to military necessity. Instead of 
safeguarding national security from administrative decisions that might have 
inadvertently jeopardized it, the evaluative process became a means for Groves, Nichols, 
and the upper echelon to delay or prevent any decision that might have created conditions 
for civilian interference or oversight and thus may have challenged the military‘s 
domestic goals for increased autonomy and authority. On occasion, such self-interested 
decision-making compromised national security initiatives.  
The AEC‘s inability to assert its authority over the program gave Groves, Nichols, 
and others who supported them numerous opportunities to exert influence outside the 
boundaries of their positions and to interfere with AEC goals. The old Manhattan guard, 
well thought of by influential Republican congressmen and Truman, who trusted Groves 
instead of specialized advisors for information about atomic weapons,
61
 gained time to 
build their organizational strength and demonstrate their worth to the JCS and other 
members of the upper echelon. Groves and Nichols then turned that support into a buffer 
when, months after taking office, the AEC recognized that the men and their supporters 
were seizing considerable institutional ground. One example of the how Lilienthal‘s 
acceptance of the operational status quo contributed to undermining the AEC‘s authority 
comes from 1947 and involved the pre-AEA transfer of ordinance and weapons 
responsibilities from Los Alamos to Sandia, near Albuquerque. Groves arranged the 
transfer after the war in an effort to preserve the military‘s hold over atomic weapons. 
Because Sandia lacked manpower, facilities, and expertise to assume those 
responsibilities, Groves had to have known that although personnel from Los Alamos 
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were assisting and would help streamline the transfer, it would cause certain delay in 
weapon development and production. Because the transfer was only partially complete at 
the time that the program was pressed to produce weapons for Operation Crossroads, 
Groves‘s decision interfered substantively with the program. According to a Los Alamos 
report, the ―effect on the Ordnance Engineering (Z) Division split between Los Alamos 
and Albuquerque was enormous and resulted in almost total stoppage of their 
development and engineering programs.‖62 This transfer caused additional confusion 
after passage of the AEA. Nearly a year later, in June 1947, Groves, who by then was 
head of AFSWAP, detailed ten officers to Sandia to learn about atomic weapons 
assembly and testing. In July, when the AEC‘s representative arrived at Los Alamos, he 
was unsure how to deal with the Z Division personnel and resources at Sandia because he 
had no authority on a military base. The situation was no more clear at the base. Though 
the Colonel at Sandia in charge of weapons and materials took direction and reported to 
AEC General Manager Wilson, his direct superior was the Commanding General at 
Sandia who, in turn, reported directly to Groves.
63
 By September, AFSWAP‘s Groves 
and AEC administrators were on their way to reaching a compromise that would have 
allowed for administrative coordination of the programs at Sandia and Los Alamos. On 
paper at least, this would seem to have been enough to resolve the problems that 
threatened to prevent the rapid expansion of weapons production and assembly that the 
upper echelon had insisted was a crucial priority. 
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But, in an example of how the layers of responsibility built by the AEA and the 
NSA operated as organizational units to protect and defend the military‘s bid to have sole 
control over atomic weapons, the compromise required the approval of the MLC. The 
MLC, a committee on which Groves also served, refused to approve it. For the MLC, the 
agreement was not an administrative solution, but a compromise that it was not willing to 
make, even if it would speed up bomb production. For the MLC, the agreement could 
possibly be interpreted as one that demonstrated the military‘s willingness to relinquish 
its right to weapons custody. In this instance, officers, including Groves, Nichols, and, 
presumably, the JCS, used a national security argument to block the agreement, claiming 
that it would amount to a concession, by the military, that it did not need ―instant access‖ 
to atomic weapons in ―times of crisis.‖64 The military‘s appeals to national security were 
elastic enough, in this case, to be stretched around an imperative to increase production 
and the stockpile as well as a willingness to sacrifice that imperative temporarily in the 
interests of protecting a measure of control over the custody and use of atomic weapons. 
Thus, military officers used national security as cover to subordinate weapons production 
to the future control of atomic science. 
Although Lilienthal, along with the other members of the AEC, had received 
legislative authority to administer all aspects of the atomic program, the fact that they did 
not exercise that authority at the outset meant that they were hamstrung by the issue of 
civilian versus military control a full six months after they had taken office and well after 
the issue of control had ostensibly been settled. Sandia became more problematic than 
necessary, and the production of weapons was affected because Groves was in a position 
to stifle AEC goals and ―civilianization‖ of the program. This was more than 
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meddlesome interference. The authority Groves assumed over Sandia was no less 
comprehensive than it had been when he was in charge of Manhattan. By holding up 
contracts for material, facilities, and housing for civilian engineers and scientists 
relocated to Sandia whose job it was to help the military set up its own weapons plant, 
Groves interfered with a national security goal and shifted the blame for the consequent 
delays to the civilian commission.
65
 To further discredit Lilienthal and the AEC, Groves 
told officers at Sandia ―it wouldn‘t be long until the Commission‘s mess of things would 
throw the whole business back in the Army‘s hands.‖66 Problems at Sandia, and the fact 
that it was dedicated solely to the production of weapons components, led to a decision in 
mid-1949 by the University of California Board of Regents to ask that they be relieved of 
their administrative responsibility because it was ―no longer appropriate to an academic 
institution.‖ By that time Sandia‘s operation had grown so large that it took Lilienthal 
three-and-a-half single-spaced pages to explain what it did to Leroy A. Wilson, president 
of American Telephone & Telegraph Company, who had expressed interest in taking 
over UC‘s contract.67 For Lilienthal‘s part, the arguments he made to the Joint Chiefs and 
also to Eisenhower, whom Lilienthal seems to have found sympathetic, to have Groves 
removed or replaced at AFSWP and on the MLC, were unsuccessful.
68
 Truman supported 
Lilienthal wholeheartedly in private, and like Eisenhower, seemed to sympathize with his 
dilemma. On at least one occasion, Truman called Nichols and Lilienthal to his office and 
told them that they needed to get along. Thereafter, Nichols temporarily took a position at 
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the Army‘s War College but he remained close to the atomic program and loyal to 
Groves, becoming part of the team that lobbied for H-bomb development. Lilienthal did 
not take all this lying down, but instead of making public his complaints about Groves, 
Nichols, and military overreach generally, he generally discussed them only with upper 
echelon officers and high level officials.  
Lilienthal‘s reluctance to respond publicly to the military‘s subversion of the 
program stands in sharp contrast to the publicity against him generated by military 
officials and their supporters. During speaking engagements, in articles, and in his 
testimony before Congress, and despite his commitment to opening up the atomic 
program so that the public could play a larger role in its evolution, Lilienthal made his 
case for the development of peacetime applications without criticizing the military. In an 
article published a year after the Commissioners took office, the Assistant to the AEC‘s 
General Manager claimed that the transfer of the Manhattan Project and the AEC‘s jobs 
under the ―much broadened and more complex peacetime charter‖ had been successfully 
accomplished. In that account, Groves and Nichols and other Manhattan officials had not 
hindered the AEC‘s mission, but had helped complete the transition. He expressed 
appreciation for the efforts of ―the active cooperation of the key military officials of the 
Manhattan District who continued to assist the commission … some through September 
1947.‖69 Moreover, and although surrogates such as Teller publicly defended Lilienthal, 
his public responses to congressional criticism were straightforward and it was only in 
private correspondence and conversations that he complained about elected officials who 
unjustifiably criticized his administration. And even in that more private venue, he 
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shrouded his irritation with oblique arguments. In 1949, for example, he responded to 
Senator Hickenlooper‘s statements that the program had failed, that it was plagued by 
―incredible mismanagement, ―misplaced emphasis,‖ and ―maladministration,‖ by 
recommending that the JCAE, a committee that Lilienthal characterized as a ―continuous 
Congressional investigating committee,‖ put a stop to ―fears and misapprehensions‖ by 
analyzing the AEC‘s performance based on substantive criteria and in comparison with 
the Manhattan Project.
70
  
In contrast, congressional opponents of civilian control used the press to circulate 
vague and unsubstantiated claims about the inability or unwillingness of civilians, and by 
extension President Truman, to prevent communist subversion within the program. Just 
as the publicity surrounding Crossroads cast the military in a positive light compared to 
civilian scientists and other officials, the military‘s congressional supporters provoked 
press coverage that elevated the military by denigrating civilian authority. The way that 
the controversy over atomic energy energized and lent significance to anti-communist 
rhetoric can be illustrated by an example drawn from July, when the House took up 
debate on the McMahon Act. Several days prior to the scheduled debate, the New York 
Times and the Chicago Tribune published a ―preliminary report‖ by the chief counsel for 
the House‘s Military Affairs Committee that claimed national security had been 
jeopardized by scientists at Oak Ridge who had been linked to societies ―devoted to the 
creation of some form of world government…to the support of international civilian 
control…,‖ and that moves were afoot to ―unionize all workers‖ at Oak Ridge. The 
coverage drew attention to House debates and specifically to one representative in 
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particular, New Jersey Republican J. Parnell Thomas. Thomas, a permanent member (and 
soon-to-be Chairman) of the Committee on Un-American Activities who was also seated 
on the House‘s Military Affairs Committee, took aim against McMahon‘s bill and its 
supporters, claiming that it was ―undoubtedly the most dangerous bill ever presented to 
the Congress in the history of the United States.‖71 The attacks continued after the bill‘s 
passage. Thomas remained an outspoken opponent of all aspects of civilian leadership, 
using the press and his position as Chairman of the Committee on Un-American 
Activities to cast suspicion on scientists, including Albert Einstein. He also waged a 
vendetta against Edward U. Condon, the eminent physicist who was known at the time as 
a defender of civilian authority and an advisor to Senator McMahon. Thomas penned an 
article for Liberty magazine entitled ―Reds in our Atom Bomb Plants‖ and castigated (or 
rhetorically castrated) Lilienthal in 1947 as a New Deal liberal: a ―Mrs. Roosevelt in 
pants.‖72 For encouragement and details, Thomas could count on Groves, who floated at 
least one sensational atomic spy story to discredit Lilienthal and the civilian 
commissioners of the AEC.
73
 Thomas may have been among the most vitriolic, but he 
was only one of those who set out to eliminate, or reduce, civilian control of atomic 
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science. When Thomas‘s article appeared in Liberty, for example, there were six pending 
bills seeking repeal of the Atomic Energy Act.
74
  
The criticism that Lilienthal was ―soft‖ on communism only increased over time, 
and the ideological and political divisions that existed between Lilienthal and Strauss 
became media fodder. When a dispute arose over Lilienthal‘s opinion that the AEA did 
not prohibit the export of radioactive material to friendly nations for non-weapons 
purposes, he came under attack from all sides. Arthur Krock writing in the New York 
Times stopped just short of calling Lilienthal a communist while siding with Strauss, 
Vandenberg, Hickenlooper, and Truman, who had also disagreed with Lilienthal‘s 
interpretation of the Commission‘s authority. For the Washington Times Herald, the issue 
was not about whether the AEA prohibited exporting radioactive material for medical and 
other peacetime applications, but about the political leanings of those on each side of the 
debate. The Times-Herald used the issue as a way to champion Strauss‘s up-by-the-
bootstraps Republicanism: Strauss‘s difficulties with Lilienthal were ―philosophic,‖ the 
―shy and sensitive‖ man had been ―in agony‖ over his disagreement with Lilienthal.75 A 
week later, the Times Herald claimed Strauss had been unjustly singled out by 
bureaucrats who ―hate the successful businessman who has earned a fortune,‖ and 
accused Lilienthal of stooping to ―the old New Deal trick‖ of smearing him as a ―former 
banker‖ so that Lilienthal could continue ―to award valuable government scholarships to 
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Communists.‖76 This is but a singular example of many such attacks that illustrate the 
way that congressmen, and the military officers who used those same congressmen as 
proxies in their battles for control, used the atomic program instrumentally, for political 
gain. By 1949, Truman also began to use the program in a similar way. Finding Lilienthal 
and his support for peacetime applications inimical to his domestic political standing, the 
president began to make decisions about the program that favored the viewpoints of his 
congressional opponents and that were contrary to Lilienthal‘s recommendations.  
Before Lilienthal became little more than a political bargaining chip for Truman, 
however, Lilienthal‘s opinions carried a lot of weight, particularly behind the scenes and 
over the issue of a continental testing site. During this time, and partly because military 
officers were reluctant to go public with a demand for continental testing, or even to have 
their unsuccessful bids for weapons custody publicized, Lilienthal was successful in 
holding the line on continental testing, which officers claimed was a national security 
necessity, and prevented the military and its supporters from completely commandeering 
the program.
77
 Beginning in 1947, Army officers began to lobby for a continental test site 
where it could experiment with lower yield tactical weapons and troops.
78
 The Army 
refused to consider the hazards of continental testing, insisting that the sooner Americans 
became accustomed to ―the possibility of an atomic explosion within a matter of 100 or 
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so miles of their homes‖ the better.79 The AEC refused that 1947 request. When the 
Army renewed it in 1948, the AEC again refused, citing ―unresolved questions 
concerning off-site hazards to the United States Public.‖80 On the same day that Truman 
agreed with Forrestal to send B-29s into England as a means of convincing Stalin to end 
the Berlin Blockade, Forrestal requested a meeting with the president and the AEC to 
discuss transfer of weapons. On July 21, Forrestal, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and members 
of the MLC presented a formal request from the ―National Military Establishment‖ for 
custody of the bomb. Lilienthal objected, and Truman agreed, saying ―You have got to 
understand that this isn‘t a military weapon … [W]e have got to treat this differently from 
rifles and cannon and ordinary things like that.‖81 But, for the military, the bomb was an 
ordinary weapon. As the Secretary of the Air Force resolutely said to Truman: ―[O]ur 
fellas need to get used to handling it.‖82 Yet again in 1949, military officers argued for 
the creation of a continental site in advance of the already-planned Pacific Greenhouse 
Series. Yet again, the AEC refused citing health and safety considerations. Only after 
Lilienthal‘s resignation and the appointment of Gordon Dean, a favorite of Truman‘s 
congressional opponents, did Truman approve the military‘s requests for a continental 
site.  
Relentless criticism and the military‘s insider campaign for more control over the 
atomic program prompted Truman to begin using the program as an instrument to 
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improve his own political standing. He was not as disinterested in polling and public 
opinion as some of his comments may have indicated.
83
 In one instance, he conceded that 
he took public opinion and his political future into account in deciding against allowing 
the military to have custody of atomic weapons. According to Forrestal, and as already 
discussed, Truman refused a July 1948 request for custody, saying it would be 
disadvantageous politically to transfer custody at that time, but that he would reconsider 
the issue after the election.
84
 To a greater extent than foreign policy or national security, 
the domestic political scene, including anti-communist rhetoric from elected officials and 
the press, pressure from supporters of military control within the Military Establishment 
and the help it received from AEC Commissioner Strauss, influenced Truman‘s decision 
in late 1949 to develop an H-bomb and his subsequent 1950 decision to approve a 
continental test site.  
It was a decision that, because of its timing, has appeared to coincide with the 
Soviet‘s development of an atom bomb and Truman‘s decision that maintaining a lead 
was the only way to preserve national security. But it was, in fact, Truman‘s second 
concession to the military‘s desire for conventionalization of atomic weapons. Truman 
had, in fact, already made the ideological concession that atomic weapons could be 
substituted for conventional weapons. Though understood as a move anchored firmly in 
foreign policy and instigated by the failure to reach a diplomatic solution to the Blockade, 
it amounted to a domestic turning point in the history of the atomic program—the first 
symbolic evidence that officers and their supporters received from Truman that the 
                                                 
83
 See Brandon Rottinghouse, ―Reassessing Public Opinion Polling in the Truman Administration,‖ 
Presidential Studies Quarterly 33 (2003): 325-332, esp. 326.  
 
84
 Forrestal Diaries, 460-461.  
265 
 
political pressure they and their supporters had been exerting on the administration for a 
resituation of military authority over atomic weapons was working.  
The Berlin Airlift 
The turbulent domestic and political atmosphere of 1947-1949 complicated the 
mission of elected officials to strengthen the nation‘s peacetime defenses as well as that 
of military officers and their supporters to demonstrate the importance of their respective 
branches to that mission. Army officers saw their branch steadily losing ground 
compared to the Navy and the Air Force. The Navy, after the attention it received from 
Crossroads and with Forrestal as popular and savvy as ever, was in the ascendency—
easily receiving authorization in May 1947 from Truman to spend $30 million to build 
two experimental submarines based in part, it argued, on information gleaned from 
Crossroads.
85
 The Air Force built on the significance of bombing during the war and 
looked forward to expansion, letting contracts for equipment and commissioning 
planning studies by political scientists and international relations specialists such as 
Bernard Brodie, who would become one of the founding members of the RAND 
Corporation.
86
 In June 1948, the Berlin Blockade, one of the first crises of what would 
become the Cold War, catapulted the Air Force back into the public‘s eye. Major 
newspapers dedicated a full page to two pictures and captions received from the Air 
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Force: one, a C-47 bomber flying over Berlin and, the other, planes arrayed on a tarmac 
in Wiesbaden being loaded with half a million pounds of flour and foodstuffs.
87
 The 
crisis, and the Air Force‘s management of it, was an irresistible drama for filmmakers. By 
December 1948, Columbia had registered its intent to make ―Berlin Blockade,‖ 
Paramount, the ―Berlin Airlift,‖ and Warner Brothers, the ―Berlin Air Corridor.‖88 The 
U.S.S.R. ended its Blockade in May 1949 after Truman, at the behest of Forrestal and the 
NSC, ordered a squadron of heavy bombers into England, signaling to Stalin that he 
might be ready to end the stalemate with atom bombs.
89
 The planes were not armed, and 
there may not have been any way they could have been, but the airlift and ploy had 
reassured American allies that the U.S. would act decisively to keep the peace in Europe, 
brought together the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and gave Stalin reason to 
believe that, if pressed, atom bombs might be used as readily as any other weapon in the 
arsenal. When combined with the Soviet‘s intransigence over international control of 
atomic weapons and blustery rhetoric and expansionism, the Soviet‘s Blockade gave 
military officers and their supporters in Congress additional reasons to target the Truman 
administration and his plan to cap the 1950 defense budget at $14.4 billion-dollars.
90
 That 
partnership between Truman‘s congressional opponents and the military is among the 
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reasons that historians point to the domestic political scene of 1947-1949 as formative 
ones in the creation of the national security state.
91
  
The Berlin Blockade and Truman‘s management of it provided military officers 
and their supporters with reasons and ways to monopolize atomic resources, to assert 
their authority over the atomic program, and to combat budgetary limits. Truman‘s threat 
to use atom bombs to end the Blockade lent credence to the argument that the military 
had made since passage of the Atomic Energy Act that to preserve national security the 
military required custody of completed atomic weapons. Prior to that threat, Truman had 
resisted the military‘s argument for custody of completed weapons as energetically as 
officers had pursued it. Afterward, Truman found it more difficult to combat the 
military‘s arguments that atom bombs should be included as part of the military‘s own 
arsenal of usable weapons. This departure in Truman‘s public stance that atomic weapons 
could not be used in an ordinary way—one he had held since passage of the AEA in 
August 1946—led the military and its supporters to assume that Truman‘s commitment to 
that policy was not deeply felt. It also lent post facto legitimacy to strategies that 
breeched the boundary between conventional and atomic warfare that Truman had 
established. On May 8, 1948, for example, just weeks before the Blockade, the JCS 
briefed Truman about ―Halfmoon,‖ an atomic war plan that included the possibility of 
dropping fifty atom bombs on twenty Soviet cities. Truman rebuffed the JCS and asked 
that it replace the ―Halfmoon‖ strategic plan with one that relied entirely on conventional 
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weapons. On May 19, however, the JCS approved ―Halfmoon.‖92 Whether the decision 
represented little more than a dereliction of duty or an outright disregard by the JCS for 
the desires of the Commander-in-Chief became irrelevant once Truman, himself, used a 
threat of atomic bombardment to end the Blockade. In hindsight, the strategy has become, 
at least in one case, little more than an example of the military‘s keen interest in 
preparedness.
93
And yet, it is also illustrative of the disparity between the foundations of 
Truman‘s policy to hope for peace while preparing for conventional war and the 
military‘s expectation that no weapon, even one with such hazardous residual effects as 
the atom bomb, was too horrendous to deploy. 
Truman‘s conviction that civilians should maintain control over the program and 
completed weapons may have begun to waver in the early months of the Blockade. In 
Fall 1948 Forrestal asked Truman to shift custody of completed weapons from the AEC 
to the military so that it would be in a position to deploy them. Truman refused. He might 
have based his refusal on the philosophical and ideological grounds that had dominated 
his public assertions—that the atomic program and atom bombs should only be managed 
by civilians because of the president‘s constitutional authority, the principle of civilian 
leadership, the legislative conditions of the AEC, or on a conviction that categorizing 
atom bombs as something akin to conventional weapons would make more likely the 
abhorrent possibility of atomic warfare. Instead, Truman told Forrestal that the domestic 
political climate prevented him from considering Forrestal‘s request for a shift in 
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custody.
94
 That concession weakened, at least for those aware of it, Truman‘s assertion of 
July 24, 1948, that, as president, he ―regard[ed] the continued control of all aspects of the 
atomic energy program, including research, development, and the custody of atomic 
weapons, as the proper functions of the civil authorities.‖95 It also sanctioned an elevation 
of armed forces lobbying and contributed to the total militarization of the atomic 
program.  
Whether at that moment Truman was merely placating Forrestal or realized that 
he had just given Forrestal the green light to inflate national security imperatives and to 
lobby congressmen ever more vigorously for funding, authority, and for the military 
monopolization of the atomic program, cannot be known. Nonetheless, by citing 
domestic politics as the reason why he could not transfer custody of atom bombs to the 
military, Truman was complicit in the military‘s use of the political forum to assert 
authority over the atomic program and to pursue increasing its footprint and ratcheting up 
its influence. Similarly, Truman‘s ―atomic diplomacy‖ reverberated wildly. The atom 
bomb threat helped to validate Soviet claims that the U.S. was not seriously interested in 
participating in a system of international control, but was negotiating in bad faith and 
using the possibility of international control as a masquerade while solidifying the U.S. 
monopoly and hindering Soviet development. As Boris Izakov remarked in Pravda, 
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Bikini ―explode[ed] something more important than…out-of-date warships, it 
fundamentally undermined the belief in the seriousness of American talks about 
disarmament.‖96 Domestically, it cast in a disingenuous light Truman‘s repeated 
assertions that the bomb was not a weapon in the ordinary sense, but something to be 
shunned, ―a frightful weapon that threatens to destroy all of us.‖97 The point of this 
review of Truman‘s management of the Berlin Blockade is not whether his ruse was 
necessary or to what extent it was effective, nor even whether the military‘s approval of 
―Halfmoon‖ exhibits prescience or disobedience. Instead, it is to explain how and to what 
extent Truman‘s inconsistent and contradictory decisions about atom bombs and their use 
helped the military achieve greater authority over the atomic program and lent 
encouragement to the military‘s use of the political arena to achieve the appropriations 
and influence that Truman seemingly opposed. Truman‘s conceit seems to have been to 
believe, at least prior to 1949, that through strength of will and words he could prevent 
the military, growing stronger by the day in political influence, from achieving practical, 
if not official, authority over the atomic program and its resources.  
While asserting that atomic weapons and warfare were anathema, Truman had, in 
fact, taken a first step toward conventionalizing atom bombs. Officers and their 
supporters, who had argued for custody and control over atomic weapons because the 
weapons might be used found Truman—the man who had persistently cited the 
extraordinary nature of atomic weapons as a reason to refuse the military‘s requests for 
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custody and for creation of a continental testing site and had resisted all arguments that 
anyone but the president could make decisions about use by saying that the ―grave 
responsibility‖ for the weapons use rested solely on the shoulders of the president—
making decisions that lent more support to their arguments than to his own.
98
 The effect 
of Truman‘s inconsistent position about whether atom bombs could, or should, be used, 
becomes evident in the following discussion of 1948‘s Operation Sandstone. Army 
officers who had drawn inspiration from the Navy‘s Operation Crossroads and had been 
seeking to demonstrate their own particular versatility with atom bombs to show the 
value of the Army in an atomic war, found reasons in the antagonistic relationship 
between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. as well as Truman‘s use of an atomic threat as tacit 
acceptance of the ―ordinariness‖ of atomic weapons, to promote and argue in their 
evaluation of Sandstone for the creation of a continental testing site where routine atomic 
experiments involving troops could be held and, of course, publicized. In the view of 
Army Lt. Gen. Hull, it was not the hazardous nature of atomic bomb experimentation that 
was standing in the way of a continental testing site but the atom bomb‘s unpopularity. 
His argument was that Americans had simply become altogether too afraid of the bomb 
and needed to be re-educated to accept continental weapons tests.
99
 The process of re-
education that he envisioned involved the manipulation of information that made its way 
into the popular media for public consumption, but also that which was provided to the 
president, elected officials, and civilian administrators so as to exaggerate the necessity 
for experimentation while downplaying the hazards. To a greater extent than national 
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security imperatives, it was the support for military buildup explicit in the anti-
communist rhetoric of Truman‘s congressional opponents as well as Truman‘s implicit 
concession that atom bombs were conventional weapons that brought closer to reality the 
proposals such as the one for a continental testing site and others that put military officers 
in a position to experiment with atom bombs at will, closer to reality.  
The next chapter examines the behind-the-scenes circumstances and the ways that 
the atomic energy program strengthened that congressional/military equation. It explains 
how military officers and their supporters used the program to expand the military‘s 
postwar influence and footprint; how their successes affected the atomic program; and, 
the significance of the relationship between the military and a militarized atomic program 
to mobilization. At the beginning of Consolidation, Manhattan personnel and a 
reincarnation of the Manhattan administrative structure and ethos became part of 
peacetime armed forces administration. Aided by the organizational strategies employed 
by Manhattan veterans to re-assume authority over the program, military officers used 
wartime-style strategies of control, including secrecy, deceit, and media manipulation, to 
achieve the increase in influence and extent of authority that Forrestal and the upper 
echelon had envisioned during wartime. At the same time, events outside the military‘s 
sphere of influence—specifically the increasing tensions between the U.S. and the 
U.S.S.R. and Truman‘s inconsistent approach to the use of atomic weapons created 
conditions that helped the military achieve its goals. Truman‘s handling of the Berlin 
Blockade was an exercise in the management of international relations as well as a 
defining Cold War event. It was also an event that military officers exploited to increase 
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their leverage over the atomic program and their influence in the public and 
congressional spheres. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
CONSOLIDATION 
In August 1946 the military and its supporters adopted a more clandestine approach to 
achieving control over the atomic program and weapons. Having narrowly avoided 
disaster in the Pacific and having officially lost their bid to maintain control over atomic 
energy, military officers pulled back from the media circus that had characterized 
Operation Crossroads and re-evaluated their options. Before long, they had adjusted to 
and were exploiting the new institutional arrangements brought about by the AEA and 
the NSA as well as capitalizing on support from the first Republican Congress to be 
seated since 1930.
 1
 Asserting their authority over the atomic energy program and 
commandeering as many atomic resources as could be managed were issues that armed 
forces officers, now more competitive than ever because of disagreements over 
unification and reorganization, could agree on.  
This analysis pries apart the tiers of institutional and political circumstances and 
action that led to the militarization of the atomic program, beginning with a brief 
overview of Consolidation and the importance of Manhattan‘s managerial elite to the 
process of militarization; a discussion of the role Los Alamos played in it, and a 
condensation of the military‘s postwar goals as laid out by the JCS in the findings and 
recommendations of the Operation Crossroads Evaluation Committee. This chapter then 
evaluates the rudiments of Consolidation, assessing how military officers and their 
                                                 
1
 Workers and businessmen disenchanted with regulation, the pace of reconversion, and with Truman‘s 
policies generally translated into victories for Republicans throughout the U.S. For a case study of a failed 
New Deal program and how consumers affected by the Office of Price Administration‘s regulation of the 
meat industry influenced postwar electoral politics, see Meg Jacobs, ―‘How About Some Meat?‘: The 
Office of Price Administration, Consumption Politics, and State Building from the Bottom Up 1941-1946,‖ 
The Journal of American History 84 (1997): 910.  
275 
 
supporters exploited the support they received from congressmen and other high level 
government officials to assert control over the program‘s resources and its production 
schedule. Operation Crossroads and the deployment of Manhattan-style strategies of 
control provided important experiences for military officers who worked throughout the 
1947-1949 period during which Manhattan‘s managerial force became part of the 
postwar state and the military consolidated its authority and expanded its influence. 
Manhattan managers were an integral part of this process, lending impetus and expertise 
to military officers interested in regaining control over atomic energy by employing and 
contributing to the widespread use of strategies of control that they had routinely used 
during wartime. Simultaneously, the ongoing debate about the extent to which military 
officers should exert control over the program energized and solidified the bond between 
Congress and the armed forces even as their leverage of the program to achieve domestic 
political goals led to its militarization and laid the foundations for Atomic Governance.  
The passage of the Atomic Energy Act did not resolve the competition between 
supporters of military control and civilian authority and interests—it institutionalized it. 
This allowed political and ideological partisans to use government assets, in this case the 
material and human resources of the atomic program, to achieve political goals. While 
congressmen were primarily interested in asserting their own authority over the 
program—having, for example, more of a say over choosing the members of the AEC, or 
in picking away at aspects of the program and its administration to discredit Truman—the 
military‘s ambitions were more comprehensive. Some military officers, including Groves 
and Nichols, who assumed positions of authority after passage of the AEA, sought 
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nothing less than autonomous control over the atomic program.
2
 To achieve authority 
over the rate of production, experimentation, and atomic resources, they and those who 
received assurance from them that such autonomy was possible, were willing to sacrifice 
increased production of atom bombs and enlarging the stockpile—a mission that was one 
of the most important national security initiatives of the early postwar years. By mid-
1949, when the ethos and influence of the wartime Manhattan Project was fully 
integrated into the peacetime state, Groves, Nichols, and other like-minded officers and 
officials had amassed enough support from inside and outside government circles to force 
Truman‘s hand in making one of the most significant decisions in postwar history: the 
decision to develop a hydrogen bomb. 
Manhattan Project administrators and personnel assisted with and streamlined the 
military‘s takeover of the atomic program. They lent organizational acumen, continuity, 
and momentum, to a process that was otherwise fraught with institutional, administrative, 
and political contingencies. The sense of mission they brought to the task of 
monopolizing atomic resources was invigorated by the same fervor, urgency, and single-
mindedness that they exhibited during wartime—an important contribution to an intra-
governmental climate in transition, one where ad hoc decision making and happenstance 
could be as significant as the purposeful strategies of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As 
William H. Sewell explains: ―Any array of resources is capable of being interpreted in 
varying ways and, therefore, of empowering different actors and teaching different 
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schemas. … [T]his seems to me inherent in a definition of agency as the capacity to 
transpose and extend schemas to new contexts.‖ Actors (such as Manhattan veterans) 
―reinterpret[ed] and ―mobiliz[ed] an array of resources in terms of cultural schemas other 
than those that initially constituted the array.‖3 Manhattan personnel helped upper 
echelon officers exploit the atomic program and to make strategic and tactical 
adjustments based on what they had learned from Operation Crossroads and in response 
to new legislation in the form of the AEA and NSA to engender even more support from 
Congress. A combination of factors, including assistance from Manhattan personnel and 
wartime-style techniques, coordination of strategic initiatives, and a keen readiness to 
exploit coincidental events, allowed military officers and their supporters to turn what 
had been an anti-military tide during the immediate postwar period to their favor and to 
amass the political and private support necessary to wield absolute authority over the 
atomic program.  
Throughout it all, the upper echelon was as careful as Forrestal had been to give 
the appearance of conforming to the rubrics of deference while routinely subverting 
civilian authority. They also adopted a more conservative approach to media relations 
and promotion, a modification that was perhaps more evident because of its contrast with 
the media-intensive Operation Crossroads. Rank-and-file officers, those on the fringes of 
the program, the public, and many elected officials who were not privy to the upper 
echelon‘s informal conversations, strategy sessions, and classified communications, 
likely took many of the operational changes that occurred during this period in stride, as 
nothing other than business as usual. Adapting to changes in the institutional environment 
and exploiting opportunities, political or otherwise, is something that is routinely 
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expected of officials in any government agency and an especially prized trait when it 
belongs to the forces upon which the nation‘s security depends. With the atomic program 
as the goal, however, such adaptations were anything but benign. When military officers 
gained enough institutional and political support to militarize the program, they used their 
authority to establish radioactive exposure levels weighted toward military utility instead 
of safety. In November 1947, for example, the JCS made it clear that military officers 
would be the only ones to evaluate and act on radioactive hazards that might arise during 
the Sandstone tests: ―The task force commander must have final responsibility in matters 
pertaining to hazards which may result in injury or death to personnel whether they be 
military or scientific.‖4 
During Consolidation, the wartime Manhattan Project became part of the business 
of peacetime government and an organizational engine for peacetime military 
entitlement. When Groves and Nichols assumed advisory and managerial level positions 
at the intersection of the atomic program and the military, they did more than act as 
liaisons between the two institutions and give technical advice—they became an 
organizational nexus for military officers and their supporters. Manhattan personnel 
greatly elevated the significance of the Military Liaison Committee from that envisioned 
by Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg when he proposed it in March 1946 as an amendment 
to McMahon‘s atomic energy bill. At that time, Vandenberg believed the committee 
would operate to protect the military‘s interest in atomic energy and declared that it 
―would have no affirmative powers.‖ McMahon opposed Vandenberg‘s proposal, fearing 
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that it would ―retard the development of atomic energy for peaceful purposes.‖ Secretary 
of Commerce Henry A. Wallace was less subtle: In his view, the amendment created the 
potential for ―military fascism.‖5 As it turned out, with leadership drawn from the 
Manhattan Project, the MLC fell somewhere between Wallace‘s dire scenario and 
McMahon‘s, but nonetheless achieved much more influence than Vandenberg had 
envisioned. In a schematic flow chart of the program the AEC would later provide to the 
JCS, the MLC was positioned directly opposite Congress‘s Joint Committee on Atomic 
Energy.
6
 MLC members elevated their responsibilities above the level of intermediaries 
by insinuating themselves into everyday routines of armed forces administration, into 
1948‘s Operation Sandstone, the only experiments with atomic weapons conducted 
during the period, and interfered with the AEC‘s ability to carry out its mandate. In this 
way, they employed and coordinated the deployment of wartime-style strategies of 
control such as media manipulation, deceit and subterfuge, and atomic secrecy, to enlarge 
their own authority within the postwar state and to help other armed forces officers 
enlarge theirs. Thus, the Manhattan Project, which had existed for all practical purposes 
save funding outside of regulatory or administrative confines, became part of the 
peacetime state, regaining much of the authority and autonomy that characterized its 
wartime existence.  
Reorganization of the military under the NSA provided additional institutional 
support for cooperation among officers of each branch who sought control over atomic 
science and for the coordination of branch-specific goals. This made the exploitation of 
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congressional support a more efficient process and also streamlined the integration of 
wartime strategies of control into the operational components of the Military 
Establishment. Through a mixture of the authority that Groves and Nichols carried with 
them into their new appointments and their aggressive ratcheting up of their own 
importance once in office, they accumulated enough influence during Consolidation to 
wield power over the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the atomic program. Over the same period 
of time that Groves, Nichols, and other like-minded officers were concentrating their 
efforts and increasing their influence, those congressmen, administrators, scientists, and 
others who had contributed to securing passage of the Atomic Energy Act were losing 
theirs. As a result of administrative and politically-motivated decisions, the impulses that 
had invigorated the belief that the program could—through sufficient oversight by 
elected officials and administration directed at balancing the development of peacetime 
and military applications—be ―civilianized,‖ became more diffuse and decentralized. 
Simultaneously, the political climate and the peacetime program‘s structure operated 
against the ability of the AEC commissioners to assert their authority and to supervise 
and manage the program in a way that would have balanced the national security 
importance of atomic development with civilian interests, particularly the health and 
safety issues that arose with experimentation. From an organizational standpoint, the 
military benefited most from postwar legislation, even the AEA under which, officially, 
the military lost its authority over atomic science.  
When Truman signed the AEA in August 1946, there was every reason to believe 
that the military had lost its best shot at maintaining its control over atomic science. By 
1949, however, the relationship between the military and the atomic program had been 
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firmly re-established. While the AEC funded weapons production and experiments,
7
 
military officers controlled the rate of production, the conditions for experimentation, and 
permissible levels of radiation exposure. By the end of Consolidation, military officials 
had achieved enough influence to begin using the program to influence diplomacy and 
domestic policymaking.  
Los Alamos: A Vision for the Future 
In October 1945, nine months before Operation Crossroads and while the 
question of postwar control over the atomic program remained a topic of active debate, 
Norris Bradbury, a University of California, Berkeley-trained physicist and wartime 
Navy Commander who had abandoned his plans to return to Stanford as a physics 
professor when Oppenheimer chose him as his successor to be Director of Los Alamos, 
delivered an address to laboratory personnel that encapsulated his vision for the 
laboratory‘s future.8 At that time, Bradbury and the personnel gathered to listen to him 
had more reasons to feel insecure about the future of their laboratory than military 
officers did about the future of the conventional armed forces. Bradbury‘s solution, and 
the urgency with which he sought to implement it, provides a lesson in the significance of 
individual initiative and the desire to maintain postwar integrity during an era, and in a 
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program, that is often interpreted as one dominated and driven by the Cold War‘s 
national security imperatives. 
Bradbury‘s plan for saving the laboratory included a kernel of what would grow 
into Operation Sandstone. He offered it at a time when some of the top scientists had 
already begun moving on to civilian work in universities and other private laboratories 
and workers still at Los Alamos had begun expressing openly their desire to work on 
something besides weapons. Bradbury encouraged scientists, technicians, and others at 
Los Alamos to stay and help him realize his goal: creating a laboratory that would be as 
essential during peacetime as it was during the war. Recognizing that it would be 
impossible to persuade them to stay under the same conditions and with the same mission 
that had occupied them during the war, Bradbury acknowledged their disdain for the 
status quo—a sensibility that had surfaced among scientists in the form of ―embryonic 
organizations‖ to block the military‘s continued control over the atomic program as then 
proposed in the May-Johnson Bill.
9
 He conceded that weapons work was ―repulsive to all 
of us,‖ but added that there was no way to stop bomb ―construction now‖ and urged the 
remaining scientists and technicians to help him find a way to transform the laboratory 
from a wartime enterprise to something more broadly useful. Part of Bradbury‘s 
argument was that the status quo was manageable, even improvable. Keeping the 
laboratory alive meant working on weapons; but Bradbury was thinking less about the 
use of the weapon and more about perfecting it, with refinements in engineering, 
reliability, assembly, and other features that would lead to ―a better weapon.‖ While 
challenging his division leaders to come up with imaginative new projects for the 
                                                 
9
 Alice Kimball Smith provides an overview of the reactionary activity of scientists following the bombing 
of Japan in ―Scientists and the Public Interest, 1945-1946,‖ Newsletter on Science, Technology, & Human 
Values 24 (1978): 25.  
283 
 
laboratory to pursue, he also proposed using the Sandia base—where Groves was 
establishing a rival group to build bombs for the military—as a field test site for weapons 
testing: ―It may not last there for more than a year, but we will learn how the ideal field 
test site for weapons should be set up.‖10 Bradbury‘s philosophy for keeping scientists 
and keeping the government interested in Los Alamos involved additional experiments, 
―subsequent Trinity‘s.‖  
The way he explained this demonstrates that in his mind, at least, he had already 
made a distinction between making a bomb and making a weapon—and it was one that 
he encouraged his audience to take to heart by explaining the difference as he saw it, and 
the way that experiments would suit the needs of laboratory personnel and the 
government.
11
 ―The TR [Trinity] bomb was a bomb and not a weapon if you will permit 
the distinction.‖ Bradbury also compared work on the bomb with cancer. This analogy 
suggests that he was ready to acknowledge, along with the scientists who were pushing 
for international control of atomic science and agreements to prevent the use of atom 
bombs, that atomic phenomena were so incompletely understood and the hazards so 
profound that, like cancer, they could become a plague on mankind. ―One studies 
cancer—one does not expect or want to contract it—but the whole impact of cancer on 
the race is such that we must know its unhappy extent.‖ Bradbury, interested in keeping 
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scientists at the laboratory and keeping the laboratory open, appealed to the professional 
and ideological sympathies of his listeners.  
Bradbury insisted that the only difference between bomb-making as a perilous 
enterprise and bomb-making as an innocuous one resided in approach and perspective. 
He argued that detonations would advance scientific understanding and might generate 
public support for international control, convincing ―more people than any manifesto that 
nuclear energy is safe only in the hands of a cooperating world.‖ He asserted that 
detonations could be an invigorating experience all around: ―further TR‘s may be a goal 
which will provide some intellectual stimulus for people working here …  and lacking the 
weapon aspect directly, another TR might even be FUN.‖ Moreover, and in the spirit of 
using the military‘s interest in bombs to generate funding for his laboratory in such a way 
to prevent alienating scientists opposed to improving the art of warfare, Bradbury argued 
that the laboratory engage in work that would be non-productive. Bradbury proposed 
working on a project that Teller had been dissuaded from pursuing during the war and 
what Bradbury—then—believed might be impossible, the hydrogen bomb: 
We will propose that the fundamental experiments leading to the answer 
to the question ―Is or is not a Super feasible?‖ be undertaken. These 
experiments are of interest in themselves in many cases; but even more, 
we cannot avoid the responsibility of knowing the facts, no matter how 
terrifying. The word ―feasible‖ is a weasel word—it covers everything 
from laboratory experiments up to the possibility of actually building—for 
only by building something do you actually finally determine feasibility. 
This does not mean that we will build a super. It couldn‘t happen in our 
lifetime in any event.
12
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Thus, in the interests of guaranteeing future laboratory funding and guaranteeing 
that scientists would continue to man the laboratory, Bradbury suggested that they work 
on something that many of them believed could not be used as a weapon: the H-bomb. 
For Bradbury, creating more and better bombs would benefit scientists and weapons 
would satisfy the military, while government investment in both would secure the future 
of the laboratory. Bradbury gave institutional impetus to the notion of an H-bomb—at 
Los Alamos and within government circles—while confiding to laboratory insiders that 
he believed its creation was such a remote possibility that the idea was little more than a 
harmless means of generating funds. There is no way to know whether Bradbury was 
being disingenuous with those in his audience or with those within government who 
learned of his plan. Nor is it possible to know, in the months and years that followed, 
whether military officers, elected officials, policymakers, or the AEC, realized that 
Bradbury was not sincere in his promotion of a hydrogen weapon. Teller had certainly 
believed that it was not impossible and had been frustrated during and after the war at the 
reluctance of Manhattan officials to allow him to pursue the ―Super.‖13  
What is known is that Bradbury proposed the possibility of producing an H-bomb 
for no other reason than to save Los Alamos. As it turned out, and as will be discussed 
later in this chapter, Bradbury‘s plan gained traction and for that reason, three 
―subsequent Trinity‘s‖ were held as the focus of 1948‘s Operation Sandstone—
experiments designed to proof test some of the theoretical advances made as a result of 
the plan he put forth in October 1945. Bradbury delivered his proposal before Operation 
Crossroads had been approved and before anyone knew whether the peacetime program 
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would be in military or in civilian hands. He had, however, correctly perceived that the 
military‘s coattails were the ones to which Los Alamos should cling. 
The Evaluation Report of Operation Crossroads: A Military Vision for America 
Bradbury‘s plan fit right in with military goals devised after Crossroads, when 
those officers and their supporters had a better idea of the value of atomic science to their 
future. ―The Evaluation of the Atomic Bomb as a Military Weapon; The Final Report of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff Evaluation Report for Operation Crossroads,‖ completed June 
30, 1947, brings to light the importance of Operation Crossroads as a maneuver that 
allowed the military to test the boundaries of what was possible to achieve during 
peacetime, the centrality of atomic science to unifying the branches into common 
purpose, and the organizational capacity that the armed forces gained during 
Consolidation.
14
  
―The Final Report of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Evaluation Board for Operation 
Crossroads‖ was the product of a civilian/military committee that Truman established in 
response to mounting public and political opposition to the Navy‘s plan for Operation 
Crossroads and to quell suspicion about the Navy‘s objectivity.15 The civilian members 
of the Board were Karl T. Compton, president of MIT, Bradley Dewey, president of the 
American Chemical Society and president of the Dewey and Almy Chemical Company, 
and Thomas F. Farrell, former Major General and Deputy Commander of the Manhattan 
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Project. The committee‘s military members were Lt. General L. H. Brereton, Vice 
Admiral John H. Hoover, Rear Admiral Ralph A. Ofstie, and Lt. Gen. A. C. Wedemeyer, 
a replacement for General Joseph W. Stilwell, who died before the report was completed. 
Truman charged the Board with evaluating the effect of the detonations at Crossroads 
and with preparing ―two preliminary, public reports‖ and a final report that would 
elaborate on the atom bomb effects and, additionally, provide strategic and national 
security information.
16
 Though the Committee promised to provide, at least in part, 
information that the public could use to form opinions about atomic weapons and atomic 
science, there was debate even before Operation Crossroads about whether it would 
provide anything but the most general information.
17
 The domestic political situation and 
the military‘s official standing vis-à-vis the atomic program changed dramatically 
between the time Truman signed off on the Committee and the date it issued the Report. 
Truman had approved the Committee before the passage of the Atomic Energy Act. By 
the time the Committee delivered its Report, military officers had begun to consolidate 
their authority and focus their attention on regaining control over the atomic program that 
they had officially lost under the AEA.  
The report has gone down in history for its incendiary discussion of the likely 
consequences of atomic warfare, for the complaints lodged by Karl T. Compton that the 
Final Report omitted paragraphs that he expected included, and for how promptly 
                                                 
16
 Since three detonations were planned for Crossroads, with the deep water ―Charlie‖ blast cancelled after 
the maneuvers were underway, it is likely that the original plan was for the committee to report on all three 
detonations. ―Report‖ Part II, (2)(3), 8.  
 
17
 Chairman Vinson of the Naval Affairs Committee who had warned in March that the findings of the 
committee would be controlled: ―The information [would be] kept in the bosom of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff.‖ New York Times, March 12, 1946, 17. 
  
288 
 
Truman ordered it classified.
18
 The Report can be understood in three ways. First, as what 
it purported to be: an evaluation by respected civilians and members of the upper echelon 
about atom bomb effects and what the bomb‘s development might mean for society and 
for the state. Second, as a political document through which the Board‘s military and 
civilian members advanced arguments to support policies that they believed important or 
essential. Third, as a blend of the first two. This makes sense in view of the institutional 
perspective of the instant analysis, but also because the Crossroads experiments were 
expected to provide additional scientific information about atomic detonations. 
Moreover, Truman, who approved the commission, other government officials, and 
interested members of the American public, all anticipated that the report would not only 
provide important information for the military and policymakers, but also that portions of 
it would be made available to the public. All expected that the Final Report would 
provide a summation of the value of an atom bomb as a weapon in the U.S. arsenal and 
its dangers—what it might mean for national security if and when other countries 
developed atomic technologies.  
The Final Report did that, and more, because the Joint Chiefs of Staff had control 
over the document‘s preparation. The JCS‘s version of the Report encapsulated the 
military‘s vision for the future with an argument for the radical expansion of military 
presence and influence. Officers used findings and extrapolations derived from Operation 
Crossroads, expanded upon what was already known about atom bombings and the 
                                                 
18
 For a discussion of the Report, the reception it received in the Truman administration, as well as 
Compton‘s disagreement with JCS deletions and the efforts to retrieve Compton‘s copy, see Weisgall, 288-
298. Though misinformed in claiming that the third test of Crossroads, Charlie, was cancelled to preserve 
scarce nuclear resources, Guy Oakes discusses the Report‘s influence on military planning, see Guy Oakes, 
The Imaginary War: Civil Defense and Cold War Culture (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 35-
36. 
289 
 
hazards of residual radioactivity derived from Trinity, Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and 
combined that information with what they learned at Operation Crossroads about the 
value of dramatic public demonstration. They took that information and used Atomic 
Secrecy to prevent the possibility of creating a backlash against weapons experimentation 
and, perhaps also to hinder diplomatic efforts, to generate public and political support for 
military expansion. The Joint Chiefs of Staff stifled civilian input, and especially the 
portions of the Report Karl T. Compton believed important, and packaged that 
information into a report that presented a unified version of how the military expected 
officials to preserve national security in an atomic age. As presented to the Truman 
administration, the Final Report anchored atomic science to military expansion and 
recommended what can without exaggeration be called a revolution in governance: an 
unprecedented expansion of military authority and a proposal to allow for pre-emptive 
atomic war. 
The Report stirred up nearly as much controversy as Operation Crossroads itself. 
Weisgall wrote that after Crossroads disbanded, the JCS feared that the report would 
raise ―serious political problems for the military‖ and neutralized it by altering, 
fragmenting, and deleting the conclusions of civilian board members when delivering the 
preliminary report.
19
 This was immediately problematic because the Pentagon had 
previously assured Compton, the committee‘s chairman, that civilians and the public 
would have access to the board‘s findings. Compton resigned in protest, but returned 
briefly when the JCS told him that the omissions and changes had been the result of 
inadvertent clerical errors. Compton repeatedly refused to relinquish his copy of the 
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report, and after his death in 1954, AFSWP tried unsuccessfully to retrieve his copy. 
They ultimately turned to the FBI to investigate.
20
 From the Truman administration‘s 
perspective, Clark Clifford said the final report so ―outraged‖ Truman that the White 
House requested all copies be turned over to the JCS, who immediately suppressed the 
document because, as a military official told reporters, its conclusions were, ―so 
disturbing and frightening … and the recommendations so sensational.‖21 The report 
presented an alarming scenario of what types of devastation would occur in the event of 
an atomic attack or all-out atomic warfare. The underwater detonation of the ―Baker‖ 
bomb and the fallout hazard that resulted, for example, demonstrated that radioactive 
fallout could ―depopulate vast areas of the earth‘s surface, leaving only vestigial 
remnants of man‘s material works.‖22 Though some of the Report‘s findings were leaked 
to the press, and despite repeated requests from newspaper reporters and commentators 
that the public had been promised it would be allowed to view the Evaluation Board‘s 
findings, the Report remained entirely classified until October 1975.
23
 For its alarming 
portrayal of the consequences of atomic warfare, the arms race that it prophesied, and the 
effect of its findings on those privy to the Report in its entirety—especially Truman, who 
ordered it classified and locked away—the Report and its history seem to reflect a 
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transitional moment in U.S. history when both the atomic age and the national security 
state—as well as the increased tensions between civilian ideals and national defense that 
resulted—were in their infancy.  
But, both the timing of the document‘s release and its contents suggest that it 
makes more sense to understand the Final Report as the product of the military‘s 
maturing political strategy. First, the document‘s findings did not provide new 
information about atomic effects. The JCS Evaluation Board first released the Report in 
June 1947—nearly a year after the end of Crossroads and the passage of the Atomic 
Energy Act, a few weeks before the creation of the National Defense Establishment under 
the National Security Act, and nearly two years after the bombings of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki. The document‘s findings had little to add to what was already known publicly 
and within the administration about the effects of atom bombs. In fact, the Report‘s 
elaboration of atomic effects did little more than reaffirm the dramatic and poignant 
findings contained in the bombing surveys of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, dated June 19 and 
30, 1946, and completed before the Able bomb was dropped at Bikini. Those surveys not 
only detailed the human and social toll of the bombs, but also elaborated on the danger of 
lingering radioactivity and ventured that devastation similar to what had been found in 
Japan would result should American cities come under atomic attack.
24
 As the Board 
admitted, ―the phenomena attending the explosions of both bombs, followed to a 
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remarkable degree the predictions made by civilian and service experts.‖25 Second, the 
Report was, for the upper echelon as well as Compton, primarily a political document, 
one its authors expected could be used to mold domestic policy. As late as December 
1948, for example, the JCS expected that it would be successful in having portions of the 
document released to the public.
26
 Third, because of the use of Manhattan-style strategies 
of control employed during its preparation by the JCS and the influence of the Military 
Liaison Committee on the JCS—a letter from the MLC reminding the National Military 
Establishment of the requirement to submit all communications between it and the AEC 
to the MLC included along with the document in JCS files—it makes sense also to 
understand the Report as a product of Integration.
27
  
The officers who produced the final version of the Report capitalized on the status 
of the Board‘s civilian observers even as they tailored its contents in ways that 
disregarded civilian influence. In late December 1948 an unsigned note to General Alfred 
Gruenther, first Director of the JCS and General Eisenhower‘s bridge partner, suggested 
that ―any publicity could be confined to only the Conclusions and Recommendations‖ 
because ―the prestige of the Board‖ would substitute for the findings that led to those 
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conclusions.‖28 Censoring civilian contributions to the Report made up for the inability of 
military officers to control Compton and other civilian members of the committee during 
Crossroads as the Navy had controlled the reporters invited to Bikini. In doing so, 
military officers betrayed Compton‘s trust, disregarding his contribution to the Report 
after assuring him that he would be able to contribute fully, and then deceived him, and 
Truman as well, by explaining away as an inadvertent error omissions that were almost 
certainly purposeful given the attention paid to the content of the Report. The military 
members of the Evaluation Board also went beyond their mandate to ―be available for 
advice to the Task Force Commander during preparation of the tests,‖ to ―examine and 
evaluate‖ the results of the tests, and to include in the final report ―pertinent comments on 
strategy, tactics, and technical information.‖29 Officers not only ―commented,‖ but 
recommended changes to national policy and, in line with what Forrestal had been 
pressing for since wartime, policymaking authority for military advisors.  
Over thirty pages of a forty-page Report, the Committee addressed a variety of 
issues from the impossibility of defending cities against atomic warfare to suggesting that 
the military receive ―title‖ to atomic weapons. The sorts of issues addressed, and the 
frequency with which those issues appeared within the report, helps to show the 
importance of the Report for military officers set, as Forrestal had been, on peacetime 
expansion. Discussion and recommendations for increasing military preparedness was, at 
thirty-three instances, the most common issue addressed in the Report. Recommendations 
for changes in atomic and national policies—including a suggestion that elected officials 
                                                 
28
Signed [illegible] handwritten note to General Gruenther, dated 12/27/48, JCS 16[illegible]1/10. United 
States National Archives, RG 218, CCS 471.6, Sec. 13, folder ―Control of Atomic Weapons and Tests‖ (8-
15-45). 
 
29
 Final Report, 8.  
294 
 
abandon the traditional prohibition against pre-emptive warfare—came in second, 
appearing no less than twenty-five times. There were twenty-three comments about the 
material effects of atom bomb detonations and at least fourteen mentions of the 
impossibility of defending cities or populations against atomic bombardment. Diplomacy, 
as a theoretical ideal and a future possibility, received five mentions. Finally, there were 
two discussions of the necessity for continued experimentation and ―full scale‖ weapons 
tests. In the Report as a whole, and despite the point-by-point itemization of issues, a 
bewildering number of recommendations contradict one another in subtle and not-so-
subtle ways. They might be imagined to be the unavoidable result of a committee-
generated document where each player insisted on presenting his own version, or, 
perhaps, as the inevitable result of repetition and an effort to avoid exact rephrasing of a 
point already made. But, that is to view the report as it appears now—a declassified 
version of a Report that was, at the time, expected to be divided for all but the highest 
level officials into public and classified portions. A mark-up version of the Report 
included in the JCS files that identifies the portions of the Report that military officials 
expected to extract and classify. These materials help to explain the contradictions and 
presents an opportunity to assess the Report‘s value to military officers who, at the time, 
seem to have regarded it as the means to assert control over the atomic program and to 
achieve policymaking authority. 
In segmenting the Report for restricted and unrestricted access, military officers 
sought to make the most of the horrendous consequences of atomic warfare while 
shielding the extent of their ambitions from the public and from most elected officials. 
What can be gleaned from handwritten bracketing on the JCS file copy is that conflicting 
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recommendations were not contradictions per se, but rather elements of a dual-purpose 
document that included purposeful phrasing that military officers expected would, with 
selective classification, provide a convincing argument for increasing military authority 
and autonomy without running the risk of (a) appearing overambitious and alienating the 
public, and  (b) insulting congressional benefactors through criticism of existing 
legislation. For example, the unclassified conclusion—the one intended for public 
consumption—asserted that the Atomic Energy Act‘s provisions, ―however justified at 
the moment of the Act‘s passage, should be reviewed from time to time.‖ In contrast, the 
classified version—for officials with sufficient security clearances—was more direct, and 
while the authors ―offer[ed] no criticism‖ of the original legislation, recommended that 
―proper authorities‖ reconsider the Act and give the military sole authority over atomic 
weapons and material. Along with suggesting that military personnel be included on the 
Atomic Energy Commission, the Committee made recommendations that would have 
stripped authority from the AEC, rendering it as little more than a managerial apparatus 
for the production of weapons. In this scenario, the authors recommended that the 
military be allowed to ―own, have title to, and be charged with the control of atomic 
weapons after fabrication, …design and test atomic weapons,‖ and ―to control all 
information relating to military utilization of the weapons.‖30 While it cannot be known 
what difference the military believed existed between ―owning‖ atomic weapons and 
having ―title‖ to them, it seems beyond question that the military expected full custody 
and authority over the stockpile. Moreover, it is also evident that military officers wanted 
to shield the public and many elected officials from viewing the extent of their ambitions, 
leaving the impression in the declassified and widely-circulated document that it wanted 
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nothing more than routine reviews of the Act‘s provisions to ensure that they kept pace 
with technology and circumstances, while asserting in the Report‘s classified portions 
that it expected to receive full custody of all atomic weapons and to suffer no interference 
whatsoever in their production, their storage, or their use. To accomplish this goal, 
military officers needed to persuade the public that a strong peacetime military was the 
only thing standing between it and an uninhabitable America, where—without adequate 
defense—it was only a matter of time before American cities were reduced to a collection 
of shadowy, radiated, ruins.  
The declassified version became a way to frighten the public with a devastating 
portrayal of an atomic attack and impress upon it the importance of a vigilant, and large, 
peacetime military force with sufficient authority to prevent one from occurring. It might 
seem that this amounted to overkill, especially after the reports of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki, Hersey‘s Hiroshima, the release by scientists of the vivid consequences of 
atomic war in One World or None, and the publicity that surrounded Operation 
Crossroads. But a public reminder of atomic devastation was especially necessary after 
Crossroads because the Navy‘s promotional campaign had tipped the balance of public 
sentiment in a way that was detrimental to the military‘s goals. Publicity had, in fact, 
raised expectations for the drama so high and the Navy had so effectively suppressed the 
crisis that radioactive fallout had produced at Bikini that, when it was over, 58 percent of 
those polled remarked that the bombs had done less damage that they had expected, while 
only 16 percent found the tests more damaging, and 11 percent reported that the tests had 
met their expectations.
31
 It is likely that neither the civilian members of the committee 
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who expected the Report to persuade the American public to throw more support into 
diplomatic solutions to atomic warfare, nor the military members who sought to use the 
possibility of atomic warfare as a means of generating support for an expanded military, 
welcomed the news that a large number of people had become more comfortable with 
atomic bombardment in the aftermath of Crossroads. The Report‘s authors used 
straightforward language to summarize the practical information gained from Crossroads, 
―Submarines, both surface and submerged, proved less vulnerable than other types of 
vessels‖—some of which had already been provided in preliminary reports and much of 
it validating earlier studies and literature about atomic effects gathered from Trinity, 
Hiroshima, and Nagasaki, and to explain that other data was either classified, restricted, 
or had yet to be analyzed.
32
 In contrast, they employed strong and imaginative language 
to paint devastating portraits of atomic warfare. So, along with the information that atom 
bombs could depopulate the earth, the authors wrote that atom bombs could make 
counterattack impossible. Atomic attack could ―nullify any nation‘s military effort … 
demolish its social and economic structures,‖ and ―an aggressor, striking suddenly and 
unexpectedly … might … insure the ultimate defeat of an initially stronger adversary.‖33 
Statements such as these, in the opinion of one officer writing to General Gruenther, 
would have sufficed ―to give comfort to our friends and some sleepless nights to 
enemies.‖34 When combined with those portions of the Report that the military wanted 
classified, it seems likely that officers preparing the report planned to use it and atomic 
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energy to justify the creation of what would amount to a command economy, where 
officers would exert policymaking—and war-making—authority. Given this scenario, it 
might be assumed that it was not only enemies, but also Truman administration insiders, 
who lost sleep after receiving the Report. 
The Report‘s authors minimized the role of civilians in preserving national 
security. The portrayal of military officers as competently self-assured in all matters 
having to do with atomic energy contrasted with the portrayals of civilians—whether 
scientists or elected officials—as, at best, ideologically ill-suited for the problems of an 
atomic age, uncertain, or perplexed. One way the Report‘s authors did this was to invoke 
historical arguments. They used Operation Crossroads as an exemplar of military 
evenhandedness, ignoring the JCS‘s role in discarding civilian input into the Report itself 
while noting that the Operation demonstrated that military personnel had proved 
themselves capable of cooperating with civilians and members of other branches, able to 
―work in efficient harmony.‖35 The assertion was possible because the Report‘s authors 
made no reference to the near-disaster of radioactive contamination that resulted from the 
―Baker‖ test that prompted the cancellation of test ―Charlie,‖ to the disregard of safety 
procedures by officers with little or no understanding of radioactive exposure hazards and 
minimal respect for the expertise (and rank) of Stafford Warren and his radiological 
safety teams, or that Stafford Warren had a difficult time persuading Admiral Blandy that 
because of contamination he should dismantle the Operation. Instead, the Report 
included language asserting that military officers had proven that they had the expertise 
to plan and conduct experiments safely: ―As a result of carefully planned operating 
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procedures and radiological safety measures, no casualties resulted from explosion or 
radiation during, or after, either test.‖36 Invocations of Pearl Harbor reinforced the 
importance of military readiness and supported an argument that in matters atomic, 
offense was the only defense.
37
 To further emphasize the need for urgency and the 
insignificance of civilian input or decision making, the authors reminded their readers 
that ―it is the lesson of history that new inventions may at any time vastly accelerate‖ 
allowing an enemy to ―outstrip U.S. quickly‖ and, while mentioning that experts outside 
military circles agreed, noted that those experts ―expressed little faith in the accuracy of 
their predictions.‖38 To further demean the efforts of civilians to secure national security, 
the Report established impossible objectives for diplomacy and used the failure to 
achieve those objectives to argue for a vast enhancement of military presence and 
authority. 
Instead of the initiative for the development of an international agency to control 
atomic materiel and research through the U.N. that was underway at the time, the 
Report‘s content set diplomatic aims impossibly high as a means of guaranteeing the 
militaristic alternative.
39
 So, for example, ―Only the outlawing of all war‖ and ―absolute 
guarantees of abiding peace‖ could preclude following the military‘s recommendations 
and its own objectives supplied in the Report. These were as exaggerated as the 
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diplomatic scenario. One of the most important recommendations was also the most 
revolutionary:  
There must be national recognition of the probability of surprise attack 
and a consequential revision of our traditional attitudes toward what 
constitute acts of aggression so that our armed forces may plan and 
operate in accordance with the realities of atomic warfare. … Offensive 
measures will be the only generally effective means of defense, and the 
United States must be prepared to employ them before a potential enemy 
can inflict significant damage upon us. 
 
To soften the blow of this assault on ―traditional attitudes,‖ the Report‘s authors 
then suggested that their proposal was, really, nothing new: ―National defense 
requirements of the future are only those of the past; any aggressor must be overcome 
with superior force.‖ What was new was a recommended change in what constituted 
aggression and the definition of an aggressor. They asked that Congress decide, in 
advance, the criteria for such factors as ―an ‗aggressive act‘ or imminent‘ or ‗incipient‘ 
attack‘[and] draft suitable standing orders‖ so that the president, as commander in chief, 
could authorize a pre-emptive attack at will.
40
 The JCS‘s logical formulation of the 
problem left no room for compromise. Absent a ―guaranty of absolute peace,‖ preventing 
the ―possible annihilation of civilization‖ required the ―manufacture and stockpiling‖ of 
enough atomic weapons to ―overwhelm swiftly any potential enemy‖ and new legislation 
―establishing new definitions of acts of aggression and incipient attack, including the 
readying of atomic weapons against us.‖ The legislation proposed would make it 
incumbent upon the president to decide, ―after consultation with the Cabinet,‖ to launch 
pre-emptive atomic bombardment.
 41
 Though the Report‘s authors used the horrors of 
                                                 
40
 Report, 10-11. Additional recommendations for pre-emptive attack authority can be found on 13, 28, 29.  
 
41
 Emphasis added. Report, 14-15.  
 
301 
 
atomic warfare to relay the need for such a drastic change in traditional ideology, it was 
not preconditioned on an enemy‘s possession of atomic weapons or expertise. Indeed, 
whatever one could imagine amounted to grounds for the legislative changes that the 
military requested:  
Situations can be envisioned in which an aggressor, with or without 
atomic weapons, relying on various factors of war favorable to him and, 
making difficult our successful delivery of atomic bombs to targets vital to 
his military effort, might undertake an attack upon us.
42
 
 
Along with changes allowing for pre-emptive assault, the potential for enemy attack 
justified, according to the Report, the revision of the Atomic Energy Act and an 
unprecedented demand for military intelligence.  
The recommendation for a pre-emptive attack as envisioned by the JCS would, 
presumably, come to the president‘s attention through the Secretary of Defense—a 
cabinet member with official, ―civilian,‖ status—and be supported by information 
supplied by ―an intelligence service with a far greater effectiveness than any such service 
this county has had heretofore in peace or war.‖43 It may seem farfetched that had 
Truman not ordered the Report secured and classified its content, the JCS could have 
successfully secured legislative sanction for its plan and been in a position to argue for a 
pre-emptive attack on the U.S.S.R. Yet, after Hiroshima, the military‘s appeals to 
national security had been sufficient to whither objections to other military proposals. 
Despite widespread opposition to Operation Crossroads, for example, there were few 
elected officials who did not relinquish their objections—many of them based in sound 
reasoning and with the assurances of scientists that the experiments could be conducted 
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with more safety and at much less cost in laboratory settings—in the face of the 
military‘s appeals to national security and military urgency. Anticipating similar 
objections in the future, the authors of the Report tried to avert them by conflating 
scientific need for experimental tests with military maneuvers and readiness. They argued 
that ―periodic tests‖ were essential to weapons development and skill in weapons use. 
The phenomenon of nuclear fission precludes the explosion of an 
atomic weapon of less than critical mass, and hence all tests must be 
‗full scale.‘44  
 
The authors also disputed the notion that atomic weapons might serve as an economic 
alternative to massive conventional forces, reminding potential readers of material 
requirements, the importance of atomic preparedness across all branches, the JCS 
principle that atomic weapons were no substitute for troops: 
The advent of the atomic bomb has not eliminated our need for 
ground, naval and air forces [nor] lessened the need for overseas 
bases.
45
  
 
One particular itemization brings to mind the requests made by small committees to 
General Groves in September and October 1945 and provides yet another illustration of 
the significance of the Manhattan Project as well as the continuities between wartime and 
the immediate postwar era to the plans of military officers for the development and 
deployment of tactical atomic weapons.  
hence the necessity for coordinated development of atomic weapons and 
weapon-carriers and their integration into a series of devices, each with a 
tactical or strategic purpose. In the category of weapon-carrier may be 
included any means of ultimate delivery such as aircraft, guided missiles, 
rockets, torpedoes and mines of all types. … Inseparable from the 
development of bombs and bomb carriers, should be the planning of naval 
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surface and submarine vessels from which atomic bomb-carriers may be 
launched or discharged, as well as of land launching devices, stationary or 
mobile, and the acquisition and maintenance of land and air bases.
46
  
 
The Evaluation Report‘s authors included language that would have allowed for 
pre-emptive atomic bombardment of an enemy who might be found to be ―readying 
atomic weapons‖ or who posed a potential threat against U.S. defenses, a finding that 
would be based primarily on the military‘s own analysis of the danger. Given the JCS‘s 
cabinet-level authority, the publication and amplification of the dangers of atomic 
warfare through a public relations campaign and release of selected portions of the 
Evaluation Report, it seems plausible to imagine that the JCS was confident that it had a 
greater than even chance of securing the legislation it desired and anticipated that it 
would not be long before military intelligence found that the U.S.S.R., or another nation, 
was ―readying atomic weapons‖ and the president, as commander in chief, was faced 
with a decision to authorize a pre-emptive atomic attack. The Report‘s authors credited 
the military with the insight to gauge intelligence and threat, and left the impression that 
the military was unique in its ability to decide whether and under what circumstances pre-
emptive attacks should be commenced.  
The Report‘s Concluding Observations asserted that only the military was capable 
of protecting America in the atomic age. The authors conceded that the ―implications of 
atomic energy‖ were all but unimaginable, ―taxing the apperceptive powers of the most 
unfettered minds in every field of thought.‖ And yet, while ―the most unfettered minds‖ 
were profoundly challenged, the Report‘s authors self-assuredly insisted that ―military 
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planners‖ should confront the ―complex problems‖ of atomic energy as an ―implement of 
war.‖ In this way, they would be able to rise above the ―inertia of conservatism,‖ to bring 
about a ―revolutionary change in military mental attitudes.‖47 Clearly, however, the JCS 
did not have a problem with ―military‖ mental attitudes. Instead, the text of the Report 
reveals that was with civilian approaches to the atomic age that insisted, even after the 
creation of the atom bomb, on obedience to tradition and constitutional principles. With 
the Report, officers hoped for a suspension of what they considered ―conservatism‖ that 
hamstrung military planners and prevented the revolution in military authority and 
autonomy that Forrestal and other military officers sought as a preventative against a 
Soviet surprise attack.  
The Final Report of the Crossroads Evaluation Committee establishes the 
significance of Operation Crossroads as a conduit between wartime and peacetime as 
well as an integral first step in the militarization of the peacetime atomic program and in 
the creation of the national security state. First, the maneuver allowed military officers to 
test the boundaries of what was possible during peacetime and to evaluate the potential of 
atomic weapons and experimentation as instruments of political persuasion. Second, the 
evaluative process provided a mechanism that officers and their supporters used to 
coordinate their atomic ambitions and goals. Third, the itemization of findings and 
recommendations in the Evaluation Report represented a crystallization of military goals, 
one that used atomic weapons as a reason for a constitutional overhaul. When viewed 
from this perspective, the Report retains its long-held significance as a document that laid 
bare the effects of atom bombs and atomic warfare while simultaneously establishing the 
centrality of atomic science to the military‘s postwar goals. Truman‘s rapid classification 
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of the Report may have meant that the military could not use the Report as it had 
anticipated, but even that helped military officers achieve their goals. It prevented the 
public from learning more about Operation Crossroads and the hazards of 
experimentation, thus giving a majority of the public little reason to change the 
conclusions they reached after Crossroads that experiments could be conducted safely 
and with no offsite hazards. Restricting the entire Report also allowed the military to 
keep the general public and most elected officials in the dark about their plans to re-
assume control over the atomic program and for the mobilization of America. The Report 
represents an important piece of the history of the national security state: an articulation 
of the armed forces‘ postwar ambitions and an argument to achieve them based on 
Operation Crossroads, the first postwar experiment with atomic weapons. For the 
military, the Report was an important step in its bid for increased influence and 
policymaking authority.  
Los Alamos‘s civilian director Bradbury and armed forces officers contributed to 
compressing atomic science into weaponry, psychically anchoring the bomb to military 
reorganization and American mobilization. The military‘s coordinated approach gave it 
the ability to suppress unwanted information after Crossroads, and the support it received 
from extra-government entities, such as Los Alamos, made it difficult for the AEC, 
Lilienthal, and others who supported the development of peacetime applications to block 
the military‘s monopolization of atomic resources for weapons development. The 
military lobbied for more than materiel and innovative weapons. It was also working to 
assert control over experimentation by minimizing the hazards of radioactive fallout 
while simultaneously issuing reminders about the lethal prospects of atomic warfare. As a 
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result, it became easier for the military and its supporters it to dismiss as ideological, and 
non functional, the varied proposals of intellectuals, scientists, and diplomats who 
understood atomic science in broader terms and who held out the hope that development 
of peacetime applications would prevent resources from being monopolized for weaponry 
and state-making, and that atomic science would become a public, and not just a national 
security, asset. As will be discussed in more detail in a later chapter, the scientists, whose 
authority became compromised by their politicization after the war, but who perhaps had 
the most to contribute to any discussion about atomic weapons, found themselves on the 
sidelines of some of the most consequential conversations of the twentieth century.
48
 
Stafford Warren became one of those sidelined scientists. 
Operation Sandstone 
Bradbury‘s 1945 plan to pursue military weapons work as a means of saving Los 
Alamos increased the Laboratory‘s value to the military and helped secure its future. 
Support came from a variety of groups with their own interests in expansion, including 
military officers seeking to control atomic development and anxious for weapons 
production at any cost, congressmen who used the atomic program and complaints about 
its administration to ratchet up their influence at the cost of Truman‘s popularity, and 
from other elected officials who genuinely believed that developing an H-bomb was the 
only way to protect national security against Soviet designs. Most of those who were not 
affiliated with the program had no choice but to rely on the advice provided by 
Manhattan veterans such as Groves and Nichols, the AEC‘s Lewis Strauss, and 
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entrepreneurs such as E.O. Lawrence who, along with Teller who had been working on 
the idea of a Super from his days in the Manhattan Project, and who competed with Los 
Alamos for government funding and resources.  
Bradbury‘s plan grew into 1948s Operation Sandstone, a three-experiment test of 
atomic weapons in the Pacific. The history of that testing series reveals the interaction 
and cooperation between military contractors and officers who  promoted 
experimentation and minimized the dangers of atmospheric testing to achieve their own 
institutional goals. Planning for the Operation itself began in Spring 1947 when Norris 
Bradbury put in a request to proof test a newer model of atom bomb to establish its 
viability and to verify theoretical calculations. Following the plan Bradbury described in 
1945 to secure peacetime funding for Los Alamos, the request was a second step toward 
that goal. Thus it was that the H-bomb, something Bradbury prophesied would not be 
perfected except in the far distant future but that in the short term would guarantee Los 
Alamos‘s short-term future, became—officially—a national security imperative.  
Bradbury‘s second step toward achieving the Laboratory‘s financial future came 
took place when he approached the General Advisory Committee (GAC) with a request 
to test new atomic weapons. On April 3, 1947, the GAC took Bradbury‘s requests for 
experiments to the AEC. On April 16, Lilienthal discussed the tests with President 
Truman. On April 21, AEC General Manager Carroll Wilson summarized Los Alamos‘s 
request for the Commission. On April 25, Lilienthal gave the MLC a heads-up on the 
308 
 
proposal and asked for an armed forces input on logistics and location. By the end of 
April, planning for Operation Sandstone was underway.
49
 
An extracted version of the Operation Sandstone Report illustrates the 
contradictions between what the AEC and the military each hoped to gain from the 
Operation. In his summary for the Commission, Wilson recommended bringing the 
military on board with a formal letter, establishing the Commission‘s need for logistical 
support and reinforcing the importance of the tests for the military. With Crossroads a 
recent memory, Wilson ―cautioned‖—in the words of the Sandstone Report, against ―too 
much fanfare,‖ and, as planning progressed and with negotiations with the Soviets for 
international control of atomic energy ongoing, the State Department agreed. In a twist 
on the emphasis that Groves and Manhattan personnel had placed on security and secrecy 
and a continuation of the self-serving use of secrecy that officers employed during 
Crossroads, armed forces officers complained that at Sandston the requirements had been 
too onerous. In one instance, authors of the Sandstone Report noted that security had 
come close to jeopardizing the scientific value of the Sandstone experiments. According 
to the Sandstone Report‘s chapter on organization, ―test security‖ had made arranging for 
personnel from the Naval Research Laboratory and recruitment difficult because it was 
only possible to inform them that ―tests would occur sometime next year (1948) in the 
Pacific and would require a two to three months absence.‖50 It seems more likely that 
instead of burdensome ―security‖ regulations, which would seem to have been immaterial 
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when dealing with scientists at the Naval Research Laboratory who possessed high level 
security clearances, the difficulty came about because the plans were in such a 
preliminary phase that the dates for the tests had not yet been established. For the AEC, 
secrecy and security were not incompatible with the holding of experiments for scientific 
purposes and were both essential issues of national security. For military officers, less 
interested in diplomacy as a national security imperative than in military readiness to 
preserve it, security regulations for Sandstone were unnecessarily strict.  
As explained in the Report‘s Summary, while Sandstone was in its planning 
stages, the radioactive hazards caused by Trinity was the reason why the test was planned 
for the Pacific:  
It was already clear that the proof-testing would have to be conducted 
outside the continental United States. Experience at Trinity with the 
hazards caused by the fallout of radioactive particles over many hundreds 
of square miles in the southwestern United States indicated that an isolated 
site, such as might be found in the Pacific Islands, would be mandatory.
51
  
 
At the conclusion of Sandstone, the Test Director and Commander of Task Group 
7.1, James S. Russell, made recommendations that placed fallout as one of the most 
important factors to consider for future planning purposes. To protect servicemen from 
fallout, and apparently with the expectation that Eniwetok would be the site for atomic 
weapons testing, he recommended not using Eniwetok during the winter, when high and 
multi-directional winds could be expected that might result in unpredictable fallout 
patterns, or during the summer, when ―stagnant‖ air would cause local dispersal of fallout 
and serious contamination. According to Russell, the most satisfactory time for testing 
was between March 15 and June 1, when the prevailing winds would carry radioactivity 
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away from troop positions. Russell also noted that radioactive contamination from the 
three-shot test should not prevent future erection of towers and equipment installation, 
but its effect on instrumentation and soil sampling should be considered.
52
 In Russell‘s 
account, radioactive fallout was the primary reason that experiments were conducted in 
the Pacific and preventing inadvertent exposure was something that he considered a 
priority for the Sandstone series as well as for future experiments at Eniwetok. And yet, 
in sections of the same summary Russell lobbied for the creation of a continental site for 
experimentation.  
The contradiction is perhaps best explained with reference to Russell‘s second in 
command during Sandstone, General John E. Hull, the officers who opposed publicity 
about the bomb‘s destructiveness and hazards because such reports were 
counterproductive to the establishment of a continental site for routine atomic testing. 
Hull was among those providing input for the report. Portions of Russell‘s summary align 
so closely with Hull‘s goals that his contribution to its content is all but certain. Those 
segments, coming toward the end of the summary, emphasize the inconvenience and 
expense of the Sandstone tests, complain that secrecy imposed by the AEC and the State 
Department was too burdensome, raising the expense and difficulty of the operation and, 
additionally, preventing the tests from being used as a step in Hull‘s plan to re-educate 
the public so that atmospheric atomic testing could be taken in stride. Other complaints 
dealt with the remoteness of the site, which had consumed ―considerable costs in funds, 
ships, aircraft, and personnel.‖ Following that, the author advocated the selection of a 
continental testing site and reminded the Report’s readers that he was not alone in 
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believing atomic weapons testing should be made more convenient. Perhaps fearing that 
he had made too strong a case for the difficulties and cost of experimenting with weapons 
at a site as remote as Eniwetok, he qualified his request for a continental site with 
language to make sure that Eniwetok could be used—and atomic experimentation should 
continue—despite the fallout hazard that would result and whether a continental site was 
approved:  
Many official and unofficial recommendations have been made by 
individuals involved in Operation Sandstone to secure a proving ground in 
the continental United States. The Commission staff should participate 
with the National Military Establishment in investigation directed towards 
securing a continental test site, but plan on using the Eniwetok location 
which has been proven a satisfactory location for atomic weapons tests.
53
  
 
Commentaries in the Sandstone Report by commanders at the Operation contain 
contradictions between the importance of safety and economy. Prior to the test, 
precautions to prevent radioactive exposure from fallout or local test debris were the 
reasons the Eniwetok site was used for Sandstone and were taken into consideration used 
to establish guidelines for experiments held there in the future. The health and safety of 
troops and the hazards of experimentation, so important for the selection of the Pacific 
site and for experimentation there, were not factored in to the commentary, which 
immediately follows the discussion about the inconveniences and expense of holding 
Sandstone at the Eniwetok site, aimed at selection of a continental test site. There is no 
evidence in the Report that the Sandstone experiments had produced data that showed the 
hazards of experimentation had been overemphasized previously, or that the experiments 
there had produced data that had so improved the predictability of radioactive hazards 
that future experiments with atomic weapons could be performed in such a way that they 
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would pose very little, or no, threat because of radioactive fallout. Instead, from the 
standpoint of Hull and others who lobbied for the selection of a continental test site, those 
factors were irrelevant when compared with the logistical difficulties of Pacific 
experimentation. From their perspective, convenience and economy trumped safety. The 
military‘s ability to massage away the hazards of atomic weapons experimentation and 
atmospheric testing, illustrated by the conclusions of the Sandstone report and the Final 
Report of Operation Crossroads, made it easier for Truman to view the atomic program 
as little more than a political bargaining chip and continental testing of atmospheric 
weapons as something that could be conducted with a greater measure of safety than had 
been imagined in the aftermath of Hiroshima.  
The important difference between Truman‘s initial refusal to approve the 
military‘s requests for a continental site and his acquiescence in late 1950 was not the 
threat posed by the Soviets‘ atom bomb, H-bomb production requirements, or the Korean 
War, but that Truman‘s political standing vis-à-vis his congressional opponents had gone 
into freefall and Truman was anxious to prevent its further deterioration. Truman had 
already attempted to deal with anticommunist fears and the cries of his critics by issuing 
three Executive Orders: E.O. 9806 in 1946, to establish a commission to study employee 
loyalty; E. O. 9835 in 1947 to require loyalty oaths, and 10038 in early 1949 to require 
oaths of public health personnel.
54
 Whether intended to establish policy or ―to send 
strategic signals to other actors‖ as one analyst put it; or, whether they were what Richard 
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E. Neustadt called a ―painful last resort,‖ they had not benefitted Truman politically.55 He 
had also reached out to the JCAE, appointing Gordon Dean after an early 1949 McMahon 
recommendation, to fill a vacancy on the AEC.
56
 Dean‘s appointment was one of the first 
signs that Truman was willing to compromise Lilienthal and the atomic program to solve 
his political problems. Lilienthal complained of the political nature of the appointment 
and of Dean‘s relative lack of experience:  
the basis of selection for this Commission should be … the very best 
qualified man in the United States, regardless of who his friends may be. 
… I don‘t think anyone would suggest that Gordon Dean, however fine a 
person and young lawyer he may be, would quite fill that bill.  
 
For Lilienthal, the appointment was ―the beginning of a downgrading of the importance 
of the Commission.‖57 In May 1949 Lilienthal again came under JCAE attack for his 
refusal to require AEC fellowship recipients to undergo security clearances. In a closed 
chamber of the Senate, Lilienthal was accused of giving away scholarship money to 
Communists or those who ―had leanings.‖ Refusing to back down, Lilienthal wrote that 
―an important principle was at stake.‖58 With news of the Soviet‘s atomic success, 
Lilienthal himself had become expendable.  
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The news that the Soviets had detonated an atom bomb was not a national security 
emergency; but, it did provide Truman‘s opponents with ammunition to use against him. 
More importantly, it provided Truman with an excuse to abandon Lilienthal who, in 
championing civilian authority had also been one of the only voices in Truman‘s circle of 
advisors who insisted that atomic science be taken on its own terms. Lilienthal had not 
only stood on principle—that control of the atomic program belonged in civilian hands—
but also on the realities of atomic exploitation: that whether for weapons or for peacetime 
applications, atomic science was a phenomenally hazardous endeavor. The national 
security imperative to maintain the lead against the Soviets was no more important than it 
had been since the end of the war. Experiments at Crossroads and Sandstone provided 
additional evidence that experimentation posed long term and unavoidable and 
irremediable dangers because of the resilience and unpredictability of radioactive fallout. 
The hazardous nature of atmospheric atomic experimentation was something that Truman 
could not ignore as long as Lilienthal was among those who had influence within the 
administration.  
By 1949 Truman had marginalized Lilienthal to suit his domestic political agenda 
and open the door to the wholesale militarization of the program and, with it, the 
downplaying of the risks of experimentation. To understand why military officers and 
their supporters who sought to control and monopolize the program were able to exploit 
Lilienthal‘s fall from grace to such an extent, it is necessary to back up and review how 
careful they were after Crossroads to portray experimentation as a manageable 
enterprise. One of the ways they did this was by refusing to allow the circulation of 
information that would have been detrimental to their efforts to experiment with atomic 
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weapons at will. This involved creating the impression that atomic warfare and the 
radioactive fallout from an enemy‘s weapon was such a fearsome possibility that the 
military should be granted extraordinary and possibly unconstitutional authority while 
promulgating the contradictory notion that the radioactive fallout produced by 
experimental detonations was without risk.  
Operation Crossroads had provided the military officers with experience in the 
use of wartime strategies of control during peacetime—something that had not been tried 
before. In the aftermath of the spectacle, the military took the experience gained in media 
and inter-governmental relations and used it to enlarge its authority over atomic science 
from the inside-out. With an assist from the institutional capacity for inter-branch 
cooperation built into the AEA and the NSA—especially the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
organization and the Military Liaison Committee—the military controlled the flow of 
information outside military circles and walked (at least in public) more carefully than 
the Navy had during Crossroads that fine line between generating fear about the bomb 
and demonstrating mastery over it in public. Behind the scenes, it used that control over 
information about atomic weapons to generate political support from congressmen for 
increased military authority in such a way as not to alienate altogether the Truman 
administration. One aspect of this new strategy was the care the military took within 
government to present a united front in the interest of benefiting all branches through the 
militarization of  atomic science. Another was the rapid disengagement from the media in 
the aftermath of Crossroads. Examining each of those in turn will illustrate how these 
strategies worked in practice. 
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National Security Imperatives  
During Integration, military officers held fast to the claim that national security 
required the nation‘s atomic resources be devoted to bomb production and that bombs, 
once made, be turned over to the military. Just as Navy officers had claimed that 
Crossroads was urgently necessary, the JCS self assuredly claimed that it had an urgent 
need for atom bombs. But, as Bernard Brodie discovered to his horror in 1947 when he 
interviewed members of the War and Navy Departments about their plans for atom 
bombs, ―virtually nobody in a position of responsibility‖ had given it much thought. One 
report from the War Department said that the armed forces needed ―a significant number 
of bombs.‖ In that same report, the ―number‖ was defined as an amount that ―would 
provide an important military capability.‖59 Besides demonstrating how little hard 
strategic data the military had drawn from Operation Crossroads, one of the claimed 
purposes of the test, Brodie‘s contemporaneous finding also substantiates the sense that 
emerges from the from the declassified documentary record: that in the absence of a plan 
for using atom bombs, the military made what might be called a ―guestimate‖ and then 
extrapolated up from that to cover unanticipated contingencies. What the JCS did, then, 
was not only to exaggerate the urgency of their need for weapons, but also the number. 
On October 29, 1947, for example, Fleet Admiral Leahy supplied the JCS‘s requirement 
to Lilienthal. ―If a decision is made by competent authority to use atomic bombs, the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff have determined that for war a military requirement exists for 
approximately 400 [number handwritten] atomic bombs of destructive power equivalent 
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to the Nagasaki type bomb.‖60 In the absence of any authority to make such demands, 
they stood on ―principle.‖ On November 12, 1947, the MLC sent a letter to the AEC, 
demanding that weapons be turned over to the military: ―As a matter of principle, all 
atomic weapons now in stockpile and completed weapons and parts thereof, when ready 
for stockpiling, be delivered to the Armed Forces at the earliest practicable date 
satisfactory to the Armed forces and the Atomic Energy Commission.‖61 While the 
requested delivery of weapons was an issue that Lilienthal took up with Truman, who 
supported Lilienthal in refusing to cede custody of weapons to the military, it was the 
JCAE that Lilienthal alerted because the military‘s extravagant claims would have 
overstretched the AEC‘s budget. The military‘s claims were enough to alarm even the 
conservative JCAE Chairman Bourke Hickenlooper, who, after becoming aware of the 
situation, went to the Secretary of Defense for clarification of what the military had in 
mind because the request for 400 bombs represented a ―preponderant part of the 
Commission‘s activities and expenditures.‖62 Although the exact number of bombs that 
were in the production phase or in the stockpile was one of the most closely guarded 
secrets during the Cold War, there were far too few in either stage of completion to fulfill 
the military‘s request. Lilienthal, himself, was surprised to learn how few had been 
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produced and, with Truman‘s approval, began an immediate program to ramp up 
production. Still, as one historian has argued, Truman‘s foreign policy during the early 
Cold War years was something of a gamble, based as it was on an exaggerated notion of 
how many bombs were in reserve and how quickly they could be produced.
63
  
The JCS, MLC, and AFSWAP, however, seem to have been less concerned with 
how many weapons were available, or could be made available, as they were with 
ensuring that the armed forces would receive all that existed and all that could be made. 
As time went on, and given Truman‘s resistance to the military‘s claimed authority over 
custody of atomic weapons, and because the JCAE had demonstrated that it was 
unwilling to completely acquiesce to all the military‘s requests, cooperation among the 
branches and the departments created under the AEA and the NSA was essential. That 
cooperative relationship achieved even greater significance as a mechanism where 
wartime-like strategies of control, including the use of a national security imperative and 
deception, were reinforced. In one incident, Nichols, in his capacity as Chief of 
AFSWAP, wanted clarification from the JCS‘s General Alfred Gruenther, about the 
scope of his duties. Gruenther, who had been Eisenhower‘s Chief of Staff and who would 
become first Supreme Commander of NATO in Europe, and a man Time would praise in 
1956 as a ―soldier-statesman‖ who understood ―that no alliance is stronger than the will 
to support it,‖64 had mentioned within earshot of Nichols that no plans should be made 
for the use of atomic weapons. When Nichols met with him to tell him that was what he 
had been doing and to ask if he should stop, Gruenther said ―No, it just means that I‘m 
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warning you that you are violating a presidential decree.‖65 Because of his intimacy with 
the Manhattan Project, the nature of the AEA, and his role in the newly-created Military 
Establishment, Nichols was undoubtedly aware that what he had been doing went against 
Truman‘s order. Whether Truman was aware of how irrelevant his order had become is 
impossible to say. It is interesting to consider, however, that while Truman was so keen 
to prevent communists from subverting the U.S. government, he failed to look over his 
shoulder at those military officers whose loyalty he took for granted. For Gruenther and 
Nichols, fealty did not extend beyond the Military Establishment, certainly not up to the 
Commander-in-Chief. In 1948, it was the alliance among officers seeking control of 
atomic weapons and resources that mattered.  
Officers who remained unwilling to concede that they could not have all the atom 
bombs that they wanted unrelentingly pressed for expanded production. As head of 
AFSWAP, Nichols actively promoted dependence on atomic weapons to the JCS and 
other upper echelon officers. Nichols owed his appointment to his experiences as 
Groves‘s chief assistant on the Manhattan Project, and those experiences seem to have 
given him a measure of respect among upper echelon officers that he might not have 
received otherwise. And, in the eyes of the JCS and other upper echelon officers who 
had, for the most part, little familiarity with anything to do with the Manhattan Project 
except for its bombs, Nichols‘s advice about atom bombs seems to have been taken at 
face value and little scrutinized. During the first few months of 1949, while officers from 
all branches testified at House and Senate committee hearings—at least sixty-six 
appearances in the first half of 1949 alone—Nichols was lobbying the JCS, and General 
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Gruenther in particular, to place more emphasis on atomic weapons.
66
 Nichols recalled 
that he met with Gruenther to explain that the atomic program needed to be expanded to 
provide for more weapons. To do so, he ―marshal[led] all the arguments for such an 
expansion‖ and told him that despite the public impression, ―atomic weapons were the 
cheapest form of defense which you could think of.‖67 By all accounts, Nichols had no 
experience with the costs of other forms of defense or, given the no-holds-barred expense 
policy that governed the Manhattan Project, did he have much information about the 
costs of atomic weapons. It is impossible to know whether Nichols‘s advice carried the 
weight with Gruenther and other members of the upper echelon that he thought it did, or 
whether Nichols gave the sort of advice that they wanted to hear. In either case, Groves‘s 
go-to guy became the one that the JCS went to. In March 1949 Nichols reported to the 
JCS that the AEC and the MLC had a reached a compromise on the numbers of weapons 
to be produced. After Nichols had delivered the agreement for JCS approval, General 
Gruenther summoned him to appear at a meeting of the JCS. In his telling: 
that was the first Joint Chiefs of Staff meeting I ever was present at, and 
General Eisenhower more of less took me apart, because he said ―Here is a 
paper in which you ask me to sign that we‘re satisfied with weapon 
production. You convinced me a short time ago that we shouldn‘t be.‖ 
   I told him, ―This has been in preparation for about a month, and is the 
result of negotiations, and is the best we could do.‖ 
   He said he would never be satisfied with anything going over his 
signature which indicated he was satisfied with the present rate of 
production. He said ―Go back and change the letter and come back here in 
half an hour with a revised version of it,‖ which I did, and called the Navy 
representative and the Air Force, and there of course was no argument. So 
it was re-submitted and changed to where that was the first formal letter 
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that went from the Department of Defense to the AEC that the military 
were unhappy with the rate of production and asking for an expansion.
68
 
 
Through force of personality, in this instance Nichols‘s; through a concept of entitlement 
based in a national security imperative and the casual way that armed forces officers 
disregarded civilian leadership or priorities, the Manhattan Project‘s influence on the 
peacetime program and on the peacetime military is unmistakable.  
Officers making demands for increased production of weapons and for custody of 
the stockpile did so forthrightly, asserting their needs with little nuance or, as is clear, 
with little need for establishing a set of strategic requirements, and with none of the 
deliberation and thoughtfulness that they employed in propagating, as Navy officers did 
at Crossroads, a contradictory set of notions about the dangers of atomic detonations and 
the safety of experimenting with atomic weapons. Military officers used wartime 
strategies of control to ensure that elected officials and the American public learned just 
enough about atom bombs to support increasing defense expenditures but not enough to 
prevent experimentation that could be used to generate support for the militarization of 
the program and, through publicity, generate additional political support for military 
expansion. 
Media Manipulation 
The last thing that the Joint Chiefs of Staff wanted publicized was that Operation 
Crossroads had backfired—that the radioactivity unleashed by the ―Able‖ and ―Baker‖ 
bombs in Bikini lagoon proved too much for even the U.S. military to master. Though 
control of information and reporters‘ movements had been the norm throughout the 
planning and implementation of Operation Crossroads, the need for managing 
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information became even more important after the maneuver, when military officers 
realized that the civilian authority of the AEC stood between them and atomic resources 
and expertise. To overcome that hurdle and to amass and experiment with atom bombs, 
they needed to find a way to negotiate through or around the AEC and the elected 
officials that supported its peacetime mission. During this time, the military erected, as 
Groves had during the war, barriers to the public flow of information about atomic 
weapons. This change in the way the military used the media occurred as military officers 
were revising their strategies for gaining control over atomic resources in light of their 
growing support among Truman‘s congressional critics and international events. A brief 
re-visiting of the end of Crossroads will provide orientation for what followed. Evidence 
in the last section showed that the military learned lessons from Crossroads about the 
value of weapons testing to generate favorable publicity that proved useful once 
continental testing was approved in the early 1950s. After Crossroads and the passage of 
the AEA, the JCS became more involved in the process of coordinating publicity about 
atomic weapons in a deliberate move to prevent the inadvertent release of information 
within or without government circles that might have jeopardized the military‘s ability to 
manage the atomic weapons testing program in the future.  
One way this was accomplished was through a review process whereby the JCS 
followed up on the AEC‘s clearance for publication process. Where the AEC passed 
judgment on what and what could not be published about atomic weapons based, in part, 
upon what had already been released through the Smyth Report and other sources, as well 
as on those technical matters that could be militarily useful, the JCS took an umbrella 
approach to its review, evaluating what it considered to be the national security 
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implications of a proposed article or manuscript. In an outgrowth of the Manhattan 
Project‘s policies for publication, and before passage of the NSA, authors submitted 
articles and manuscripts to the AEC for review prior to publication to prevent the release 
of classified information. After passage of the NSA, the AEC forwarded material that it 
had already cleared to the JCS for its impressions and as a safeguard against the 
possibility that AEC personnel might unintentionally approve the release of information 
that could have jeopardized national security. In theory, this practice made perfect sense 
from a national security standpoint. In practice, however, it gave the JCS an opportunity 
to defend not only national security, but its own interests in (a) presenting a uniform 
position on behalf of the armed forces and atomic weapons, and (b) preventing material 
that operated against that uniform position from appearing in print. An example of the 
way that the JCS used its authority to restrict publication as a means of subduing and 
reconciling competition and animosity between the branches occurred in mid-December 
1948. Rear Admiral Parsons, who served under Admiral King, the former leader of the 
ordnance division at Manhattan who had overseen the fabrication of the Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki bombs as well as the modifications and arrangements for delivery, wrote an 
article about the atom bomb and its effects for the Saturday Evening Post. In it, Parsons 
sought to dispel fears about atom bombs and their effects, to explain that the weapon was 
not altogether different from other weapons of war, and that should war break out, it 
would be only one of many resources put forward to win battles. Parsons received 
clearance to publish his article from the Secretary of Defense‘s Office of Public 
Information as well as the AEC and completed his final version on December 12. 
Something in the article, however, drew the attention of Forrestal, then Secretary of 
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Defense, and on December 14, he directed that a memo be attached to the Parson‘s article 
and had the package delivered to Major General Gruenther, then Chief of the JCS, asking 
it to be re-reviewed ―for clearance on policy‖ prior to that week‘s Post deadline. The JCS 
blocked Parson‘s article until well after the deadline, declassifying it only in 1976.69  
The history of military control of atomic information in the months following 
Crossroads establishes that, for military officers, the primary obstacle to routine military 
experimentation was not the hazards of experimentation, but the psychological mindset of 
those who opposed it. It was not hazards, but ―hysteria,‖ that was the problem. The term 
gained currency among the upper echelon during Consolidation, some of whom 
proposed, as had General J.E. Hull, that the public needed to be re-educated if the 
military were to be allowed to test weapons routinely. One way to begin doing this was to 
withdraw from the limelight and to downplay the dangers of atomic experimentation. In 
1948, while plans were underway for Sandstone, another round of atomic testing in the 
Pacific, Hull agreed with the AEC that the tests should be held secretly, but did so for a 
different reason than national security. Hull argued that it was best to abstain from media 
coverage because Americans‘ fear of atom bombs had been inflamed to such an extent 
that they were counterproductive to the military‘s goal of achieving approval for routine 
experimentation at a convenient, continental, testing site. The serialization and 
publication of John Hersey‘s Hiroshima had given Americans a better picture of the 
tragedy of atomic warfare and memories of the media coverage of Crossroads and David 
Bradley‘s recently-published No Place to Hide had given Americans a better sense of 
what the consequences of peacetime military experimentation might be. Hull thought it 
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best to let those memories to fade in the interests of achieving a larger goal. He said that 
the policy of citing radiation hazards to justify the enormous expense of Pacific testing 
had been counterproductive: it had engendered what he called a ―hysterical … alarmist 
complex‖ that effectively prohibited the creation of a continental testing site. De-
emphasizing the health risks, however, would accustom the public to ―the possibility of 
an atomic explosion within … a hundred or so miles of their homes‖ and the Army could 
then, with less expense and inconvenience, test weapons in the United States.
70
 Hull 
carried the same line of argument into the summary that he wrote as Commander of Joint 
Task Force Seven following the Sandstone tests. There, he skirted the hazards of 
experimentation, reinforced the sense of armed forces‘ officers that the AEC‘s purpose 
was to produce weapons, and blamed the AEC‘s demands for absolute secrecy for the 
expense and inconvenience incurred with Pacific testing.  
One of the most serious responsibilities and one which posed some of the 
more difficult problems was the requirement for secrecy and security.  
It is hoped that full scale experiments with atomic weapons may become 
routine and commonplace. Much of the difficulty in the 1948 program lay 
in the exacting requirement for secrecy which was posed by fear of 
international reaction, which might be caused by focusing attention upon 
the fact that the United States was embarked on a program to develop (sic) 
and produce atomic weapons. Quite patently in the Atomic Energy Act of 
1946 the Commission is directed to do just that. Yet, within the 
Commission itself, to a greater extent in the State Department, and to 
some extent in the National Military Establishment, there was 
considerable reluctance to conduct proof-testing under any but the most 
secret conditions.
71
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The pull back from publicity during that time also made domestic political sense for 
military officers who were already benefiting from the work their congressional 
supporters were doing to whittle away at Truman by attacking the civilian administration 
of the AEC, fueling anti-communism and ruthlessly attacking the loyalty of military 
nemesis Lilienthal. Changes in public opinion reflected in polls taken in 1946 and in 
1949 suggest that fear of communism was increasing and that the public becoming more 
willing to combat communism, through the use of force, if necessary. Additionally, 70 
percent of Americans had come to disapprove of the ―no first strike‖ policy about atom 
bombs. It is impossible to re-capture all of the forces that went into that change of heart, 
but the military‘s ―re-education‖ campaign was certainly among them.72  
But the military had been engaged in ―re-educating‖ the public long before Hull 
articulated his plan, and at least since Forrestal had begun promulgating anti-Soviet 
treatises and submitting them to media contacts, and since Groves‘s hand-picked New 
York Times reporter began publishing the official Manhattan history. Controlling 
reporters‘ movements during Crossroads was one way that that the military officers, 
particularly the Navy brass, had contrived to shape the public‘s thinking about atom 
bombs and experimentation. After it was over, Army and Navy officers continued to 
mold what the public learned about it, downplaying the extent of radioactive 
contamination that had caused the cancellation of a third detonation and the evacuation of 
Bikini. And, after the passage of the NSA, the JCS and the MLC blocked the release of 
any information that might have jeopardized the military‘s chances of securing all the 
authority it wanted over atomic weapons and experimentation.  
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The following discussion demonstrates that the knowledge about radioactive 
hazards was well developed as a result of investigation after the bombings in Japan and at 
Bikini, that the military suppressed and sometimes molded that information to suit its 
own interests and ambitions for atomic science, and suggests that by actively 
manipulating the media and selectively restricting the flow of information about 
radioactive hazards, the military was at least partly responsible for the philosophical shift 
in the approach to warfare that prompted 70 percent of Americans polled to approve of a 
first strike policy. More importantly, however, it helps to explain why Truman ultimately 
bargained away his refusal to permit continental testing and approved the creation of the 
Nevada Proving Ground and why there was no public or political outcry against that 
decision.  
In at least one instance, the dis/mis-information campaign was so effective that 
some officers may themselves have come to believe that atom bombs, at least those that 
would be detonated by the U.S., were relatively insignificant. During a 1949 budget fight, 
Navy officers demanded to appear before the House Armed Services Committee to argue 
for more resources and to combat the notion embedded in Secretary of Defense Louis 
Johnson‘s budgetary requests that bombers and atom bombs provided an economic 
solution to escalating military budgets. In an appeal aimed at diminishing the Air Force‘s 
importance by discrediting strategic air initiatives and indiscriminate bombing, Navy 
Commander Eugene Tatum claimed that, ―contrary to popular opinion,‖ the atom bomb 
was not very efficient at wholesale destruction. In fact, he continued,  
You could stand in the open end of the north-south runway at Washington 
National Airport, with no more protection than the clothes you now have 
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on, and have an atom bomb explode at the other end of the runway 
without serious injury to you.
73
 
 
Tatum‘s primary goal was to discount the effectiveness of the Air Force and its bombers 
while lobbying for additional resources for the Navy‘s carriers and air wing, and thus it 
seems reasonable to believe those present and those who read about his testimony in the 
newspapers took that goal into account when deciding about the credibility of his 
hyperbole. Nevertheless, it is more reasonable to expect that the committee and the public 
took his statements about the effects of atom bomb detonations seriously than it is to 
assume that they discounted them entirely. Tatum was, after all, a high ranking Navy 
officer whose testimony carried the weight of his rank and was given under the authority 
of Admiral Radford, Commander of the Pacific Fleet. Moreover, with so much money 
having been spent on the Crossroads and Sandstone experiments, it is likely that 
committee members and that segment of the public who read or heard about his 
testimony considered that his claims were based, at least in part, on information gleaned 
from those atomic experiments carried out in the Pacific.  
As with other information that bore on the consequences of atom bomb 
detonations, the press, and thus the public, had no way of knowing that within the 
administration, Tatum‘s understanding about atom bomb effects was being called 
―laughable.‖ In a letter to Clark Clifford, the Secretary of the Air Force, W. Stuart 
Symington, passed on a statement from a source he called an ―intelligent man‖ that 
portrayed Radford as a ―brilliant‖ but dangerous renegade. According to the source, 
Radford possessed a ―pigheaded insistence upon the rightness of his own intuition,‖ a 
trait that caused him to reject ―professional help‖ in preparation for the hearings and, as a 
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result, had culminated in the ―laughable and devastating episode‖ about the ―A-bomb on 
the National Airport runway.‖ The letter made its way to Clark Clifford and to Secretary 
of Defense Johnson, who indicated (according to Symington) that he would be 
forwarding it to President Truman.
74
 There is no indication that the administration took 
more than passing note of Tatum‘s misinformed opinion about the atom bomb. And, 
although there was information about the bomb that the public would have been able to 
access that would have providing something of a corrective to Tatum‘s deceptive 
statement, no direct refutation of it emerged from an equally authoritative source. Instead, 
within the administration and among the other branches, the testimony became subsumed 
as a peripheral aspect of the defense budget debate and Tatum‘s misguided testimony 
stood. For officers and their supporters, the passive response to Tatum‘s testimony 
complemented an ongoing and active campaign to shape perceptions about atomic 
weapons and experimentation.  
The notion that atom bombs might not be as dangerous as the public had once 
believed was one that the military had cultivated since the immediate postwar period. 
One way the military did this was through the official history of Operation Crossroads. It 
reinforced the distorted image that emerged from the carefully controlled press coverage 
of Crossroads, containing primarily information that had already been revealed through 
press reports and media coverage of the event. What was new was Bombs at Bikini, the 
official history of the Operation and its aftermath.
75
 But, in relating the effects of 
radioactive contamination, the author did no more than meet the military‘s objective to 
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walk the same fine line between generating fear and building confidence in military 
ingenuity. He emphasized those things that the military had correctly anticipated and 
minimally or vaguely addressed aspects of the Operation that had caught the military by 
surprise, fostering the notion that as far as the maneuvers and atomic weapons, the 
military had matters well in hand. For instance, the Navy had anticipated dangerous 
levels of radioactivity would be present in the lagoon after the shots, and so supplied test 
animals with abundant food and water. Such conscientious attention to detail meant that 
supplies had not been depleted by the time the vessels were safe enough to be re-boarded. 
And, as anticipated, signaled by the author with an ―of course,‖ the animals had ―suffered 
very little from shock … and none from heat or light.‖ Also, as had been expected, 
―radioactivity took a heavy toll. Some … animals died … even before the ships were 
reboarded. Many others died later.‖ Among the symptoms of radiation sickness were 
―general apathy, weakness, and tendency to develop secondary infections. But lest that 
information be too disturbing, the author provided reassuring upside: ―it should be 
remembered that radiation sickness is essentially painless.‖ To soothe the 41 percent of 
Americans who had opposed the use of animals at Crossroads, he reminded readers that 
animals do not suffer from ―mental anguish‖ and so they suffered minimally: it was ―a 
painless death.‖ These animals, he said to readers who would likely extrapolate 
information because of their own concerns about radioactive warfare, had provided 
―knowledge as to what dangers might confront men and what steps would minimize the 
injury.‖ The confession that the extent of radiation damage had been greater than 
expected was something that had already become general knowledge, and may have been 
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received as less important that the knowledge that, well, if atomic warfare did break out, 
one could at least be certain that they would not face a painful death.
76
   
The military‘s interest in telling its own story about Crossroads went hand-in-
hand with its concern to suppress information that might have jeopardized future 
weapons experiments. A year after his experiences at Crossroads, Stafford Warren wrote 
home to his wife Viola while on a trip to Washington, D.C. In a self-professed ―tizzy‖ he 
explained that he had been denied permission to publish the studies he had prepared from 
Crossroads data that evaluated the unpredictability of downwind radioactive 
contamination. They were, ―too scary to publish now and they agreed to a panel of 
psychologists, psychiatrists, and social scientists with war experience to study this 
problem so that the info could be put out without causing mass hysteria.‖ Warren 
continued: ―There is a great deal more interest in the east now than ever before and it has 
the Navy and Army worried that the ‗hysteria‘ will go in the wrong direction.‖77 The 
explanation that Warren received was disingenuous at best. At that time, the AEC had 
been seated for several months and was already in the process of educating the public 
about the peaceful uses of atomic energy. Moreover, opinion polls offer nothing to 
suggest that Americans were so anxious about atomic warfare that Warren‘s article about 
fallout would have provoked anything even remotely close to ―mass hysteria‖ in the 
public sphere. Given the record, it seems that if ―hysteria‖ was a problem at all, it was 
confined to those circles of the defense establishment that feared they would be restricted 
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from future weapons experiments and thus prevented from using atomic science as an 
instrument for political gain. As David Bradley recounted in No Place to Hide, a 
combination of secrecy and apathy had made the atom bomb an easy problem to ignore. 
In his words, the ―Bomb had failed to impress more than a few congenital pessimists with 
the full scope of its lethal potential.‖78 Warren‘s article might have disturbed the apparent 
ambivalence of the public, an ambivalence that played into the ambitions of the military 
who selectively restricted information flows to foster the sense that atom bombs were 
little different than other types of weapons. More important from the military‘s 
standpoint at that time, however, would have been the effect that Warren‘s article would 
have had on elected officials, and especially Truman, who had the final say over the use 
of atomic material for experimentation and who had refused the military‘s demands for a 
continental proving ground. This scenario is even more likely given that the JCS was 
aware of Truman‘s visceral response to the contents of the Evaluation Report. As 
important as the reasons why the military refused to allow Warren to publish his article 
was the effect that that decision had on the future of atomic experimentation. 
Warren‘s article included data demonstrating that radioactive fallout was a fickle 
phenomenon, unpredictable enough to render extrapolations based on notions of uniform 
dispersal meaningless. Predictions of what might constitute a safe experiment from a 
hazardous one was thus not something that Warren believed scientists, let alone military 
officers, could predict with any degree of accuracy. If published, Warren‘s findings 
would have made it more difficult for military officers and their supporters to secure 
authority for future testing and for control of atomic resources. It would, a little bit like 
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the radioactive fallout that Warren wrote about, ―go the wrong way‖ – into Congress and 
the White House.  
Prevented from publishing his article, Warren took a grass roots approach not 
unlike Lilienthal‘s and used public speaking engagements as educational forums. Prior to 
assuming his position as Dean of UCLA‘s medical school, Warren spoke to a variety of 
clubs and civic organizations. By his own estimate, he had delivered over fifty talks by 
the end of May 1947.
79
 Warren, like Lilienthal, kept whatever misgivings he might have 
had about the military and its goals for atomic science to himself. But, unlike some 
members of the newly-seated AEC who were interested in fostering support for peaceful 
development and educated public engagement, Warren was able to draw on personal 
experience in an effort to educate his listeners not only about the potential peaceful uses 
of atomic energy, but also with informed knowledge about what the use of atomic 
weapons—whether as instruments of war or in experimental circumstances—could do to 
people, animals, and the environment. In a draft of one such talk, Warren made explicit in 
a paragraph that he later crossed out that at least one of his goals was to prevent future 
weapons experimentation. Referring to Trinity and Crossroads, Warren said  
I am thoroughly convinced … perfectly satisfied … that there are not any land 
masses, certainly not on the North American continent, large enough to run a test 
safely. Well, we got by the Alamagordo test all right. We were shot with luck and 
if we had to do another one we might not be so fortunate. We might injure a large 
group of people.
80
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Warren provided his audiences with precisely the sort of vivid explanation of the 
effects of atom bombings and the consequences of radioactive contamination that was 
missing from the alarming, but nonetheless measured and depersonalized critique 
contained in the Final Report and in the Operation‘s official history. That said, Warren 
was no maverick. He remained mindful of security restrictions and edited drafts of his 
writing and comments made about the work of others reveals that he remained interested 
in preventing negative publicity about Manhattan or Crossroads.
81
 By applying what he 
had learned at Crossroads about the need for practical examples to educate non-
specialists, Warren illustrated his talks with slides and footage of Crossroads that the 
Navy had discarded; demonstrated the inconsistencies of detonations and radioactive 
fallout by breaking the ubiquitous biscuits or crackers served with meals during meetings 
and pointing out the variety in the size and dispersal of the crumbs; and delivered 
poignant stories of his experiences in Japan, all in an effort to convince his audiences that 
atomic experimentation was a hazardous business under even ideal situations and that 
atomic warfare must be avoided at all costs.
82
 Warren remained hopeful that knowledge 
would mobilize the electorate to press for peaceful applications for atomic energy: ―Can 
we not apply the lessons taught us … [to] … know more fully what disease is and 
…alleviate, if not eventually eliminate it,‖ and encouraged his audiences to support 
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diplomatic solutions or United Nations control over atomic energy to lessen the chances 
of atomic warfare.
83
 ―Instead of pouring so much money into inventing more efficient 
ways to kill people. ... Let us have peace and get about our peaceful affairs.‖84 After 
painting a disturbing scenario of an atomic Armageddon for one audience, Warren 
concluded hopefully that ―if we can settle this matter of war … then we‘ve got a 
wonderful opportunity to advance knowledge particularly in the medical field.‖85 Though 
the optimism that Warren repeatedly expressed through 1947-1948 about the possibilities 
of regulating atomic weapons and the creation of an international organization to control 
atomic material might seem in hindsight to have been overly hopeful given the 
conventional portrayal of this period as one of rapidly mounting antagonisms, he was not 
engaging in groundless wishful thinking. As one historian pointed out, those enmeshed in 
diplomatic circles at the time remained hopeful that negotiations between the U.S. and 
the U.S.S.R. would be successful.
86
 Warren‘s talks also provide a means of evaluating the 
differences between the official version of Operation Crossroads—information approved 
by military officers for release—and some of the facts as told later by Warren, the 
Operation‘s Chief Radiological Safety Officer.  
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At Bikini, as Warren later explained, recognition of the hazards of radioactivity 
varied depending on education and expertise but it took material evidence to impress 
anyone other than scientists or technicians. Geiger counters provided the technicians and 
scientists with information about radioactivity‘s insidiousness; admirals gained a sense of 
the consequences of that insidiousness when shown a fish photographically reproduce 
itself or upon learning that a pair of under shorts, worn three weeks after the ―Baker‖ 
blast by a man who boarded a ship anchored a mile and a half from the location of the 
detonation that had been, as Warren said, ―beautifully laundered,‖ were condemned 
because they still contained enough radioactive material to cause skin damage.
87
 For 
ordinary sailors, evidence of radioactive hazard appeared in the form of exposed and 
dying fish. They watched as little reef fishes began turning up on the surface of the ocean 
looking ―weak and wobbly‖ two weeks after the bomb blast, a fate that befell the larger 
predators, barracuda and basses, in another two weeks.
88
 In comparison, the official 
account emphasized that fish had been killed because of the blast, but few had died 
because of radioactivity. ―A large number of fish were killed in the corner of the lagoon 
where the explosion occurred. Elsewhere in the lagoon the fish survived, and outside the 
atoll the fish were practically unaffected by either the explosion or the subsequent 
radiological effects.‖ More might have been learned, the author admitted, but 
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―unfortunately‖ that knowledge was lost when the ship carrying 40,000 fish from the atoll 
were nearly all lost when it ―went aground‖ south of San Francisco on its return voyage.89  
Unlike the shallow, sometimes optimistic, tone of the official history of 
Crossroads and the conclusions of the Evaluation Report, which lost some of their 
potency in the incomprehensibility of the magnitude of the portended disasters and 
became sterile on the written page, Warren brought the hazards of atomic weapons to life. 
He drew his examples from personal experience and presented them in a way that made 
them meaningful for his audiences. Speaking to scientific professionals, Warren 
compared the detonation of an atom bomb to Krakatoa, a 1883 volcanic eruption that 
they likely would have learned about in science class, reminding them that volcanic 
residue fell as far away as Norway and the Cape of Good Hope and explaining that the 
Trinity cloud‘s height was similar. This comparison allowed his audience to imagine that 
under similar atmospheric circumstances, the dispersal of Trinity‘s radioactive residue 
might have traveled as far as ash from Krakatoa. Warren explained that Trinity did not 
darken skies and color sunsets because fallout was not as widely dispersed. Yet, that 
―small bomb‖ was enough to cause cattle ―50 to 100 miles away in Alamagordo‖ to lose 
their hair. The fallout proved to be as unpredictable in its dispersal as it was hazardous: 
―they happened to be in a place just right for the fallout. It was an accident that they 
didn‘t have more; it was an accident that it happened to hit right there. It could have hit 
anywhere, but that is the kind of thing I‘m talking about.‖90 Warren helped that audience 
understand the effects of experimentally produced radioactivity across space and time, 
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and used an example from Nagasaki to engender a sense within his audience of the 
helplessness felt by medical professionals left to deal with the aftermath of an atomic 
attack. At the medical school in Nagasaki, a building that was designed to be earthquake 
proof by American architects and that Warren said ―wasn‘t too different from this or any 
other medical school,‖ only five survived out of the faculty of fifty, and three died soon 
thereafter. The survivors had ―no memory of what actually went on; they just remember 
that something happened. There was a flash, and several hours later they came to 
themselves working on patients in front of the [destroyed] hospital.‖ Warren wanted the 
people in his audience to gain a sense of what an atom bomb meant on the personal level. 
On his first visit to the ruined medical school, Warren said, at the top of the stairs lie  
the charred remains of what looked like either a Japanese girl technician or 
a nurse or a woman medical student. … I passed her body for the next 
three days, and on the fourth day it was replaced by a little pile of plaster 
with some Japanese writing on it, a little gravestick with her name and 
Japanese characters indicating her family origin and some other things (the 
interpreter wouldn‘t completely translate them for me), and then a little 
potted plant with two narcissus flowers.
91
   
 
What becomes clear from this period in the nation‘s atomic history is that military 
officers prevented the dissemination of information that Truman and members of the 
JCAE could have used to inform themselves more thoroughly of the more dangerous 
aspects of atmospheric atomic weapons experiments. It cannot be known whether or to 
what extent Truman or congressional leaders would have taken note of the types of vivid 
explanations Warren provided to attendees at his talks, or whether they would have been 
influenced by that same information. What we do know is that the military, and for 
reasons that they admitted were anchored in their effort to prevent a ―hysterical‖ reaction 
and that had nothing to do with national security, refused to allow Warren to publish his 
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article about fallout. What is also known is that military officers made repeated requests 
to the president to approve a continental testing site, a location that would allow the 
military to test weapons at far less expense and inconvenience that the Pacific Proving 
Ground that they employed for the 1948 Sandstone atmospheric tests. For his part, 
Truman—routinely reminded of the hazards of experimentation by Lilienthal—refused 
throughout the 1940s to grant the military‘s request. All of this supports the assumption 
that it was not the general public, but Truman and other elected officials, that the military 
was thinking of when it rejected Warren‘s request to publish his article. And, although 
the timing of Truman‘s decisions to embark upon a program for H-bomb development 
and his subsequent approval for the establishment of the Nevada Proving Ground, 
coming as they did on the heels of the Soviet‘s first atomic detonation and with 
Communism gaining ground abroad, has left the impression that they were national 
security imperatives, those decisions were politically motivated ones and were easier to 
reach because military officers and their supporters had been so successful in preventing 
Warren, and others, from explaining the hazards of atomic weapons and atomic 
experimentation. 
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PART TWO 
 
ATOMIC GOVERNANCE 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
POLITICAL CALCULATIONS 
By early 1949, the military and its supporters had nearly extinguished meaningful civilian 
control over the atomic program. Officers had parlayed their partnership with influential 
members of Congress into increased appropriations and influence in the public sphere 
while increasing their power base behind the scenes. While exploiting international crises 
such as the Berlin Blockade, military officers had benefited from the organizational 
acumen of Manhattan‘s old guard and the friendship and support of Forrestal‘s acolyte 
and AEC Commissioner, Lewis Strauss. At every stage in this process, wartime expertise 
and strategies of control gave military officers an edge against those who sought to limit 
the military‘s influence, but especially against Lilienthal and others who believed that the 
atomic program required meaningful civilian control and who worked to restrain military 
influence. Officers and their supporters had used national security arguments to 
commandeer the bulk of atomic resources for weapons development and employed 
atomic secrecy to control what elected officials and the public learned about radioactive 
hazards and the dangers of experimentation. Thus, they had not only ensured that they 
would receive an enlarging stockpile of weapons for experimental—and demonstration—
purposes, but had also reduced the chances that safety would be used as a reason to 
prohibit or limit future experiments. The militarization of the program was an 
incremental process of increasing authority and autonomy. The military and its supporters 
steadily increased their influence over the administration as Truman acquiesced to the 
upper echelon and their congressional supporters. This steadily winnowed the 
administration‘s options to those that the military favored. Militarization operated both up 
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and down the chain of command: even as it affected executive-level decision- and policy-
making, it influenced the operational conduct of atmospheric weapons testing. One sign 
that militarization of the program had affected the Truman administration‘s ability to 
govern was Truman‘s decision to develop an H-bomb—a choice that in hindsight seems 
to have been unavoidable. At the time, however, some people, including members of the 
upper echelon, advisors with the State Department, and AEC scientists, believed it made 
little diplomatic, strategic, or economic sense.  
The Soviets‘ first successful atom bomb detonation in August 1949, ―Joe One,‖ 
provided military officers and their supporters with an additional reason to discredit the 
Truman administration and to argue for additional increases in military budgets, the 
atomic arsenal, and authority. Truman‘s response to the Soviets accomplishment came in 
January 1950 with a decision that the U.S. would embark on developing The Super—a 
hydrogen bomb. From a Cold War perspective, and to participants as well, the event 
appears to have been a transformative moment in post-war history and domestic security 
policy, one that led to an escalation of atomic weapons development and locked the U.S. 
and U.S.S.R. into a costly and drawn out arms race.
1
 Truman had no choice except to 
respond; but he could have chosen options other than an H-bomb. Two precipitating 
factors help to explain why he discarded more moderate responses to the Soviets‘ 
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success: (a) Truman‘s desire to recover lost political influence; and, (b) the power 
military officers and Manhattan veterans had amassed to steer executive policymaking. 
The decision was, in fact, yet another in the string of concessions that Truman 
made to the military and its congressional supporters in efforts to revive his political 
standing. The circumstances surrounding the H-bomb decision demonstrate that Truman 
had already ceded so much authority to the upper echelon that they were able to set the 
conditions under which it could be made. Months before he issued his announcement 
and, before the Soviets detonated Joe One, Manhattan veterans and their supporters inside 
the administration and in the private sector were actively organizing support for an H-
bomb program. And more generally, by the Spring of 1949, the military and its 
supporters were leveraging their substantial political clout in Congress and among 
administration advisors to shape national security policy. In this analysis, the H-bomb 
decision was not indicative of a move toward militarization, but evidence that it had 
already occurred. By the time Truman made his decision, Atomic Governance—a shift in 
constitutional prerogatives brought about by the militarization of the nation‘s atomic 
program and an expansion of military influence that limited the ability of elected officials 
to exercise their constitutional prerogatives—had already taken root. Truman‘s decision 
to proceed with H-bomb development allowed it to branch out.  
The H-bomb decision was part of the trajectory of increasing militarization and 
instrumental use of the program for a range of domestic political and institutional 
purposes that began in the aftermath of World War II. Institutionally, the decision can be 
traced back to Norris Bradbury who viewed H-bomb development as a lifeline to 
continued military support for the Los Alamos Lab, through the encouragement that the 
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Los Alamos initiative gave to officers such as General Hull who sought to use routine 
experimentation as a vehicle for increased military appropriations and authority, and to 
the Sandstone series of atmospheric tests. As a manifestation of the upper echelon‘s 
organizational capacity, it can also be traced back to the integration of Manhattan 
veterans into the defense establishment and into the AEC, where they wielded influence 
over JCS decision-making and helped AEC Commissioner Strauss promote Forrestal‘s 
vision for a mobilized America.
2
 Truman‘s H-bomb announcement did not provoke 
mobilization. Instead, it lent authorizational force to the pattern of expansion and 
militarization of the atomic program that began at war‘s end and that gathered steam in 
early 1949, when Truman began bargaining away executive authority to placate the 
military and its congressional supporters in an effort to preserve and perhaps to generate 
political capital for a future that still included a possible bid for re-election in 1952.
3
 
From this perspective, the announcement amounted to a ceremonial transfer of power 
over the atomic program and its resources to the military and its supporters, making 
official (and public) a transfer that had for all practical purposes occurred well before the 
detonation of ―Joe One.‖  
It was, nonetheless, critical. The announcement gave the military and their 
supporters the green light to: (a) wield publicly the authority over atomic science that 
they had administratively achieved after passage of the AEA and the NSA; (b) justify the 
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routine exploitation of the atomic program for domestic political purposes, and (c) use 
their policymaking influence to increase military authority and autonomy to even higher 
levels. Another consequence of the decision was Lilienthal‘s resignation and the 
solidification of a partnership between the Chairman Gordon Dean‘s AEC and the 
military. The primacy of military-specific goals to the AEC meant that it abandoned its 
duty as a civilian guardian of atomic science, becoming wholly supportive and protective 
of the military‘s interests against the suppression of military autonomy over atomic 
science and against any limitation on appropriations or experimentation. During the 
Truman administration, the AEC/military partnership promoted the creation of a 
continental weapons testing facility in Nevada and fostered excessively hazardous testing 
practices in Nevada and in the Pacific. During the Eisenhower administration, the 
partnership grew stronger as Lewis Strauss, appointed by Eisenhower to serve as 
Chairman of the AEC on June 24, 1953, used his cabinet level position to promote 
military experimentation against diplomatic forces that might have limited it. Strauss 
undermined diplomacy by interfering with negotiators working to end, or slow, the 
nuclear arms race; purposefully prolonging atmospheric weapons experimentation and 
increasing its economic and environmental costs. 
The centrality of atmospheric nuclear testing to this process and the conflation of 
military strategy with national policy that began in 1949 and continued until the 1958 
moratorium—the era of Atomic Governance—is the subject of this chapter. The first 
section examines the relationship between military consolidation and Truman‘s political 
dilemmas and shows how both gave rise to Atomic Governance and the H-bomb 
initiative. The second section discusses the affect of Atomic Governance over AEC 
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leadership and priorities. It focuses on Lilienthal‘s successor, Gordon Dean, and his use 
of wartime strategies of control to secure Truman‘s approval for the creation of the 
Nevada Test Site for the purpose of conducting atmospheric weapons tests.  
Decision-making and the H-bomb 
Understanding Truman‘s January 1950 H-bomb decision becomes clearer when 
studied in light of the domestic context from which it emerged, particularly the political 
challenges the administration faced in 1949 and the relationship between Truman‘s 
political dilemmas and the militarization of the atomic program. This study points to 
three interrelated factors that contributed to creating the conditions for the H-bomb 
decision: the ascendance of Dean Acheson to Secretary of State; the power of Manhattan 
veterans within the administration; and Lilienthal‘s diminishing influence. It examines 
the domestic motivations that drove the decision by putting some flesh on Acheson‘s 
admission that politics factored into the H-bomb decision. In his words, he could not ―see 
how any president could survive a policy of not making the H-bomb.‖4 It also re-
evaluates Acheson‘s role in the decision-making process, suggesting that he took the lead 
in that decision and shaped the terms of the deliberations to ensure that Truman would 
choose the one path that he believed held the most political bang for the buck.  
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The decision was to a large extent the product of the influence Manhattan 
veterans wielded within the Truman administration; the status Groves and Nichols 
enjoyed among influential affiliates of the atomic program and Truman‘s congressional 
detractors; and, their ability to serve as an organizational nexus for H-bomb supporters. 
Groves and Nichols, with the backing of Strauss and his friend E.O. Lawrence, creator of 
the cyclotron and Director of the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, promoted The Super 
as a means of expanding the atomic program and reinforcing the military‘s authority over 
it. Discussions about the project made allies of the competing laboratories. As with 
Bradbury‘s 1945 suggestion that Los Alamos scientists pursue H-bomb development, 
Lawrence had professional and institutional reasons for supporting the program. The 
significant difference between the two men, however, was that while Bradbury believed 
The Super was probably a practical impossibility, Lawrence agreed with his scientific 
superstar, Edward Teller, that the only thing standing between theoretical and actual 
development was a commitment of resources and manpower. For Strauss‘s part, (and 
perhaps also for Groves, Nichols, and Lawrence as well) the issue seems to have been so 
intimately tied to a military course of action—to the strengthening the military‘s authority 
over the program and its resources—that he failed to notice H-bomb proponents had 
gained an important civilian ally. Strauss stridently lobbied congressmen and among his 
supporters in the private sector apparently unaware that Acheson, in a bow to the political 
influence Manhattan veterans wielded and the interest in the project they had generated 
among Truman‘s congressional opponents, was in their corner. As Gordon Arneson, one 
of Truman‘s long-time atomic energy advisors and then State Department assistant 
recalled, Strauss was ―running around town and around the country drumming up 
348 
 
support‖ for the H-bomb. ―It was very strange. ... He was getting all the support he could 
find. It never occurred to him to talk to anybody at the State Department.‖ Arneson 
indicated that Acheson‘s support for the H-bomb was such an open secret that he was 
surprised Strauss was not in on it. Arneson could only surmise that Strauss must have 
―figured Acheson might be against it.‖5 By the winter of 1949, the sense that Acheson 
and Truman had come to the conclusion that pursuing an H-bomb project was the only 
way to avoid political suicide was due in large measure to Groves and Nichols, whose 
interest in militarizing the program and organizational talents contributed to turning a 
theoretical possibility—the H-bomb—into a political cause célèbre.  
Their success at generating political support behind the concept of the world‘s 
most powerful weapon created another obstacle. The JCS, long opposed to the program 
as one that had no military utility and that would drain resources away from what they 
viewed as the more important task of building bombs to stock the arsenal and for 
experimentation (demonstration) purposes, withheld their approval.
6
 Thus, before 
Truman could order the AEC to pursue development of an H-bomb (and reap whatever 
domestic political benefits he and Acheson expected to flow from that decision) and 
before Groves, Nichols, and Strauss could get an H-bomb program funded, they first had 
to overcome JCS opposition. Again, the expertise of Manhattan veterans was decisive. 
This task fell to Nichols. Using money as a bargaining chip, Nichols successfully 
persuaded the JCS that the H-bomb program would come at no expense to them. Once 
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reassured that H-bomb development would hinder neither military funding nor atom 
bomb and weapons production, the JCS dropped their opposition.
7
  
The point is not only that the military and Manhattan veterans were able to 
influence an administrative decision, but that their consolidated influence and authority 
was sufficient (a) to force Truman into making a decision that became one of the most 
consequential in Cold War history; and, (b) to receive the sort of budgetary assurances in 
advance of that decision necessary to persuade the JCS to drop their opposition to a 
program that had no known military purpose. By Fall 1949, when Truman was 
considering how to respond to the Soviet bomb—and arriving at a response that he 
believed would be politically advantageous—the JCS had already amassed enough 
authority to hold his plan of action hostage. Moreover, Manhattan veterans had achieved 
enough influence within government and over the program to be in a position to ransom 
it by satisfying the JCS that their own goals and ambitions would not be compromised in 
the process. The H-bomb decision was anchored in the domestic imperatives of 
Manhattan veterans and the atomic program; the military and its supporters; and Truman, 
who expected that by making it he would gain some room to maneuver out of the 
political corner that he had been squeezed into by military officers and their 
congressional supporters. Atomic Governance had already narrowed the options to one 
for the Truman Administration.  
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Johnson‖ January 13, 1959, FRUS, 1950 Vol. 1, 506.  
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On January 31, 1950, Truman announced that he had ordered an investigation to 
―determine the technical feasibility of a thermonuclear weapon.‖8 The decision had, in 
fact, long since been made. During the Manhattan Project, members of the theoretical 
division at Los Alamos began studying the possibility of a hydrogen weapon; they 
recorded their wartime progress so as not to lose momentum pending legislative 
settlement of the atomic program; and, after the seating of the first AEC, the theoretical 
division at Los Alamos divided their time equally between perfecting the atom, or fission, 
bomb and studies on the thermo-nuclear, or hydrogen, bomb.
9
 As Oppenheimer, 
Chairman of the AEC‘s General Advisory Committee (GAC) explained to Lilienthal, the 
GAC supported the program because the goal was not to make an H-bomb, but to study 
thermo-nuclear theoretic processes to improve atomic weapons.
10
 The JCS had also 
participated throughout this time, weighing the benefits of developing the H-bomb 
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against the reductions in A-bomb, or fission, weapons that development would entail.
11
 
Though initially unaware of the progress that had already been made on an H-bomb, 
Truman learned of that work sometime in October 1949 and thus knew that the decision 
he was making was primarily one to elevate H-bomb study to the level of a policy 
priority with the funding stream to achieve the task.
12
  
Though strategically justifiable as a means of countering the Soviets‘ first atomic 
success, it was also, for Truman and Dean Acheson, his Secretary of State and perhaps 
closest advisor and confidant, a political necessity.
13
 The Soviet‘s success seemed to 
validate the complaints of Truman‘s critics that his administration had not worked hard 
enough to seek out communists in government service and that his support of AEC 
Chairman Lilienthal and his policies had put the nation‘s atomic program at risk and 
jeopardized national security. As Herken wrote, ―Joe One‖ seemed to confirm the charges 
of Truman‘s critics, ―proving duplicity and even treason at high levels in government.‖14 
                                                 
11
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Though it was an event expected by people familiar with the program, scientists in 
government advisory positions and especially the GAC; by AEC Commissioner Strauss 
who had encouraged the development of a program for detecting atomic detonations and 
thus by the JCAE, the JCS and other military officials and advisors;
 15
 and by members of 
the Truman administration itself, the Soviet bomb shattered the status quo. Anticipating 
the certain negative response, Acheson recommended to Truman that he be the first to 
announce that the Soviets were in possession of an atom bomb.
16
 Acheson also likely 
believed that the administration could readily diffuse the criticism by recommending 
increased military funding and pursuit of The Super.  
Carrying out that object required Acheson to scuttle a number of possible 
alternatives. One would have been to wait. George Kennan, a respected analyst who had 
served under Secretary of State General George Marshall, wrote in 1948 that it might be 
possible to diffuse tensions between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. once the Soviets had 
developed their own atom bomb. He believed the Soviets likely would be more tractable 
during negotiations once they were no longer disadvantaged by the imbalance between 
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U.S./Soviet capabilities.
17
 Another option emerged from deliberations after Joe One—a 
recommendation to use the possibility of H-bomb as a bargaining tool, presenting the 
Soviets with the U.S.‘s plan to develop The Super on the chance that the Soviets would 
recognize the benefits of joining in a non-development agreement. But Acheson 
dismissed both of those options in the interests of political expediency. No alternative 
that involved diplomacy, however reasonable from a practical or foreign policy point of 
view, had the potential to give Truman the same punch that he needed to assert his 
authority and claim a decisive political victory as the H-bomb did. Officially, Truman 
based his decision on recommendations from Acheson, Secretary of Defense Johnson, 
and AEC Chairman Lilienthal, and an admission by all that it was possible that the 
Soviets were already developing the H-bomb and that, if they were, the U.S. was in 
danger of losing its nuclear edge.
18
   
It was, and still is, portrayed as the only practical course of action to emerge out 
of a number of other options that Truman or Acheson, or both, dismissed as unrealistic, 
idealistic, or unworkable. Then and now, the decision appears to have been both 
diplomatically and domestically a suitable course of action. It temporarily satisfied 
congressmen who had been arguing that Truman should focus more of his energies on 
meeting the communist threat as well as satisfying McMahon‘s insistent demands that 
The Super be made a priority,
19
 and conformed with the minority recommendations of 
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AEC commissioners Dean and Strauss. Of the AEC members, these were the two most 
closely aligned with Truman‘s congressional opponents, especially Senator McMahon. 
Along with the JCAE, McMahon was engaged almost daily from Truman‘s September 
23, 1949, announcement about the Soviet bomb gathering support among congressmen 
and with AEC contractors throughout the United States while pressing Truman for a 
decision to pursue H-bomb development.
20
 Additionally, the decision met with approval 
from the JCS once they had been assured that their funding would not be compromised 
by H-bomb expense, and it satisfied members of the National Security Council concerned 
with insuring that the U.S. retain its technological lead over the Soviet Union. And yet, a 
study of the mechanics, cost, and potential use of the H-bomb, including consideration of 
two possible sizes of bomb and an estimated cost of ―one to two hundred million dollars‖ 
for bomb material alone, left little doubt that at its value as a weapon would be 
negligible: 
The results are that production of the 65 square mile Super would give 
at best only relatively small increases [compared with an equivalent to 
fission bombs] in total or annual damage area, while production of the 
300 square mile Super would as much as double the total or annual 
damage area. There is of course the question as to whether there are 
enough 300 square mile targets to justify the larger Super. 
 
As an added complication, no studies had yet been conducted to determine how the bomb 
could be carried and delivered and thereby used as a weapon.
21
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Atomic Governance offers a strategy for answering a fundamental question about 
Truman‘s H-bomb decision: Why was it that Truman and Acheson decided that the only 
―practical‖ solution to the possibility that the Soviets would, or were already, developing 
an H-bomb that everyone agreed at the time was so large and complex that it would likely 
never be capable of being used as a weapon was for the U.S. to undertake a program that 
would result in it being developed? The motives for the decision were not diplomatically 
but politically strategic. The small pro-H-bomb lobby only carried weight because their 
solution was politically advantageous, unlike the larger number of advisors including 
Lilienthal, the majority of the AEC, and the members of the administration‘s General 
Advisory Committee who proposed alternatives to the development of a bomb that had 
no military application.  
Truman‘s decision to pursue H-bomb development was but one of a chain of 
reactive maneuvers he made to prevent falling deeper into the political pit that the 
military and its congressional supporters had dug for him. Each concession Truman made 
allowed the upper echelon to take another incremental step toward achieving the 
authority and autonomy that they had been seeking since the end of World War II. One of 
the most important factors that contributed to the dilemma Truman found himself in by 
1949 appears to have been his willingness to address political criticism with quick fix 
solutions without taking into account the longer-range consequences of those solutions; 
or, for that matter, without taking the time to frame them in such a way that they could 
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not be used against him. Truman‘s efforts to satisfy the military‘s budgetary demands 
illustrate this. As communists made gains overseas, Truman ratcheted up his budget 
requests and asked Congress for increased armed forces appropriations. He may have 
anticipated that the proposals he made would be considered insufficient, but it is just as 
likely that he expected this demonstrable attentiveness to national security threats to bring 
him some relief from criticism. Instead, Truman‘s opponents turned his recommendations 
for increasing defense budgets against him, as an acknowledgement that he had 
underestimated military needs and asked why he had failed to do more. In April 1948 
Truman presented Congress with a supplemental request to increase defense funding by 
$3 billion dollars, an amount that included $775 million for aircraft, components, and 
aviation research funding. Upon receiving it, the House Armed Services Committee 
recommended unanimously that Truman present another that would allow them to 
increase the Air Force‘s fifty-five groups to seventy.22 By August, the defense budget of 
$10.9 billion for 1949 that Truman proposed in January 1948 had grown to $54.3 
billion.
23
 For its part, the Defense Department announced that it would reduce 
unnecessary expenses. In October, Forrestal announced via a press release that he had 
ordered the armed forces to institute a pilot project to consolidate recruiting and public 
relations and to relocate some offices from rented to government-owned facilities. 
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According to Department spokesperson, the expected savings would amount to at least 
$172,582 a year in rental costs and another $125,000 saved in recruitment. With no 
reference to the combined armed forces budgets, these cost-saving measures may have 
appeared to be more impressive than the 0.000548 percent of military expenditure that 
they actually comprised. The release noted a final benefit: the news media would benefit 
from ―prompter, more convenient and more efficient service.‖ Besides the monetary 
savings, then, the project fit in with the emphasis on media promotion that was 
Forrestal‘s hallmark: It provided a means of streamlining—and a means for 
coordinating—the military‘s public relations efforts while also providing Forrestal with 
the opportunity to present himself as sympathetic to the economic purposes behind 
Truman‘s postwar plan for unification that Forrestal had opposed prior to passage of the 
NSA.  
More counterproductive to Truman‘s goals than his efforts to quell criticism 
through increases in military spending were his Loyalty Orders.
24
 From a civil service 
standpoint, these may have prevented some subversives from working for the federal 
government, but they did little to stifle anti-communist criticism and placed a heavy 
burden on investigative agencies. In two years, for example, the program resulted in over 
two million investigations of employees working in non-sensitive areas.
25
 As a means of 
quelling criticism about his anti-communist credentials, the program was a failure. As 
Jessica Wang has noted, his ―anti-communist foreign policy contributed to the generation 
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of a domestic anticommunist response.‖26 But they did more than fuel anti-communist 
rhetoric and nurture the seeds of McCarthyism.  
Truman‘s Loyalty Orders validated the attacks of his opponents and created the 
impression that communism in government service was endemic. In the end, the Orders 
contributed to undermining Lilienthal‘s authority as Chairman of the Atomic Energy 
Commission. Truman may have believed that there was simply no other way to deal with 
the possibility that communist, and especially atom, spies were occupying key 
government positions and to demonstrate to his critics that he was responsive to their 
concerns. But, by issuing the Orders, Truman shifted the focus of suspicion from forces 
outside government to those inside it. Before the Orders, it could have been realistically 
imagined that a handful of communists had, or were seeking to, infiltrate government, 
and perhaps even the atomic program. After, it became easier to envision as widespread 
communist contamination of all government agencies and bureaus. The Orders indicated 
that Truman himself had come to believe that communism was not a problem for 
government, but of governance. By September 1948, 74 percent of those responding to a 
national poll thought that the ―spy investigations‖ were productive and not ―just 
politics.‖27 Consequently, it became more difficult, if not impossible, for Truman to 
dismiss even the most outlandish anti-communist attacks as incidences of political 
grandstanding or exaggeration. It also made it more difficult for him to support 
Lilienthal, who had suffered the brunt of anti-communist criticism, without risking 
certain political backlash. To make matters worse, criticism and concern about 
communists in the State Department escalated in the wake Whittaker Chambers‘s 
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―Pumpkin Papers‖ revelation on December 2, 1948,—a month to the day after Truman 
won the presidential election. His January 1949 appointment of Dean Acheson to 
Secretary of State attracted even more controversy and he threw his energies into 
defending Acheson, leaving Lilienthal to face his critics alone. Among the by-products, 
then, of Truman‘s Loyalty Orders was the undermining of Lilienthal‘s authority and, with 
it, the undermining of meaningful civilian custody of the atomic program.  
Lilienthal, who had personified Truman‘s atomic policy and the principle of 
civilian control of atomic energy and who had been an easy target from the moment he 
was nominated, began in 1949 to lose the influence he had wielded in the administration. 
Part of Lilienthal‘s problem was that he had little with which he could defend himself. 
Meaningful and substantive responses would have required divulging atomic secrets, and 
Lilienthal‘s commitment to national security imperatives made it impossible for him to 
share with the public details of what he and the Commission had done to preserve and 
improve the military‘s atomic capability.28 The resulting double-standard meant that 
military officers and their supporters were able to pummel Lilienthal with vague and 
innuendo-laden attacks in the public sphere while Lilienthal was unable to respond 
publicly and effectively with details about the advances in military production and 
development that the AEC had made during his Chairmanship. Nor could Lilienthal 
anticipate or guard against congressional critics such as Iowa‘s Republican Senator 
Bourke B. Hickenlooper. Hickenlooper‘s statements about Lilienthal and his 
management of the program swung wildly from day to day, by turns praising the program 
and its record for loyalty as one that he believed could not be ―equaled among any other 
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group or class of people‖ only to follow that statement ten days later with a complaint 
that the program was plagued with ―incredible mismanagement.‖29  
With little more than general, unspecific, and unsatisfying responses to the 
complaints of his critics, Lilienthal did what he could to focus attention on the gains he 
could discuss: the civil, non-military and non-secret, advances in medical and industrial 
applications for atomic science. But, as important as they were, such technological 
milestones could only be described and imagined; they did not lend themselves to the 
dramatic earth-shattering, types of display that had become atomic science‘s stock in 
trade.
30
 Lilienthal dealt with this problem in a way that demonstrates he knew his only 
option carried the potential for misinterpretation. In a speech delivered to a gathering of 
radio executives that was broadcast on radio and television throughout the Northeast, 
Lilienthal mentioned—―cryptically,‖ according to New York Times reporter William L. 
Laurence—that ―we are improving [the atomic weapon] on top of a mesa in the 
mountains of New Mexico‖ and briefly mentioned tests planned for Eniwetok. Lilienthal 
adopted something of an apologetic tone about his inability to discuss that aspect of the 
program and sought to persuade his audience to pressure their elected officials for more 
information about atomic science. He stopped short of blaming the military and their 
congressional supporters for blocking the release of important facts about atomic science 
while encouraging them to insist on learning all that was known:  
The principal and perhaps the only hope for preventing the use of 
atomic energy for destruction on a scale that has not yet been 
disclosed is for peoples everywhere to come to understand the 
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atomic world; and to understand thereby the opportunities that lie 
before us to put this knowledge to uses beneficent and humane. … 
[A] vacuum of knowledge about the atom will be filled somehow. 
As time goes on it may be filled by utter indifference … by 
phantasy [sic], by illusions. Neither panic nor phantasy provides 
the basis for a world of peace and security.
31
 
 
He lent encouragement to those who might have believed that most of the important facts 
were already known, or those who believed the effort to learn more might be fruitlessly 
blocked by atomic secrecy, telling them progress had already been made: that people 
were becoming more informed, and that the ―nonsense‖ that atomic science was a 
military secret was ―about exploded.‖ For those in Lilienthal‘s immediate audience, and 
perhaps for many tuned in to the broadcast, this would have been interpreted as a strike 
across the bow to Forrestal, his congressional opponents, military officers, and others 
who advocated ―voluntary‖ censorship to protect atomic secrets.32 And, in what was 
perhaps an optimistic stretch at how successful he had been about delivering the message 
of peaceful applications for atomic science, Lilienthal added that people were also 
beginning to abandon the ―well cultivated fiction that atomic energy is a bomb and 
nothing else.‖33 Before 1949, however, Lilienthal‘s one advantage against the critics had 
not been the content of his speeches but Truman‘s support.  
The president‘s votes of confidence in his ability and management deflected at 
least some of the vile and vindictive criticism of him and, in the process, reinforced the 
principle of civilian authority that Lilienthal worked so hard to defend. By early 1949, 
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however, the campaign of criticism that military officers and their supporters launched in 
late 1946 was paying dividends: Truman‘s support of Lilienthal waned and the 
substantive sort of civilian authority over atomic energy that he had championed was 
slipping. Publicly, anti-communist rhetoric reached a crescendo and the fear of 
communist subversives had become pervasive enough to threaten not only civilian 
control of the atomic program, but the civil rights of American citizens and the principle 
of civilian leadership altogether. Between May 1948 and April 1949 the percentage of 
those polled favoring a law requiring members of the communist part to register with the 
Justice Department climbed from 77 percent to 83 percent; 87 percent reported that they 
believed that communists should be prevented from working in industries that would 
produce materials should war break out.
34
 The political cartoonist Herbert Block 
(―Herblock‖) tried to capture what was at stake. In June 1949 he published a cartoon of a 
man scaling a ladder propped against the arm of the Statue of Liberty. With ―hysteria‖ 
written on his thigh, the man carried a bucket of water to douse the flame, calling out a 
single word: ―Fire!‖35 Inside the administration, Truman‘s failure to protect Lilienthal 
against his anti-communist critics helped them to douse the last flicker of meaningful 
civilian control over atomic energy that Lilienthal had tended since his appointment.  
Lilienthal lost Truman‘s support at the very time that one of his most important 
civilian goals for the AEC—the education of industry professionals—was being put to 
the test. Lilienthal took a stand that the training of scientists should not be politicized, 
that AEC fellows should not be forced to undergo FBI background. He argued that the 
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investigations would erect an unnecessary bar on the ability of students to receive an 
education and would be counterproductive, driving good students into other fields and 
depriving the program and the nation of new talent. The hearings and the publicity 
surrounding background checks revealed how effective the military and congressional 
partnership had been in promoting acceptance of peacetime military authority. After the 
hearings, for example, a majority (38 percent) of people polled who had followed the 
hearings believed that the Army should assume control of the program compared to those 
(36 percent) who thought that the program should remain in civilian hands.
36
 Called to 
defend his policies for the granting of AEC fellowships in May 1949 Lilienthal confided 
in his journal that his opponents were closing ground: ―They feel they have me on the 
run, have tasted blood, and it will go on from here.‖37 Later, using a similarly grisly 
analogy, one of Truman‘s advisors pointed to the discrediting of Lilienthal as a reason for 
considering a complete overhaul of the atomic program. ―it is difficult to say publicly that 
Lilienthal has failed. However, the fact is that this thing behind walls of secrecy has 
ground up a good man … like raw meat.‖38 But secrecy had been an ongoing condition of 
Lilienthal‘s chairmanship, and thus was only part of the problem. Before 1949, Lilienthal 
had always come out whole in the grim battle of wills with Truman‘s congressional 
opponents. By the time of the controversy over AEC fellowship policies, it was not 
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secrecy, nor the intensity of congressional attacks, that weakened Lilienthal‘s ability to 
defend the principle of civilian control over the atomic program. Instead, it was the fact 
that Lilienthal‘s principles and those of meaningful civilian authority no longer coincided 
with Truman‘s political goals. 
In Spring 1949, Truman took advantage of the resignation of AEC Commissioner 
Bacher to mend political fences with his opponents in Congress. Ignoring Lilienthal‘s 
recommendations and over his objection, Truman appointed Gordon Dean. Dean had 
served as an assistant to Robert H. Jackson, the chief prosecutor for Nazi war criminals, 
had been among those who gathered evidence and negotiated the Allied charter, and had 
handled public relations for the Nuremburg trials.
39
 For Truman, however, Dean‘s most 
significant qualification for the position was that he was the congressional favorite: a 
former law partner of Brien McMahon, the Chairman of the JCAE. Though the political 
maneuverings that led to Truman‘s appointment of Dean in May 1949 have long been 
recognized,
40
 they amounted to more than political détente. Truman‘s appointment of 
Dean was also a direct concession to military control. From the perspective of the JCS 
and the military‘s congressional supporters, Dean‘s appointment was a tacit 
acknowledgement that Truman‘s commitment to civilian control had become so 
superficial that it could be sacrificed in the interests of political expediency. The 
appointment provided Strauss with an ally on the Commission and another congenial 
liaison between the AEC and the military‘s congressional supporters—an affiliation that 
fostered military expansion, continental testing, and provided reasons for Truman to 
approve H-bomb development against the majority opinions of the AEC and the General 
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Advisory Committee. Moreover, it contributed to Lilienthal‘s decision to resign his 
Chairmanship, putting an end to Lilienthal‘s vision of a program that paid due diligence 
to a notion of civilian control that balanced the national security needs of the military 
while investing resources into peacetime applications for atomic energy. Following 
Lilienthal‘s resignation, Truman again catered to his militarily-supportive congressional 
opponents, appointing Dean to succeed Lilienthal as AEC Chairman. That decision 
reverberated down to the operational level. After Truman appointed Dean to Chair the 
AEC, Carroll Wilson, Vannevar Bush‘s protégé and the man who had served as General 
Manager of the AEC from its inception, walked into Truman‘s office and resigned. 
Wilson objected to the politicization of the program, telling Truman that Dean had 
―neither the ability nor the inclination to resist political interference.‖41 This chain of 
events began in 1949 and appears directly related to the new approach to policy—foreign 
and domestic—that occurred when Truman named Dean Acheson to succeed George C. 
Marshall as Secretary of State. Acheson‘s appointment caused an intensification of anti-
communist criticism. Publicly, Truman‘s support for Lilienthal declined as his defense of 
Acheson increased. 
Like Lilienthal, Acheson faced stiff opposition from the very moment he was 
appointed. Named by FDR as Under Secretary of the Treasury in 1933, his New Deal 
credentials and his wartime experience as Assistant Secretary in the Department of State 
made him vulnerable on ideological grounds to the political attacks of congressional 
conservatives. His 1946 partnership with Lilienthal in a plan to create an international 
agency for the control of atomic energy—the Acheson-Lilienthal Report—contributed to 
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the notion that he was ―soft‖ on communism. And, as Marshall‘s Under Secretary of 
State, Acheson‘s participation in the crafting of the Truman Doctrine and the European 
Recovery Program put him squarely at odds with Truman‘s opponents. When he became 
Secretary of State in January 1949, the Berlin Airlift was in its seventh month, North 
Korea was threatening the new Republic of South Korea, and the NATO treaty was still 
being hammered out.
42
 By the time he had finished a year in office, the Soviets had 
detonated their first atom bomb and China had fallen to the communists. By then, 
Truman‘s opponents had had enough of Dean Acheson. The same was true of many 
Americans. By the end of his first year, only 31 percent of those polled reported that he 
should stay on the job; and, by February 1951, that percentage had dropped to 25 
percent.
43
 In his memoirs, Acheson distanced himself from the problem, explaining that it 
had been his misfortune to find himself in the midst of an ongoing, and historically 
unprecedented, political battle. The partisan infighting of the period was, he wrote, ―as 
bloody as any in our history.‖44 Despite the fact that political attacks had long plagued the 
Truman administration, Acheson was undoubtedly responsible for many of them. After 
he came out publicly in support of Alger Hiss in January 1950, Senator Hugh Butler of 
Nebraska had difficulty deciding whether it was his demeanor or his suspected 
communist connections that was the most repulsive:  
I look at that fellow, I watch his smart-aleck manner and his British 
clothes and that New Dealism in everything he says and does, and I 
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want to shout ‗You stand for everything that has been wrong in the 
United States for years!‘45  
 
Though Acheson‘s communist connections were the most serious of the charges 
against him, the factors that bothered a larger percentage of his detractors and that stuck 
in the public‘s mind were that he was incapable and relied too much on guidance from 
the British. In September 1951, of those who felt that Acheson should be replaced, more 
than 9 percent complained that he was a communist ―traitor‖ while slightly more than 22 
percent claimed that he had a ―poor record‖ and was ―influenced by England.‖46 However 
unpopular, Acheson had an advantage that Lilienthal did not: he was a close personal 
friend of President Truman‘s.  
By all accounts, it was a friendship characterized by loyalty and mutual support, 
with Truman prizing Acheson‘s advice and Acheson more than pleased to help Truman 
personally, politically, and administratively. Acheson seems to have approached the task 
as Secretary of State in much the same way as he had during his service with the 
Department during the war when he took pride in his domestic political acumen and 
ability to muster congressional support. His approach was shaped by his friendship with 
Truman and his habits as a lawyer. In 1957, for example, he admitted that his legal 
experience had been a double-edged sword during his service as Secretary of State; while 
logical reasoning had been essential to his legal successes and foreign policy 
accomplishments, the habits of advocacy narrowed his perception to that which served 
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his client‘s interest.47 The ways he balanced his responsibility to foreign policy as 
Secretary of State and his interest in helping Truman recover politically and achieve his 
domestic goals bore directly on his friend Lilienthal‘s ability to preserve the civilian 
authority over atomic energy written into the Atomic Energy Act of 1946. Unlike 
Lilienthal, Acheson‘s decision-making reflected the military‘s point of view and appears 
to have been designed to mollify both the military and their congressional supporters. 
Acheson‘s desire to see Truman safely through treacherous political waters contributed 
even more to the narrowing of Truman‘s decision-making options and put in place the 
conditions for a nuclear Cold War arms race.
48
  
Acheson‘s own admission of the political importance of Truman‘s decision 
suggests that the tendency to separate Acheson‘s realist approach to foreign policy from 
the political problems he brought down on the Truman administration has limited critique 
of the interaction of the two on Acheson‘s decision-making as Secretary of State. 
Acheson‘s biographers have recognized the close relationship between domestic political 
influence and the ability to generate support for diplomatic aims, and, admittedly, without 
domestic political support it would have been impossible for the Truman administration 
to carry out such initiatives as the Marshall Plan and the Berlin Airlift. But, despite 
discussions of the anti-communist controversy that dogged his term, the most famous 
being Whittaker Chambers‘s denoucement of Alger Hiss, a brother of Acheson‘s friend 
and protégé Donald Hiss, historians have been more willing to discuss the ways that 
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Acheson mobilized political support to achieve foreign policy goals without much 
attention to the ways that he pressed foreign policy into service as a means of achieving 
domestic goals.
49
 Because he played such an important role in the H-bomb decision, 
however, Acheson‘s approach to his duties as Secretary of State and the motivations that 
guided him as one of Truman‘s most trusted advisors are important issues in the history 
of the atomic program.  
It is impossible to recapture all of the factors that went into Acheson‘s and 
Truman‘s decision-making, but if their primary interest in recommending development of 
an H-bomb was rooted in domestic political imperatives and not in Realpolitik, then the 
decision, and the chain of events that it generated, cannot be explained entirely as Cold 
War imperatives. The H-bomb decision justified an expansion of the atomic program and 
production capabilities necessary not only to meet the requirements of H-bomb 
development but also to satisfy the military‘s atomic production demands. And, 
according to the record prepared by AEC officials, the H-bomb imperative and not the 
Korean War was the reason why the AEC recommended, and Truman approved, the 
creation of the Nevada Test Site for the continental testing of weapons and routine 
experimentation that dispersed radioactive fallout throughout the U.S. and the H-bomb 
experiments in the Pacific that contributed to global radioactive fallout. The background 
to that decision suggests that it was more likely than not that national security was the 
rationale, and not the reason, for the H-bomb decision. And, as the impetus for the 
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program‘s expansion, it rationalized the use of the atomic program for domestic political 
purposes and, in fact, authorized militarization.  
Acheson became Secretary of State having achieved some fame within 
Washington circles as a brilliant lawyer and had already achieved a reputation for 
administrative and political competence. No less an authority than FDR considered him 
―without question the ablest lawyer in Washington.‖50 Armed with a law degree from 
Harvard in 1918 and a recommendation from Felix Frankfurter, Acheson began his career 
as a clerk for Louis Brandeis. In private practice, he specialized in advocacy against the 
U.S. government, representing Norway and Sweden in their World War I claims and 
Arizona in its suit contesting Boulder Dam. His appointment as Under Secretary of the 
Treasury in the Roosevelt administration ended in 1933 when Roosevelt fired him 
because of his disagreement with FDR‘s gold purchase program. Both continued to hold 
one another in high regard, however, with Acheson an important behind-the-scenes 
―interventionist‖ in 1940-1941.51 He considered himself a pragmatist, one who was not 
inclined ―to become the prisoner of a priori moralistic, deterministic, idealistic, or 
Manichean images and states of mind.‖52 And, despite his service in the State Department 
under Henry Stimson and George Marshall, his understanding of foreign affairs was 
limited by his dependence on second-hand information because he had not been in 
Europe since 1939. What first-hand knowledge he did possess came primarily from 
discussions with ambassadors from England and France, those most willing to dramatize 
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Europe‘s situation to secure American aid.53 All of these influenced his responses to the 
challenges that came his way as Truman‘s Secretary of State. So, too, did his 
administrative style as Secretary reflect a preference for consolidating authority within 
bureaus and agencies of the federal government. During 1947-1948, for example, 
Acheson argued as a member of the Commission on the Organization of the Executive 
Branch—the Hoover Commission—that upper echelon Foreign Service officers should 
be incorporated into the Department of State and favored strengthening the position of 
Secretary of Defense. Along with Acheson‘s views about governance and a history that 
gave him confidence in his own ability and stature among Washington‘s elite power 
brokers, one way to assess the significance of Acheson‘s appointment to Secretary of 
State is in comparison with his popular predecessor, General George C. Marshall.
54
 
Acheson was nearly the antithesis of Marshall. Both men were decisive, but Marshall‘s 
methods had been honed by many years of reliance on others. Acheson‘s had been 
shaped by a lifetime of success proving others wrong.  
One of the first things Acheson did was to un-do some of the structural changes 
that Marshall had implemented within the State Department and, in doing so, limited the 
intellectual breadth of State Department‘s analytical and advisory capacity. Marshall had, 
for example, established for the first time a division within the State Department for 
planning. ―You can‘t plan and operate at the same time‖ he recalled a decade later, 
―[T]hey are two states of mind. …You just had a hit or miss affair going on around 
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there.‖55 By separating planning and operational components of the responsibilities of the 
office, Marshall tried to ensure that each received singular attention, that care would be 
taken to consider each in light of the other, and that the resulting multidimensional 
understanding would help prevent counterproductive decision-making. An example of the 
significance of this approach to management of atomic science emerges in a June 1947 
diary entry where Truman recorded the outcome of an informal meeting he called to 
discuss the timing of the proposed Sandstone atomic weapons tests. As if to emphasize 
the importance of diplomacy over the needs of the military and the atomic program, 
Truman identified Marshall first in a group that included the Secretaries of War and 
Navy, General Eisenhower, Admirals Leahy and Nimitz, and Lilienthal, and recorded 
Marshall‘s contribution first.  
General Marshall agreed that they should be tested but at a date beyond 
the Foreign Ministers‘ meeting in November—say from February to 
April.
56
  
 
In this instance, Marshall‘s input on the foreign policy implications of the test were 
clearly the most important factor in Truman‘s decision to allow the tests to be conducted. 
Only after receiving Marshall‘s recommendations did Truman note his designation of 
―Patterson, Forrestal, and Lilienthal‖ as the group to work out the details, Eisenhower and 
Nimitz as advisors, and directed that Marshall and Leahy both ―be consulted as 
developments proceed.‖ In a final comment on the meeting, Truman took a dig at those 
who had derided his management of the atomic secret while reinforcing the view that 
diplomacy, and not defense, was his priority: ―We must make the tests without insulting 
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the Bolskies or our own Red helpers—headed by Wallace.‖ The precautions Truman took 
to avoid a possibly provocative affront to the Soviet Union can be seen as a reflection of 
Marshall‘s understanding of the nature of atomic experiments and the care he took as 
Secretary of State to avoid military confrontation. 
Marshall‘s re-structuring of the Department of State was not just an 
organizational accommodation to the complexities of post-war foreign relations, but a 
measure of the value he placed in the ability and expertise of his subordinates and, 
because of that, the confidence he had in delegating responsibility. Stimson, for example, 
praised Marshall‘s ability to achieve cooperation and success through trust.  
he was always willing to sacrifice his own prestige. … His trust in his 
commanders is almost legendary … he leaves the man free to accomplish 
his purpose unhampered.
57
  
 
It was this mindset that was responsible for the elevation of Soviet expert George 
Kennan, author of the legendary ―Long Telegram,‖ to head the newly formed Policy 
Planning Staff. Kennan detested Stalin, but made careful distinctions between Stalinism, 
communism, and the Russian people and his recommendations were grounded in his 
belief that if conflict could be avoided and if Greece and Turkey could be stabilized until 
they could become independent, Stalinism would eventually fail under its own oppressive 
weight.
58
 During his tenure under Marshall, Kennan drafted the plan for European 
recovery and established the prescription for containment that became policy under NSC 
20/4. Where Marshall had investigated diplomatic alternatives to manage America‘s 
postwar influence, Acheson‘s tendency was to discount them. 
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One of Acheson‘s first acts as Secretary of State was to demonstrate that he had 
no use for Kennan or for the policy planning group that he and Marshall had 
established.
59
 He sidelined the Planning Staff and relegated Kennan to the position of 
―counselor.‖ Kennan‘s comment on the demotion helps to illustrate not only the different 
approaches of Marshall and Acheson as Secretaries of State, but also the extent to which 
the changes that Acheson made were motivated by a desire to avoid any circumstance 
that might delimit his range of authority or autonomy: ―The thought of consulting the 
staff as an institution and conceding to it, as did General Marshall, a margin of 
confidence within which he was willing to respect its opinions even when that opinion 
did not fully coincide with his own. … All of this would have been strange to him.‖60 
Acheson ensured that Kennan would not be in a position to exert policymaking influence 
over his Department of State. But Kennan had already made an enduring mark on 
postwar policy. The Long Telegram became a foundational touchstone of the Cold War 
because it easily accommodated, and could serve as an authoritative reference, for widely 
divergent views. Like poorly written law, it was full of loopholes.  
Kennan himself described the eight-thousand word document he sent from 
Moscow in February 1946 as an effort to give Washington ―the whole truth ... divided, 
like an eighteenth-century sermon, into five separate parts.‖ According to Kennan, the 
organization was strategic: ―if it went in five sections, each could pass as a separate 
                                                 
59
 Acheson wrote that Kennan‘s views ―were of no help.‖ Present at the Creation, 346.  
 
60
 Kennan, Memoirs, 450. There are so many studies devoted to Acheson, Kennan, and the relationship 
between the two men and their relationship to the cold war, that it has nearly become a sub-field of its own. 
A representative sample includes John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment and his ―NSC 68 and the 
Problems of Ends and Means,‖ International Security 4 (1980); Walter Isaacson and Evan Thomas, The 
Wise Men: Six Friends and the World They Made (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986); Wilson D. 
Miscamble, George F. Kennan and the Making of American Foreign Policy, 1947-1950 (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1992); John Lamberton Harper‘s American Visions of Europe. 
 
375 
 
telegram and it would not look so outrageously long.‖61 But it was not the ―whole truth‖ 
as Kennan saw it that accounts for the missive‘s significance, but the elasticity of 
Kennan‘s prose.62 Under one interpretation—the one that Kennan attributed to it—the 
Telegram was a recipe for containing the spread of communism with limited use of force 
while avoiding the alienation of the Soviet Union until the benefits of capitalism could be 
realized. Kennan argued that Stalinist totalitarianism was only a temporary condition, a 
―device of despair, arising from specific and particularly painful problems of adjustment‖ 
as societies developed.
63
 Under another, it became a call to arms. Forrestal, for example, 
found it supportive of his view that America was on track for a cataclysmic conflict with 
the Soviet Union. He had it copied and distributed to thousands of high-level officers, 
declared that it was required reading, and used it as grounds to argue that the nation‘s 
survival depended on permanent mobilization and granting policymaking authority to 
military officers. Forrestal‘s reading, and similar subsequent ones, overlooked the fact 
that the thrust of Kennan‘s argument was that with the Soviets, attempts at containment 
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through military force would certainly validate Russia‘s traditional fear of invasion.64 For 
Acheson, the Telegram and the NSC directives that delineated Kennan‘s version of 
containment became useful only insofar as they could be used as touchstones for a 
subsequent study that set the parameters for NSC 68, the document that set forth 
Acheson‘s preference for strengthening the conventional military and that made 
mobilization a national policy.
65
 Though Acheson‘s revision of national security policy 
occurred after the H-bomb decision, the following discussion of the factors that 
conditioned that review help to illustrate the inter-relatedness between foreign and 
domestic policy during Acheson‘s tenure, as well as the contributions that Acheson‘s 
policies made to mobilization and Atomic Governance.  
The State Department‘s policy review was the product of a collaborative effort 
between military strategists and Acheson‘s go-to guy on State‘s policy planning staff, 
Paul H. Nitze.
66
 Nitze could not have been more different than Kennan. An anti-Soviet 
True Believer, Nitze personified the shift in hatred from Nazis to Soviets that Forrestal 
had fostered in the immediate postwar period: ―Every bone in Nitze‘s body ached with 
suspicion of the Soviet Union.‖67 In his own words, Acheson‘s H-bomb recommendation 
and his promotion of NSC 68 envisioned a no-holds barred approach to the Soviet Union 
that combined conventional and atomic capabilities to create a policy toward the Soviet 
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Union based on ―situations of strength.‖68 As with the H-bomb decision, the sense that 
Acheson‘s effort to deal comprehensively with the Soviet threat and to signal America‘s 
intent to use force to halt communist expansionism represented the development of a 
fresh foreign policy strategy does not preclude the consideration of those same decisions 
as politically-motivated strategic maneuvers.
69
 Acheson conceded that the military and its 
congressional supporters had already limited the sort of response that Truman could 
make; and, his national security review depended almost entirely on the military‘s own 
evaluation of national security requirements. It might be argued that Acheson‘s analysis 
required information that only the military could provide. It is puzzling, however, that 
Acheson adopted the military‘s perspective without critique or revision and made little or 
no effort to evaluate the situation from a diplomatic perspective.  
Acheson forged closer ties between State and Defense by discounting diplomatic 
avenues for solutions to the Soviet threat in favor of military ones. He sidestepped the 
possibility that of intra-service rivalry had shaped the upper echelon‘s claims for 
resources and, similarly, the possibility that military officers had for their own self-
interested purposes exaggerated the minimum necessary resources. Instead, he concerned 
himself with what appeared to be a disjunction between the armed forces‘ reliance on 
atomic weapons as contained in their strategic plans and the level of resources that 
officers claimed would be necessary to carry out those plans. Acheson‘s review of 
defense has been tied to his mistrust of the Pentagon and the shallow regard he held for 
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Louis Johnson, Truman‘s budget conscious Secretary of Defense who took charge after 
Forrestal‘s May 1949 suicide.70 But, the desire to do an end-run around Johnson and deal 
directly with the Pentagon while insisting on the need for a review because of mistrust of 
the Pentagon presents a contradiction that is difficult to resolve. If that was the case, why 
did Acheson depend almost entirely on the military‘s own estimates of what was 
necessary to craft NSC 68? Among the claims that Acheson took at face value were: (a) 
Curtis LeMay‘s complaint that SAC was too ill-equipped and trained to carry out the type 
of devastating attack on the Soviet Union envisioned in one of the military‘s own 
strategic plans, ―Fleetwood;‖ (b) the Harmon Committee Report commissioned by the 
JCS that called for a buildup of conventional forces to supplement nuclear weapons; and 
(c) the expression of the Navy‘s dissatisfaction with its share of appropriations that 
culminated in the 1949 ―Revolt of the Admirals.‖71 From this perspective, Acheson‘s 
concern with the likelihood that the military did not have sufficient resources to carry out 
their strategic plans was provoked apparently by a JCS request after the Soviet‘s first 
atomic detonation for more atom bombs
72
 and was nothing more than a restatement of the 
argument that the upper echelon had been making since the end of World War II.  
Acheson‘s uncritical adoption of the armed forces‘ estimates contributed to 
closing the gap that typically existed between what the armed forces wanted and what 
elected officials considered sufficient. That he did so led, ultimately, to the 
unprecedented budgets justified under NSC 68.
73
 Assuming that Acheson was in a 
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position to recognize the military‘s tendency to make unsubstantiated appeals to national 
security—as was the case with the dressing down that Nichols received from Eisenhower 
over the issue of how many bombs the military needed for 1948—to ensure satisfactory 
appropriations, Acheson‘s acceptance of the military‘s own assessment of its 
requirements reinforces the argument that his decision-making was strongly influenced 
by the political clout of a consolidated military. And, while State‘s review of security 
policy and the H-bomb decision may have involved different processes, the review and 
the decision seem to have been motivated by Acheson‘s desire to salvage Truman‘s 
political standing by satisfying the military and its congressional supporters. The view 
that Acheson‘s adoption of this course reflects the calculations of a hardheaded foreign 
policy realist is discounted by Acheson‘s dependence on the military‘s own calculations 
of force and resource requirements. It becomes more suspect when considered in light of 
Acheson‘s domestic political dilemma and attacks by anti-communists that threatened not 
only Acheson‘s stature but Truman‘s as well. And, by taking into account Truman‘s 
willingness to meet political detractors with acquiescence to the demands of the upper 
echelon and their congressional supporters—a practice that became more acute after 
Acheson‘s appointment to State—it becomes even easier to see that Acheson‘s decisions 
were those of a realist with at least one eye, and at times perhaps both eyes, trained on the 
domestic political front to determine how his recommendations would be received by the 
military and their supporters in Congress.  
There are additional reasons to suggest that Acheson‘s approach to the H-bomb 
decision and NSC 68 was shaped more by domestic political realities than foreign policy. 
Prizing practicality, one of his law partners is reported to have said that he ―was not a 
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man to wander into the penumbra of thought.‖74 Additionally, however, and though his 
impatience with deliberation is well documented, it seems that not only was he 
disinclined by nature to suffer the recommendations of those with whom he did not agree; 
but in discussions about the H-bomb and the security review, he was also interested in 
shaping the terms of the deliberation. The appeals to reason that Acheson used in 
disputing alternative recommendations suggest that he was not genuinely interested in 
alternatives but, as has been suggested of Truman and his appointment of the H-bomb 
committee, primarily concerned with making it clear that he had gone through a 
deliberative process.
75
 In 1949, for example, after Acheson asked both Kennan and Nitze 
for input on his strategic review, he apparently chose to discount Kennan‘s because it 
―simply advocated new arms talks.‖76 And, during discussions about the H-bomb, 
Acheson supposedly listened ―sympathetically‖ to proposals aimed at disarmament from 
Oppenheimer and others, but reported to longtime Truman advisor and Acheson assistant, 
Gordon Arneson, that he could not ―understand‖ how it was possible to ―persuade a 
paranoid adversary to disarm ‗by example.‘‖77 Because the obverse—that one might 
persuade a paranoid adversary to disarm by out-arming him—is such a logical stretch, the 
statement seems not to reflect open mindedness as much as it does a comment of a man 
to a like-minded colleague who, with decision-making well behind him, was musing out 
loud about ways to discredit his opposition. The sense that Acheson was interested in 
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hearing only those arguments that would reinforce his own preferred course of action is 
strengthened by the fact that he seems not to have given much thought to the practical 
alternatives to the immediate ramp-up of H-bomb development before the decision was 
made and did not seem to have considered some of the recommendations about courses 
of action should the H-bomb become a national imperative. It stands to reason that had he 
been keen to gather the most sensible solutions to the problem of the Soviet‘s possession 
of an atom bomb, he would have been in a position to look beyond the moral repugnance 
expressed by the weapon‘s opponents and to the prospect of a nuclear arms race, an issue 
those opponents also discussed, and into the value of possibilities—including 
diplomacy—for preventing it.  
However weighted by responsibility or repugnance, those brought into the 
decision-making process took their advisory roles seriously. Participating in the decision-
making was something that Lilienthal, for one, had hoped to avoid. On November 1, 
1949, Lilienthal told Acheson that he did not want to be involved, and that the decision 
whether to develop an H-bomb was ―essentially a question of foreign policy for 
[Acheson] and the President.‖78 He had already spent a month pondering the problem at 
the prompting of Lewis Strauss, who proposed that the Commission ―make an intensive 
effort to get ahead with the ‗Super‘.‖79 Lilienthal then invited the General Advisory 
Committee (GAC) and its Chairman J. R. Oppenheimer, to present a military, technical, 
and operational, analysis of the issue to the Commission on the last weekend in 
                                                 
78
 Lilienthal, The Atomic Energy Years, 583.  
 
79
 Lilienthal, The Atomic Energy Years, 580.  
 
382 
 
October.
80
 Both committees, the AEC and the GAC, met during that weekend. 
Lilienthal‘s journal reflects that military officers were the only ones who seemed 
ambivalent, and his puzzlement suggests that he was unaware of what was going on 
behind the scenes with the JCS‘s opposition to the program until it could be assured that 
it would not compromise armed forces‘ budgets. In yet another example of how atomic 
science served as a mechanism for the consolidation of authority and as an indicator of 
how nefarious militarization had been, Lilienthal drew the wrong conclusion from the 
reluctance of officers to engage in the discussions. They were, he wrote, either ―too busy 
with the inter-service row, or just not too able to grasp it.‖ Perhaps in an attempt to focus 
the military‘s attention on the actual consequences of atomic weapons, some members 
launched difficult questions toward General Bradley, Chairman of the JCS. As to whether 
the U.S. would attack Russia if London would likely suffer the reprisal, Bradley who was 
on record for his aversion to viewing atom bombs as weapons but who also seems to have 
been interested in keeping the military‘s options open, answered only that he believed the 
―Super‖ would offer a ―psychological edge.‖ Enrico Fermi commented that development 
should proceed, but he qualified his approval with a recommendation that the government 
consider later (and more carefully) whether to use it. The others shared opinions 
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obviously honed long before the meeting began. Some, including Harley Rowe, an 
electrical engineer and manager who had worked on the Manhattan Project, and James B. 
Conant, former president of Harvard University and friend of the Manhattan Project‘s 
Groves, were both opposed to proceeding with H-bomb development.  
The content of the discussion ranged from a prescient conclusion that radioactive 
fallout would pose ―grave contamination‖ problems to a comment reminiscent of the 
monstrous vision that Stimson conjured up when he addressed one of the first meetings of 
the wartime Interim Committee formed to consider postwar control of the bomb: ―We 
built one Frankenstein.‖81 When the GAC submitted its written report, no member of the 
Committee recommended development. Among their reasons, reflects a measure of 
contrition, if not guilt, over the atom bomb. Other reasons varied. Members remarked that 
it promised too much devastation, would result in radioactive contamination, and that is 
cost could not accurately be determined. Significantly, however, the GAC would not 
approve the weapon because there was ―no foreseeable non-military application.‖82 This 
statement suggests that the efforts made to find alternative, peacetime, applications for 
atomic energy by elected officials and scientists, however fruitful, had at least partially 
offset the remorse they felt over the tragedy of Hiroshima and Nagasaki; therefore, the 
possibility of some sort of peaceful application was a condition that they considered 
essential if they were to recommend H-bomb development. Fermi and Rabi both 
suggested that a diplomatic solution might yet be found. Specifically, they noted that if 
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the Soviets were made aware that the U.S. was considering an H-bomb, they might be 
more willing to agree to joint non-development.
83
 
Acheson‘s approach to his responsibilities as Secretary of State beginning in 1949 
reflected not only an interest in national security but also a recognition of and concession 
to the military‘s political influence. The centrality of the atomic program to the 
administration‘s political problem is unmistakable. Military officers and their supporters 
had used the atomic program to discredit Truman, his policies, and the principle of 
civilian oversight of atomic science. They had exploited every Soviet move as evidence 
that the mobilization they had been promoting since the end of World War II was 
necessary: that national security could only be preserved by expanding the military‘s 
footprint and by granting military planners the authority to set policy. Moreover, when it 
came to the H-bomb decision, they made sure that the administration was left with no 
delusions about the JCS‘s significance. They used their considerable influence to parlay 
Truman and Acheson‘s commitment to pursue development (at perhaps, all costs) into 
increased funding by way of guarantees that their projected needs for atomic resources 
would be not be compromised. They positioned themselves to benefit doubly—directly 
because of the promise that their projections would be satisfied and indirectly because 
their monopolization of AEC resources meant that increased AEC appropriations yielded 
military returns.  
In January1950 Manhattan veterans had achieved what Truman and Acheson 
could not: a JCS recommendation that Truman proceed with development of an H-bomb. 
The recommendation arrived in a letter from General Bradley on behalf of the JCS, who 
had been assured that the H-bomb would not come at the expense of armed forces 
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budgets. Addressed to the AEC, there are indications that the letter was likely written by 
members of the MLC, including Manhattan veteran Kenneth Nichols. The letter 
pointedly disputed the moral objections that advisors had raised, arguing that no weapon 
was ―more immoral than another.‖ 84 This language suited Truman who, besides needing 
the support of the military before he could announce the development of a new weapons 
system, was no doubt satisfied to read arguments from the JCS that supported his own 
view of atomic and nuclear weapons: that the H-bomb would not revolutionize warfare, 
did not hold the promise of providing any strategic advantage, and thus a decision to 
develop one was not likely to result in the beginning of the end of civilization.
85
 Much 
has been made of the fact that Truman believed at the time that the JCS recommendation 
―made a lot of sense.‖ And that, in Truman, the JCS ―found a sympathetic reader.‖86 The 
episode is significant for several reasons. First, it demonstrates that the military had 
achieved enough authority within Truman‘s administration to hold the decision hostage 
pending satisfaction that their funding would not be compromised by the proposed H-
bomb program. Second, and although it is not clear where they received authority to 
promise the JCS a secure funding stream, it reveals the centrality of Manhattan veterans 
to the process through their ability to affect decision-making at the highest levels of 
military and administrative responsibility. Third, by showing how important the 
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military‘s assent to the program was for Truman and Acheson, it reinforces the argument 
that they were not primarily interested in developing a response to the Soviet‘s atomic 
success, but interested in putting forth the only solution that promised a domestic political 
benefit. Fourth, it illustrates the dynamic nature of the relationship between advisory 
groups and advisee, and the evolution of coherence of opinion between those counselors 
who seek to satisfy their superiors and officials who seek to have their pre-existing 
decisions ratified, bringing to the fore a risk inherent in an advisory process that is, 
consciously or unconsciously, disingenuous.
87
  
Truman‘s decision was likely anchored in assumptions about command and 
control that were limited to his term in office, but it had a long-lasting affect on the 
atomic program‘s administration. In light of Truman‘s persistent support of peaceable 
atomic development, his repeated refusals to authorize the military to possess stores of 
atomic weapons or components despite the claimed strategic advantage to doing so, it 
appears likely that one of the most important features of the JCS recommendation for 
Truman was not the fact that it added clarity to the moral objections, or whether the H-
bomb would give the U.S. a psychological or strategic edge over the Soviets, but that it 
placed the moral responsibility in the hands of the initiating party. For Truman, who was 
committed to the belief that only the president could decide whether or not to use nuclear 
weapons and equally committed—at that time—to the belief that he would never order an 
atomic first strike, the decision to devote resources to the development of a nuclear 
weapon unimaginably more destructive than the atomic bombs that had been used against 
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Japan and then in existence presented no moral dilemma. Truman was certain that he 
would not authorize its use, or the use of any other atomic weapon, in a first-strike 
scenario. Moreover, he anticipated that his successor would retain the same control over 
the use of weapons as he himself had. In accordance with NSC 30, finalized September 
16, 1948, ―The decision to use atomic weapons in the event of war is to be made by the 
Chief Executive when he considers such decision to be required.‖ That criterion remained 
unchanged through the remainder of Truman‘s presidency, to be included in a set of 
policies put together for President Eisenhower. Under the heading ―Use of Atomic 
Weapons‖ the decision remained with the president: ―In the event of a positive decision, 
the President would authorize the Secretary of Defense to use atomic weapons under such 
conditions as the President may specify.‖88 
Yet, Truman did not appreciate the long-term consequences of his decision and 
Acheson, who was the one person in a position to evaluate the potential alternatives to H-
bomb development and who might have steered Truman into another course of action—
or mediated the consequences of the one ultimately taken—did not. Given the history 
recounted here, or even in light of Acheson‘s legendary self-assurance and confidence in 
his own ability, the reasons Acheson provided later, and that others have reiterated, are 
not persuasive. Acheson‘s own explanation for his H-bomb recommendation was that 
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although he was sympathetic to the objections raised by Lilienthal, Conant, and other 
members of the GAC, his role was limited by Truman‘s request that he, as a member of 
the committee, deliver a decision based on one issue, whether or not to develop the 
hydrogen bomb, and that the objections of other advisors could not factor into his 
decision. As Lilienthal recounted in a memorandum dictated for the file immediately 
after the meeting he, Johnson, and Acheson had about the decision, Lilienthal reported 
that after Acheson told him he agreed with his opinion but added:  
[It] did not offer an alternative course that appealed to him, that he felt the 
pressure for a decision was so great, that the discussion and feeling in the 
Congress had reached such a point that to defer the decision to this 
purpose was an alternative that he could not recommend. Secretary 
Johnson apparently agreed. We must protect the President.
89
 
 
The almost apologetic emphasis behind Acheson‘s claims of obedience to Truman‘s 
directive as well as his comments on the limitation of a statesman in relation to a citizen 
or to his president, for example, appear manufactured out of his respect for Truman and 
to disguise the considerable influence that Acheson undoubtedly had over Truman‘s 
decision-making as his Secretary of State, confidant, and friend.
90
  
In bowing under the weight of political pressure, Acheson surrendered his high 
ground—and that of the Truman administration—to the military and its supporters. The 
Secretary not only signaled his acceptance of the military‘s point of view, but put in place 
strategies that allowed the armed forces to achieve the policymaking goals that Forrestal 
established before the end of World War II. By severing the tension that had existed 
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between the diplomatic, civilian, aims of State and the military goals of the Pentagon, 
Acheson eliminated any balance between defense and diplomacy that might have 
tempered or perhaps prevented the nuclear arms race. Despite the effort Acheson put into 
justifying his decision-making and recommendations as those of a pragmatic diplomat, he 
used the atomic program for political purposes, consulting directly with the influential 
E.O. Lawrence, for example, and ceded foreign policy to military planners.
91
 Instead of 
promoting diplomacy while taking military needs into account, Acheson disregarded 
diplomacy in favor of militarism.  
The engine driving all of this was militarization. The military‘s consolidation of 
their authority and the way officers and their supporters used it to undermine Truman‘s 
goals in favor of their own. They shaped future policymaking and contributed to the 
subordination of diplomatic responses to ―Joe One‖ in favor of force-driven, military, 
solutions. Just as military officers and their supporters had used national security as a 
rationale to achieve domestic political goals, so too did Truman, on the advice of 
Acheson, use national security to rationalize a politically advantageous decision. Dean 
Acheson, the man who in 1947 had counseled Truman to exploit the domestic political 
climate to achieve a diplomatic goal, to boost anti-communism and secure U.S. support 
for Turkey and Greece, employed the same politically-based strategy in reverse in 1949. 
Acheson advised Truman to use a diplomatic crisis, the Soviets atomic detonation, to 
achieve a domestic political goal.  
The changes in Truman‘s administration that took place beginning in January 
1949 and the H-bomb decision had profound short and long term consequences. They 
contributed directly a drain of leadership and advisory capacity, the resignations of (1) 
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George F. Kennan, whose intelligence and expertise in the field of foreign policy was, 
and remains, undisputed; (2) Oppenheimer, whose objection to the H-bomb appeared to 
validate his opponents‘ claims, particularly those of Lewis Strauss, that he was a 
communist sympathizer and became one of the reasons he was removed and tried as a 
communist; and, (3) Lilienthal, a man who had been the foremost public spokesperson 
for civilian control and for the peacetime development of atomic science. Their 
departures created a vacuum in the realm of national policy and a dramatic 
transformation of the intellectual and ideological base that had driven policy since the 
end of the war.  
NSC 68 filled that vacuum. The protocol known as NSC 68 filled that vacuum 
and transformed the post-war policy from one of political containment of communism to 
one that emphasized military containment.
92
 Because the massive military build-up 
envisioned in NSC 68 required an equally massive budget, Truman and fiscally-
conservative insiders initially resisted the adoption of that policy.
93
 The ―logjam‖ broke 
free with the onset of the Korean War in June 1950 and Truman approved NSC 68 in 
December 1950. As Hogan pointed out, it ―subverted Truman‘s attempt to recapture the 
[budget] initiative‖ and ―national security became the common currency of most policy 
makers, the arbiter of most values, the key to America‘s new identity.‖94 But NSC 68 can 
also, like the H-bomb decision, be understood as a manifestation of militarization that 
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lent authorizational force to military policymaking. That authority became self-sustaining 
through an advisory ethic that did not replace outmoded strategies or initiatives, but 
continually built on existing models.
95
 Along with a built-in administrative resilience, the 
directive‘s ideological underpinnings gave AEC Chairman Gordon Dean the opportunity 
to expand the significance of the AEC and to use that relationship to promote the 
military‘s use of the program and experimentation to generate fear.96 This alignment of 
the two bulwarks of the Cold War American state—the NSC and the AEC—gave the 
AEC, the JCS, and upper echelon officers a nearly-limitless and unregulated ability to 
initiate weapons development, pursue testing schemes continentally and in the Pacific, 
and rationalize the expansion of classification systems, all in the name of national 
security. The result was a constitutionally debilitating ensemble of maneuvers whereby 
military officers and their supporters with the AEC evaded congressional, and even 
presidential, oversight.  
The armed forces had come to view their entitlement and mission as so grandiose 
as to absolve them from responsibility for their peacetime, constitutional, duties to their 
commander-in-chief, and to the citizens they were to protect. The necessity to guard the 
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nation from the real enemy, the U.S.S.R., led the military to view with suspicion and 
animosity anyone who might learn their secrets or, through public opinion, begin to 
thwart their ability to amass their self-determined necessities. Perhaps as much as they 
feared the U.S.S.R., the armed forces came to fear American citizens and the weight of 
democratic constraints.
97
 During the era of atmospheric weapons testing, military officers 
and their supporters used wartime strategies of control to exploit the atomic program and 
to interrupt the operation of those constraints in other venues as well. Through appeals to 
national security and subterfuge, the JCS controlled the terms of NSC policy reviews, 
disabling the body of advisors whose responsibility it was to organize and manage 
national security itself, and interfered with the ability of the president to carry out his 
constitutional responsibilities. An incident from 1952 that is reminiscent of Groves‘s use 
of a national security argument to prevent a review of the Manhattan Project provides one 
example of how the military used its authority to thwart an NSC initiative and Truman‘s 
constitutional prerogatives. 
In November 1952, the JCS blocked an effort to provide the president with the 
information he would need to respond effectively to a national security emergency. The 
following summary shows that Truman seems to have come to accept that his role as 
commander-in-chief was devoid of any but symbolic authority. Unlike his public refusal 
to countenance any affront by the military, as had been the case with his dismissal of 
MacArthur, Truman was careful behind closed doors not to press the JCS into a 
confrontation and apparently passively endured what by any measure amounted to open 
insubordination. At the 126
th
 meeting of the NSC, the president ended up in the middle of 
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a dispute between the NSC and the JCS. A memorandum detailing that meeting reflects 
that NSC had agreed to a recommendation put forth by CIA Director General Walter B. 
Smith and other NSC committees that the NSC gather and catalog a listing of the nation‘s 
national security resources as a first step in a planning review and compiling a list of 
resources—―Commander‘s Estimates‖—for the president and NSC to draw on should 
emergency deployment become necessary. Though undefined, the context suggests that 
this information would have included a complete inventory of military resources. The 
JCS and service secretaries agreed to the review, but only if they alone were the ones to 
gather and compile the information. Smith objected, but gently, ―with all deference to the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff,‖ he noted that because the review included civilian and military 
information, the NSC was responsible for and in a position to collect the information 
from all agencies, including the armed forces. Truman conceded the issue was 
―controversial‖ and asked for input. In response most, including JCS Chief General Omar 
Bradley, agreed that the estimates required more than the military alone could provide. 
Nonetheless, the JCS refused to cooperate with the NSC because the evaluations 
―involved the war plans of the United States.‖ Instead, they agreed to provide ―oral 
presentations on the problem to whatever group of the National Security Council it was 
determined should receive such information.‖ Because the sort of oral presentation or 
question and answer session envisioned could not have been comprehensive enough to 
allow for the type of compilation envisioned by the Council, Truman could have insisted 
that individual branches supply their own list of resources or that each provide at the 
minimum an eyes-only itemization. Instead, he avoided pressing the JCS for cooperation 
and, in fact, temporarily relieved them of dealing with the matter altogether by suggesting 
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that the NSC set up an ad hoc committee to address the problem of how the military 
information might be incorporated into a strategic summary.
98
 One partial explanation for 
why the upper echelon had been able to usurp the president‘s authority in this instance 
was the expansion of political might that the armed forces derived from the authority they 
gained over the atomic program and the expanded political might that they derived from 
using the atomic program, and atomic experimentation, to generate fear and support for a 
expansion of military authority.  
The advent of continental weapons testing in Nevada, and the AEC/military 
partnership that developed when Dean became Chairman of the AEC that led to the 
systematic and institutionalized deployment of wartime strategies of control such as 
appeals to national security and media manipulation, made it easier for military officers 
and the AEC to use atomic experiments as instruments for political gain. The appeals to 
national security made by military officers and their supporters within the NSC and the 
AEC allowed the military to achieve General Hull‘s 1948 goal for a continental testing 
facility. The AEC supported that imperative, institutionalizing and sanctioning media 
manipulation and deception. Its partnership with the military meant that routine atomic 
experimentation could take place under the cover of media manipulation and organized 
public relations campaigns that persistently downplayed radioactive hazards. In this 
climate, atmospheric detonations as political theatre flourished, and officers, the AEC, 
and their supporters among the program‘s network of institutional partners used atom 
bombs to reinforce fear of nuclear war and to generate support for continual expansion of 
the atomic program, a large peacetime military, and the means to fund both. Such 
exploitation meant that hazards were disregarded and diplomacy compromised.  
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The AEC/Military Partnership: Gordon Dean and Continental Weapons Testing 
With the H-bomb decision in hand, military officers, their supporters within the 
National Security Council, managers at Los Alamos and at other laboratories in the 
program‘s network, had the national security justification they needed to realize the long-
held goal of conducting atomic experiments within the continental United States. They 
opportunistically seized on Truman‘s December 16, 1950, declaration of a state of 
emergency over the Korean War and, via a National Security Council recommendation 
issued on December 18, asked Truman to approve a continental testing facility. For 
military officers, the relative economy of testing in the United States created more 
opportunities to use atmospheric weapons tests as instruments for political gain. Self-
interested promotional strategies that catered to the press, public, and politicians with 
invitations to witness experiments created pressure on testing officers and managers to 
subordinate precautionary guidelines aimed at reducing the hazards of radioactive 
weapons testing in the interests of preventing inconvenience to invited dignitaries and 
members of the media. Demonstrations such as these kept the public‘s fear of enemy 
weapons alive and generated support for military expansion. The AEC‘s collaboration in 
the production of what might have appeared to be war games in the conventional sense—
an opportunity for training and promotion—meant that its duty to protect civilian 
interests took a back seat to the military‘s public relations goals. Because of this, the 
AEC paid more attention to ensuring that no adverse publicity ensued, creating the 
appearance of safety for the short term while disregarding the offsite consequences of the 
radioactive fallout produced by military demonstrations. Taking a wait-and-see approach, 
the AEC and its managers subordinated the long-term health of participants, observers, 
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and downwinders to advance the military‘s domestic ambitions. By early 1949, military 
officers had used the atomic program and military strategies of control to realize the 
Manhattan-style autonomy that had been their goal since the end of the war. In 1951, the 
military began expressing their authority over continental atomic weapons 
experimentation at the Nevada Test Site. 
Lilienthal‘s resignation resulted in the takeover of the AEC by officials devoted to 
the military‘s cause. The two commissioners who had disagreed with the majority AEC 
opinion against hydrogen development, Gordon Dean and Lewis Strauss, did so with the 
backing of conservative members of Congress who, preferring military trusteeship, had 
not only battled Lilienthal throughout his tenure, but had been highly critical of Truman 
and his policies.
99
 Dean succeeded Lilienthal as Chairman of the AEC and Strauss 
succeeded Dean.
100
 Together, the two men retained control of the AEC throughout the 
period of atmospheric testing. Just as the change of leadership over the Department of 
State radically transformed the practice of diplomacy, the change of leadership over the 
AEC transformed the priorities of the Commission and the character of its operation. 
Most apparent was the AEC‘s support for the creation of a continental test site. Less 
apparent was the militarized AEC‘s neglect of its responsibility to the American public.  
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The most fundamental and significant difference between Lilienthal‘s 
management of the program and Dean‘s was in their respective approaches to the hazards 
of experimentation—approaches that provide yet another example of the superficiality of 
the civilian/military dichotomy and its insufficiency as a guarantor of civilian authority 
over atomic science. Though both qualified as civilians in the conventional meaning of 
the term, only Lilienthal placed the interests of civilians first. Dean, on the other hand, 
protected the military‘s unfettered right to experiment and neglected his civilian 
responsibility. In hindsight, he appears to have exemplified a propensity that J. R. Lucas 
found indicative of government generally, where ―unpalatable facts are screened out and 
mistaken decisions consequently go unreviewed.‖101 Lilienthal‘s conception of his 
responsibility as Chairman included dealing with ―unpalatable facts‖ that emerged in the 
course of reviewing prospective projects. He had a healthy respect for radioactive hazards 
and was likely aware of studies that had demonstrated definitive links between radiation 
and anemia, lung cancer, diseases of the blood and lymphatic systems, bone disorders, 
malignant changes over long periods of time, leukemia, and stomach cancer.
102
And, as 
Chairman of the AEC, he was familiar with the reports from Crossroads and Sandstone 
that detailed the precautions taken there to prevent injuries from radioactive fallout. As 
the stockpile increased and the program seemed poised for more frequent 
experimentation, he took a special interest in learning about the hazards that would be 
posed from increased levels of radioactive fallout that experimentation would entail. 
In response to a military request for the expansion of weapon facilities in July 
1949—and a ―whopper‖ at that—Lilienthal sought information regarding the 
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consequences of fallout from atomic bombs. ―How many bombs might it take to 
―contaminate the atmosphere? … Stafford Warren and others put [the number] very low 
[while] E.O. Lawrence and his people think this is rot.‖103 Both men Lilienthal consulted 
had potential biases. Stafford Warren was by then Dean of UCLA medical school. As one 
of the recipients of AEC funding for studies interested in the medical use of radioactive 
isotopes, Warren and his staff at UCLA maintained a close professional relationship with 
the AEC. During the early years of testing at the Nevada Test Site, when fallout 
sometimes settled in the Los Angeles basin after testing in Nevada, Warren unofficially 
monitored levels of radioactivity and relayed the results, and his concern, to his colleague 
Shields Warren, who at that time served the AEC‘s Director of the Division of Biology 
and Medicine.
104
 Lawrence, on the other hand, had every reason to minimize the danger. 
Any decision to increase the nation‘s stockpile could only help his bottom line, and he 
was an accomplished opportunist. Commissioner Henry Smyth noted that Lawrence was 
a brilliant scientist but had been known to have ―overstepped the line in pushing projects 
which add to his own ‗Empire.‘‖105 Lawrence and Stafford Warren depended on the AEC 
for project funding. Unlike Warren, however, Lawrence sought to shape the program by 
engaging with members of the Commission. Lawrence, for example, cultivated a 
professional and personal friendship with Lilienthal at the same time he was nurturing his 
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already close ties with Strauss. He was also personally involved with those scientists who 
served on the GAC and operated as counselors to the AEC and routinely made 
recommendations about projects and initiatives, especially those expected to involve 
large capital investments.
106
 After the H-bomb decision, he met with Acheson and 
members of Nitze‘s working group. Lilienthal, having received polarized opinions from 
two respected scientists, requested an additional, independent, report. It sounded the same 
precautionary notes as Warren‘s and was not in agreement with Lawrence‘s. Even then, 
Lilienthal remained wary: ―We must try to get a reasonable answer‖ he wrote.107 
Dean‘s approach to the problems of fallout was a dramatic departure from 
Lilienthal‘s. Dean viewed fallout as primarily a psychological problem that could be 
managed, as General Hull had argued, with public education. Because of this, he failed to 
heed the recommendations of expert advisors that radioactive fallout should be strictly 
limited and made decisions that, in the view of many experts at the time, increased the 
likelihood for radioactive injury. During an AEC meeting held in May 1952, after the 
second year of weapons testing in Nevada, Shields Warren warned that dangerous levels 
of fallout would be produced by even moderate yield devices detonated from towers in a 
desert location. Warren, a graduate of Harvard Medical School, was among the foremost 
experts on the health effects of radiation, had been a colleague of Stafford Warren in the 
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Hiroshima and Nagasaki studies, produced the first systematic study of radioactive 
fallout, wrote the textbook on the biologic effects of ionizing radiation, and, as a 
pathologist, had revolutionized the therapeutic use of radioisotopes.
108
 Warren combined 
service with the AEC, the UN Atomic Energy Agency, the National Academy of 
Sciences, Department of Defense, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and 
the Veteran‘s administration, with his personal work, primarily at the New England 
Deaconess Hospital in Boston as Chief Pathologist for 36 years in the radiation 
laboratory that is named in his honor. 
In 1952, however, Warren‘s expertise and authority did not lead Dean to 
reconsider the safety of tower shots or the risks posed by continued military weapons 
testing. The minutes reflect that Warren told the commission that it should be ―careful in 
the future to avoid tests when the winds in the upper air reach high velocities. … The 
Tower Shot [―Easy‖- 12 kt] reinforced his conclusion that we cannot risk any [larger] 
continental shots.‖ In response, Dean could have cancelled tests pending further study; 
gone on record as supporting the decisions of the military regardless of the risks; or 
approved such experiments provided they were conducted at the Pacific Proving Ground. 
Or, he could have recommended an approach that balanced military needs with off-site 
safety by supporting the development of a set of criteria for weapons testing at the 
Nevada Test Site, criteria that would have given the military a set of parameters to use in 
planning and would have provided test managers with expert advice to guide them in 
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making decisions to allow, postpone, or cancel, planned detonations.
109
 Instead, Dean 
sidestepped the safety issue altogether by suggesting that the problem was not one of 
reducing hazards, but of reducing complaints. Dean‘s response to Warren‘s warning was 
to note that ―a popular article on fall-out to reduce the possibility of public anxiety. . 
.might be helpful.‖110 
Though only a rough beginning to the public relations campaigns that the AEC 
would develop to protect the military, and in a brief introduction to the content of the 
next chapter, Dean‘s comments came after a short but powerful burst of energy by the 
military that had already totally undermined the authority of the AEC and the Division of 
Biology and Medicine to regulate the terms of troop exposure.
111
 In 1949, in preparation 
for the Army‘s anticipated indoctrination of troops to radioactive fallout, Warren had 
contacted Dr. Joseph G. Hamilton, a medical physicist and physician who during the war 
had pioneered studies on animals of the metabolic effects of radioactivity. When Warren 
contacted him, Hamilton was Director of UC, Berkeley‘s Crocker Radiation 
Laboratory.
112
 Warren provided Hamilton with all available information to launch a 
thorough appraisal of the problem. In response, Hamilton determined that troops might 
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remain operational if not psychologically disturbed, but noted that the root issue was 
internal radioactive poisoning from inhalation. Recommending more experimentation to 
determine, with precision, the exact strata of safe to dangerous levels, Hamilton argued 
that no such maneuvers be attempted until lengthy experiments had been performed using 
―large monkeys such as chimpanzees.‖ He warned that without such preliminary studies, 
the AEC risked opening itself up to criticism that it had recklessly endangered human 
lives. The strength of his feeling about the ethical boundary this would cross was 
captured in the chilling connection he made between the types of maneuvers that the 
military proposed and Nazi experimentation, writing that without a prior understanding of 
the nature of the hazard derived from animal experimentation, the military‘s proposal 
carried with it ―a little of the Buchenwald touch.‖113 Warren took Hamilton‘s opinion into 
account when making his own recommendations about limits for military training 
exercises. But, like Stafford Warren before him, he was unable to instill in officers and 
their supporters a realistic concern for radioactive hazards. Army officers trumped 
Shields Warren, made only marginal concessions to his admonitions and insisted the 
realistic training exercises they proposed rose to the level of a national security 
imperative. 
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This assertion of military authority over the terms of experimentation was but a 
continuation of the military‘s peacetime takeover of the atomic program that began with 
planning for Operation Crossroads. In official and unofficial ways, President Truman 
had long since sanctioned the military‘s authority over atomic science; allowing military 
officers and their supporters to replicate, and reinforce, the use of Manhattan Project 
protocols to achieve authority over the program. The autonomy that military officers 
secured over the atomic weapons experiments—continental and otherwise—is traceable 
back to the Manhattan Project through the Military Liaison Committee. Staffed by 
Manhattan‘s managers, the MLC amassed enough authority after passage of the AEA and 
NSA to require that the JCS subordinate its decision-making process to the MLC. And, in 
1949, it was the MLC and the Manhattan Project‘s Nichols who lobbied for H-bomb 
development and who arranged the terms necessary for the JCS to sign off on the project. 
After that decision, the MLC officially asserted its authority over the AEC by requiring 
the AEC to submit to routine and comprehensive MLC reviews of AEC programs. In 
1951, the MLC advised the AEC that to avoid ―misunderstandings,‖ the AEC should 
report directly to the MLC on a monthly basis of ―all the latest concepts and possibilities 
in the atomic weapons field plus the status and progress of all previously presented 
concepts.‖ The MLC also required that the AEC submit all study plans, designs, 
specifications, and time estimates for delivery. On a quarterly basis, the MLC mandated 
that the AEC submit summaries and updates for all monthly reports, including similar 
material drawn from AEC contractors and laboratories. Moreover, the MLC required the 
AEC to supplement the monthly and quarterly reports with letters ―when there arises any 
change or an actual or foreseeable delay [including] the reasons therefor, alternatives … 
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and new times estimates.‖114 In 1952, President Truman approved the MLC‘s mandate to 
the AEC.
115
 The authority that the MLC wielded over the AEC in this incident derived 
from the authority the AEC, through Chairman Dean, granted it when the AEC and the 
MLC joined together to press for the creation of a continental weapons test site two years 
earlier.  
Citing the needs of scientists for a convenient place to perform experiments in 
furtherance of the H-bomb initiative, the AEC asked the NSC in December 1950 to 
recommend a stateside testing site. The nature of that recommendation and the course 
experimentation took almost immediately thereafter provides another example of the 
influence of the wartime Manhattan Project on peacetime decision-making and illustrates 
the ease with which some of the president‘s closest advisors used Manhattan-style 
strategies of control in furtherance of the military‘s domestic goals for the atomic 
program. Dean‘s diary entries illustrate how quickly the AEC worked to satisfy the 
military‘s desire for a site. On November 1, Dean casually mentioned to the president that 
more testing would be necessary and would like to discuss it with him in the future. That 
same day, the NSC‘s Executive Director James Lay told Dean that he wanted to consider 
it, get it on the agenda and discuss ―energy releases, etc.‖ Dean told him that ―a paper‖ 
was being prepared. Dean then contacted Colonel Richard Coiner, the Deputy Director of 
the Division of Military Applications, asking about the study for site selection and telling 
him that the Commission had discussed the matter with the president earlier, on October 
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25. Still later on November 1, Dean and Lay discussed the formation of a ―working group 
committee‘ to evaluate the creation of a continental site. On November 2, Dean spoke 
with the Chairman of the Military Liaison Committee, Robert LeBaron, and told him that 
Lay had discussed the continental site that day in a conference with Truman and 
suggested that they ―strike fast.‖ To do so, the men arranged to make it appear that the 
issue had been the topic of ongoing investigation. Dean told LeBaron that ―enough paper 
work had been completed for the working group to get started.‖ Dean recorded that 
Lebaron then  
said that he would have to create a piece of paper saying that they were 
studying the matter in order to get it started internally but that it would be 
very easy if Lay would set it up first and then they could just follow along. 
GD [Dean‘s shorthand for himself] said he would call Lay and tell him 
that.
116
 
 
In December 1950 the NSC recommended that Truman approve a continental 
testing facility. The fact that the recommendation came on December 18, two days after 
Truman‘s December 16 declaration of a state of emergency over the Korean War, and 
because of the way the site was used once it was created, it has become customary to 
acknowledge in passing the military‘s longstanding desire for a continental test site and 
Dean‘s commitment to help it achieve that goal, while focusing more directly on link 
between the site‘s creation with Korean War imperatives.117 But even with the ―national 
emergency‖ that appears in hindsight to justify the site‘s creation, a notion reinforced by 
the fact that the AEC made the recommendation before the Army Corps of Engineers had 
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completed studies on radiological factors, the record indicates that the recommendation 
was fundamentally an opportunistic exploitation of an international event.
118
 
Dean and the AEC, the NSC, and officers with the MLC deceived President 
Truman and other cabinet level officials to receive permission for continental weapons 
testing. Truman approved the site based on a notion that it would be something entirely 
different from the continental site for weapons testing that the military had routinely 
requested and that he had just as routinely denied. The recommendation that Truman 
approved asked for a continental site as a convenient location where scientists could 
conduct a ―few relatively low-order detonations on an emergency basis.‖119 It gave 
Truman reason to believe that the use of the site would be extremely limited (―few‖) and 
that there would be relatively little radiation release (―low-order detonations‖) and skirted 
the fact that there were already plans for the military to use the site; that the detonations 
that occurred there would not be limited to those needed to prove up on a scientific 
principle on an ―emergency‖ basis, but would be conducted at the outset by the military; 
and, at least after the first tests in January 1951, would be the product of advance 
planning by the military. Additionally, the January 10 press release announcing the 
beginning of continental testing—―Project Mercury‖—implied that the program was 
temporary while reinforcing the AEC/NSC‘s portrayal of the site in the recommendation 
that Truman approved. It announced that ―experiments‖ would be performed by the Los 
Alamos Scientific Laboratory in a section of the Las Vegas Bombing and Gunnery 
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Range. The release left the impression that bombs would not be detonated by making a 
distinction between the experiments that would be conducted and atom bomb 
detonations:  
Test activities at the new site will include experimental nuclear detonation 
for the development of atomic bombs – so-called ―A-bombs‖ – carried out 
under controlled conditions. 
 
Another indicator that the site would not be used for detonating bombs was the 
comment that the AEC would ―continue to use the Eniwetok Proving Ground.‖ The 
release also reinforced the notion that the safety of the planned experiments had been 
carefully considered: 
Radiological safety and security conditions incident to the type of test to 
be undertaken have been carefully reviewed by authorities in the fields 
involved. … [T]he tests may be conducted with adequate assurance of 
safety. ... All necessary precautions, including radiation surveys and 
patrolling of the surrounding territory will be undertaken to insure that 
safety conditions are maintained.
120
 
 
The final form of the release emphasized more strongly the scientific nature of the 
experiments, noting in the second paragraph that ―use of the Las Vegas Bombing and 
Gunnery Range will make available to the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory a readily 
accessible site for period test work with a resultant speed up in the weapons development 
program.‖121 Neither science nor national security, however, had much to do with the 
advent of atmospheric atomic weapons testing in Nevada. 
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Dean‘s gross mischaracterization of the proposed site‘s purpose makes it 
reasonable to conclude that Dean, and others involved in the recommendation, believed 
that Truman would not have approved it otherwise. Additionally, it operates against the 
notion that the Korean War, or national security, was the reason for the site‘s creation and 
the imperative driving weapons testing.
122
 Truman was, after all, not unaware of the 
hazards of atomic experimentation, having certainly developed some familiarity with the 
risks of experimentation from the Crossroads Evaluation Report and as a result of his 
relationship with Lilienthal. Moreover, he had routinely considered, and refused, the 
military‘s requests for a continental testing facility. Though perhaps incomplete, what 
little understanding Truman did have about radioactive hazard helps to explain why Dean 
felt it necessary to deceive the president about the nature of the planned experiments: it 
seems unlikely that even a ―national security emergency‖ would have been enough for 
Truman to grant the military permission to conduct within the continental United States 
the types of experiments that had been conducted during Crossroads, at Bikini, and, with 
Sandstone, at Eniwetok; or, for that matter, the ones that Dean had planned.  
Other factors may also have contributed to the rapidity with which Truman 
approved the site. One was related to the H-bomb: on December 9, ten days before Dean 
issued his request, an AEC study noted that Los Alamos scientists could work more 
quickly on The Super if they could perform some experiments stateside while larger 
detonations would be planned for the Eniwetok Proving Ground. There is, however, no 
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indication that the report itself made it from the AEC to the president.
123
 Another was 
political: Truman may have been reluctant to risk ruining the cordial relationship that had 
developed between the administration and the JCAE‘s Brien McMahon after Truman had 
taken McMahon‘s recommendation to appoint Dean to the Commission and later, in part 
to prevent the JCAE from moving to take control of atomic science altogether, made him 
Chairman.
124
 Yet another was institutional: Truman had established within the National 
Security Council a Special Committee on Atomic Energy composed of the Secretaries of 
Defense and State and the AEC Chairman and advised that he would not consider any 
directive until the Committee as a whole had signed off on it. Along with unofficially 
formalizing an elevation of the AEC Chairman (Dean) to cabinet level status to ensure 
that these important advisors remained in the ―loop‖ of all significant decisions, Truman 
may have expected that the traditional tensions between State and Defense would help to 
ensure balance between diplomatic and military interests.
125
 And, his familiarity with 
Lilienthal‘s conscientiousness about civilian interests and military overreach gave 
Truman reason to expect that Dean, though coming to the job under different 
circumstances, would manage his responsibilities in much the same way as Lilienthal 
had. Relatedly, Truman‘s assumptions about the civilian/military divide may have caused 
him to approve the recommendation without giving much, or any, thought to the 
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possibility that the military, and particularly the MLC, would be able to operate through 
Dean to achieve their goals.  
In any event, Truman approved the NSC recommendation, and did so without 
(apparently) becoming aware of the backroom controversy that ensued between his 
approval for the site‘s establishment and the approvals necessary to begin testing. The 
problems began when Dean and the MLC established a testing schedule that was grander 
in scope and in radiological hazard than had been proposed to Truman and to the other 
members of the NSC‘s Special Committee on Atomic Energy. Dean‘s irritation at being 
second-guessed, evident from notes made in his office diary, suggests that he, and 
perhaps others with the MLC and NSC, too, expected clear sailing once they had received 
the president‘s approval to conduct tests and had failed to take into account that all of the 
others who had been involved in some way in the original recommendation would also 
carefully review the rudiments of Dean‘s plan before signing off on it. That material 
consisted of a preliminary press release, a packet of information listing the officials that 
Dean and other AEC officials planned to contact immediately prior to the initiation of 
testing, and a request for expenditure of atomic resources that could only be approved by 
the president. Dean‘s release and his request for material were both so different from 
what Defense Secretary Marshall, Acheson, the JCS, and Los Alamos scientists expected 
that all of them launched objections.
126
 All were concerned about the sizes of the shots 
Dean had planned and the risks they posed, especially the fifth, ―Fox‖, which was the 
largest planned for the spring testing schedule. It is likely that the objections Marshall 
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and the Joint Chiefs raised were anchored in the understanding they had developed over 
the previous year about the health effects of radiation derived from a re-evaluation of new 
radiological and biological weapons undertaken by Marshall as part of the Defense 
Department‘s July-December 1949 semi-annual report to the president.127 Aimed at 
coordinating military planning and recent scientific advances by developing a general 
understanding of the science and properties of new weapons, and with an introduction 
that illustrates that Marshall was also interested in reinforcing the line between military 
planning and civilian policymaking—―which the Congress has quite wisely placed … in 
agencies other than the military establishment‖128—the study helps to explain the 
divergence between the MLC‘s promotion of atomic weapons and the JCS‘s reluctance to 
approve Dean‘s proposed testing schedule. The broad and long range perspective adopted 
by the JCS for the study led to a conclusion that although atomic weapons (and 
radiological substances that might be used in lieu of bombs) had some advantages that 
conventional weapons did not, those benefits were partially, if not wholly, offset by 
short-term and long-term disadvantages, including the ―imperative‖ to provide shielding 
to prevent personnel exposure to ―injurious radioactivity,‖ and by the impossibility of 
assessing the long term health effects of radioactive exposure or overexposure: 
The effects of radiation at intensities which might be practicable of 
attainment over any considerable area usually do not appear immediately. 
This fact would militate against its use for tactical purposes.
129
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Scientists at Los Alamos objected to the claims Dean made in his press release 
that the Laboratory‘s most prominent scientists—identified by Dean in the release—had 
comprehensively investigated the safety issue and determined the schedule of detonations 
to be safe. Individually or separately, experts at Los Alamos and the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
were in agreement that Dean had underestimated the dangers inherent in his proposed 
course of experimentation.  
Dean‘s methods illustrate the importance of intermediate-level officials in 
creating the conditions for Atomic Governance. He purposefully used vague language 
when discussing the experiments with Truman. And, instead of using his position on the 
NSC Special Committee to consult Marshall and Acheson, he worked through lower-tier 
officers and officials. Among those Dean turned to were: Robert LeBaron, the Chairman 
of the MLC and who owed his position to Lewis Strauss;
130
 James Lay, the Executive 
Director of the NSC who had partnered with Dean to gain approval for the site in the first 
place; military officers and subordinate officials such as Gordon Arneson, the assistant 
Acheson confided in during the H-bomb decision and the person one tasked by Dean‘s 
inner circle with ―priming‖ the Secretary of State;131 Admiral Frederic Withington, a 
member of the MLC and an expert in naval ordinance; James McCormack, Director of 
Military Applications who had served under Groves, been involved with the Manhattan 
Project, and appointed Director with the passage of the Atomic Energy Act; and Edward 
Trapnell, Associate Director of the Division of Public and Technical Information, who 
went on to co-author an AEC history and a section of the DOE‘s history of the first 
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nuclear reactor. Dean called on all of them to help him override the objections of 
Marshall, the JCS, and Los Alamos managers, that the tests Dean planned were so large 
and risky that approving them would mean breaching the promises they had made to 
Truman that ―no large tests‖ would be conducted. 
Dean‘s diary reveals that the claims about the safety study that he had made in the 
press release were a complete fabrication.
132
 Though extensive, the language of the 
release provides context for Dean‘s attempt to deceive Cabinet and White House 
officials, and had it been approved, the public, too. 
Full consideration has been given to the radiological safety requirements. 
The Commission‘s Advisory Committee for Biology and Medicine has 
approved safe permissible levels of exposure to radiation applicable to this 
work. The AEC Division of Biology and Medicine has reviewed the types 
of tests proposed and found such tests could be conducted with adequate 
assurances of safety under the conditions prevailing at the bombing 
reservation. The detailed radiological problems and necessary precautions 
which they require were reviewed by a panel of specialists in the 
radiological field, including  
 
Dr. Enrico Fermi – Institute of Nuclear Studies, Chicago 
Col. Benjamin G. Holzman – Office Deputy Chief of Staff, Development, 
USAF 
Dr. Joseph Kennedy – Washington University, St. Louis 
Dr. Frederick Reines – Physicist, LASL 
Dr. Roderick Spence – Radio-Chemist, LASL 
Col. George Taylor – Meteorologist, USAF 
Dr. Edward Teller – Physicist LASL 
Dr. Thomas N. White – Health Physicist, LASL 
 
All phases of the radiological safety plan have been reviewed by a special 
panel for the Commission headed by Dr. Shields Warren, Director of the 
AEC Division of Biology and Medicine.
133
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Dean‘s response to the safety concerns lodged by Marshall and the JCS about the 
tests he had scheduled reveals that he had no documentation, or even verbal assurances, 
that the tests would be safe or that the studies he referred to had been performed. He 
contacted a staff member at the Division of Biology and Medicine and asked him whether 
a ―radiation safety group‖ had submitted their report. The staffer directed him to Dr. 
Charles L. Dunham, chief of the medical branch of the Division of Biology and 
Medicine. Dunham was an M.D. who had been an instructor of medicine at the 
University of Chicago before the war and afterward became chief of its arthritis clinic. 
He downplayed his lack of training in nuclear physics, saying that ―basic principles of 
radioisotopes in medicine are basic to basic principles, not to a mere disease.‖134 When 
Dean contacted him, Dunham reported that he knew of no such report and, furthermore, 
had no knowledge that one had been proposed. Dunham told Dean that the Chief of the 
radiology branch of the Division of Military Application was just then in the process of 
arranging the ―radiological setup‖ for the Nevada tests. Dean‘s follow up questions 
suggested that he was aware of at least some hazards from fallout, but was most 
interested in knowing that they could be managed. When he asked about fallout dispersal, 
Dunham assured him that Colorado River water would not be affected but that people in 
Alamo, fifty miles from the site, might.
135
 A call Dean placed to Dunham the next day 
prior to a meeting with Marshall and Acheson indicated that either Dean did not record 
some of the information he received from during their first discussion, or that Dean and 
Dunham had had other conversations about flocks of sheep that were grazing and passing 
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through areas to the west and northwest of the site. Dean asked Dunham if he could 
anticipate any ―other difficulties in radioactive hazards‖ that might occur, ―other than 
sheep?‖ The two men discussed the possibility of a rain storm, and Dunham told Dean 
that if that happened, the Army Corps of Engineers had agreed to evacuate people within 
about 24 hours. As for the sheep, Dunham said any exposures could not be ―controlled so 
the trouble would be with friends in Interior.‖ Dean asked about the possibility that 
people downwind would receive ―minor skin burns‖ and Dunham responded that he 
thought that would be the ―worst thing that could happen to people.‖136  
These exchanges illustrate two characteristics that became routine in the 
management of continental weapons testing: First, despite claims to the contrary, AEC 
officials expected offsite exposures and, instead of working to prevent them, devised 
ways to manage them by minimizing their importance if and when they occurred. 
Second, rather than run the risk of receiving opinions from experienced or top-level 
experts that had the potential to disrupt AEC/military plans, AEC officials drew on those 
professionals who would provide the most congenial opinions. In this instance, Dean 
apparently did not consult Shields Warren, the Director of the Division of Biology and 
Medicine, or scientists from Los Alamos. For private counsel, he relied on Dunham, who 
predicted that radioactive injuries, if they occurred, would be minor. This practice had a 
history stretching back to Crossroads. Just as Naval officers had during Crossroads, 
Dean made a conscious decision to consult only those experts that he had reason to 
believe would provide him with the type of information that would be supportive of his 
larger mission and purposely avoided or disregarded those who openly opposed or who 
might be expected to object to the course of action he had already decided to take. Dean 
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was, for example, aware that Warren disagreed with his position that all tests should be 
approved simultaneously, perhaps ensuring that nothing would interfere with the large 
―Fox‖ shot. Warren‘s position was that the business of continental weapons testing was, 
itself, an experiment. As he explained to McCormack [Director of the Division of 
Military Application], each shot should be considered individually based on ―completely 
satisfactory radiological effects of previous shots.‖137 Warren‘s concept of a ―completely 
satisfactory‖ result was a more exacting standard than the more general proposition held 
by the JCS and Los Alamos that the tests be considered in turn. It was certainly a more 
cautious approach than Dunham‘s, which was to assume that (a) sheep might suffer 
radioactive injuries, but that problem could be shifted to the Department of the Interior; 
and (b) people could be evacuated if necessary, but if there were not sufficient time for 
the Corps of Engineers to get them out of harm‘s way, their injuries would be limited to 
radioactive burns. Additionally, Dean did not contact any of the prominent scientists he 
had identified in his proposed press release because he knew, from McCormack, that the 
only two scientists listed who reportedly agreed with Dean‘s version of the release—
Fermi and Kennedy—had also refused to publicly acknowledge their views and had 
asked to have their names eliminated from the list before the release was issued.
138
  
Unlike Warren and the Los Alamos scientists, Dunham‘s chief claim to fame in 
1951 was that he expressed an interest in helping Dean achieve his goals. By 1955, 
Dunham had risen in the AEC hierarchy and was made the Director of the Division of 
Biology and Medicine. But, in 1951, Dean‘s interest in him was in the fact that he saw no 
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significant reason to disagree with Dean and the MLCs position that the scheduled tests 
should go forward and, moreover, that radioactive fallout from the tests would not cause 
an immediately-evident tragedy.  
Dean shielded himself from responsibility for deception through a purposefully 
vague and misleading approach. Because his conversations with the president had not 
been recorded, and because Dean had used general phrases to describe the shots instead 
of specifying anticipated yields, Dean claimed the high ground when the president‘s 
advisors complained that the planned detonations were too large. He confidently threw 
the burden of proof back on those who argued that the shots were larger than the sort he 
had originally proposed. Discussing the problem with LeBaron, Dean reasoned that since 
he (Dean) was under the impression that ―only over bang 6 or 7 times‖—presumably six 
or seven very large shots—would cause the president to become alarmed, and since no 
specific representations about size had been made, then Marshall and the others were 
wrong to ―oppose on the ground that the President would not like it.‖ Dean made other 
overtures to ensure that detonation size would not become a matter of record by telling 
LeBaron that the topic was not suitable for an NSC meeting—where questions might lead 
to a conversation about weapon yield and where minutes would memorialize the content 
of the discussion.
139
  
As a means of achieving his goal while avoiding responsibility, Dean distanced 
himself from the process. Dean avoided making any concessions, or creating a record of 
discussions about the planned tests other than his own office diary, by using his 
intermediaries to work through the problems of size and safety beneath the level of 
official, committee-level discussions. Dean learned through his intermediaries that the 
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principles were expressing a willingness to grant their approval to a modified schedule 
that did not include ―Fox‖ within the initial request for material. If Dean were willing to 
conduct the first four tests as something of a trial run—as experiments, in fact—and if 
they were successful and safe, they would then grant approval for the ―Fox‖ detonation. 
Dean refused that compromise with an appeal to national security. In the same way that 
Navy commanders had done in asserting that Crossroads should be approved as a 
national security imperative, Dean told LeBaron that those opposed to his plan ―were 
missing the boat‖ and threatened that he would hold them all responsible if the progress 
that he and the MLC had deemed necessary was stymied, saying he would have ―Jim 
McCormack [Director of Military Applications] document this as to what would happen 
if you left out the 5
th
 [―Fox‖].‖140 But neither the national security argument Dean made, 
nor the related scientific one, were valid given what he had already learned in a talk with 
McCormack.  
McCormack, a former Rhodes Scholar who had also held an MA in civil 
engineering, tried to convince Dean to back away from the hard line he was taking on the 
large ―Fox‖ shot. McCormack, for example, approved of Warren‘s assessment that each 
test be dependent on the success and safety of the one preceding it, telling Dean that it 
was ―a good one to think about.‖ He also explained to Dean that it was not necessary to 
perform the test in Nevada, or in conjunction with the other four, telling him that 
Bradbury—the Director of Los Alamos and at that time actively engaged in work on the 
H-bomb—had suggested that the fifth test be shot off elsewhere. Though this eliminated 
both of the arguments Dean was using to gain approval—that ―Fox‖ was an urgent 
scientific and, because of its relationship to H-bomb progress, national security necessity, 
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Dean would not reconsider his stand on ―Fox‖. Instead, he responded with a 
mischaracterization that ignored the obvious possibility of detonating it at Eniwetok, 
―Can you get a decent measurement on the 5th one if you took it out over the water, for 
example?‖ When McCormack tried to clarify that that was not what Bradbury had in 
mind about the shot, Dean cut him off: ―the question is how hard to fight this.‖ But that 
was not even a question in the rhetorical sense: Dean had already indicated that he was 
committed, stubbornly so, to his original plan, despite the risks. Dean and McCormack 
were already in agreement that they would justify whatever catastrophe might result by 
claiming that it had been a national security imperative, citing the ―state of emergency‖ 
that the president had declared before approving continental weapons testing: 
The only worry about it would be if it goes sour and then the Commission 
had to do it because of the military emergency of the situation. GD said 
even if it goes sour, don‘t they want to try it?141 
 
Dean proceeded with his original testing schedule knowing that it posed risks and 
knowing that the president himself would not have approved it had Dean been frank with 
him about the consequences. The perversion of authority that Dean perpetrated in the 
interests of satisfying the military‘s desire for a continental test site and routine weapons 
testing that he recorded in his office diary is difficult to reconcile with one historian‘s 
portrayal of Dean as a defender of the principle of civilian control over the atomic 
program.
142
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Manhattan style strategies of control employed by Dean and his intermediate-
level supporters—civilian and military—opened the door to routine continental weapons 
testing. Backchannel legwork by the NSC‘s Lay, who made it appear that Dean was 
willing to take the wait-and-see approach that he was, in fact, unwilling to take, and the 
MLC‘s McCormack, who satisfied the JCS that Dean and the AEC had accepted full 
responsibility for all aspects of the tests, convinced Marshall and Acheson to allow 
Dean‘s proposal to go forward as he had initially envisioned it, with the controversial 
―Fox‖ included. Dean‘s only concession was to revise the press release. After Dean 
stripped out the safety claims he had made in the first version, all that remained was for 
Dean, Lay, and McCormack to get the president‘s approval.143 To limit the possibility 
that the president might develop some second thoughts if he were presented with both 
approvals at the same time, Lay proposed and Dean agreed that it would be best to 
separate the two documents, creating an interval between the two. The men worked 
through the president‘s staff to ensure that they would present Truman with the press 
release first and then, hours after he had approved the release, provide him with the 
document approving the tests.
144
 
Dean then engaged in the sort of public relations that became a hallmark of the 
AEC‘s management of continental testing. He contacted William Borden, the Executive 
Director of Congress‘s Joint Committee, to sound him out on the congressional reaction 
to the project and to encourage him to get one of the members of the Committee to make 
a supportive public statement about the tests. After Dean responded negatively to 
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Borden‘s comment that no one had stepped up to endorse the tests, Borden agreed to 
work on rounding up an agreeable JCC member and offered Dean some preliminary 
―positive‖ language that he would use to draft the statement. Dean told Borden about the 
―pleasant‖ meeting he had had with Nevada‘s Senator Patrick McCarran, who always 
welcomed federal investment, and then learned that about eighteen members of the JCC 
planned to attend the tests. Others, according to Borden, were less enthusiastic, and some, 
Borden said, had mentioned that they were ―glad it isn‘t where ‗I live.‘‖145 On the day 
after the press release went out, Dean responded to a United Press reporter‘s questions 
about safety. With the sort of analogy between atomic weapons experimentation and the 
risks people voluntarily take in their everyday lives that became routine in the AEC‘s 
repertoire for downplaying radioactive hazards, Dean told him that ―every precaution was 
being taken … there was less danger in it than taking an automobile from here to 
Richmond.‖146  
By the time Truman left office, the military had detonated twelve atom bombs in 
the Nevada desert, and three of those were equivalent to, or greater than, the 21 KT 
weapon dropped on Nagasaki. That those three were at least 9 KT larger than the upper 
limit for continental testing established by Shields Warren illustrates the importance of 
the AEC/military partnership that Dean fostered and the contribution that relationship 
made to creating conditions for needlessly hazardous weapons testing at the Nevada Test 
Site. Whatever controversy still remains over the health effects of radioactive fallout and 
the value of continental weapons testing for national security, the important historical 
facts are that Truman was misled about the types of experiments that would be conducted 
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and approved the continental weapons testing because of purposefully deceptive 
discussion he had with Dean and that experts within and without the government believed 
at the time that atomic weapons testing as endorsed by Dean posed considerable short 
term and long term risks. Finally, and as Bradbury‘s proposal to conduct ―Fox‖ elsewhere 
illustrates, the H-bomb and other national security imperatives could have been served by 
performing hazardous experiments—such as ―Fox‖—remotely. Admittedly, this would 
have increased the expense of experimentation and involved some inconvenience. 
Nonetheless, given the demonstrated willingness of Congress and the president to support 
programs involving national security, it is easy to imagine that necessary costs of 
experiments in the Pacific would have been borne and the AEC and the military could 
have together discovered ways to minimize the inconvenience. Another possibility is that 
the cost and inconvenience would have prompted a re-evaluation of the atomic program 
and its national security value. But none of that came to pass.  
The AEC, through Dean and in league with the military and his supporters among 
intermediate-level officials, deceived the president and purposefully subordinated the 
safety of participants and downwinders to satisfy their institutional and political 
ambitions. In a repeat of Operation Crossroads, atomic experimentation became an 
exercise in public relations. One historian captured the military‘s enthusiasm for the new 
facility: ―The generals rushed to the chalkboards. There would be war games to end all 
war games. Troops. Tanks. Artillery. Paratroopers.‖147 In the very best possible light, 
such exuberance over the chance to practice with real atom bombs can be interpreted in 
light of habitus, as a cavalier expression of business as usual by upper-echelon officers 
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hardened by their experiences during World War II. But that was only one aspect of 
militarization that led to the consolidation of military authority; it took a combination of 
military authority and civilian supporters to bring about the systematic manipulation of 
public information to delude the public and elected officials about the consequences of 
atomic experimentation. In 1949, David Bradley, the author of No Place to Hide, decried 
the popular misconceptions in an interview with the New York Times: 
They‘re all still thinking in terms of Hiroshima and Nagasaki‖ he says, 
shaking his head. ―Those explosions, of course, were in the air and the 
rising heat carried the radioactive particles up into the stratosphere, where 
they dispersed harmlessly. Nobody considers that tidal wave at Bikini. 
Those particles didn‘t disperse. They stayed right there. More than seventy 
ships, and we‘ve only been able to decontaminate nine of them. The Navy 
referred to the others as ‗survivors.‘ That‘s a cute way of putting it. For 
my money, that lagoon will always be deadly.
148
 
 
The AEC and its military partners used Manhattan style strategies of control to 
gain approval for a continental weapons test site, to conduct experimental detonations 
and war games; and, additionally, to preserve their ability to use experiments to garner 
public and political support for military programs and expansion. Their pursuit of 
individual and institutional goals in the name of the state undermined government itself, 
the constitutional rights of Americans, and the prerogatives of elected officials. The result 
was a program of needlessly hazardous continental atomic weapons testing and a pattern 
of deception that outlived Truman‘s presidency. 
By the time President Eisenhower took office, atomic and nuclear weapons had 
taken center stage in national defense strategies and the AEC, and especially its 
Chairman, had assumed a more important role in the development of defense policy. 
When President Eisenhower appointed Lewis Strauss to serve as AEC Chairman in June 
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1953, Strauss assumed cabinet-level authority. He used his position to promote and 
accelerate atmospheric weapons testing and downplayed the dangers of experimentation 
at the Nevada Test Site and in the Pacific through the press and congressional testimony. 
He also used his influence to protect military experimentation by undermining diplomatic 
negotiations between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.  
During the era of Atomic Governance, intermediate-level officials used their 
political leverage to gain autonomous control over atomic resources, production, and 
experimentation; used that control to deceive their superiors and the American public 
alike; and used weapons testing as a public relations vehicle for the achievement of 
domestic goals. The atomic program was not unlike other government agencies and large 
bureaucracies where, as has been demonstrated elsewhere, mid-level administrators and 
officials with professional status or special expertise wield significant independent 
authority and serve not only well beyond the reach of the electorate but often their 
superiors as well. The way intermediate level officials and officers carried out their 
responsibilities was especially important with the atomic program where there was such a 
dramatic contrast between the phenomena observable—the detonation, fireball, 
mushroom cloud—and unobservable, radioactivity. National security and its significance 
to military goals, Atomic Secrecy, and the specialized knowledge and techniques 
embedded in the AEC‘s departments and divisions and throughout its network of 
institutional affiliates that supported them provided excellent conditions for the abuse of 
authority. Dean, other AEC officials, and their military partners wielded authority in the 
name of the state but operated independently, abusing their authority by exploiting 
administrative goals and distorting them to achieve their own. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
DEAN AND DECEPTION 
When Dean became Chairman of the AEC, he made the military‘s goals his own. It was 
the first time since the Atomic Energy Commission took charge of the resources of the 
wartime Manhattan Project that the program‘s leadership put military objectives ahead of 
all other responsibilities identified in the Atomic Energy Act.
 1
 After the hurried 
improvisational methods that Dean used to gain approval for the Nevada Test Site and the 
first testing series, Dean‘s AEC and its military partners used their consolidated power to 
manage the program and weapons testing in ways that suited their own institutional 
ambitions. Just as Los Alamos‘s Director Bradbury worked after the war to sustain his 
laboratory and scientists by encouraging the military‘s desire for weapons with the 
unrealistic (in his view) prospect of an H-bomb, Dean used Los Alamos‘s request for an 
experimental facility to satisfy the military‘s desire for a continental test site. His support 
for military projects was so thoroughgoing that his imaginative reach for the potential 
uses of atomic weapons outpaced those of the military officers in whom he confided. For 
all practical purposes, Dean‘s priorities were military ones.2 This mutually beneficial 
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arrangement stimulated increased material goals to satisfy the demands for H-bomb 
development and more frequent weapons tests, stimulating AEC expansion. 
Simultaneously, atmospheric weapons tests themselves provided promotional 
opportunities to generate even more public and political support for continued expansion. 
Under Dean, the Site became the locus of AEC/military publicity, a place where AEC 
officials and military officers capitalized on the fearsomeness of nuclear detonations to 
promote the program and military projects to an extent that Forrestal, Strauss, and the 
Navy‘s postwar publicity machine could only dream about when they conducted 
Operation Crossroads in 1946. And, just as Naval officers scuttled safety in the interests 
of self-interested objectives at Crossroads, the AEC/DOD made decisions about testing 
to avoid acute injuries only and conducted tests that they knew at the time posed long-
term health risks to achieve short-term domestic political goals.
3
 For AFSWP and Army 
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officers, the opportunity to test in Nevada freed them from the expense of Pacific testing, 
which was at least double the cost of Nevada testing, and with it, some of the burden of 
justifying to the upper echelon or the DOD the expense or necessity for tests.
4
 Similarly, 
testing in Nevada freed Army and other military officers from the logistical problems and 
expense the Navy encountered in publicizing maneuvers in the far-away Pacific. 
Moreover, because the AEC put a ―civilian‖ face on what was primarily a military 
project, officers involved in Nevada tests were immunized from the onus of self-
promotion that plagued their Navy brethren before and during Crossroads. This was a 
significant factor at a time, not unlike the immediate postwar period, when Congress was 
closely scrutinizing armed forces‘ spending. By 1951, budget conscious congressmen 
outnumbered the military‘s most generous backers and stripped the upper echelon of 
some of its discretion by passing laws restricting how the DOD and branches could use 
appropriated funds. For Army officers especially, weapons tests and the maneuvers that 
they conducted with ―live‖ shots were doubly significant: they provided opportunities for 
promotional demonstrations, convincing the public and elected officials that (a) nuclear 
arms were as critical to the role the Army would play in national defense as missiles and 
bombs were to the Navy and Air Force; and, (b) conventional, ground, forces had value 
on an atomic battlefield and would be essential in the event of nuclear war.
5
 For the AEC, 
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this was a mutually beneficial arrangement that stimulated AEC expansion and increased 
the institution‘s political influence. Weapons-testing-for-scientific-development (as Dean 
pitched his cause to Truman) became, at times, weapons-testing-for-AEC/military-
promotion.
6
 For the military as for the AEC, public relations was more than a 
developmental imperative that cleared a path for continued experimentation and 
technological progress; it was one of the reasons why tests were conducted in the first 
place.
7
 
The combined organizational capacity of the AEC and the armed forces and 
continental experimentation increased the significance of strategies of control officers 
and officials employed to ensure their autonomy over the program and testing tests. 
Military urgency, media manipulation, and appeals to national security buttressed the 
Manhattan Project‘s superstructure from the end of the war, through Operation 
Crossroads, and drove militarization as Groves, Nichols, and other Manhattan veterans 
gained influence throughout the re-organized military establishment, the program, and 
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among the military‘s congressional supporters during Lilienthal‘s tenure. The same 
strategies of control gave Dean and his military partners the autonomy they needed to 
plan, conduct, and exploit, continental weapons testing to capitalize on the drama and 
spectacle of weapons tests and generating fear in a gambit to secure increased 
appropriations and influence. They made appeals to national security to conduct nuclear 
tests continentally, used deceptive language to mislead elected officials about the safety 
of weapons testing, and used and manipulated the media—all to guard against the 
possibility that health concerns would interfere with their autonomous control of the 
program, its resources, and experimentation.  
Autonomy meant power. AEC officials and officers used the program and 
weapons testing to influence domestic and foreign policy, realizing Forrestal‘s military 
policymaking goal. As Forrestal had, Dean advocated for military officers and proposed 
that they receive official policy-making authority. In his Report on the Atom, Dean 
argued that limiting policy formation to civilians was one of the ―fundamental faults‖ 
with government and explicitly called for a ―basic rearrangement of the lines of 
command, the assignment of responsibility‖ so that military officers could participate in 
policymaking at the national level.
8
 To preserve their influence, Dean and his military 
partners created an alternative reality, portraying themselves as servants to national 
security and radioactive fallout from U.S. weapons tests as harmless.  
National security implications, the use of weapons tests to generate emotions 
productive of appropriations, and the hazards of production and experimentation, all 
contributed to making the abuses of authority described here more significant than similar 
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exercises in autonomy that were characteristic of administrators in other postwar 
agencies.
9
 The nature of the AEC/DOD partnership meant that the institutional 
imperatives of both extended out from the program‘s center to their network of affiliates, 
magnifying both the significance of those objectives and created conditions for 
extraconstitutional abuses of authority. The collaborative relationship between influential 
members of the JCAE, Dean, and military officers, for example, compromised both 
congressional and presidential oversight and decision-making.
10
 It certainly eliminated 
any check on unwarranted expansion that Truman may have envisioned when he 
mandated that all military and nuclear requests be evaluated by special three-man 
committee of the Secretaries of State and Defense and the AEC that he created as an 
adjunct to the National Security Council. Instead of tempering military proposals, as 
Truman might have expected given the traditional civilian/military divide, the committee 
provided only an illusion of accountability and legitimacy while serving as a fast-track 
approval mechanism for AEC- and DOD-sponsored programs.
11
 Operationally, Dean‘s 
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partnership with the military fostered a re-emergence of Manhattan‘s wartime culture 
among program managers and officials and the reinforcement and reproduction of 
wartime practices (habitus) that determined the behavior of front-line personnel. Multiple 
factors, including a militaristic chain of command within the AEC‘s lower managerial 
tiers, among military officers, radiation safety personnel, and contractors, anti-communist 
fears and secrecy, military urgency, and appeals to national security all fit Cover‘s model 
of ―requisite cues‖ for the suppression of individual, ―conscious,‖ behavior based on 
social or ethical norms to the hierarchies of institutional authority. Such cues engendered 
obedience and loyalty among lower-level officials, managers, and technicians—those 
who understood the implications of radioactive exposure and who, were it not for the 
persistence of the institutional wartime culture and militarization that governed the 
priorities and decision-making of intermediate level officials, might have alerted public 
officials or the public about abuses of authority and reckless, irresponsible conduct.
12
 
This re-evaluation of Dean‘s tenure as AEC Chairman and his administration of 
continental testing in Nevada uncovers the importance of the program‘s militarization 
and the product of that process: the self-interested use of the program and 
experimentation that was Atomic Governance. Following a brief overview of the 
continental test site, the first section of this chapter focuses on the significance of AEC 
leadership and of the AEC/military partnership to the management of weapons testing. It 
shows that Dean was a pivotal actor in the program‘s history, assessing what he knew the 
dangers of atmospheric weapons testing to be and, using extracts from the AEC‘s reports, 
illustrating the institutional abandonment of Lilienthal‘s emphasis on program safety in 
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favor of weapons testing that was the priority of Dean‘s regime. The next section 
examines the strategies Dean used to deceive Truman and other elected officials. The 
history shows that Dean succeeded in keeping Truman and other elected officials in the 
dark about the types of tests that were being conducted in Nevada, the safety of those 
tests, and misled them about the progress of tactical weapons development. For the 
Army, especially, the promise of tactical weapons and the possibility that weapons tests 
and maneuvers could persuade the public and congressmen to support large numbers of 
ground troops had motivated the military‘s desire for a continental testing site in the first 
place and those ambitions dictated the way that officers used the Site. Publicizing tests 
and maneuvers to achieve support for conventional ground troops and for expansion of 
the AEC‘s weapons program is the subject of the third section of this chapter. It sets the 
stage for the fourth, which evaluates military maneuvers and civil defense exercises. It 
highlights the primacy of publicity to officers who subjected soldiers to ―live‖ nuclear 
exercises and the negligible benefit of those exercises to the CDA. The primary 
beneficiaries of the CDA‘s participation at weapons tests were the AEC and the DOD. 
CDA involvement with weapons testing generated very little of the public and political 
support that its officials expected and very little practical knowledge, too, because of the 
AEC‘s reluctance to share with the CDA information about monitoring, shielding, and 
sheltering. In the process, CDA lost out while the AEC received positive publicity by 
appearing to partner with the CDA. For its part, the armed forces gained additional public 
and political support for military solutions because CDA publicity in newspapers and on 
television and circulation of nuclear devastated ―doom towns‖ increased the desire for 
military solutions.  
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Much has been written about what happened at the Nevada Test Site. The goal of 
this chapter is to explain why. The AEC and military officers used continental weapons 
tests to keep alive the fear of an enemy nuclear attack while claiming reassuringly that 
fallout from American testing posed no danger to participants or to the public.
13
 Wartime 
strategies of control ensured that the message went uncontested, while officials in other 
federal agencies influenced by it became advocates for Dean and his military partners, 
unwittingly helping them to achieve their domestic political goals. After ―Fox‖, the fifth 
shot of the first series of tests caused radioactive snow to fall on Washington, D. C., for 
example, the head of the Radiation Section of the Bureau of Standards remarked that ―he 
wouldn‘t mind eating the snow.‖14 Dean and his military partners exploited the program 
and experimentation and it was this process—and not ignorance, developmental 
requirements, or national security imperatives—that created the conditions for hazardous 
weapons testing.
15
 The history in this chapter shows that Dean, AEC administrators, and 
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their military partners misled President Truman and members of Congress about the types 
of weapons being detonated in Nevada, the pace of weapons development, and the 
dangers of radioactive fallout. This was Atomic Governance. And the waste and suffering 
that was a product of the atmospheric testing era was a direct result the self-interested use 
of the program by AEC officials and military officers. 
Weapons Testing and the Nevada Test Site: An Introduction 
The Nevada Test Site is located 65 miles northeast of Las Vegas, Nevada, and 
now covers 1,350 square miles, twice the 680 square miles that President Truman 
claimed for it on January 11, 1951. Of the first five tests in Nevada that comprised the 
Ranger series, two were one-kiloton, two others were eight-kiloton detonations, while the 
                                                                                                                                                 
example of the heavy-handedness of the nuclear establishment, the ―surreptitious tradition of nuclear 
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last test, ―Fox‖, was, at twenty-two kilotons, larger than the bomb that devastated 
Nagasaki. ―Fox‖ shattered showroom windows in downtown Las Vegas and illuminated 
the Los Angeles skyline. The blast was felt 500 miles from the Site: south of the Mexican 
border and as far north as Boise, Idaho.
16
 Despite these dramatic effects, there was little 
local opposition to the Site‘s creation. With payroll for preliminary construction 
approaching four million dollars, an amount equivalent to thirty-three million dollars in 
2008, most residents and the local newspaper decided that the prospect of prosperity 
promised by future construction, filled hotel rooms, and nationwide exposure were 
compelling reasons for believing the assurances of Dean and other AEC officials that 
inconvenience would be the most serious consequence of weapons testing.
17
 After Dean 
learned from the Ranger series that the AEC‘s statements about the safety of testing were 
effective in quelling fears and oppositions and that weapons could be detonated without 
evidence of immediate serious injury to participants or off-site civilians, bomb yields 
(and publicity) increased. Before the year ended, Dean‘s AEC approved a thirty-one 
kiloton continental detonation. Within its second year, the Site was renamed the Nevada 
Proving Ground (NPG), becoming the sort of continental weapons testing facility that the 
military had repeatedly requested and that Truman and repeatedly refused to approve.
18
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In mid 1953, after Lewis Strauss replaced Dean, the AEC allowed the detonations of a 
sixty-one kiloton air-drop bomb in 1953 and a seventy-four kiloton bomb suspended from 
a balloon in 1957. By the end of 1958 when President Eisenhower and Premier 
Khrushchev agreed to what turned out to be a temporary moratorium on atmospheric 
weapons testing, 128 detonations had been conducted at the AEC‘s Nevada Site.19  
The Pacific Proving Grounds (PPG) was the AEC‘s first testing facility. It was 
located within the Pacific Trust Territory at Bikini and Eniwetok Atolls, 200 miles from 
the base at Kwajalein and approximately 2200 and 2370 nautical miles, respectively, 
southwest of Hawaii. The site of the Crossroads, it was purposefully remote, with 
―hundreds of miles of open sea in the direction in which the prevailing winds would carry 
radio-active particles.‖20 Initially, its scientific facilities and housing were primitive, 
semi-permanent, structures funded by the AEC and constructed by the military for the 
Sandstone series of tests in 1948, when a force of 9,000-10,000 traveled to the site in 
planes and ships with 250,000 tons of cargo.
21
 In 1949, Lilienthal‘s AEC improved the 
PPG in anticipation of increased developmental testing requirements, constructing 
permanent administrative and technical facilities, housing for a resident community of 
scientists, military and civilian personnel, barracks for troops, accommodations for 
construction workers, and equipment storage. The AEC also made provisions for 
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biological and medical experiments to investigate the hazards of nuclear radiation, 
building a research library and establishing a ―breeding colony‖ on an island at Eniwetok 
so that scientists could work with ―acclimatized, calibrated animals.‖22 Two chapels, 
medical and dental facilities, barbershops, theatres, recreation rooms, playfields, and 
fenced lawns rounded out the amenities aimed at making life at the remote location a 
little easier for residents.
23
 By Fall 1951, the PPG supported a population of 
approximately 10,000 people committed to the business of testing nuclear weapons.
24
 
Stateside, the AEC established a permanent unit at Los Alamos, ―J‖ Division, to 
coordinate ―activities at the proving ground [to formulate] scientific experiments for full-
scale tests‖ and to ―direct relevant research.‖25 It was ―J‖ Division‘s desire to conduct 
some interim experiments that were too large for their Los Alamos facility that Dean used 
to prime the JCAE in November 1950 for continental testing and in December to gain 
Truman‘s approval for creation of the Nevada Site and experimentation.26 The PPG was 
the site for 105 atmospheric nuclear tests, among them the largest in the nation‘s arsenal, 
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twenty-eight H-bombs in the megaton range; and occasionally served as a supply depot 
for the Nevada Site.
27
  
After the creation of the continental site, all but the largest weapons were tested in 
Nevada. The first were air drops that caused little surface disturbance and reduced the 
amount of material radioactivized compared to weapons detonated near, on, or under, the 
ground. As testing continued, tower, surface, and subsurface shots became common and 
close-in fallout became a problem even as radioactive exposures nationwide increased.
28
 
The only health effects that the AEC/military worked to prevent as it conducted larger 
types of weapons tests were acute ones, those that would draw attention to the dangers of 
testing, spawn negative publicity, and perhaps threaten continental testing altogether.
29
 In 
April 1952 the convenient experimental site in Nevada that Los Alamos scientists 
expected to use only for small, preliminary developmental experiments became the 
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military‘s proving ground, a convenient place for the military tests and maneuvers that 
the AEC (under Lilienthal) anticipated would take place at the PPG.
30
 It was immensely 
popular. As with the Pacific Site, where a Los Alamos scientist complained that 
experiments were made more complicated because ―thousands‖ of people ―dreamed up 
all sorts of reasons for being there,‖31 the Site‘s convenience and the relative economy of 
experimentation meant that officers with AFSWP and the Army came up with all sorts of 
reasons and types of weapons to test.  
Like a forest fire that generates its own weather, the Nevada Site spurred AEC 
and military expansion and funding for both skyrocketed. Within six months of its 
creation, the AEC asked for additional funds to maintain the pace of development. 
Truman took their request to Congress in August, asking for $233,000,000 to supplement 
the $1,200,000,000 already approved for 1952.
32
 In October 1951 then Secretary of 
Defense Lovett used the AEC‘s supplemental as a reason for increased DOD funding, 
clearing its own supplemental request with the JCAE so that the military could take 
advantage of the AEC‘s expansion. In a tangible expression of the centrality of the 
atomic program to the exploding military appropriations of the early 1950s, the Secretary 
anticipated needing enough funds to make use of the ―several hundred percent increase‖ 
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of uranium and plutonium that the Secretary wanted for the armed forces.
33
 Nevada 
testing was the direct provocation for both of these requests. As Dean and other AEC 
officials explained, the first series of tests resulted in enough technological progress in 
weapons development that money the AEC had expected to spend in 1953 could now be 
spent in 1952. Moreover, the Site had made testing so convenient that the AEC expected 
it to be a routine occurrence: ―We will have much more frequent tests in the future.‖34 At 
the end of his term as Chairman, Dean took pride in championing military causes, 
boasting that between 1951-1953 he had doubled the AEC‘s capacity to satisfy the 
military‘s desires.35  
And yet, Dean‘s support for military weapons testing resulted in duplicative and 
unnecessary testing that consumed military resources and reduced the availability of the 
Site for developmental testing and slowed progress. Appeals to national security and 
claims of ―military urgency‖ notwithstanding, the AEC used these tactics to approve 
duplicative or unnecessary tests and, in at least one instance in 1952 to secure same-day 
permission to verify data already derived from earlier tests.
36
 Dean‘s AEC provided 
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―civilian‖ cover to the Army and AFSWP‘s self-interested use of the program. 
Capitalizing on that support and the Site‘s convenience, officers adopted what amounted 
to a ―cafeteria‖ approach. Ten months after testing began, Los Alamos‘s Director wrote 
that the laboratory‘s efforts to satisfy military demands for a different sorts of weapons 
may have lent variety to the stockpile but it hamstrung both research and development, 
consuming enough of the laboratory‘s time and energy to impede ―longer range 
progress.‖37 Frustrated after military officers complained about Los Alamos‘s ability to 
meet military demands, the Director lashed out: 
It is the subject of no little Laboratory bitterness that these criticisms are 
made of the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory at precisely the time when 
it has apparently been a military necessity to take a retrogressive step in 
Laboratory philosophy and return to the production field.
38
  
 
By January 1953, the factor governing continental weapons testing was the 
functional capacity of the Site determined by routines already established. At that time, 
officials envisioned more of the same: laboratory requirements would ―approximate the 
effective capacity of the NPG with regard to frequency, yield and type,‖ and with the 
addition of tests in the works for the Spring 1953 series, ―future tests [would] conform 
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generally as to types with those tested in the past.‖39 Dean and AEC administrators also 
gave Army officers permission to test weapons the AEC‘s own experts previously 
decided were not suitable for detonation in an arid location, causing contamination 
problems as early as mid 1952 that threatened the use of the site for scientific, 
developmental, tests.
40
 Within two years of the Site‘s creation, Los Alamos scientists 
complained that they would need another experimental site if it continued to be 
monopolized by the military, civil defense, and for the ―reportorial press.‖41  
From Safety to Risk 
Dean‘s primary interest was to protect the autonomy that AEC officials and his 
military partners enjoyed over the program and its resources. The extent of this 
protectionism was more deliberate and comprehensive than the carelessness, ignorance, 
negligence, and short-sightedness that have become legendary characteristics of the 
AEC‘s history.42 During the atmospheric era, AEC officials and military officers 
sacrificed safety in the interests of promotion, to economize, to accelerate testing 
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schedules; and, on occasion, to avoid inconveniencing or disappointing congressmen, 
dignitaries, and other guests invited to witness a detonation. In addition to outright 
deception, this required (a) an institutional marginalization of the standards for safety that 
Lilienthal imposed as an institutional priority and inculcated in production facilities and 
laboratories; and, (b) the downplaying of the hazards of radioactivity and fallout that had 
circulated since the Hiroshima bombing.  
Lilienthal had responded to the uncertainties spawned by the debate between 
experts who believed in the ―no threshold‖ concept of radiation exposure—where no 
exposure was without danger—and those who argued for adoption of a ―low threshold‖ 
standard by trying to reduce exposures to the lowest extent possible. He also backed the 
setting of dose standards by an independent authority.
43
 The matter became acute as 
Lilienthal reached the end of his tenure as the increased use of radioactive isotopes in 
peacetime applications coincided with the increased experimentation and exposure 
potential brought on by the decision to develop an H-bomb. This precautionary approach 
evaporated with Lilienthal‘s resignation, militarization, and Dean‘s expansionary goals. 
For Dean, downplaying the hazards of continental weapons testing was made 
easier by Truman‘s hydrogen bomb decision. The prospect of a weapon thousands of 
times larger than the bombs that had devastated Hiroshima and Nagasaki gave those 
supportive of the AEC/military partnership a reference point for bomb magnitude that 
dwarfed the destructive potential for earlier bombs. In January 1951, the same month that 
testing begin in Nevada, William L. Laurence, the New York Times science writer who 
had chronicled the Manhattan Project, portrayed the ferocity of the new bomb in The Hell 
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Bomb.
44
 After testing began, even participants failed to grasp the yield of bomb tests in 
Nevada. In one instance, the memories and images of the column and mushroom cloud of 
seawater and vapor that descended after the underwater ―Baker‖ bomb to swamp ships in 
Bikini‘s harbor created the mistaken impression that the bombs detonated in Nevada were 
not, as was often the case, larger, but instead seemed to be much smaller ―firecrackers.‖45 
By emphasizing the size of weapons tested in the Pacific and the prospect of the 
increased yields and destructive capacity of thermonuclear weapons, Dean‘s statements 
and AEC publicity caused even more slippage in the way the general public, elected 
officials, and federal officials, AEC personnel and contractors, and military officers 
thought about atom bombs—once the ―ultimate weapon,‖ before anyone had witnessed 
an H-bomb explosion.
46
 Dean‘s AEC also downplayed the significance of manmade 
sources of radioactive contamination by playing up the ubiquitous presence of natural 
sources of radioactive energy in everyday life.
47
  
The following section compares two Semi-Annual Reports to Congress, one put 
together toward the end of Lilienthal‘s tenure and another at the end of Dean‘s, to 
illustrate the significance of the AEC chairman‘s goals to the program‘s standards for 
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safety. Because both Dean and Lilienthal used the Act‘s requirement that they submit 
reports to Congress as a vehicle for documenting their achievements and as a means of 
persuading Congress and the public alike to accept their vision of the program‘s value 
and its future, the reports provide insight into their personalities and motivations. The 
reports also illustrate how the goals and approaches of commissioners determined the 
priority of AEC precautionary standards, rendering suspect the claims by Dean and 
military officers that advances in scientific understanding were responsible for changes in 
safety standards during the early years of atmospheric testing. The reports mark an 
administrative shift in perspective that occurred after Lilienthal‘s resignation and the 
institutional transformation that occurred with Dean‘s chairmanship and the advent of 
continental testing. The latter illustrates the persuasive strategies used by the AEC to 
garner acceptance for weapons tests and the fine line the militarized AEC walked 
between the skillful re-packaging of information and deception.  
In July 1950 the AEC awarded pride of place to the dangers of radioactive 
exposure in its Eighth Semi-Annual Report. From the title of Part One of the Report, 
―Control of Radiation Hazards in the Atomic Energy Program,‖ to a cover page,  a 
montage of photographs of warning signs from AEC production facilities that featured 
not only the common Danger and trefoil warning, but also handwritten signs: ―STAY 
OUT FLOOR HIGHLY CONTAMINATED,‖ ―CONTAMINATED GLASSWARE‖ and 
special purpose signs, ―HOT SINK,‖ ―FOR ALPHA CONTAMINATED CLOTHING 
ONLY,‖ ―HOT TONGS ONLY,‖ ―REMOVE RUBBERS/CONTAMINATED 
BOUNDARY THIS EDGE,‖ a somewhat mysterious ―ABOSLUTELY NO SHAVING 
PERMITTED WITHIN RESTRICTED AREA‖ sign, and a full page image of a chained 
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and padlocked door with ―RADIATION HAZARD HOT RUN‖ on facing the first page 
of the report, the report‘s theme was unmistakable. Clearly, the AEC wanted to impress 
on readers the uncommon dangers of radioactivity and make them aware of some of the 
precautions necessary to protect workers at AEC facilities. The report began with a 
recitation of the AEC‘s legislative mandate to maintain safety and cited portions of the 
Atomic Energy Act that outlined the Commission‘s duty to ―protect the health of 
employees and of the public in carrying out its program of research, production, and 
weapons testing.‖ The second paragraph reinforced the montage‘s portrayal of the critical 
issue of safety by quoting from testimony by a Manhattan administrator following the 
war that ―the atomic energy program [was] ‗by long odds the most dangerous 
manufacturing process in which men have ever engaged.‘‖48 The AEC expanded on those 
two themes through 161 pages, that included specific details about exposure and graphic 
charts that portrayed dose ranges and health effects, subheadings such as, ―The Hazards 
of Radiation,‖ ―How Radiations Cause Damage, and ―Where the Hazards Arise,‖ pictures 
of radiation protection equipment, and discussions of protocols designed to ensure the 
safe handling of radioactive material.
49
 While adopting a low-threshold standard, 15 rem 
per year below which exposures ―may safely be regarded as insignificant,‖ the AEC had 
set a goal for its facilities and contractors to reduce exposure to the greatest possible 
extent. ―When knowledge of the effects of many kinds of exposure is fragmentary and 
incomplete, as it is today, the only safe procedure is to include very large safety 
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factors.‖50 To demonstrate the success of this commitment, the AEC reported that the 
average of the ten highest exposures at Hanford for 1949 was ―1.1 r, or 93 percent below 
the permissible limit; at Oak ridge … the average was 4.2 r, or 72 percent below the 
limit.‖51 Additionally, while noting that non-AEC affiliated institutions allowed 
―substantially greater‖ exposures and considered them safe, and that there were valid 
arguments to be made about whether the cost of preventing exposures—estimated for 
construction of facilities alone to be about twelve times the cost of a plant dealing with 
non-radioactive material—could be reduced without significantly compromising safety, 
the AEC reaffirmed its commitment to safety above all:  
In the view of the Commission, upward adjustment of permissible levels 
of radiation can be allowed only if it is determined with reasonable 
certitude that higher exposures will be harmless. … It has preferred to err 
on the side of safety and it is still possible that some standards may need 
to be tightened with the increase of knowledge about the long-range 
effects of radiation.
52
  
 
The AEC dedicated a short section on military testing, ―Control of Hazards at 
Weapons Tests,‖ and opened it with a frank statement: ―The explosion of atomic 
weapons in testing operation releases large amounts of all types of ionizing radiation,‖ 
and noted that of the six weapons detonated during peacetime, there had never been an 
injury related to the explosion itself but that during recovery operations, some contractor 
personnel had suffered beta burns to their hands.
53
 Except for a summary of the tests held 
to date, the remainder of the information in the section was drawn from the final report of 
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1948‘s Operation Sandstone because radiation safety for that operation was under the 
sole direction of the Joint Task Force Commander. Among the advance precautions were 
two weeks of lectures to train radiation safety personnel, full dress rehearsals with 
departure, re-entry, and evacuation practice. To prevent injuries to personnel during the 
tests, the test island was completely evacuated and all personnel and ships were moved at 
least ten miles away. To prevent unintended exposures, the downwind area was charted 
and patrolled, with no ship allowed to enter a zone where fallout might occur.
54
  
The 1950 Report portrayed the program as a system where safety was not just a 
facet of the operation, but integral to the process of development itself. This extended 
through to the conclusion, where pending scientific discoveries of less costly ways to 
prevent injury from radioactive exposures, ―the AEC can fulfill its obligations only by 
taking all feasible precautions to safeguard workers and the general public against the 
potential hazards of … production and development.‖55 In Lilienthal‘s AEC, the expense 
and trouble of safety precautions was warranted not only by what was not yet known 
about radioactive hazards, but also by virtue of the AEC‘s obligations under the Atomic 
Energy Act. The philosophy—one that had come under attack in early 1950 by Los 
Alamos officials who complained to Shields Warren that meeting the stricter standards 
arrived at by an international committee would be costly, difficult to achieve, and limit 
the laboratory‘s progress—did not survive Lilienthal‘s term. 56  
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As Chairman, Dean fostered a culture that rewarded decisions that streamlined 
increases in production and experimentation at the cost of safety. He encouraged public 
and institutional acceptance of his pro-military ambitions and program expansion by 
downplaying the hazards of experimentation in ways that shifted responsibility for harm 
away from the AEC and its administrators. He brought about an institutional 
transformation from the top down and presided over a regime that squeezed out 
Lilienthal‘s standard bearers. The result was a uniform, pro-military, pro-experimentation 
philosophy that dominated AEC decision-making.  
By 1953, the changed priorities of a militarized AEC were reflected in the AEC‘s 
Thirteenth Semi-Annual Report. Dean‘s AEC replaced the responsibility to balance 
development with the prevention of known and potential hazards—that Lilienthal 
regarded as a legislative mandate—with a vision of the AEC as a military provider 
charged with a duty to develop weapons and to do so economically. In the revised 
concept, this duty included continental weapons testing as a matter of course. It also 
sidelined the issue of long-term illness caused by radiation exposure, taking only those 
precautions that were incontrovertible, focusing almost entirely on those acute injures 
that resulted from high level exposures.  
Selections from the 1953 report illustrate that Dean‘s AEC had eradicated the 
notion that radioactive hazards were inevitable and replaced it with the position that 
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weapons testing was the inevitable quotient and hazard was a manageable quantity. 
Under the heading ―The Need for Nuclear Test Detonations,‖ the AEC explained that 
experimentation was necessary because although it was possible ―to evaluate many 
weapons principles and designs in the laboratory or by mathematical computation … 
under certain circumstances, the only practical method of evaluation is that of actually 
detonating a nuclear ‗gadget,‘ or device, to test the design or principle involved.‖57 It 
emphasized the economic benefits of continental testing no less than six times; claimed 
forthrightly that testing was safe at least three times; and, drawing from the twenty tests 
conducted by the time the report was issued, mentioned at least seven times that no one 
had been harmed or exposed to radiation from fallout that exceeded their maximum 
permissible dose.
 58
 While the AEC advised the report‘s readers that it considered the 
―maximum permissible levels‖ for external radiation (0.3 r/week), it finished that same 
sentence with a legalistic qualification that it should not be taken to mean that the 
―maximum permissible level‖ was hazardous. The AEC argued that it took a dose of 25 
rem ―given in a few minutes or hours‖ to ―produce detectable effects on the blood‖ and 
even then, that dose would not ―so far as is known‖ cause irreparable damage.59 
Qualifications such as ―detectable‖ highlight the AEC‘s interest in discussing only short-
term, observable, health effects. Moreover, the AEC worked to create an impression that 
it was actually taking a conservative approach to radiation safety by diluting exposure 
levels through averaging and creating imaginary distance between the AEC and the 
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experts who determined exposure thresholds. Citing a supposedly independent ―ad hoc 
committee composed of authorities in the fields of medicine and roentgenology‖ whose 
members were, in fact, connected in one way or another with the AEC and its programs, 
the Report indicated that the committee had determined that a dose ten times the AEC‘s 
―maximum permissible‖ .03/week dose, or 3 r, was safe whether it was an accumulated 
dosage received over a long period of time or all at once during a ten week period.
60
 The 
AEC also benefited from the military maneuvers, using soldiers participating in exercises 
to ally fear and downplay dangers:  ―thousands‖ of military personnel had been in 
foxholes as close as 7,000 yards away from ground zero without being injured.
61
 The 
AEC also drew selectively on the history of radium exposure to downplay the dangers of 
internal radiation. Ignoring the fate of the radium dial painters altogether, the AEC 
reported that people who had accidentally or therapeutically absorbed and ―carried in 
their skeletons‖ a one-microgram measure of radium (ten times the AEC‘s permissible 
limit) exhibited ―no observable damage.‖62 It used comparisons between therapeutic and 
naturally occurring radioactivity and manmade radioactive fallout from testing to 
reinforce the notion that weapons testing had been conducted well within the margins of 
safety and presented no danger to those on or off site.  
Even the structure of the report relegated the issue of safety to a level below that 
of development and funding. The AEC subtitled its January 1953 Report Assuring Public 
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Safety in Continental Weapons Tests, but relegated the discussion of that particular issue 
to Part Three. Preceding it were ―Major Activities in Atomic Energy Programs, July-
December 1952‖ (Part One) and ―Condensed AEC Annual Financial Report, Fiscal Year 
1952‖ (Part Two.) At forty-eight pages, the final segment on safety took up slightly more 
than one-third of the document, excluding appendices.
63
 The first three paragraphs of the 
section described the location of the site; avoided the word bomb by referring to the 
twenty ―explosions‖ there as ―tests;‖ and identified the possible offsite effects of such 
―tests‖ as blast waves, radioactive fallout, and flashes of light. Of the three, the only one 
the AEC suggested was dangerous was the light flash, which was ―potentially a source of 
hazard to persons as far as 30 miles away.‖ The fourth paragraph characterized people 
who expressed concerns about testing in ―some communities‖ as ―uninformed‖ and their 
worries unfounded or based on misunderstanding or misinformation. In this way, the 
AEC shifted the burden for any anxiety about fallout to the people themselves, who had 
become unnecessarily worried because they had used measurement equipment 
―improperly,‖ had relied on ―faulty interpretation of [equipment] readings,‖ or who had 
become unnecessarily alarmed about any level of fallout, no matter how small, because 
they did not realize ―that they are continuously exposed to radiation from natural 
sources.‖64 Reinforcing the continuing presence of naturally occurring radioactivity, the 
report noted that fallout caused an ―increase in natural radiation.‖ The authors included 
two different discussions under ―Effects of Weapons Tests‖ subheadings. The first 
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contained four ―general statements‖ about testing and presumed a high level of 
confidence in AEC decision-making, pointing out that ―no person had been exposed to a 
harmful level of fallout,‖ that no hazardous accumulation of radioactivity had built up in 
the soil or at dangerous levels in food,‖ and that fallout was ―far below the level which 
could cause a detectable increase in mutations or inheritable variations,‖ as if to suggest 
that the only possible long term effect from radioactive fallout was a generational one, 
and noted that although blast waves had caused property damage, no people had been 
injured.
65
  
The second discussion described an atomic explosion and included separate 
explanations of blast effects: flash, air blast, influences on the weather and the 
troposphere, ozonosphere, and ionosphere. A section on damage, settlement, and 
mitigation pointed out that the AEC paid no claims for property damage over $1,000.00. 
The footnoted details indicate that total settlements increased as testing levels and the 
size of ―devices‖  increased, with 113 claims totaling $15,000 for the first series; 
$27,929.59 paid for 268 allowed claims after the second—the result of a single ―blast‖ in 
November—and $42,929 paid to settle 381 claims after the third. The section included 
language claiming vaguely that ―many variables‖ prevented the AEC from avoiding off-
site damage. It did so in a way that reinforced the notion that both weapons testing and 
damage was something that the public needed to learn to accommodate, shifted the 
responsibility for the damage away from the AEC and toward the property owners. The 
AEC argued that people offsite needed to accept some of the burden for preventing 
property damage. For example, the Report noted that damage might not have occurred 
had it not been for the age and construction of buildings, suggesting that residents should 
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have upgraded or reinforced their buildings. About broken windows, the AEC pointed out 
that no damage would have occurred had doors or windows been opened to equalize the 
pressure of the blast.
66
  
Under ―Establishment of the Nevada Proving Ground,‖ a discussion of the 
national security value of weapons tests and the cost savings of continental testing 
preceded a section entitled ―Possible Hazard From Fall-Out.‖ Ironically, that section 
drew attention away from the possibility that fallout might harm people. What it did do 
was to create a historical narrative that validated the assertions of Dean‘s AEC that 
continental testing posed no dangers. The story left out enough details to imply that only 
an overabundance of caution had caused testing to be conducted remotely, an impression 
that in the language of the report had since been authoritatively revised. According to that 
history, in 1947 a question arose about whether ―persons or property‖ might be damaged 
by blast or fallout and was settled temporarily with a decision to conduct testing 
―overseas‖ until ―it could be established more definitely that continental detonations 
would not endanger the public health and safety.‖ The three paragraph summary 
mentioned little about what had been learned during earlier tests.
67
 As with the JCS‘s 
Evaluation Report for Operation Crossroads, the AEC excluded information that would 
compromise its goals.  
It overlooked entirely the hazards acknowledged, and provided for, during Pacific 
weapons tests; made no mention of Operation Crossroads and what was learned about 
fallout from the two tests at Bikini. Only in passing did it acknowledge the 1948 
                                                 
66
 Thirteenth Semi-Annual Report, 83-89.  
 
67
 Thirteenth Semi-Annual Report, 80.  
 
455 
 
Sandstone series at Eniwetok that were the first peacetime tests conducted by the AEC. 
The two hazards it did discuss were portrayed as incidental, easily remedied, and minor. 
Drawing from the pre-AEC Trinity test at Alamogordo, the report noted that cattle had 
suffered ―skin burns,‖ with the only ―detectable‖ damage being the ―subsequent graying 
of hair on their backs.‖ The authors prevented readers from making sense of the 
relationship between these skin burns and Trinity by omitting the information gathered by 
Stafford Warren and delivered as part of his report on the test and in talks that he gave to 
small audiences afterward, that the cattle suffering radiation burns from Trinity‘s twenty-
two kiloton detonation had been grazing at distances that ranged from fifty to one-
hundred miles from the site.
68
 Authors left it to the reader‘s imagination to estimate the 
animals‘ proximity to ground zero with an unspecific comment that they were ―near‖ the 
test site.
69
 The other hazard mentioned was the fogging of film after the Trinity test, a 
material that the AEC singled out as unique, one that was ―extremely sensitive to 
radiation.‖  
The selective release of information about radioactivity that Dean adopted as an 
extension of Hull‘s ―re-education‖ campaign and the methods for classification that 
Groves and Nichols managed for the JCS led to uninformed decision-making in media 
circles and increased radiation hazards far from the AEC‘s proving grounds. In 1953, for 
example, the same year that the AEC issued its Thirteenth Semi-Annual Report, a 
member of the AEC‘s Advisory Committee for Biology and Medicine, Giocchino Failla, 
reported that he learned that the Navy had been using Strontium as an ingredient in the 
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button markers it used to mark passageways in the event of a power outage.
70
 Failla‘s 
comments included a reminder to the group that Strontium was ―one of the most 
hazardous materials ever to have [been] distributed.‖ Despite that fact, the institutional 
urge to protect the AEC‘s autonomy and authority seems to have prevented Failla from 
warning either his informant or Navy officials directly about the danger of using 
Strontium for its glow-in-the-dark properties. Instead, he waited and brought the issue 
before the Committee at one of its regularly-scheduled meetings. That same urge was 
reflected in the Committee‘s recommendations to give the problem additional thought 
and that Failla and John Bugher, then-Director of the AEC‘s Division of Biology and 
Medicine, ―consult and arrange for calling the problem to the attention of the proper 
people.‖71 The ignorance that led to the use of Strontium as a material for markers was a 
direct result of the way that the Military Establishment and the Military Liaison 
Committee used its ability to limit in self-serving ways what became known about 
hazards. And it was so effective that once it had become part of the AEC‘s administrative 
philosophy with Dean‘s chairmanship, Dean had confidence that the decisions he and 
other AEC administrators made to permit risky weapons tests in Nevada would not leak 
out of the organization to cast suspicion on the alternative history relayed in the AEC‘s 
1953 Report.  
Dean‘s enthusiasm for weapons testing and satisfying his military partners 
combined with his authority over the circulation of information instigated a pattern of 
detonating weapons with yields that were larger, and with methods, that exceeded the 
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recommended boundaries for continental, desert, experiments that AEC and military 
experts established early in the Site‘s history. In a phenomenon known to exist since 
Trinity, and one that was known to be exacerbated by the aridity of the Nevada Site, the 
amount of fallout produced by a test was not just a product of yield, but also by how 
close to the ground the explosion occurred. Both the AEC and military officers knew that 
by detonating a bomb at an altitude sufficient to prevent the fireball from reaching the 
ground, they could reduce substantially the amount of material that would be 
radioactivized, drawn up into the mushroom cloud, and dispersed through air currents and 
winds far from the site of the detonation. Before the Site‘s creation, the Director of 
Military Applications implied that the bombs to be exploded in Nevada would not 
produce fallout on the scale of the Trinity test. In paperwork the DMA submitted to Dean 
(at his request) in December 1950, ―a substantial improvement in predicted safety‖ over 
the Trinity experience could be achieved through elevation and paving, factors that would 
limit fallout to such an extent that yield boundaries of twenty-five kiloton could 
―certainly‖ and fifty kiloton ―probably‖ be ―detonated within acceptable safety limits‖72  
As Richard B. Holtzman (an AEC advisor engaged at the Radiological Physics 
Division of Argonne National Laboratory) noted, the only types of tests envisioned for 
Nevada when testing began were air-drops and neither the aridity nor the meteorological 
characteristics of the Nevada Site seem to have factored into test planning. Holtzman 
explained during a meeting in 1951 after the Ranger series of tests that air delivered and 
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detonated weapons reduced the possibility that inaccurate weather forecasts would result 
in dangerous fallout dispersals: 
I don‘t think you can count on the meteorologists to do the forecasting 
here with any degree of reliability … the real facts are that at Ranger we 
did not forecast the winds with any great degree of accuracy, we just 
didn‘t care what the winds were because we were so sure with air bursts 
that it would be all right.
73
 
 
Ironically, the purpose of the meeting Holtzman attended was to come up with a way to 
accommodate military requests to test bombs at and below the surface to determine how 
yield and placement affected the size of a crater left after a detonation. The tests were 
expected to produce so much radioactive contamination that, even after the creation of 
the Nevada Site, the upper echelon planned to conduct the tests at Amchitka, a place 
remote enough to prevent the possibility that fallout would lead to overexposures.
74
 
Sometime after Secretary of Defense George Marshall submitted the Amchitka plan to 
the NSC for approval and submission to the President in May 1951, lower-level officers 
asked for and received AEC approval for a surface and a subsurface test for Nevada. 
―Sugar‖ and ―Uncle‖ conducted on November 19 and 29, 1951, multiplied what 
Holtzman called the ―uncertainties‖ of testing in Nevada.75 Three years later, and in 
response to a slightly different problem—reducing on-site radioactive contamination 
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because internal radioactive exposures had become a ―considerable problem‖ for 
personnel cleaning up after detonations—, an AEC committee reiterated the same 
recommendations it had earlier: tests should be detonated at higher elevations and the soil 
underneath detonations stabilized. Thus, after two years of testing, the AEC had not 
implemented protocols that the DMA had implied in 1950 would be employed to reduce 
the dangers of experimentation.  
Significantly, AEC officials recognized at that time that its failure to implement 
those rudimentary precautions had exposed workers to potentially dangerous levels of 
internal radioactive exposure that could jeopardize their health.
76
 Additionally, they 
recognized that their actions could have caused overexposures to people offsite. Still, 
they dismissed the significance of accumulating internal exposures as far as 200 miles 
from the site. In their words, people offsite had gotten lucky—they had not been exposed 
to as much radioactivity as they might have had it not been for the ―good fortune which 
has on occasion caused highly-radioactive clouds to wend their way in between 
communities.‖77 As for limiting fallout by paving underneath blasts, that recommendation 
was not adopted until March 1955.
78
 
Increasing fallout was a product of atomic governance. As the AEC and its 
military partners grew more confident in the use of deceit to mask the hazards of 
continental weapons tests and as they used the Site more frequently for promotional 
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demonstrations, the motivations for reducing fallout diminished in inverse proportion to 
increases in the frequency of testing higher-yield weapons, tower shots, or exotics, such 
as the atomic cannon—all of which produced high levels of radioactive fallout.79 During 
the first year of testing, Dean and AEC administrators sent a signal down the managerial 
tiers and out through program affiliates that it would accommodate military requests for 
tests that its own top health advisor found too dangerous to be conducted in Nevada. 
Shields Warren, then Director of the Division of Biology and Medicine, argued that 
because of the increased amount of fallout and inhalation hazard, the military should not 
detonate bombs from towers or conduct those tests in an area where the ocean would 
absorb the higher levels of fallout they would produce. Despite his objections, AEC 
administrators approved the military‘s request to conduct tower shots, a method that the 
military preferred because it provided greater control over detonation, measurement of 
yield, and because commanders could situate soldiers closer to detonations if they did not 
need to compensate for targeting problems with air drops.
80
 The need to justify 
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compromises such as these that Dean made to satisfy his military partners explains the 
inclusion of misleading discussions about radioactive hazards and the history of weapons 
testing contained in the AEC‘s 1953 Report.  
The Report is significant in the history of militarization for several reasons. It 
reflected the routinization within the program of the wartime strategies of control that had 
led to the program‘s militarization and Dean‘s elevation to Chairman. It incorporated the 
lessons learned over two years of continental testing about the practice and politics of 
exploitation, among which was that persistent references to cost savings and safety 
provided cover for the tremendous cost of expansion and the exploitation of the program 
by AEC officials, military officers, and an expanding network of affiliates. As such, it is 
an exemplar for how Dean and the AEC used deceit, euphemism, military urgency, 
secrecy, the selective use of information, and congenial scientific expertise, to create an 
artificial distinction between the dangers of radioactive fallout that would be produced by 
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an enemy‘s bomb and radioactive fallout produced by American bombs to serve 
domestic, institutional goals. 
After two years of continental testing, Dean‘s abdication of responsibility for 
civilian safety permeated the AEC. The factors that made experimentation needlessly 
dangerous were aspects of a deliberate institutional strategy that internalized, organized, 
and employed strategies of control specifically designed to guard against any threat to the 
autonomy of the AEC and its military partners. A review of the 1953 Upshot-Knothole 
series of tests and the commissioner‘s involvement as that series progressed illustrates 
how thoroughly the military‘s mission had penetrated into the AEC‘s administrative, 
managerial, and advisory structure. One of the most significant differences between 
earlier tests and the 1953 testing series was that Shields Warren, who had been the 
Director of the Division of Biology and Medicine under Lilienthal and who during his 
service under Dean took a firm stand against the military‘s most hazardous proposals, had 
resigned. His replacement, John C. Bugher, had little of Warren‘s familiarity with 
radioactivity and its effects. Before 1937, Bugher taught bacteriology and pathology at 
the University of Michigan and then joined the Rockefeller Foundation as a member of 
its field staff. In 1951, he became a consultant for nuclear affairs, and in 1952 Dean 
appointed him to be Warren‘s replacement. Like Dean, Bugher made the military‘s 
mission his own and he viewed fallout in a way similar to Dean: as more of a 
psychological or public relations problem than as a physiological one. Under Bugher, the 
Division served, like the entire AEC, the military. 
Throughout the planning and execution phases of Upshot-Knothole conducted 
from March through June 1953, Bugher and officials serving under him systematized 
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media manipulation and deception. The need to overemphasize the safety of even 
blatantly hazardous testing practices had become especially acute after 1952‘s test series 
drew complaints from Utahans and their Congressman Douglas R. Stringfellow, which 
were encapsulated an article in Salt Lake‘s Deseret News: ―We are living in the atomic 
age whether we like it or not, but we don‘t want the atomic age to be living with us.‖81 
With heavy fallout expected from the ten (later eleven) shots of the 1953 series, the AEC 
discussed ways to head off antagonism, privileging public relations over safety and 
developing an ―information plan concerning the public health aspects of spring tests.‖82 
As a measure of Dean‘s confidence in the loyalty of his subordinates, he and the 
Commissioners supported the efforts of intermediate-level officials such as Test Director 
Alvin C. Graves to instruct front-line officials in ways to deal with the public. The 
operational criteria for Upshot-Knothole contained an Order instructing radiation safety 
monitors in the fine art of public relations.
83
 Graves turned employees into functionaries, 
expected to deny that their presence was even necessary. Via a ―Test Director‘s 
Operations Order,‖ Graves warned the monitors ―to avoid causing fear‖ and provided 
sample dialogue. For example, monitors at check points were instructed to use innocuous 
euphemisms for radioactive material such as ―dust‖ or ―stuff‖: ―If we find traces of fall-
out inside your car, we may wash or vacuum the car at our expense, even if there isn‘t 
enough of the stuff to hurt anyone.‖ Graves also instructed monitors to downplay the 
radiation expected to register on monitors‘s geiger counters by dismissing it as a function 
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of the instrument‘s sensitivity and comparing radioactive fallout to what people might 
find on their bedside table:  
We fired an atomic bomb near here this morning and we are checking to 
see if any dust from it fell on the highways. Don‘t be worried if the needle 
kicks around a bit, because things like a luminous alarm clock can give 
you quite a reading on this meter.
84
  
 
The effort Graves put into organizing public relations to forestall negative 
responses the AEC expected from a series that would produce high levels of fallout was 
greater than the effort he put into establishing the criteria for a scientific study of fallout 
from the series. Only after the series was underway—and presumably the study as well—
did he revise his methodology to include areas ―at various distances up to 100 miles from 
ground zero.‖ 85 At the core of the AEC‘s approach was a policy to permit risky testing 
and to deny responsibility, a routine that was useful when it was caught unawares, as it 
was repeatedly during Upshot-Knothole.  
The ―Nancy‖ shot, the second of Upshot-Knothole detonated on March 24, 1953, 
was codenamed ―Nevada Zombie,‖ and at six and one-half tons was one of the largest 
weapons ever detonated from the top of a 300 ft. tower.
86
 The shot was one of the high-
profile media events of the series and dispersed radiation over 97 percent of America‘s 
counties, and caused enough losses of livestock to Southern Utah sheepmen that after 
AEC officials claimed the losses were the result of malnutrition, they filed suit.
87
 
                                                 
84
 ―Operation Order No. 1-53 (Upshot-Knothole).‖ 
 
85
 Test Director Alvin C. Graves to Personnel concerned with Weapons Test Report Programs, May 6, 
1953, esp. item 27.1, ―Study of Off-Site Air-Borne radioactive materials, Nevada Proving Grounds, 
Gamma Fallout originating from Upshot 2,3,4,5,7 and 8 at various distances.‖ CIC 14169.  
86
 For an account of Nancy and the effects of fallout from that test and others of Upshot-Knothole on 
sheepmen and people in Southern Utah, see John G. Fuller‘s account, The Day We Bombed Utah, passim.  
 
87
 For the nationwide fallout, see Miller, The U.S. Atlas of Nuclear Fallout, 143. The lawsuit was Bulloch v. 
U.S.  
465 
 
―Simon,‖ the seventh shot of Upshot-Knothole, was a forty-three kiloton device that was 
detonated from a 300 ft. high tower at 4:30 a.m. on April 25. The highest levels of fallout 
from ―Simon‖ fell in Clark County, Nevada, with the cities of Warren and Washington, 
New York, coming in second.
88
 Though AEC officials originally denied that radioactivity 
in New York was a product of ―Simon,‖ officials reversed themselves and took 
responsibility after students and a professor at the Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute 
measured extraordinarily high levels of radioactivity (270,000 times more radioactive 
than water approved for drinking.)
89
 In Troy, radioactivity on the ground reached 10 r., a 
dose more than double the 3.9 r. allowed for test site workers in a ten-week period (the 
3.9 measure already more than four times the .9 r. that Canadian and UK researchers 
recommended as a maximum weekly dose for workers and that AEC officials discounted 
as ―inadvisable‖). Still, the media coverage bore the AEC‘s touch. As reported in the New 
York Times, Albany, New York, had had an ―unfortunate‖ encounter with fallout carried 
in a thunderstorm. The admission came well after the time when officials could have 
warned residents about protective measures, and was issued with a ―no harm, no foul‖ 
reassuring statement that the levels of radioactivity were well below safe standards. As 
the Times put it, rain was the most important factor: the ―City is sopping but safe.‖90 The 
ninth shot, the thirty-two kiloton ―Harry,‖ has gone down in history for a number of 
reasons: it was the most efficient fission weapon under 100 kt ever detonated—one that 
did not go into production because it was technologically obsolete at the time it was 
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detonated—and it caused the most exposures for offsite gamma radiation of any 
continental test, so much that it has come to be known as ―Dirty Harry.‖91 At least one of 
the reasons for the calamity was that it was planned as a public relations spectacle. The 
AEC and military officers invited a large group of congressmen, visitors from Utah, and a 
group of national observers, expecting especially to impress Utahans with the AEC‘s 
safety precautions. ―Harry‖ was plagued from the start. A larger number of tests that 
Spring and insufficient planning meant that officials did not have on hand the steel tower 
they needed to detonate it. In place of the steel tower, they shipped in an aluminum tower 
from the PPG and used it, despite the fact that earlier tests had demonstrated that it was 
not a suitable material to use for Nevada tests.
92
 Originally scheduled for May 2, the test 
was first postponed because contamination from an earlier shot prevented workmen from 
entering the area. Rescheduled for May 16, rain and clouds caused the shot to be delayed 
a second time.
93
 On May 19, Test Director Graves gave the okay for ―Harry‖ to be 
detonated despite the fact that weather conditions had not much improved. Hundreds of 
spectators watched as the cloud climbed to 38,484 feet before it met up with a 91 mph 
northwest wind. Fallout from the blast moved offsite, across highways leading into and 
out of Las Vegas, and toward St. George, Utah. AEC monitors inspected ―hundreds‖ of 
vehicles at six check points, and washed nearly 100 contaminated cars—reassuring the 
motorists as Graves instructed. After St. George‘s Chief of Police complied with AEC 
requests to ask residents to stay indoors and to wash their clothes, he proudly claimed to 
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have done so ―as not to frighten or alarm the people,‖ adding that they had all taken it in 
stride. Fallout had become a routine occurrence in St. George: radioactive clouds ―always 
come over.‖94  
The experiences of Frank Butrico, one of the radiation monitors sent into St. 
George that day, reveals the power of the AEC‘s military culture to overcome the ethical 
responsibility felt by one technician as a result of the systematic privileging of public 
relations over safety. When Butrico picked up radioactivity in the middle of St. George, 
he contacted his superiors at the Nevada Test Site for instructions. An hour after his 
monitor reached its maximum range—300-350 mr/hr—Butrico received approval to issue 
the warning to stay indoors. Afterward, he said, he saw so many cars on the roads, people 
on the streets, and grade-school children playing outside during morning recess that he 
concluded that many had not received it. Supervisors instructed Butrico to keep changing 
and washing his clothes and taking showers until his personal readings decreased. When 
he asked if he should issue the same warnings to the community, he received a 
―resounding ‗no‘‖ because it might cause ―panic.‖95 As an example of the level of 
awareness that AEC monitors possessed about the dangers of external and internal 
radioactive exposures, Butrico and fellow monitors in St. George also asked Test Site 
officials if they should collect samples of local milk. Receiving the same negative reply, 
Butrico purchased a quart of milk from a store, seeking to avoid the sort of alarm that 
might be raised had he requested samples from the local dairies or from families with 
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backyard cows, and submitted it to AEC officials. He never learned whether it was tested 
for contamination.
96
  
Butrico‘s behavior and that of other monitors in St. George after ―Harry‖ cannot 
be explained narrowly as a product of their position within the bureaucratic AEC 
hierarchy and their obedience to superior authority. That Butrico asked his superiors for 
permission to help people avoid the danger he believed them to be in illustrates that he 
had accepted the authority of the AEC‘s militaristic chain of command. But, that Butrico 
subsequently obeyed orders that conflicted with what he believed to be the right thing to 
do illustrates the importance of habitus and the resilience of the wartime institutional 
culture of the Manhattan Project and its influence over the AEC of the 1950s. During 
peacetime, in the small town of St. George, the force of institutional cultural imperatives 
and habitus kept Butrico from acting in accordance with his professional ethical 
standards and, more significantly, from following the direction of his own moral 
compass. That Butrico was not motivated entirely by the AEC‘s regulatory structure or, 
more significantly, by the national security imperatives that are so often used to explain 
the behavior of AEC officials during the atmospheric testing era, is illustrated by 
Butrico‘s ambivalent reaction to the orders he received and his attempts to make right 
from wrong: requesting permission to issue additional warnings and buying milk so that 
it could be tested and the findings put to use in the future. Without knowing it, Butrico 
was a participant in a superficial show of the AEC‘s commitment to safety. AEC officials 
not only prevented Butrico from providing people with rudimentary precautions they 
could have taken to protect themselves, but it also failed to provide them with the type of 
instruments that were routinely used at the time to detect radiation to the thyroid. Nor did 
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AEC officials provide for internal monitoring (urine, fecal, or blood samples) from 
people exposed during the ―Harry‖ incident, even though that procedure was then typical 
in laboratories when workmen had been exposed to lesser dosages.
97
 
AEC Commissioners who met as the series progressed ignored their authority to 
modify policies to prevent tests that would produce high levels of fallout while working 
to prevent future public relations problems. At an April 1 meeting, the AEC briefly asked 
about the research on ―the genetic effects of radiation‖ but returned to focus on the ―PR 
aspects‖ of fallout.98 When Commissioners pressed the Division of Biology and 
Medicine‘s John C. Bugher for advice about radioactive fallout and hazards, he 
discounted the notion that any harm had been done by using averages to dilute exposures 
and harm and rationalized the figures for exposure differently depending on the 
circumstance.
99
 As Bugher sidestepped his responsibilities in favor of finding the means 
to continue testing rather than searching for ways to ensure that it was conducted safely, 
Commissioners abandoned theirs—asking few, or no, follow up questions to explanations 
that Bugher supplied that relied on different methodologies to estimate harm. In May, 
Bugher dismissed the significance of heavy exposures for people in Nevada and Southern 
Utah because of low population numbers: ―fortunately, only thinly populated areas had 
been affected and the exposures incurred were not considered to be dangerous.‖ For the 
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New York rain-out, Bugher admitted that a ―relatively large‖ dose had been delivered. 
But, instead of using population density as with the Nevada and Utah fallout events, he 
extrapolated and estimated dose spatially, on a per-square-mile basis. In this formulation, 
the radioactive contamination in New York remained ―well below the maximum 
permissible level.‖100  
By 1953, Commissioners were either ignorant of the fundamentals of atmospheric 
testing or aware of them but preferred to detach themselves from their duties under the 
law. The result was that the body charged with program management and direction was 
unable to assert anything but the most superficial direction or control over the decisions 
made by the AEC‘s operational staff. When they met on May 13 to discuss the fallout—
literally and figuratively—of Upshot-Knothole, they seem to have been unaware of a 
committee formed to evaluate policies at the Site, despite the fact that the Committee on 
the Operational Future of Nevada Proving Grounds formed by the Manager of the AEC‘s 
Santa Fe Operations Office came together in January 1953 and its recommendations 
about yield and type of tests for the Site emerged on May 11, two days before the AEC 
meeting.
101
 At the May 13 meeting, Commissioners asked about the fallout problems that 
had plagued the entire series and asked about Site and test management.
102
 About the 
unexpectedly high yield of ―Simon‖, Captain John T. Hayward, Deputy Director of 
Military Applications, remarked that the military did not yet have an explanation, but 
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would present one when the ―facts were known.‖ When Commissioners asked Bugher 
how such fallout incidents might be prevented in the future, Dean intervened. Dean‘s 
response amounted to a vague statement that absolved himself and his officials from any 
responsibility for texting excesses. Dean failed to mention the boundaries for yield that 
Warren had tried to implement, the Committee formed to study testing practices, and 
used language as imprecise as that in the Thirteenth Semi-Annual Report to make, in 
essence, an argument that because no boundaries had been pre-established, none were 
necessary: 
apparently it had simply been understood that relatively large yield 
devices would be detonated outside the Continental U.S. However no firm 
criteria for deciding such issues had been established. 
 
After the Chairman finished, Bugher shifted the discussion away from the hazards of 
fallout to public relations. Bugher did so in a way that left no doubt that it would be the 
military, and not the AEC, who would make the final decision. ―It might be advisable to 
prepare a press release concerning fall-out from the April 25 shot,‖ and told the 
Commissioners that he would ―discuss the matter with the Division of Military 
Application and Information Services.‖ 
On May 21, 1953, Commissioners received answers about the criteria for 
approving a shot that were nearly as vague as those delivered by Dean about size.
103
 
Graves was apparently responsible for determining which parts of the United States 
received the most fallout during Upshot-Knothole, but he crafted his answers in terms of 
future tests—not in answer to his management of the instant series. Attempts to prevent 
                                                 
103
 The discussion of this issue is drawn from AEC Meeting No. 865, May 21, 1953. U.S. DOE Archives, 
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Minutes of Meetings 795-883, Vol. II, 1953, Item No. 2, 310-311. See 
also Fuller‘s explanation, The Day We Bombed Utah, 36-38.  
 
472 
 
fallout within a range of 500 miles of the test site might, Graves said, ―well be 
undesirable in terms of long-range fallout.‖ Explaining his method for deciding to 
approve or call off shots, he said that ―shots will not be fired if winds at the 30-45,000 
foot altitude are in the direction of St. George—Bunkerville area.‖ Again, because that 
area had been especially hard hit during Upshot-Knothole, it appears that this requirement 
was also one that would be implemented in the future. As inexact as Graves‘s criteria 
were, perhaps the most alarming comment he made was that the standards he described, 
and that he claimed to have rigidly followed, had never achieved the level of operational 
protocols. In fact, the measures that Graves used to determine whether a planned test 
should be fired or be cancelled had ―not been written down.‖104 That Commissioners let 
Graves‘s explanation go without comment suggest that (a) they had not yet had time to 
consider the significance of something so fundamental; (b) their devolution of authority 
over testing to managers had been so complete that they accepted such operational 
informality as a matter of course; or (c) that they, along with Dean and his militarized test 
organization had reached a deliberate or unconscious conclusion to avoid the 
establishment of standards that might limit the flexibility and authority of administrators 
and officers.  
As the meeting continued, the discussion reveals that the Commissioners were 
more interested in mitigating a potential disaster than in preventing one from occurring. 
After Bugher joined Graves in pointing to uncertainties about weather forecasting as the 
reason for unexpected fallout, a couple of commissioners began to ask about the plans for 
dealing with catastrophe—perhaps having arrived at an unstated conclusion that a 
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grievous mis-step was inevitable. Commissioners Henry D. Smyth and Eugene M. 
Zuckert commented on the potential for thunderstorms to caused high concentrations of 
fallout and concluded that the reason a serious rain-out incident had been avoided was 
―due in some part to good fortune.‖ Bugher‘s answer to Zuckert‘s follow-up question 
about what he would do should a rain-out occur illustrates that the Director of the 
Division of Biology and Medicine had no plan in place. Instead, he vaguely reinforced 
how dangerous such an incident might be, resulting in ―many r. per hour‖ and added that 
if a rain-out occurred over a small area such as St. George, the town ―could be evacuated 
in time.‖ If it were to happen over Salt Lake City, however, then ―all that could be done 
would be to have the inhabitants remain indoors.‖ The discussion ended with a request 
that Graves write down the standards for the Commission‘s benefit the criteria he 
followed for deciding whether to allow or cancel a detonation. Dean then asked that 
―everything be done to avoid another fall-out over St. George.‖ At no time during this 
discussion did any Commissioner or advisor suggest limiting fallout by restricting the 
yield of atomic weapons the military tested or by requiring different methods for 
detonating them.  
Dean‘s AEC sidestepped or avoided altogether the responsibility to control the 
hazards attendant to weapons experimentation while counting on their authority to 
persuade the public and elected officials that weapons testing was being conducted 
safely. Fallout from Upshot-Knothole’s cannon shot, three airdrops, and seven towers 
blasts traveled on Spring winds from Southern Nevada, across the heartland, and to the 
Eastern seaboard.
105
 In conjunction with the tests, over 20,100 DOD personnel 
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participated in Desert Rock V, maneuvers that earned distinction as having an ―unusually 
large‖ number of over-exposed officers and soldiers. And because the AEC assigned 
responsibility for radiation safety protocols for maneuvers to the military, a group that 
during Upshot-Knothole included AFSWP, Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, and Coast 
Guard groups, the official ―maximum‖ exposure limit for the entire exercise was 6 r., 
established by the Office, Chief of Army Field Forces, double the AEC‘s 3.9 r. exposure 
limit, a dose that was already more liberal than international standards.
106
 The eight 
officers who volunteered to entrench closer to the tests than frontline soldiers during 
―Simon‖ received 9.5-17.5 r, and up to 28 r. of additional neutron radiation. Some 
participating soldiers received over 10 r., and one Marine was exposed to 22 r. Even the 
Army‘s trained radiation-safety personnel received dosages over 16 r. after entering an 
―unexpectedly contaminated area‖ with their monitors turned off.107  
In the course of Los Alamos‘s post mortem of the event, J-Division‘s Gaelen Felt 
referred to the series as ―the troubles‖—as if it represented some unavoidable set of 
circumstances—and then reported observations that placed responsibility squarely on the 
decisions made by the AEC and its military partners about the size and manner of testing. 
Felt‘s comments in his report to the Test Director had been standard fare since Trinity but 
during the era of Atomic Governance had become irrelevant to the AEC and its military 
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partners: ―Generally speaking, tower shots are more hazardous than free air bursts, high 
yields are more hazardous than low, and weather conditions have a pronounced effect.‖108  
Along with a window into the consequences of militarily-supportive AEC 
decision-making, the history of Upshot-Knothole lays bare the elitism and racism behind 
the AEC/DOD disregard for the West‘s people and ecology.109 While it is true that 
officials universally downplayed the hazards of radioactive fallout and made little or no 
effort to tailor the management of tests to prevent fallout dispersal nationwide, the way 
they dealt with overexposures differed depending on where they occurred and who was 
affected. Bugher, for example, could have applied identical strategies to explain (or 
explain away) the fallout-produced overexposures in areas bordering the Site as he did 
for those in New York, but he did not. For Bugher, and for those Commissioners who 
failed to question his reasoning during the May 13 AEC meeting, the people of Nevada 
and Southern Utah comprised an insignificant population compared to those in New 
York.
110
 In response to the New York fallout incident, the AEC made some effort to 
remedy the effects of the fallout by funding as one of its ―Major Activities‖ experiments 
directed by Harvard and Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute in water treatment for suppliers 
in Massachusetts (Lawrence, Cambridge, and Boston) and New York (Troy and Albany) 
that removed radioactive isotopes from fallout-contaminated water. As a result, people in 
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those areas—unlike those in the West or other areas—received water decontaminated to a 
level that exceeded standards then in effect.
111
 
What Did Truman Know and When Did He Know It?  
Of the five detonations that made up the first testing series in Nevada, only the 
first and third were in the one kiloton range that Marshall had identified in another 
context as ―small‖ and which, along with Dean‘s characterization of tests as 
―experiments‖ or of ―gadgets,‖ might be supposed as forming some sort of working 
definition for Truman and his advisors during the early age of continental tests.
 112
 The 
second and the fourth shots were eight kiloton detonations, including ―Baker 2,‖ a 10,800 
lb. bomb built on the ―Fat Man‖ Nagasaki model; another shattered barracks windows at 
an Air Force facility thirty-five miles from the site, automobile showroom windows 
seventy miles away in Las Vegas, and lit up the pre-dawn sky of Los Angeles. It surely 
exceeded anyone‘s notion of what Dean called a ―low-order device.‖113  
There is no indication that the ferocity of testing caused Truman any concern, but, 
there is also no reason to believe that he understood that what had occurred was that 
bombs had been detonated in Nevada or that he would have approved of it if he had.
114
 In 
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fact, despite the heralded national security significance of the program that followed the 
Soviets‘ atomic success, the H-bomb decision, and the advent of continental testing, 
Truman seems to have accepted Dean‘s description of the bombs as ―experiments‖ or 
―gadgets‖ and remained otherwise generally incurious about the program and how the 
Nevada Site was being used.
115
 Truman‘s ignorance operated to the benefit of Dean and 
his military partners, who pursued their own objectives by exploiting the still-
suppositional but prolific discussion in the national press about small-scale, 
conventionalized, nuclear weapons and whatever popular notions that Truman may have 
harbored about scientists and their experiments.
116
 Truman‘s overestimation of the 
number of bombs in America‘s arsenal affected his postwar foreign policy judgment and 
decision-making. Dean perpetuated the president‘s misunderstandings, jeopardizing 
sound decision-making about the program, weapons testing, and about the use of nuclear 
weapons on the battlefield.  
Truman‘s misconceptions extended across the spectrum, from the types of 
weapons that were being produced and tested in Nevada to the sorts of weapons available 
for troops in Korea. There is no indication that he was aware of either the size or the type 
of ―experiment‖ that had lit up the Los Angeles skyline; or, given the reassurances of 
safety issued by Dean and AEC officials, that the fallout from the tests that traveled 
across the United States was anything other than harmless. In fact, it appears that because 
Dean avoided the word ―bomb,‖ using instead euphemisms such as ―experiments,‖ 
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―devices,‖ and ―gadgets,‖ Truman may have been unaware throughout his term that atom 
bombs really were being testing in Nevada.
117
 Before discussing how Dean‘s purposeful 
deceptions interfered with Truman‘s ability to make decisions about domestic and foreign 
policy, the following example places more of the responsibility on Dean‘s shoulders by 
illustrating that it was not just Truman who was misled about the program.  
The use of wartime strategies of control by the AEC and its military partners also 
prevented congressmen from exercising meaningful oversight. One measure of their 
success was that witnesses to weapons tests doubted what they saw in favor of the 
misconceptions they held based on the misleading and deceptive information about 
weapons testing and radioactive fallout the AEC promulgated. In 1953, for example, 
Samuel W. Yorty, then a Democratic Representative from California who later became 
Mayor of Los Angeles, was among those who watched ―Simon‖ explode. Exploded from 
a 300 ft. tower, the bomb‘s yield was approximately forty-three kilotons, larger than what 
had been anticipated and slightly more than twice the size of the bomb that devastated 
Nagasaki.  
The numbers of personnel and participants would have provided an indication of 
the complexity and cost of the test. Those working at the Site included radiation safety 
personnel who monitored and participated in decontamination procedures, AEC 
contractors who performed construction work, scientists from Los Alamos and UC 
Radiation Lab and members of the Weapons Development Group who conducted twenty-
three experiments, and AFSWP‘s Military Effects Group carrying out another twenty-
seven experiments to determine the effects of the weapon on assorted military targets. 
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Additionally, the CDA‘s Civil Effects Group reportedly studied the durability of shelters 
and weapons effects on ―living organisms and drugs.‖ DOD support personnel numbered 
approximately 350, while 3,000 uniformed soldiers from all over the United States and 
others from the U.S. Sixth Army assembled at Camp Desert Rock V for maneuvers. 
Some ―officer observers‖ voluntarily entrenched themselves between troop trenches and 
ground zero. In addition, Marine Corps helicopter units and planes and crews from the 
Air Force‘s Special Weapons Unit based at Kirkland Air Force Base in New Mexico 
participated. Fallout from ―Simon‖ meant that the excitement continued after the test. For 
the first time in the Site‘s history, the AEC fallout closed Highways 91 and 93, the major 
roads in and out of Southern Nevada, and travelers heading north, south, east, and west, 
waited through roadblocks, monitoring, and decontamination performed by AEC and 
DOD personnel. The AEC also decontaminated automobiles in North Las Vegas, St. 
George, and Alamo, Nevada.  
Later, when discussing his experience on the House floor, Yorty insisted that he 
had not seen a bomb. The New York Times quoted his statement verbatim, indicating that 
they were concerned with making sure that they had not misunderstood what he had said. 
The explosion was not a bomb, Yorty explained, but ―an atomic device used to test 
theories applicable to bombs. Actual completed bombs, because of their costly 
complexity, are not used for such a test.‖118 The distinction between a ―device‖ and a 
―bomb‖ may have given Yorty a way of expressing his belief that continental weapons 
tests were of a much different character than those tested at the PPG. The fact is, 
however, that ―Simon‘s‖ yield was larger than the average of the three shots made during 
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Sandstone in 1948 and only slightly smaller than two of the four detonations during 
1951‘s Operation Greenhouse—all conducted in the Pacific.119 It is impossible to know 
whether Yorty had the type of information to make a similar comparison between Pacific 
tests conducted in previous years and the test that he witnessed as is possible now, but the 
fact that he could witness the spectacle that was ―Simon‖ and believe he had not seen a 
bomb testifies to the power of the Dean‘s euphemistic deceptions. Yorty certainly noticed 
the height of the mushroom cloud—one that reached 44,000 feet.120  
Yorty‘s comments illustrate that he was among those convinced by the 
comparisons that Dean and his military partners made between Nevada and Pacific 
testing to create the impression that Nevada tests were, size-wise, insignificant. This was 
a comparison made easier by the prospect of H-bombs that were thousands of times more 
powerful than earlier models—the non-thermonuclear ―atom‖ bombs used in Japan and at 
Crossroads. Imaginatively, none of the earlier types of fission weapons could compete in 
conceptual fearsomeness with descriptions circulating about the H-bomb in newspapers 
and in Laurence‘s The Hell Bomb. Such comparisons, when combined with Dean‘s 
euphemistic language, fueled a popular notion that the AEC failed to dispute: that tactical 
nuclear weapons were being tested in Nevada. Repetition reinforced the notion. The 
distinction between what was tested in Nevada and the bombs that were detonated in the 
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Pacific had become so prevalent in AEC statements and press materials that a staff writer 
for National Geographic made note of the distinction, but did so in a way that suggested 
he sensed some artfulness in the AEC‘s explanation:  
Today‘s most powerful atomic bombs are never exploded in Nevada. 
Instead, the Atomic Energy Commission speaks of ―nuclear devices‖ and 
―diagnostic shots.‖ The Army talks of small-scale ―tactical weapons,‖ 
including the atomic artillery shell.
121
  
Dean‘s careful use of language and the autonomy that he and his military partners 
exercised over weapons development and testing, combined with their monopoly over 
what was known, and not known, about the program and experimentation, contributed to 
Yorty‘s and Truman‘s misunderstandings. More than protecting their ability to manage 
the program in the interests of increasing their influence on the domestic political front, 
however, Dean and his military partners used these and other strategies to shape foreign 
policy.  
The confidence that Dean gained in his ability to manipulate Truman into 
believing that Nevada testing was innocuous through the simple act of linguistic 
repackaging allowed him to use the same strategy in a bid to bring about another 
significant change in policy. In July 1951, while cease fire talks were underway, Dean 
educated members of the upper echelon in the manipulative deployment of language, 
seeking to help them secure permission to deploy atom bombs against North Korean and 
Chinese troops. Though nuclear bombs of the sort used against Japan had increased in 
yield and destructive capability significantly in the postwar years, Dean used the 
difference between those fission bombs and what Truman and others thought about the 
greater destructive potential of the still-undeveloped H-bomb to create the imaginative 
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space for a fission bomb to be considered a tactical weapon. In Dean‘s summary of the 
July meeting, he wrote that he suggested to Army command that they should describe the 
atom bomb as a ―tactical‖ weapon to supply the conceptual shift necessary to overcome 
whatever reluctance preventing its use that existed in the administration.
122
 The meeting 
between Dean, Secretary of the Army Frank Pace, Jr., and Defense Department officials 
took place after one Army study concluded—as earlier studies had not—that force 
concentrations and terrain did not, as had been previously believed, rule out using nuclear 
weapons against forces in North Korea. The meeting‘s purpose was to draft a 
memorandum to present those findings to George C. Marshall, then Secretary of State, 
that would, with Marshall‘s approval, be submitted to the president. Dean and the others 
at the meeting supported not only using the bomb to stem Chinese involvement in Korea, 
but also a transfer of bomb custody from the AEC to the military. Once the transfer was 
complete, bombs could then be delivered to the theatre and used immediately should 
officers there find that some pre-determined concentration of enemy troops emerged.  
The important issue is not that, like many other Americans, Dean and his 
colleagues believed that all available weapons should be used in Korea—a belief 
fostered, in part, by the military‘s monopolization of information about the residual 
effects of radioactive fallout and the program‘s militarization. Instead, this incident is 
significant because Dean and the officers at the meeting planned to accomplish that goal 
through deceit, manipulating the president and his closest advisors into believing that 
they were suggesting that ―tactical‖ atomic weapons could be used against North Korean 
forces. At the same time, they implied that ―tactical weapons were available, leaving 
room for some conjecture—perhaps by Truman—about whether the tactical weapons that 
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were available and being recommended for use were typical ―tactical‖ weapons such as 
cannon, or were, in fact, atom bombs to be used in a way that Dean defined as ―tactical.‖  
The first ingredient Dean identified that the memorandum to Marshall should 
include, and the one that received the most attention throughout his summary of the 
meeting, was that it should ―stress the importance of new terminology; the reference to 
this use as a tactical use.‖123 Second, Dean suggested that it include the study‘s findings 
and an argument that a bomb used tactically could be used to take ―the heart out of the 
Chinese Army.‖124 Finally, Dean made sure that he would be able to take part in the final 
deliberations. He suggested the Memorandum include a recommendation that the 
president refer the matter to the NSC‘s Special Subcommittee—the subcommittee 
composed of himself, the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State, and the same 
one he used to receive approval for continental atomic testing. Dean noted that the group 
was in agreement that ―one of the real hurdles‖ would be the resistance to the use of the 
bomb that then existed. For Dean, however, who optimistically anticipated only benefits 
from the bomb‘s use, it was the only hurdle.  
Dean exuded confidence in his ability to foretell all the possible implications that 
might arise from the bomb‘s use. When Pace asked Dean about possible domestic and 
diplomatic repercussions, Dean explained to him that if the bomb were used, it would 
neither adversely affect public opinion nor disturb the already-tense situation with the 
Soviets. Paraphrasing MacArthur, he explained to Pace that the popularity of victory 
would be enough to quell any public opposition. And, the bomb would not cause the 
Soviets to react. Dean explained to the officers that using the bomb in Korea would not 
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―tee-off a third world war‖ because ―Russians do not act except by plan.‖ Here, Dean 
betrayed some familiarity with a Forrestal‘s philosophy of the Soviet mindset that using 
the bomb would not be enough to cause the Soviets to diverge from their strategy of 
advancing ―across Europe.‖ The meeting continued with discussion of the wording for 
the memorandum. Dean‘s summary reveals that his plan depended on using both deceit 
and military urgency to secure approval. The way that Dean reported reinforcing his 
views suggests that Dean found himself making a case to the officers for the bomb‘s use. 
He emphasized that his predictions were based on manufacturing a re-conceptualization 
of the A-bomb as a tactical weapon—while admitting to the officers that it was not—and, 
making a claim for military urgency to the military officers present, stressed the need to 
accomplish that goal before time ran out: ―There is no need to wait for the purely tactical 
weapons … and we may not have the time to wait for it.‖125 Dean‘s conclusion lays bare 
the connection he made between the way he had convinced Truman to approve 
continental weapons testing and what he expected to be the result of the memorandum, 
expressing confidence that re-characterizing the bomb as a tactical weapon would be 
sufficient to break down the barriers to the use of the bomb in war.  
we want to honestly be able to say that this gadget is a small bang gadget 
or a tactical gadget for the purpose of securing the support after the attack 
of people in the Middle East, Western Europe, Asiatics generally and for 
that matter the people of this country. We discussed at some length the 
terminology which might be used. I stated should such a weapon be 
dropped, the term ―tactical‖ was the best yet evolved but it was the feeling 
that a new term was needed, such as junior ―small bang weapons,‖ 
―Nevada bombs,‖ etc. No very good names were produced.126 
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The fact that the military officers attending the meeting were not as satisfied as 
Dean was with the word ―tactical‖ illustrates just how revolutionary was Dean‘s 
proposal. For them, this was not a rhetorical or an ideological problem, but a practical 
one, with the word ―tactical‖ conjuring up a conception of distinct levels of warfare that 
encompassed not only equipment for a hierarchy of responsibility. ―Tactical‖ described 
the lowest level, one involving battlefield command and soldiers; ―strategic‖ was the 
highest, a theatre-level engagement or one that involved larger issues of how the war 
would be conducted.
127
 Though some elasticity occurred (and still occurs) between 
levels, the A-bomb (as Dean referred to it) just did not fit into a military conception of a 
―tactical‖ weapon: something used by soldiers on a battlefield, as an element deployed 
under a field commander at the combat level in a battle, engagement, or action involving 
a small unit.
128
 For the officers present, using the bomb against troop concentrations that 
Dean estimated (in his summary) at 250,000 rose well above the level of battlefield or 
campaign to the theatre level—it would be, no matter what Dean wanted to call it, a 
strategic use.
129
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The issue had, in fact, already been joined. The strategic/tactical distinction was 
one that then Secretary of Defense Robert A. Lovett made to the JCAE on October 1, 
1951, when he appeared before the Committee to discuss the military‘s plans for using 
atomic weapons. During his testimony, he worked to correct the Committee members‘ 
misconceptions about the use of atomic weapons in Korea. Before advising the JCAE that 
it would be at least two years before the technology was available to deliver with 
accuracy anything approaching a weapon that could be used tactically, he called the 
notion that atom bombs could be used in Korea ―patently absurd,‖ given that the armed 
forces had ―thousands of individual targets … such as bridges and vehicles on the roads 
… all the way from Ryojun and Chongjin and Wonson to Seoul and China.‖130 The 
officers meeting with Dean, and Secretary Lovett, too, were also likely aware, as Dean 
was not, of at least one or more of the no fewer than six studies carried out or 
commissioned by the Army between 1945-1951 to evaluate the tactical possibilities of 
atomic weapons to not only capitalize on the military value of atomic science but also to 
prevent the Army from being squeezed aside in favor of the Air Force and its value as a 
force for the delivery of strategic atomic weapons. They all failed.  
What Dean failed to grasp was that the insistence on the utility of tactical 
weapons Army officers made was not based on any plan to use the weapons to achieve a 
military goal, but to use the idea of tactical weapons to achieve a domestic political goal: 
congressional support and funding for conventional ground forces. The Army‘s 
opponents were the Air Force and the Navy (the branches increasingly favored by 
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congressional benefactors because of their ability to deliver nuclear weapons) and 
congressmen (who believed that ground troops would not be necessary in a nuclear war 
and should not be maintained except at minimal levels.) Dean‘s suggestion to use atom 
bombs tactically was not one that would help the Army achieve its objective; instead, it 
assumed that, at least in the near term, a bomb would be dropped from an airplane. As 
such, the plan operated against what this study reveals, that the Army was trying to 
accomplish an objective similar to what Navy officers sought to accomplish in 1946 with 
Operation Crossroads: to prove its viability. When Dean met with the officers, one of the 
Army‘s objectives was to promote, through maneuvers at the Nevada Site, that ground 
troops would field, and be the ones to deliver, nuclear shells on the battlefield.  
As John J. Midgley, Jr. found in his study of the Army‘s history with nuclear 
weapons, the powerful incentives that drove the Army to investigate ways to use atomic 
weapons tactically resulted in no good solutions.
131
 From the end of World War II 
through 1977, Midgley discovered what he concluded was a ―Nuclear Will-O‘-The 
Wisp,‖ a disparity between the Army‘s desire for, and collection of, a nuclearized arsenal 
and its inability to guide commanders on how they might incorporate those weapons into 
their operations or ways that ground troops could use them.
132
 In 1949, for example, an 
exasperated AFSWAP‘s Chief, Brigadier General Herbert B. Loper, insisted that the 
efforts to identify a tactical use of atomic weapons were futile: ―Show me how to use this 
weapon tactically, if you can. It is not a tactical weapon.‖133 Even Dean‘s friend, Senator 
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Brien McMahon, who at times seems to have been confused about the differences 
between fission (atom bomb) and thermonuclear (H-bomb) weapons, and who pushed as 
hard as anyone in Congress for the atomization of the entire U.S. arsenal, showed no 
inclination in 1951 to blur or eradicate the conventional divide between tactical and 
strategic in a discussion where he described the atomization of conventional artillery.
134
 
Four years after the meeting Dean described, Army officers were still—as they had been 
since the end of World War II—making the case for the relevance of conventional forces 
and the use of human delivery systems for tactical nuclear weapons. In doing so, they 
clung to the distinction that Dean wanted to downplay and divided in the conventional 
way strategic and tactical weapons, arguing that both were valuable and necessary—atom 
bombs as an economical alternative to conventionally loaded B-29s and mobile units 
armed with tactical weapons, ―atomic cannon, rockets, and guided missiles (short 
range).‖135 Tactical weapons remained high on the JCAE‘s and armed forces‘ wish lists. 
They were, according to a JCAE advisor who outlined the tactical weapons problem for 
McMahon in 1951, the perfect economic and strategic solution: the ―natural armaments 
of a numerically inferior but technologically superior‖ nation and a ―natural answer to the 
armed hordes of the Soviet Union and its satellites.‖136 With the only danger mentioned 
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by that advisor the possibility of ―hitting our own troops,‖ it seems that the fantasy 
militarization fostered about the innocuousness of U.S. sourced fallout fed into the JCAE 
advisor‘s sense at that time that tactical weapons were a heaven-sent possibility.137  
Truman was unable to sort through the hype, misinformation, and misleading 
language to determine what the program had accomplished and what it had not. Some of 
this can be attributed to Truman himself, who was apparently satisfied with what Dean 
told him. But Truman‘s misconceptions had not grown overnight; his lack of 
understanding was a consequence of the process of militarization: strategies of control 
such as manipulation of the media and the use of secrecy by the military and its 
supporters from World War II forward, and, the downplaying by the JCS, the MLC, and 
individual officers such as Lt. Gen. Hull, of the health effects of U.S.-produced 
radioactive fallout. Dean, owing his position to the militarization of the program, 
followed their lead, deceived Truman about the scope of continental nuclear tests and 
manipulated the media to underestimate the hazards of nuclear experiments. So, too, did 
military officers, who persistently used claims to national security through the press and 
elsewhere to promote weapons development, arguing for the value of bombs and 
nuclearized conventional weapons for war. Simultaneously, the use and misuse of 
Atomic Secrecy spawned supposition. Misunderstanding and confusion about the 
program and nuclear weapons were inevitable.  
All of these factors influenced Truman‘s thinking about the program and about 
what was going on in Nevada. Some insight into Truman‘s thinking emerges from Dean‘s 
diary. In February1951 Dean made a note that suggests that Truman believed that only 
scientific experiments or some sort of small, tactical weapon was being fired in Nevada. 
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After Ranger, the first series in Nevada, came to a close, Truman asked Dean for a 
written report about the tests and indicated that he ―might be able to attend one of the 
Eniwetok tests.‖138 Had Truman recognized at that time that bombs were being detonated 
in Nevada, it is unlikely that he would have concluded a mention of his interest in 
watching a bomb detonation by saying that he hoped to be able to travel to the Pacific to 
do so. Dean reminded Truman of this comment on October 15, 1951, as an introduction 
to an invitation to attend ―one of the test explosions‖ at the Site during the Buster-Jangle 
series planned for October19-November 29, 1951. Dean avoided the word ―bomb‖ in his 
invitation, describing the blasts as ―explosions‖ or ―shots,‖ and indicated that the first 
four were ―designed to find more efficient ways of using fissionable material.‖ The 
fifth—in language that indicates Dean wanted to encourage Truman‘s assumptions about 
the progress of tactical weapons—was a ―stockpile model, considerably smaller in 
diameter and weight than anything heretofore tested, and probably it will be the most 
interesting shot to witness.‖139 Truman did not take Dean up on his invitation. Dean‘s 
language, however, reinforced yet again the notion that tactical weapons were being 
developed in Nevada.  
The larger implications of how Truman‘s misconceptions affected policymaking 
arose in August 1951 after the first round of tests and after Truman had submitted the 
Supplemental request for AEC funding. Dean learned from his friend Senator McMahon 
that Truman believed that tactical, projectile, atomic weapons had been perfected and 
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were ready to be used. Because McMahon‘s explanation was nearly identical to the one 
Dean had proposed to officers during his meeting about tactical weapons a month earlier, 
either the memorandum or the content of that meeting had come to Truman‘s attention or 
Dean characterized it as such when he referenced it in his diary. McMahon told Dean that 
Truman was considering using tactical weapons should ―intelligence‖ reveal that there 
existed an ―attractive concentration of troops‖ against which cannon-fired atomic artillery 
could be usefully deployed. Dean quickly arranged for a meeting with Truman over the 
lunch hour on August 31 to let him know that atomic artillery did not yet exist. He 
explained that one shell would be tested later that year in Nevada and was expected to 
become a limited ―stockpile‖ item available sometime after May 1952 but that production 
problems with the 280 millimeter rifle to fire it would mean that it would probably be 
Fall 1952 before it could be included in the arsenal.
140
 For Dean‘s part, instead of 
learning from this episode that the president needed to be better informed, he seems to 
have corrected Truman‘s understanding of atomic artillery without explaining that what 
was available—and what had been and would be detonated in Nevada—was bombs. He 
pressed his case for using bombs as tactical weapons by letting Truman know that 
although the AEC could not provide artillery shells to be deployed in Korea in the short-
term, an ample capacity of ―existing weapons‖ could be used ―at any moment against 
troop concentrations.‖141  
Eight months later, with no indication that his idea to re-package bombs as 
tactical weapons was going forward, Dean went public. During an April briefing for 
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reporters assembled to view ―Charlie,‖ or ―Operation Big Shot,‖ the first televised 
detonation in Nevada, Dean trivialized the belief that atom bombs were solely strategic, 
and ignored the fact that Truman, congressmen, and military officers did not share his 
enthusiasm for using atom bombs as tactical weapons. Dean suggested that those who 
were up-to-date with the issue had already accepted that atom bombs could be used as 
tactical weapons and characterized those who failed to adopt his perspective as a minority 
fringe who clung to an outmoded or old-fashioned concept.  
there is one thing you will be aware of tomorrow—if you are not aware of 
it already—and that is the changing concepts, in connection with atomic 
weapons, that have taken place since Bikini. In 1946, atomic weapons 
were thought of by most people as strategic weapons…they were 
considered to be weapons that could only be used by a strategic air force 
carrying an attack against the industrial heartland of an enemy. In those 
days it was fashionable to assume that a dozen or so such weapons … 
could knock out any of the major powers of the world. 
Since then, this concept has been rather radically revised. Today, atomic 
weapons are thought of as tactical as well as strategic weapons—that is, 
they are thought of as weapons that can be employed by military forces in 
the field against military forces in the field. 
142
 
 
Whether Dean had begun to despair about the possibility that an atomic gun or 
cannon could ever be developed for routine use for troops or whether he believed that 
atom bombs should be used tactically until a more portable, and workable, atomic device 
was developed—or used alongside it, Dean‘s semantic wordplay kept Truman and other 
elected officials unaware of what types of weapons were being detonated in Nevada and 
allowed Truman to remain confused about what types of nuclear weapons existed in 
American, and Russian, arsenals.  
Reporters covering Sam Yorty‘s comment on the House floor in 1953 about the 
―devices‖ tested in Nevada, surmised that the same conceptual distinction between 
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―devices‖ and ―bombs‖ might have been what Truman had in mind when he had said on 
another occasion that he was ―not sure‖ that Russia had developed an atom bomb.143 
Truman‘s statement so rattled AEC officials that AEC Commissioner Eugene Zuckert 
later admitted ―it knocked me right flat.‖144 Zuckert recalled that reporters tracked Dean 
down to a hotel in Toledo and Dean told them that the president would ―never‖ have said 
such a thing. Later, Dean learned that Truman reiterated his statement when the reporter 
contacted him for confirmation.
145
 Oppenheimer was similarly bewildered by Truman‘s 
statement, calling it ―disturbing‖ that despite what Truman knew of the intelligence he 
could doubt that the Soviets had a bomb; and could only surmise that secrecy prevented it 
being ―talked about, or thought about, or understood.‖146  
Truman‘s misconceptions illustrate the significance of the partnership forged 
between the AEC and the military and the potency of wartime strategies of control they 
employed during the era of Atomic Governance. Truman‘s misconceptions derived in 
part from assumptions about the differences between ―military‖ and ―civilian, and the 
perception that Dean‘s perspective about atomic weapons, testing, and safety, would 
differ from those of military officers, who were expected to give first priority to national 
security and defense. But his misconceptions were also among the consequences of 
militarization and the extra-constitutional abuse of authority built on the willingness of 
Dean, intermediate-level AEC administrators, and military officers to use techniques that 
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kept elected officials and the general public alike un- or ill-informed about atomic 
science, weapons, and the hazards of experimentation. 
Militarization was the essential ingredient in the process that allowed Dean, AEC 
affiliates, and their military partners to sustain their claims to expertise and to carry the 
program in the direction that they wanted it to go. Neither Dean nor his military partners 
could depend solely on their status or expertise, or on their untypical cozy relationship 
with influential congressmen, to achieve their goals.
147
 In part, and especially during the 
first year of testing, neither status nor expertise alone could have prevented some doubts 
from being raised about the ability of Dean and other AEC officials after their predictions 
about test effects were so wrong. During the first round of testing, for example, the AEC 
officials informed the local Las Vegas newspaper reporters that ―residents probably 
won‘t see or feel the effects.‖148 Two weeks later, the headlines read ―Vegans Atom-
ized‖ and ―Sky Lights Up, Doors Slam—But Life Goes On.‖149 The tests in Nevada were 
national news. Had Dean and others in charge of  the tests relied on nothing more than 
their positions or administrative authority—as some administrators did in the postwar 
state—their authority would have been jeopardized by their inability to predict the 
outcomes. A theoretical perspective on the significance of the authority embodied in 
AEC officials and military officers, of their selective release of information and the 
words they used to describe what they were doing, and on the ways that all of that was 
received, lends understanding into the power of the AEC/military partnership.  
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As Pierre Bourdieu explained, the power to exercise authority in the name of the 
state depends not only on holding a position of authority, but on creating the conditions 
where that authority cannot be challenged. Dean‘s partnership with the military and their 
combined ability to control what was and what was not known about the program and 
experimentation provided the circumstances through which Dean was able to persuade 
Truman that the explosions occurring in Nevada were not from nuclear bombs, but 
―devices.‖ Dean and other AEC administrators operated in ways similar to the judges in 
Bourdieu‘s study of the justice system: they exercised authority in the name of the state, 
and their statements—and the language used to construct those statements—were, in 
Bourdieu‘s formulation, ―magical acts,‖ the ―quintessential form of authorized, public, 
official speech, spoken in the name of and to everyone.‖ Their success, however, was 
dependent on being ―universally recognized‖ and creating a ―situation which no one can 
refuse or ignore the point of view, the vision, which they impose.‖150 This leads to the 
significance of those pre-conditions: for Dean, the critical element was his partnership 
with the military. Dean succeeded in using language to manipulate perception only 
insofar as he had the full backing of officers and they presented a coordinated message—
with the creation of the continental site and weapons experimentation, for example. 
Where he did not, and when it was left up to him alone to prompt the necessary 
conceptual shift as with his bid to repurpose atom bombs as tactical weapons, he failed. 
With atomic science and weapons, where both complexity, secrecy, and a history of 
deception contributed to speculation in the media about the development smaller 
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weapons and misunderstanding among members of the public, the president, his advisors, 
and members of the JCAE, euphemism (―magic‖) worked: Dean imposed his vision with 
a linguistic trick that played on his listener‘s imaginations and turned bombs into 
something less, ―devices.‖ In the same context, Dean‘s efforts to perform a similar 
terminological twist with the words ―tactical‖ and ―strategic,‖ whose meanings and 
relationship to one another were generally understood, fixed in common parlance and in 
military practice, were unsuccessful. The fact that he attempted it suggests that Dean may 
have been unaware of how much he owed to the JCS/MLC classified review system of 
militarization and the program of re-education Lt. Gen. Hull and his colleagues 
conducted to be successful in creating the alternative reality that opened the door for the 
Site and routine testing there. It may be that he was unwittingly influenced, at least in 
part, by military‘s mis-information campaign. He certainly overestimated his own ability 
to shift—without military cooperation—the meaning of words in the military‘s own 
lexicon.  
Promotion as an Institutional Imperative: The Illusion of Control 
Promotion was the cornerstone of Atomic Governance. Convenience and 
economy certainly contributed to the demands placed on the Site by scientists and 
military officers, but the primary reason why Nevada testing was such a hazardous 
endeavor was the primacy of promotion to the AEC and its military partners. The 
primacy of public relations to AEC officials and military officers who partnered in 
managing the program and testing meant that experimentation in Nevada, whether used 
for demonstration purposes or not, was a sort of theatre, where the illusion of mastery 
over atomic weapons and the illusion of safety were more important than reality. The 
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creation of the illusion was a multi-faceted product of militarization and ranged from 
purposeful deceit—the claims of AEC officials that testing was safe, for example, when 
even Dean acknowledged the likelihood that tests would produce radioactive fallout that 
could cause skin burns—through the selective restriction of information about the 
hazards of experimentation, to mischaracterization. Dean and his military partners 
conducted a political exercise with the Nevada Test Site by means of practices that were 
destructive of human life and representative government.  
By 1950, atom (fission) bombs were increasingly viewed not in light of their own 
immediate and long-term destructive potential, but in relation to the vastly more 
destructive potential of the thermonuclear (fusion) bomb. Dean used relative terms such 
as ―small‖ and ―large‖ to reinforce the differences and exploited this conceptual 
comparison to minimize the dangers of atom bombs and combined it with the 
technological imperative of militarization: the drive to do more with more. Just as the 
AEC made it appear in its Report that scientific advances had changed understandings 
about radioactive hazards, military officers also worked to establish some conceptual 
distance from the mid-1940s impressions of experimentation as a hazardous affair—
particularly those generated by the well-publicized Operation Crossroads—by implying 
that through scientific and technological advances, planned nuclear detonations had 
become manageable and risks negligible.  
For Army officials, persuading the public and legislators that radioactive 
contamination could be managed was a priority if they were to gain support for their 
contention that conventional troops could wield tactical nuclear weapons effectively. This 
process of re-education occurred from the highest levels of the administration to the 
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general public through statements to the press and through information included during 
indoctrinations conducted in Nevada to teach soldiers about the ―facts‖—as the Army 
conceived them—of atomic warfare. In one case, it reached from General Groves all the 
way down to schoolchildren, when the Journal of Educational Psychology featured a 
year‘s summary of atomic energy exhibits and quoted Groves: ―nuclear energy, like fire 
and electricity, can be a good and useful servant.‖151 An example of the way this worked 
within the administrative circles of the Truman administration emerges from a 1950 DOD 
report on ―New Weapons‖ that was circulated to the National Security Council, the 
Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney General, the Department of Agriculture, the 
Public Health Service, and ―certain other interested agencies.‖152 In what appears to have 
been an insertion into a section discussing radiological warfare, the protection of troops, 
and the difficulties of inflicting substantial short-term injuries in an atomic attack, a 
segment of the report dredged up the sinking of ships at Crossroads to compare the 
difference in expertise between 1946 and 1950 and implying that radioactivity was, in 
fact, not the unmanageable problem that it had appeared to be during and following that 
operation. The author(s) of the segment explained that it was not radioactive 
contamination, but a combination of ignorance and caution that led to the ships‘s sinking. 
It was not true that they ―constituted a grave radiological hazard and could not be de-
contaminated.‖153 Instead, the Navy‘s  decision to sink the ships was nothing more than 
an excess of precaution, the result of ―adhering‖ to a ―conservative‖ safety policy because 
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―of the unknown factor of permissible safe dosage.‖154 The segment concluded with a 
strangely worded sentence that suggested progress had been made since the days of 
rudimentary decontamination methods used during Crossroads without actually claiming 
that procedures for decontamination were possible.  
Since that time when large scale decontamination of material was first 
attempted the Department of Defense has been carrying on a vigorous 
program to improve methods which can provide successful 
decontamination.
155
  
 
A different type of subtlety was necessary to convince the public that radioactive 
contamination was manageable without attracting the attention of scientists and other 
public observers who might contradict what the DOD wanted people to believe and 
without irritating Truman, and later Eisenhower, who disapproved of direct informational 
statements about weapons as possible violations of national security regulations and of 
their effect on intra-service rivalries.
156
  
To carry out their goal of shaping public opinion about atomic warfare and its 
effects, officers used soldiers that they brought to the Nevada site under the auspices of 
indoctrinating them in atomic warfare as conduits to the general public. Soldiers 
attending maneuvers were urged to share what they learned from their lectures and 
experiences back with soldiers at their home bases and also with their families and 
                                                 
154
 ―New Weapons,‖ 10. 
 
155
 ―New Weapons,‖ 11.  
 
156
 For an example of the way Truman dealt with the problem, see the discussion of his request to the 
Psychological Strategy Board to develop a way of preventing officials from making public statements that 
were not cleared in advance. [Sanitized] Minutes of the Tenth Meeting, Psychological Strategy Board, 21 
February 1952, Agenda Item No. 3, ―Public Statements with Respect to Certain American Weapons,‖ 7-11. 
Collection: SMOF, Psychological Strategy Board, Box 28, Folder Minutes #337, HST Library.  
 
500 
 
friends.
157
 Again, the more Army officers quietly worked off the Crossroads model for 
political aggrandizement the more they worked to distance themselves completely from 
Operation Crossroads. Among the things that soldiers learned during indoctrination at 
the test site and, and that was reinforced by questioning during post-shot psychological 
surveys, was that none of the Crossroads ships was sunk because of radioactive 
contamination.
158
  
The promotional value of those tests planned as spectacles increased the pressure 
on military officers and the AEC alike to put on a good show to guard against the 
possibility of embarrassment. This was even more important after the AEC‘s initial 
efforts to control publicity by force-feeding selected information and pictures to reporters 
backfired. After whetting the appetites of media representatives with an announcement in 
August 1951 that testing would become a ―commonplace‖ in Nevada and there was a 
possibility that the press and civil defense personnel might be admitted, reporters 
responded angrily to being shut out of the subsequent November tests.
 159
 They decried 
what they viewed as an illicit use of secrecy that excluded reporters from the Site but 
welcomed chatty congressmen and others. They spent their time in Las Vegas 
speculating—sometimes based on smiles or scowls of scientists returning to their hotels 
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along Fremont Street—and submitting stories critical of the military and the AEC. 
Reporters‘ barbs hit every tender spot:  that atomic science was not living up to its 
military potential, that taxpayer‘s money was being wasted, and that the AEC and the 
military were engaged in ―play acting.‖160 The AEC responded with a version of the 
Crossroad plan, controlling the message and the reporters it allowed onsite.  
Unable to thoroughly modulate information about tests through releases issued by 
the AEC/DOD Joint Information Office and releasing its own photographs and film 
produced by Lookout Mountain Studios, the AEC added a layer of non-affiliated 
reporters and cameramen to its existing public relations machine and began allowing 
them onsite.
161
 To satisfy their audience and to deliver the desired signal, they used 
briefings to limit and control what reporters learned and wrote about, managed reporters‘ 
movements by transporting them to, on, and from, the Site. And, as at Crossroads, 
selection to attend a shot was a mark of prestige for reporters that offset the convenience 
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of enduring repeated, ―many‖ in the words of one, formal briefings.162 Even more 
prestige attached to those reporters chosen by lot to experience the shot in one of the 
trenches. All of this ensured loyalty to the AEC and its military partners and obedience: 
grateful reporters failed to question the AEC‘s assurances of safety and repeated them, 
verbatim, in their articles.
163
  
To guarantee positive publicity from demonstrations, the AEC detonated 
especially large or unusual weapons, as was the case with the atomic cannon, resulting in 
unnecessarily high contamination and diminished safety standards. As early as 1946, 
officials were mindful that weapons tests could generate negative publicity. During the 
planning for Crossroads, Oppenheimer pointed out in the letter he sent to Truman listing 
his objections to Operation Crossroads, that there was a one-in-fifteen chance that the 
bomb would be a ―dud,‖ a consequence that would have a direct influence on public 
opinion at home and abroad.
 164
 In 1952, for example, Dean‘s planning for the AEC‘s 
first full-dress press event, ―Charlie‖, or ―Operation Big Shot,‖ ignored the issue of safety 
altogether while including assurances to the White House Press Secretary Joseph Short 
that ―there will be no danger of observers getting an erroneous impression that it is a 
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‗fizzle.‘‖165 Dean‘s priorities were evident from his own ranking: out of the five itemized 
points in his letter to Short, he placed the explosion‘s quality second only to the number 
of observers expected to attend—one-hundred state and city civil defense officials and 
medical professionals along with ―325 press, periodical, radio-television, newsreel, and 
still picture correspondents‖—and before his summary of the security precautions 
established for the test. The event, conducted on April 22, 1952, lived up to Dean‘s 
expectations. The thirty-one kiloton ―Charlie‖ was large as any weapon detonated up to 
that time in Nevada.
166
 Dean uncharacteristically identified the test as a ―bomb‖ during a 
pre-shot address the day before the event, but followed that comment by comparing it 
with the size of tests conducted in the Pacific: it was ―not the largest bomb that we have 
exploded. If it were, we would not be exploding it here within the United States. We 
would, instead, be exploding it at Eniwetok.‖167 ―Charlie‖ may not have been the largest 
bomb that the AEC had ever detonated, but it dispersed fallout into 99 percent of U.S. 
counties, with the highest radioactive value recorded in Glenn County, California, 
followed by areas of Alabama and Florida.
168
 In 1953, invitees to ―Harry,‖ who had 
waited through two earlier delays, would not be disappointed again when the AEC 
decided to detonate it on May 19, despite the presence of a still-overcast sky and wind 
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currents that would put fallout on a path for Southern Utah.
169
 As this example illustrates, 
another reason why promotion increased the hazards of continental testing was that 
advance planning required for media and dignitaries operated against the possibility that 
the AEC would postpone or cancel tests for safety reasons. To guarantee cooperation 
from the media, particularly radio and television, the AEC and its military partners 
accommodated the need of broadcasters to know in advance about the timing of shots so 
that they could plan for transmission of stories, images, and programs.
170
 
Political exploitation of weapons tests required manufacturing the impression that 
blasts and their effects were predictable and radioactive fallout was safe, an impression 
that contributed to the enthusiasm of congressmen, government officials, members of the 
media and the general public for witnessing shots. The AEC and DOD expected so many 
Washington, D. C. area officials to attend operation Tumbler-Snapper in Spring 1952, for 
example, that AFSWP devised a routine to streamline the clearance and credentialing 
process by checking observers boarding planes in Washington, D.C. and telephoning lists 
of names to AEC officials at the Test Site.
171
 On March 17, 1953, over 800 members of 
the national press, radio, television, and Civil Defense officials assembled to witness 
―Annie,‖ a 2700 pound ―tactical‖ shell detonated from a 300 foot tower. Carried on the 
front page of the New York Times and national television, millions of people saw or read 
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about the blast. Though not among the largest tests conducted in Nevada, ―Annie‖ 
produced fallout in 95 percent of U.S. counties, ranking it twenty-first among all 
atmospheric tests that sent fallout offsite. Although the highest fallout levels were 
recorded in Washington County, Utah, hot spots—areas measuring significantly higher 
levels of fallout—were recorded the day after the test in five New Jersey counties.172 
Recent accounts describe ―Annie‖ as one detonated for the CDA.173 At the time, 
however, the New York Times relayed the theme of an AEC release: the test was a 
national security imperative, the ―latest in the series of tests designed to maintain the 
United States‘ lead in atomic weapon development.‖174  
AEC officials and military officers had no more enthusiastic boosters in their 
promotional campaign than most of the residents, newspaper editors, and politicians in 
Nevada. Senator Pat McCarran of the appropriations committee and the editors of Las 
Vegas Review Journal and later the Las Vegas Sun newspapers not only welcomed the 
project to Nevada, but also defended the AEC officials and military officers against 
complaints from a handful of Nevadans who dared to speak out and residents of 
California and Utah who argued that fallout from weapons testing was dangerous. 
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Together, McCarran and the newspapers fostered so much support for the program that 
by 1953 AEC officials reported that the ―attitude‖ of people in the region about the Site 
and weapons testing was ―to some degree that of participants.‖175 As a component of the 
AEC/military campaign of re-education, and an ongoing ―educational‖ imperative to 
prevent what the AEC called a ―latent fear of radiation,‖ the local press became unofficial 
collaborators, using appeals to national security, anti-communist rhetoric, and ridicule to 
mask their support for a program that provided so many economic benefits.
176
 Out of 161 
articles sampled in Las Vegas newspapers about the program between1951-1958, eighty-
six were informative articles about individual series or tests, troop maneuvers, or civil 
defense exercises. Ten of the total contained information about the hazards of testing or 
radioactive fallout derived from other news sources. Sixty-five out of the total were 
editorials or persuasive articles that emphasized the benefits of testing; twenty-nine 
discussed test safety; twenty others, the direct economic benefits of the Site; and sixteen 
pointed to the national security importance of tests or the dangers of communism.
177
  
As boosters, the local press‘s interest in prosperity caused newspapermen to make 
appeals to national security and anti-communist rhetoric in support of testing in Nevada 
while ignoring or disregarding information circulated in the national publications about 
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the hazards of radioactive fallout. As the earlier example about the Las Vegas Sun 
editor‘s complaints about smokestack fallout illustrated, airborne pollution was 
something that members of the newspaper press believed harmful.
178
 Where radioactive 
fallout was concerned, however, that editor and his colleagues in Las Vegas paid almost 
no attention to the scientific studies of the dangers of fallout and the precautionary 
recommendations contained in other publication to prevent or reduce exposure to 
radioactive hazards. There were, in fact, many reasons for locals to be skeptical about the 
AEC‘s claims that fallout was not dangerous. 
Even before the Soviet test, for example, a sampling from the Science News Letter 
and Science Digest illustrates the nature of the articles that appeared about radioactive 
hazards that passed the test for non-restricted information. These included warnings about 
the relationship between radiation and disease, ―A-Bomb can Speed Cancer,‖ genetic 
damage—―Abnormal Offspring,‖ ―Effects of Radiation on Offspring Called Insidious,‖ 
―Radiation Produces Freaks‖—fallout, ―Death Sand Kills Subtly‖ and ―Atom Dust 
Weapon.‖179 The Review Journal dismissed this sort of information with a John Wayne-
ish bravado, welcoming the site‘s creation with a front page headline that may have been 
intended to shame into submission those who harbored very real concerns: ―Heck, We‘re 
Not Scared!‖180 On January 10, 1951, the Review Journal estimated that the site would 
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result in a five-million-dollar windfall and that more would follow.
181
 Purposefully, as the 
fearlessly bold headline indicated, they ignored or subordinated information about the 
hazards of radioactive exposure and fallout. A scant five days before the first test, for 
example, The New Republic carried John Newman‘s review of The Hell Bomb, a book 
written by William L. Laurence, the science reporter Groves hired to chronicle the 
Manhattan Project. The Hell Bomb called attention to the degree of devastation likely 
from the explosion and the resulting fallout.  
―In the long run,‖ as Lord Keynes once pointed out quite reasonably, ―we 
shall all be dead.‖ The opinion was voiced in more hopeful times. It now 
seems likely that the run for most of us may be considerably shortened.
182
 
 
Like the AEC, however, newspapers in Las Vegas emphasized the dangers of enemy 
fallout produced by Soviet nuclear weapons while downplaying the effects of fallout 
from nuclear bombs detonated in Nevada.  
This pro-AEC stance was driven by the economic benefits testing brought to 
Southern Nevada. After newspapers in Los Angeles, for example, criticized the AEC for 
conducting hazardous nuclear testing in Nevada, the Review Journal responded with an 
editorial claiming that the Los Angeles newspapers were engaged in a disingenuous ploy 
for tourist dollars. The paper‘s editor castigated Los Angeles editors for spreading 
unfounded concern to ―frighten Southern California people and dollars into staying 
home.‖183 At the same time, the newspaper‘s editor John Cahlan also worked to diffuse 
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the anxiety of locals—evidence that not all Southern Nevadan‘s were comforted by the 
AEC‘s claims of safety—by singling them out as alarmists,  
yesterday‘s sensation has become commonplace. …A lot of people … 
allowed their imaginations to carry them completely away. …Today, of 
course, they‘re smiling at themselves and wondering why they allowed 
themselves to be disturbed at all.
184
  
 
From Cahlan‘s perspective, geiger counters were useful only as props for models 
hired to promote atomic tourism.
185
 For editors such as Cahlan, anti-communism called 
for testing and testing meant dollars for Las Vegas. In front page stories carried during 
the spring of 1951, for example, the newspaper covered the death sentence handed down 
to Julius and Ethel Rosenberg after their convictions for espionage, CDA rehearsals in 
Michigan simulating a Russian attack, underground construction at Dugway Proving 
Ground in Utah in preparation for a ―third world war,‖ increases in the U.S. stockpile to 
maintain ―constant readiness,‖ and the announcement that an additional $1 million would 
be spent on expansion of the Nevada Test Site.
186
 
The immediate consequence of media support for the Site was that it stifled local 
opposition and perhaps postponed the emergence of a national political conversation 
about the necessity and risks of atmospheric continental testing.
187
 In the long term, local 
media cooperation with the program provided the AEC/military partnership with the 
means to promote the most optimistic opinions about the hazards of radioactive fallout 
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generated by AEC experts and to dismiss the pessimistic views of others outside the 
AEC‘s network who argued that testing and fallout were more dangerous than the AEC 
wanted to admit. Because of the media‘s cooperation with the AEC, a potential political 
discussion about the cost and safety of the continental program itself devolved (as 
discussed in the next chapter) into a debate about safety that politicized scientific 
issues.
188
 What is unavoidable is the fact that the support that local and national media 
gave to the AEC and its military partners during the atmospheric weapons era creating 
the conditions for hazardous experimentation that jeopardized the health of people 
throughout America who were unaware that radioactive contamination was contained in 
the milk and bread they and their children consumed and those soldiers who had no 
choice but to cooperate with the self-interested goals of officers to demonstrate that 
ground troops would be critical in a nuclear war. 
Weapons Testing, Maneuvers, Civil Defense 
The Army‘s need to gain political traction against the sense growing among 
congressmen that a nuclear-equipped Air Force and the Navy provided sufficient defense 
remained a priority throughout the atmospheric testing era. It reached critical proportions 
during the Eisenhower administration, when the Crossroads veteran and then-Chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Radford backed the doctrine of massive retaliation 
through aerial bombardment and severe limitations for conventional forces.
189
 In protest 
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against that philosophy, both Generals Matthew Ridgway and Maxwell Taylor stepped 
down as Chiefs of Staff of the Army during the Eisenhower administration.
190
  
The Army‘s insecurities became especially acute in the Fall of 1951. On October 
1, two weeks before soldiers from Camp Campbell, Kentucky, arrived in Nevada to 
become part of a 5,000 man force at Camp Desert Rock, the Army‘s Chief of Staff 
Lawton Collins, found himself making a case for the Army‘s salience before the JCAE. 
His main goal was to counteract the belief that ground troops could be all eliminated 
because the Air Force, Navy, and Marines were best equipped to fight a nuclear war. As 
if to symbolize a hierarchy of importance among the services, Collins‘s turn to talk 
without much interruption came toward the end of the hearing. He followed testimony 
from Secretary of Defense Robert A. Levitt and General Hoyt S. Vandenberg and 
Admiral William M. Fechteler, the Chiefs of the Air Force and Navy. While Collins was 
waiting, Vandenberg presumed to speak for him, explaining that the Army was ―very 
much interested‖ in artillery, but did not yet know ―how it is going to work … what its 
area is going to be … and what type is the best to get, and therefore he [Collins] can‘t lay 
down at this time the exact number that he wants.‖191 When Collins tried to respond to 
Vandenberg‘s comment, Senator Jackson interrupted him. When his turn finally came, he 
began to brief the Committee on the Army‘s plans and the training it had conducted to 
ready commanders and soldiers for tactical warfare. Senator Hickenlooper‘s follow-up 
illustrates how tenuous was the Army‘s claim to atomic resources and, perhaps in the 
mind of Collins, was the Army‘s future. In phrasing that indicates Hickenlooper‘s mind 
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was nearly made up about the irrelevance of the Army, and suggesting that he was 
familiar with Dean‘s position on the tactical use of nuclear bombs, he put the General on 
the spot:  
I would like to have the reasoning by which the Army justifies the 
extensive investigation and development of ground atomic weapons which 
manifestly can be delivered only a short distance as against using the Air 
Force for … the tactical delivery … the Air Force [could] deliver that 
weapon on target … keeping the technique within one service, rather than 
to have perhaps conflicting operations or duplicating operations.
192
  
 
The General then repeated points he had already made about the significance of 
ground soldiers for locating and developing targets, massing enemy troops into bomb-
able concentrations and delivering tactical weapons during inclement weather. To this 
summary, Vandenberg replied that the Air Force was already equipped to deliver small, 
tactical-sized atomic bombs and missiles. Not only was Collins‘s testimony undercut by 
Vandenberg‘s, it was also overshadowed by Senator Bricker. Bricker drew from Collins‘s 
explanation to complain about a magazine article he had read, presumably one detailing 
the training at Sandia that Collins had emphasized as part of the Army‘s mission to 
prepare for the time when tactical weapons would be coming off line. Leapfrogging over 
Collins, Bricker directed his consternation with the article to Secretary of Defense Lovett, 
who sided with Bricker over Collins: 
Senator Bricker. You are talking about the concentration of troops and the 
use of artillery in meeting those concentrations … and the tactical use of 
it, and I saw that story in one of the magazines and they had the men 
marching around the road and the concentration points and so on. In your 
judgment isn‘t too much publicity being given to all of these operations 
that are underway now? 
Secretary Lovett. I can‘t tell you how strongly I feel about it, Senator 
Bricker, it is absolutely outrageous. 
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Senator Bricker. Measures ought to be taken to stop it at once. 
Secretary Lovett. Yes, sir. 
Senator Bricker. I don‘t know whether the rest of the committee agrees 
with me or not, but that to me was very dangerous.
193
 
 
The problems the Army had in 1951 securing respect from elected officials as well as the 
Secretary of Defense prompted the Army‘s desire to demonstrate its soldiers‘ capabilities 
in ―live‖ training exercises despite the fact that (according to Marine officers who 
participated) they were less effective than maneuvers employing simulated nuclear 
weapons.  
For Army officers, the unspoken benefit of ―live‖ training was the same as it had 
been for a continental site after the war: publicity. There was a direct line between this 
pre-1949 history and maneuvers at the Nevada Test Site: The Commander for the Ranger 
series of tests was Maj. D.H. Russell, the same officer who had been in charge of the 
1948 Operation Sandstone. After Ranger, the Army immediately began planning Buster-
Jangle, tests and maneuvers scheduled for October-November 1951. Called ―Desert Rock 
I,‖ those exercises disappointed General John E. Hull. Hull had, in the years since 
advocating for his re-education campaign and service as a Lt. General and commander at 
Sandstone, become Vice Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army. After ―Desert Rock I,‖ Hull 
complained that radiation safety precautions at that first exercise were too strict, reducing 
his 6,500 troops to ―purely observers.‖194 A year later, Hull posed for a photograph with 
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the Commander of ―Desert Rock IV,‖ seemingly pleased with the event and the fact that 
soldiers were no longer observers—after ―Desert Rock I,‖ the AEC acquiesced to 
officers‘ requests to position soldiers closer to ground zero and for increases in the 
amount of radiation to which soldiers could be exposed.
195
 That exercise involved 
approximately 10,000 soldiers, roughly the same number that Hull commanded during 
Sandstone.  
Officers who decided to demonstrate that soldiers could function on a nuclear 
battlefield for domestic political gain knowingly took risks with their long-term health. In 
the years that had passed since Crossroads, when sailors were exposed to dangerous 
levels of radioactivity in the interests of the Navy‘s political goals, nothing had been 
discovered to prevent long-term injury from radioactive exposure. In 1949, Shields 
Warren anticipated the Army‘s plan to introduce and attempt to accustom troops to 
radioactive fallout and in an effort to supply officers with information about boundaries 
for dose and tolerance. He contacted Dr. Joseph G. Hamilton of the University of 
California Berkeley‘s Crocker Laboratory and provided him with all available 
information to launch a thorough appraisal of the problem.
196
 Hamilton was recognized 
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as a conscientious researcher, one of the premier authorities on the health effects of 
radioactive exposure, was at Bikini as ―sort of a walking encyclopedia,‖ and was 
interested especially in respiratory exposure and the behavior of radioactive particles in 
the lung.
197
 Hamilton determined that troops might remain operational if not 
psychologically disturbed, but noted that the root issue was internal radioactive poisoning 
from inhalation. Recommending more experimentation to determine, with precision, the 
exact strata of safe to dangerous levels, Hamilton recommended that no training 
maneuvers be attempted until lengthy experiments had been performed using ―large 
monkeys such as chimpanzees,‖ and warned that the AEC could otherwise be accused of 
recklessly endangering human lives. As an indication of how close Hamilton believed the 
AEC and military officers interested in weapons testing were coming to a line that should 
never again be crossed, he drew on what was then recent history, explaining that doing so 
without waiting for the results of animal studies smacked ―a little of the Buchenwald 
touch.‖198 Hamilton made his comparison of military maneuvers with human 
experimentation knowing that military officers favored experiments to evaluate how 
humans reacted to various dosages of radiation to establish concrete guidelines for 
commanders interested primarily in knowing how much radiation a soldier could tolerate 
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before becoming ineffective in battle. It is, perhaps, because of this that military officers 
did not appreciate the connection that Hamilton made between nuclear maneuvers and 
human experimentation. In any event, they planned and conducted maneuvers without 
regard to the long-term effect of inhaled radioactive contamination on the health of 
soldiers that they brought to Nevada.  
The thinking of military officers about the significance of short-term and long-
term injuries that influenced how they conducted maneuvers in Nevada emerges from a 
discussion about the problem before testing in Nevada began during a meeting of the 
Committee on Medical Sciences of the DOD‘s Research and Development Board held on 
May 23, 1950. During the meeting, doctors, scientists, and officers from the Army, Navy 
and Air Force, discussed experiments aimed at satisfying the military‘s need for 
information about radiation exposure. While acknowledging some interest in long-term 
health effects, officers attending that meeting were primarily interested in functional 
understanding they could give a commander of forces during a nuclear war—how much 
radiation a soldier could endure in the short term and still fight:  
The levels we are particularly interested in are those of relatively short 
duration. In other words, a man may develop a cancer 20 years later but if 
he is in the middle of combat we don‘t think that would deter from 
actually [accomplishing?] something, so that what we are interested in is 
what level is going to make this man sick or noneffective within a period 
of 30 days, in all probability. Now we are very much interested in long-
term effects but when you start thinking militarily of this, if men are going 
out on these missions anyway, a high percentage is not coming back, the 
fact that you may get cancer 20 years later is just of no significance to 
us.
199
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Six months later, officers pressed their case outside the confines of the DOD, 
employing wartime strategies of control—appeals to national security and military 
urgency—and invoked Crossroads in an effort to convince Shields Warren and other 
members of the AEC‘s Advisory Committee for Biology and Medicine to approve human 
experiments. Brig. Gen James Cooney of the Division of Military Application discounted 
as unreliable estimates already made based on studies of the victims of the Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki bombings and animals after the war. He insisted that the only estimates that 
would satisfy the military and its commanders would be those based on human data, and 
tried to convince members of the Advisory Committee with appeals to national security 
and military urgency. Cooney warned the committee that unless it was willing to risk the 
lives of some experimental subjects, the result would be that no one would find out until 
a battle, when ―we … force people and force thousands of young men perhaps and maybe 
lose the battle as a result of [what is] not known, and so on?‖200 Cooney‘s ideas mattered. 
It was he, as Shields Warren recalled years later, who approved the 3.9 r. standard for off-
site exposures to fallout resulting from Nevada tests.
201
 
The disregard for the long-term radioactive health effects exhibited by officers 
conducting maneuvers for public consumption at the Site reflect the adoption for 
purposes of the maneuvers the same disregard for the long-term health effects that 
Cooney and his colleagues considered insignificant from the point of view of a (real) 
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battlefield. On January 26, 1951, one day before the first continental weapons test was 
conducted at the Nevada site, a DOD committee summarized the problems of atomic 
warfare, the work underway to investigate those problems, and estimates about research 
progress.
202
 The first item of that summary pointed out that the Panel was interested only 
in matters of ―immediate military significance‖ and identified as irrelevant any health 
effect that would not result in debilitation or require evacuation.  
Long term effects, such as reduction in fertility, increase in the number of 
mutations, and reduction in the ultimate life span of exposed individuals, 
will be the concern of military planners, but will hardly affect the 
decisions of commanders in the field.
203
 
 
Because of the partnership between the program and the military, what commanders in 
the field wanted influenced the hazards of continental testing. In a 1954 report, Los 
Alamos Test Director Alvin Graves noted that persons off-site were subject to exposures 
that exceeded the 3.9 r. per quarter standard and explained those overexposures as 
militarily necessary:  
One must conclude that between the ‗safe‘ laboratory standard of 3.9 
r./quarter and the ‗militarily significant‘ dose of 50 r. there is a wide 
region in which one must operate if test operations are to be conducted.
204
 
 
But the 50 r. dose that even the military had defined as ―significant‖ was not a firm 
boundary. Following ―Badger,‖ a 23 kt device detonated from a tower on April 18, 1953, 
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during the Upshot-Knothole series, recovery parties were given permission to exceed the 
10 r./hr standard for recovery operations when they were allowed to use the Mercury 
Highway to get to the recovery area, a circumstance under which they were exposed to 
radiation intensities from fallout above 50 r./hr. That opened the door for other recovery 
teams, 133 in all, comprising 396 men, to exceed the 10 r./hr standard, additional 
overexposures resulting from the recovery operations themselves as well as the time 
spent getting to and from recovery areas in contaminated vehicles. Ninety-two vehicles 
used during ―Badger‖ required decontamination after the shot. The blast left a 100 r. 
―integrated dose line‖ thirty-five miles out from ground zero, a 10 r. dose level 110 miles 
from the blast, with the highest levels of fallout between the Site and Lake Mead. It also 
produced ―significant‖ ground levels from Williams, Arizona, to the ―South Rim of the 
Grand Canyon of the Colorado River,‖ measured by a Los Alamos scientist using a form 
of reference that suggests he may have had some interest in emphasizing that fallout had 
affected water supplies.
205
 For Test Director Alvin Graves, as for others in the program, 
their responsibility to the military overshadowed their administrative ―civilian‖ 
responsibilities and public relations took precedence over safety. Graves‘s plan for 
counteracting negative publicity about the dangers of fallout by publicly announcing that 
exposures of 15 r. were of little consequence, ―equivalent to … a piece of carborundum 
in the eye or a cut finger, and because of that, the AEC would henceforth report 
exposures that exceeded 15 r. as ―accidents.‖ This, he argued, would ―be extremely 
useful for public relations.‖206 
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The AEC and military officers who engaged in such downplaying of the health 
effects of fallout in the interests of creating realistic scenarios for troop exercises and 
promotional demonstrations did so despite the fact that ―live‖ exercises offered less in the 
way of practical training benefits that those conducted with simulated weapons. The 
Marines‘ own record of its participation in ―Desert Rock VI‖ in March 1955 reveals that 
―live‖ maneuvers were primarily useful for training their radiation monitors, not soldiers. 
This was the case because ―live‖ detonations inevitably meant that they had to evacuate 
soldiers before they could accomplish their objectives while exercises with simulated 
weapons, a common practice during the atmospheric era, gave soldiers a more thorough 
training experience. Marine officers, for example, expressed satisfaction with the 
functional results of exercises they conducted using ―atomic simulators‖ at their own 
bases.
207
 A Marine Corps recapitulation of the ―Desert Rock VI‖ operation reflected the 
Corps‘ gratitude for the opportunity to conduct ―realistic‖ maneuvers during a nuclear 
detonation but added that simulations were used to serve the same purpose: ―the 
maneuver itself could readily have been executed with equal success at Camp Pendleton 
with the use of atomic simulators.‖208 In addition, the use of a ―live‖ weapon limited the 
potential benefit of the exercise. Soldiers were unable to complete the entire maneuver 
because of ―artificialities,‖ elements introduced into the exercise to make the use of real 
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atomic weapons possible.
209
 The Corps did indicate that, as they had during ―Desert Rock 
V‖ when approximately 2,100 marines attended as participants and observers, Fleet 
Marine Force Commanders and radiation monitor teams would attend future tests.
 210
  
As with the Army, promotion was one of the Marine Corps‘ primary motivations 
for participating in ―live‖ maneuvers. The promotional value of participation to the 
Corp‘s political goals cannot be precisely measured, but among the conditions that 
Marine Corps officers established for future participation was the remedying of problems 
they had encountered in achieving their promotional goals during ―Desert Rock VI.‖  
The public relations aspects of the exercise began—as Crossroads had—well in 
advance of the test, on February 10, and extended afterward through the publication of a 
―Public Information Annex‖ that included a photographic array.211 The Corps complained 
that AEC security requirements prevented meeting all of its plans for publicity and that 
AEC and DOD lacked facilities for ―play-back on radio tapes, as well as screen facilities 
for motion picture film‖ preventing them from securing rapid ―declassification and 
release to news media.‖212 Despite those limitations, the Marine Corps ensured that its 
participation would become news throughout the country via reports about participating 
soldiers. Marine Corps staff sent out 1,632 photographs with stories, 351 tape recordings, 
and eighteen 35mm films to the ―Fleet Home Town News Center‖ for distribution; and, 
                                                 
209
 ―Report of Exercise Desert Rock VI,‖ VII-1, 2(d) 
 
210
 See ―Department of Defense Plan for Participation in Upshot-Knothole,‖ 2; attached to H.C. Donnelly, 
Colonel, Chief AFSWP to Kenneth Fields, Brigadier General, Division of Military Application, 6 February 
1953, SWPOT 969.2, DNA1.941220.011. Approximately 2,100 Marines attended Desert Rock V. 
 
211
 ―Report of Exercise Desert Rock VI-Marine Corps 3d Marine Corps Provisional Atomic Exercise 
Brigade, March ‗55‘,‖ Sections III-12-14, VI-6. A/12441 at Technical Library of the Armed Forces Special 
Weapons Project, 11 May 55, DNA1.940923.027. 
 
212
 ―Report of Exercise Desert Rock VI,‖ III-14, Item 8(k).  
 
522 
 
moreover, sent news stories and photos to all wire services and news media in Los 
Angeles and San Diego near their Camp Pendleton locale.
213
 After the brigade arrived in 
Nevada, the Corps took more photographs and sent them out for distribution while one 
Marine Corps officer recorded a telephone interview for a radio broadcast. On the day of 
the shot, the Marines took additional pictures and distributed those to news services and, 
additionally, delivered film coverage of the maneuvers to NBC and CBS. CBS planned to 
use segments of the footage, while NBC planned to use all of it, scheduling the broadcast 
of all segments in color as well as in black and white. Marine Corps personnel also 
delivered additional copies of the film footage to ―theatrical‖ and film-strip companies 
and to Life, which promised to ―view the color footage‖ for possible use. The Marines 
made arrangements with the media for two different officers to provide their assessment 
of the shot-day operation: the Commanding General taped interviews on that day for ―all‖ 
Los Angeles networks and a Time interviewer discussed the maneuvers with the Brigade 
Chief of Staff. On the day after the test, the Corps distributed more photographs and a 
―round-up‖ release. 214  
Army officers used maneuvers to engage in the same sort of formal public 
relations outreach as the Marine Corps during ―Desert Rock VI,‖ but also employed less 
formal means of spreading the Army‘s views of the importance of testing, maneuvers, 
and the use of atomic weapons for war. Evidence for the Army‘s plan to use troops 
participating in maneuvers as nodes of communication—points of contact to other 
soldiers as well as friends and families outside of the armed forces—emerges out of 
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psychological studies the Army arranged to be performed on soldiers who participated in 
maneuvers. That Army officers considered this informal promotional function of 
maneuvers significant is evident from the attention paid to it by the social scientists the 
Army employed to study the participants‘ reactions and behavior before, during, and after 
the tests.  
During the ―Desert Rock I,‖ the Army‘s troop instructions differed from those the 
AEC issued to the Army‘s participants. The AEC identified nine particular items of 
classified information that soldiers might learn from the tests and told them to expect that 
anything else they might notice could be classified, too. The AEC‘s ultimate 
recommendation, summarized by the military‘s psychological analysts, was a blanket 
admonition against saying anything: ―The simplest guide is not to talk about the test and 
refer all questioners to the AEC Information Office.‖215 In contrast, the Army‘s official 
instructions told soldiers that ―everyone will want to know what you have seen‖ and 
reminded them that because the enemy might also be among them, suggested that soldiers 
limit their responses to the fact that they did observe an atomic test and ―what results 
thereof looked like to you.‖216 During that exercise, the Army also arranged for a press 
conference on the day of the blast and selected eleven soldiers to respond to questions 
from reporters. The Army strongly encouraged soldiers to talk about the test: ―the troops 
                                                 
215
 See ―instruction sheet‖ attached to Office Memorandum, from R.L. Southwick, Assistant Chief Public 
Information Service, U.S. AEC to Joseph E. Short, Press Secretary The White House, January 25, 1951, 
―Atomic Bomb and Energy, June 1950-1952,‖  White House Central Files (Confidential Files) Box 4, 
Papers of Harry S. Truman, HST Library, included in record, Prescott v. U.S., CIV LV-80-143, 
Defendant‘s exhibit DX21926. For the psychological implications of the AEC‘s instructions, see Human 
Resources Research Organization [HumRRO], Report, ―consolidated account of psychological research 
done with exercise DESERT ROCK I,‖ 8. DNA1.940920.065; NVO767823.  
 
216
 HumRRO, ―consolidated account of psychological research done with exercise DESERT ROCK I,‖ 8, 
DNA1.940920.065; NVO767823.  
 
524 
 
were urged to disseminate as widely as possible those things which they observed and 
learned at Desert Rock.‖217 The study revealed that the briefings, indoctrination, and 
maneuver had little effect on soldiers aside from the short-term anxiety and excitement of 
the test itself and that on returning to their bases soldiers were not necessarily 
forthcoming about their experiences. The result was disappointing: the Army‘s ―correct 
facts‖ did not circulate among soldiers and did not make it into the mainstream. The 
study‘s authors surmised that there were two likely reasons for this. One, derived from 
comments made by General Hull, was that soldiers were forced into the attitude of 
observers by regulations that kept them too far from the blast. The other was an absence 
of realism—soldiers did not confront an enemy, they moved in formation, and the only 
demonstrable measure of the bomb‘s destructiveness was some damaged equipment. 
Because the operation did not include buildings that might be bombed during combat, 
and though the desert‘s ―sparse vegetation‖ burned, it was ―a less spectacular target to the 
A-bomb than structures.‖218  
One of the reasons, then, for providing a realistic experience for soldiers had 
nothing to do with preparing soldiers to fight an atomic battle and much to do with 
maximizing the promotional potential of maneuvers by coaxing soldiers into talking 
about their experiences and spreading the ―facts‖ about atom bombs that were part of the 
soldiers‘s indoctrination. Toward that end, future maneuvers were designed to impress: 
they were more realistic—soldiers were trenched closer to ground zero, they were given a 
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precise objective, more equipment was arrayed close to the detonation site, buildings 
were constructed to provide the dramatic examples of the bomb‘s destructive capacity 
that tanks and other military equipment did not. The Army arranged for the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture and the Forest Service to cooperate in erecting three stands 
(one with 145 trees) of Ponderosa pine trees, into concrete at various distances from 
ground zero.
219The erection of civil defense ―doom towns‖ not only helped to reinforce 
the military‘s core ambition by providing examples of destruction that generated more 
support for the services, but also contributed to the military‘s more immediate 
promotional goals to impress soldiers enough that they would talk about their 
experiences. 
After realizing that it had guessed wrong about the gregariousness of soldiers who 
engaged in atomic maneuvers, the Army not only adjusted the way it conducted exercises 
but also commissioned its researchers to study soldiers before and after the exercise to 
learn more about what they talked about and with whom they visited. The following year, 
the Army‘s psychological study of participants in ―Desert Rock IV‖ (May-June 1952) 
included as one of its four primary objectives, learning about the ―extent to which 
participant troops disseminated information about the maneuver and the A-bomb‖ once 
they returned to their home base.
220
 Based on questioning of participants and non-
participants who remained on base during the maneuver and did not travel to Nevada, 
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researchers found that more realism and drama did not cause participants to be more 
outspoken than before.  
Few of them reported discussing the maneuver with more than one or two 
soldiers who had not participated, and few of the nonparticipants 
expressed any great interest in learning about the maneuver. As a result, 
the nonparticipant troops showed no changes in attitudes or information 
about the A-bomb.
221
 
 
Undeterred, the Army continued to modify its exercises to maximize the promotional 
benefits of information combination between participants and non-participants.  
As outlined in the Human Resources Research Office Technical Report Two of 
1953, produced after studies conducted during ―Desert Rock IV‖ the same year,  
Atomic maneuvers provide experience and training for participant troops 
and observers. Beyond that, however they also can exert a potentially 
great influence on non-participants through the dissemination of facts and 
attitudes after the participants have returned to their home stations. The 
Army recognizes this potential effect by including a considerable number 
of observers in every atomic maneuver, as well as by officially 
encouraging discussion (within the limits of military security) of 
maneuver experiences between participants and nonparticipant troops.
222
 
 
Additionally, the Army expected not only that soldiers engaged in a maneuver would 
share what they had learned about it with soldiers they were acquainted with at their 
home bases who had not participated in the maneuvers, but also to their families and 
friends. A summary of the outcome reveals that the Army‘s expectations were that it 
would be able to circulate ―correct facts‖—information compiled by the Army and 
delivered to soldiers during instructional briefings. Through subsequent informal 
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discussion, those ―correct facts‖ would spread, ―influencing attitudes‖ among non-
participants who, the Army expected, would be curious and interested in the soldiers‘ 
experiences.
223
 Ultimately, however, soldiers were simply not good disseminators of 
information. They still had political value, for their very participation in nuclear 
maneuvers provided military officers with the opportunity to enhance their political 
futures with demonstrations of the role of ground troops in fighting a nuclear war.  
Maneuvers gave officers an opportunity to demonstrate a versatility with nuclear 
weapons that did not exist. Soldiers, primarily draftees, endured increasingly dramatic 
nuclear exercises involving so-called tactical weapons that were not easily deployed in 
scenarios that were implausible with nuclear weapons, even in the opinions the military‘s 
top strategists. 
224
 As the DOD‘s own July-December 1949 study demonstrated, the need 
for shielding soldiers from radioactivity and the long term health affects made the use of 
atomic weapons in battle impractical.
225
 And yet, by monitoring soldiers participating in 
maneuvers to keep radiation exposures below what they expected would cause acute—
and thus noticeable—injuries, they avoided negative publicity and fueled interest in 
tactical atomic weapons that, unlike bombs, they argued would be delivered by ground 
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troops. For the AEC, maneuvers translated into increased appropriations and political 
influence as the developer and provider of a class of weapons that commanders had yet to 
figure out how to use.
226
 The failure to address long-term hazards allowed AEC officials 
and military officers to package and promote nuclear weapons as if they were no more 
than monstrously scaled up versions of conventional weapons, creating unrealistic 
expectations about atomic warfare. The losers in these political exercises were soldiers 
who were briefed extensively about the problems of heat, blast, light, and residual 
radioactivity but who were provided only the most optimistic portrayal of the effects of 
participating in a ―live‖ test: the possibility that they would be inhaling and ingesting 
radioactive dust and debris that could result in injury or disease twenty to thirty years 
hence.  
Exposure to close-in fallout and dust stirred up by detonations was evident even 
to observers of the tests. During maneuvers in 1953, Lyle Borst, a professor of physics at 
the University of Utah, reported that despite the collapse of some protective trenches—a 
―serious problem‖ to use his phrase—soldiers managed over the course of three or four 
hours to make their way through a sea of dust to within 2000 yards of their goal before 
they had, he surmised, ―taken their permissible dose of 6 r‖ and were removed by bus for 
the trip back to Camp Desert Rock for decontamination. Borst noted that the operation‘s 
commander, General Hodge, said after the maneuver that for the future, ―he saw no 
reason why troops could not be located one mile from the blast.‖227 Presumably, putting 
troops closer to the trenches would have meant that they needed to cover less ground to 
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achieve their objective. This cooperative arrangement could not have been more suited to 
the AEC/military partnership  
Under Dean‘s Chairmanship, the AEC drew on the survivability of soldiers 
participating in maneuvers to support their claims that weapons tests were safe and that 
radioactive exposures resulting from those tests were not hazardous. The AEC misled the 
public and congressmen, arguing that the absence of short-term injury meant that no 
injuries had occurred:  
Under the operating controls used in Nevada, thousands of military 
personnel have occupied fox holes 7,000 yards distant from detonations 
without casualty. Other participants and observers, with no protection 
other than goggles, have witnessed tests from a distance of 10 miles 
without injury.
228
 
 
Thus, maneuvers that failed to take into account the long-term hazards of radioactive 
exposure benefitted both the military—who used such exercises as instruments of self-
promotion—and the AEC, who used them in the absence of scientific studies to validate 
their claims that radioactive fallout posed no dangers to human health. As with military 
maneuvers, CDA exercises in Nevada were primarily promotional events. 
Atomic detonations did provide information for researchers in many fields 
studying the effects of atomic detonations on military equipment, civilian structures, and 
other articles of daily life such as food and automobiles—contained in ―Doom Towns‖ 
erected onsite—that generated data for the armed forces and CDA.229 And yet, as with 
Crossroads, some of this data could have been derived from laboratory experiments. 
Other experiments duplicated earlier ones, verifying findings or gathering information 
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that had been overlooked previously.
230
 Like military maneuvers, the historical and 
contemporary accounts use CDA exercises to point out the utility of weapons testing and 
the importance of the Site as a location for training of CDA officials. Because the two 
were often combined to maximize the publicity potential of ―open‖ shots, it was 
customary for both to be combined in articles about the Site and testing. In 1953, for 
example, a twelve-page article in National Geographic portrayed military maneuvers and 
CDA experiments as equally valuable contributions to national defense.
231
 Indeed, both 
CDA and military officers acknowledged at the time that the primary value of 
participating in a ―live‖ atomic event over the simulations both routinely conducted was 
the opportunity it provided for promotion. An agenda item considered during a meeting 
of the AEC‘s Advisory Committee for Biology and Medicine held in September 1955, 
after the CDA had taken part in several different weapons tests in Nevada billed as ―civil 
effects tests,‖ illustrates that the CDA derived very little, if any, functional information 
from their participation. Despite all of the publicity that surrounded such tests and the 
supposed value of the tests to CDA efforts to inform and protect the public, the AEC 
failed to allow the CDA access to the information necessary to evaluate weapons effects. 
In a report titled ―Shelters for Civil Populations,‖ thirty-five out of thirty-seven 
references concerning above-ground construction were classified and unavailable to CDA 
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officials, as were thirteen of the fourteen references to below-ground construction, as well 
as all of the references to earthen structures.
232
 Aside from the CDA‘s inability to benefit 
in a practical way from testing, there was another fundamental difference in the value of 
testing for the military and the CDA: unlike the military, which derived political benefits 
from conducting maneuvers, the primary beneficiaries of CDA exercises were the AEC 
and its military partners.  
After the AEC decided in 1952 to welcome unclassified civil defense officials and 
workers to a planned detonation, Dean relayed the CDA‘s enthusiasm for the decision to 
the White House Press Secretary James Short. Dean explained the CDA‘s expectation 
that the experience would ―considerably stimulate the zeal and raise the effectiveness of 
… volunteers and paid personnel.‖233 The test was ―Charlie,‖ the ―open‖ shot that the 
AEC scheduled as a nationwide, televised demonstration. While at the Site, CDA 
officials were chiefly observers but also performed smaller versions of the types of drills 
that they routinely practiced in their own communities. Because those exercises were 
decoupled from the community resources that were the backbone of civil defense, they 
provided little more than opportunities to view articles of daily life demolished or 
irradiated by atom bombs and the chance to practice with radiation detectors. And, they 
were ineffective at generating federal support because Congress remained chronically 
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unwilling to provide more than minimal funding, expecting states and cities to provide 
the bulk of CDA funding. This surprised and angered CDA officials and backers. After 
CDA officials reported on their experiences at ―Charlie,‖ their first official opportunity to 
participate in nuclear exercises, Truman accused congressmen of being ―penny-wise and 
pound foolish,‖ reminding them that the $535 million he requested to fund CDA 
programs had been stripped down to $75 million.‖234 When Truman‘s outburst failed to 
draw results, Hanson Baldwin, the New York Times’ Pulitzer Prize winning military 
editor, compared America‘s miserly funding for civil defense with that supplied by 
European allies after the war, decried the fact that CDA was the ―stepchild‖ of defense, 
and argued that it was time the organization received a ―shot in the arm.‖235 The CDA‘s 
own publicity initiative fared little better. One effort, the Alert America Convoy, was 
actually three separate traveling exhibits that delivered movies and three-dimensional 
―dioramas‖ emphasizing the significance of the CDA (―Learn how Civil Defense protects 
you and your family‖) to eighty American cities.236 Despite the billing, the exhibit 
contained enough information about the dangers of nuclear and biological warfare that it 
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failed in its mission to channel fears into support for the remedies for survival that Civil 
Defense promised while stimulating defense spending.
237
 
For its next demonstration, the CDA borrowed the military‘s ideas and added a 
dose of realism in an effort to increase its promotional value. Perhaps because of the 
competition for attention, the DOD objected to the emphasis on civil defense planned for 
the ―Annie shot and appealed to the president to close the ―open‖ shot. The DOD lost its 
appeal.
238
 Described along with a scenario of its military use by William Laurence of the 
New York Times as the ―first public demonstration of a prototype of the tactical atomic 
bomb that may be used to annihilate armies of a would-be aggressor before they had 
succeeded in crossing the border of their intended enemy,‖239 ―Annie‖ was a sixteen 
kiloton bomb detonated from a tower. The CDA relied on donated equipment and 
material to photograph and later observe the effects of ―Annie‖ on vehicles, two homes, 
fifty mannequins and clothing, and eight underground shelters. All three networks carried 
the event in a three part series, the first on Sunday—two days before the shot—with a 
preview of the location for the test, another on Tuesday morning with tours of the houses 
and material, and another for Tuesday afternoon with a recap of the test, including 
footage from automatic cameras positioned inside the homes.
240
 A two-page article about 
the test began on the front page of the New York Times, and dedicated only four 
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paragraphs to the civil defense aspect of the test while nine described the military 
maneuvers and the military value of tactical weapons, estimated that millions of people 
watched the detonation on television.
241
 The house located 3,500 feet from the blast was 
destroyed, supplying the CDA with the now familiar image of the two-story white house 
imploded in the force of an atomic blast; another, at 7,500 ft from the blast, was badly 
damaged and demolished.
242
 Before the shot, the CDA announced that the fully dressed 
mannequins would be used around the country to demonstrate the value of various types 
of clothing as protection during a nuclear war.
243
 Afterward, however, the planned utility 
of the mannequins as instructional models changed, and the mannequins, which rode out 
the blast in underground shelters and in cars, became part of the CDA‘s effort to drum up 
volunteers. The Las Vegas J. C. Penny store was among the first to host the mannequins, 
a display advertised in the Las Vegas Review Journal with a warning: ―These 
mannequins could have been real people, in fact, they could have been you. Volunteer 
now for Civil Defense.‖244  
The CDA gained little from ―Annie.‖ Despite all of the attention paid to the shot, 
it did not contribute to CDA‘s ability to mobilize the sort of public support necessary to 
attract more volunteers or congressional funding. As with the 1952 exercise, the primary 
benefit for CDA attendance at a nuclear detonation was the opportunity to be there.
 245
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What civil defense promotions did generate was support for military programs. As Allan 
Winkler observed, the expectation during the 1950s was that the military would keep 
bombs from ―getting through.‖246 And this was an expectation nourished by the AEC and 
its military partners, who exploited the program, tests, and the CDA.  
During the era of atmospheric weapons testing, the primary beneficiaries of 
publicity by and on behalf of civil defense were the AEC and their military partners. The 
AEC earned some kudos for helping the civil defense cause and, during Dean‘s tenure, 
the good will of the Truman administration, too. The most significant result of civil 
defense participation with weapons tests was that it lent energy to expansion—a repeating 
loop where civil defense experiments and the circulation of film showing homes and 
mannequins obliterated in the wake of a bomb blast generated more support for civil 
defense experiments as the armed forces used their political muscle to transform the 
anxiety raised by the dramatic images of civil defense experiments into dollars for 
defense, and so on. 
As the only other federal agency with the ability to authoritatively dispute Dean‘s 
claims about the safety of atmospheric weapons testing, Dean kept the CDA at arm‘s 
length throughout his Chairmanship. In the year before testing came to Nevada when 
publicity about the possibility of an atomic attack and its repercussions increased, 
Americans became accustomed to thinking that local civil defense officials were, 
perhaps, the only ones the public could turn to for advice about what to do and think 
about the confusing and sometimes contradictory information about nuclear bombs, 
radioactive health effects, and precautions. In March, the JCAE elevated the significance 
of the CDA when it held hearings in response to complaints from governors and mayors 
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nationwide who did not know what to do in the event of an atomic attack. The hearings 
shed light on the lack of preparedness and coordination between the AEC and the CDA. 
Called to testify, Chairman Dean explained that the AEC was not prepared to train civil 
defense officials for an attack, while other AEC officials, who indicated that they were 
unimpressed with the CDA‘s mission, mentioned that they were instructing civil defense 
personnel in radiation monitoring to ―check on radiation accidentally released‖ by AEC 
operations. Shields Warren left the CDA out of the picture altogether, testifying that the 
AEC was developing a simple geiger counter that people would be able to purchase for 
ten to fifteen dollars to measure the amount of radioactivity produced by a nuclear 
detonation.
247
 The hearings produced little in the way of practical advice to governors and 
other officials who needed it, and, except for JCAE requests that the AEC speed up its 
assistance to the CDA, provided no direction to the AEC or the CDA on ways to improve 
their working relationship. The CDA pressed on with very little help or interaction with 
the AEC. A month before the first test in Nevada, the CDA distributed a handbook urging 
that civil defense preparations begin immediately for ―critical target areas,‖ those 
communities with large production facilities or, like Las Vegas, with nearby military 
installations.
248
 What became known as the Blue Book recommended that CDA officials 
organize resources to provide first-aid and mortuary services, extend protection to 
industrial healthcare, stockpile medical equipment and medicine, and safeguard sanitation 
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facilities and water supplies.
249
 It ended on an encouraging note: the organization of a 
―smoothly functioning team,‖ meant that civil defense officials could ―meet even the 
worst disaster.‖250 Las Vegas‘ CDA official was, however, caught unawares on the 
Saturday morning of the first Nevada blast. When contacted by a New York Times 
reporter, he admitted knowing no more about the test than the reporter, having only 
learned about it from the press wires. He was willing, however, to speculate about what 
he did know: if the flash and blast were the result of a nuclear explosion, he supposed its 
radioactive particles would have ―dissipated‖ before reaching Las Vegas. Still, he could 
not be sure. ―If they are not spent in all that distance, then God help us all.‖251 Because of 
Atomic Governance, his brief prayer may have been the last time that any official with 
the federal government expressed publicly the dangers of testing nuclear weapons in 
Nevada. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
SCIENTISTS AND ATOMIC SECRECY 
Militarization of the peacetime atomic program was a political process that could not 
have occurred but for the military‘s ability to commandeer the expertise and authority of 
scientists to control what the public and elected officials learned about the atom bomb 
and its effects. Despite a postwar flurry of anti-military sentiment by scientists who 
lobbied for civilian control of the peacetime project and anti-atom bomb activism by 
those pushing for international control of atomic energy, the physical and theoretical 
scientists, chemists, biologists, health physics professionals, and medical doctors who 
came out of the Manhattan Project knew, as did university and laboratory administrators 
throughout the U.S., recognized that the deepest pockets for postwar funding would be 
military ones. The first element for militarization thus fell in place almost seamlessly 
after the war with the continuation of the Manhattan Project and the desire of all branches 
to continue existing contracts or forge new ones to develop military applications for 
atomic energy. Established scientists returned (physically or intellectually) to their 
routines or acceped more lucrative offers and moved. More than a few of them had ideas 
for using the network of relationships formed during the war to draw funding to their 
institutions, departments, and students. Younger unaffiliated scientists at Los Alamos, 
Oak Ridge, and throughout the Manhattan network of laboratories and production 
facilities carried on much as they had during the war in preparation for Crossroads. That 
Operation was the conduit for the passages of wartime practices into peacetime, practical 
institutional ones and manipulative, strategic ones. During the same span of months that 
prestigious scientists attracted public attention for political activism about the issues of 
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domestic and international control of atomic energy, some scientists also stepped into the 
limelight to oppose Operation Crossroads. Navy officers, committed to a dual argument 
that Crossroads was not only a national security imperative but also a scientific one and 
yet unable during peacetime to commandeer the authority, or even the silence, of all 
scientists, responded to oppositional scientists in a way that became routine as the 
peacetime program evolved: they denigrated the qualifications and integrity of 
oppositional scientists while relying on the authority of supportive scientists to achieve 
their political goals. For Crossroads, Navy officers drew on the authority of the Stafford 
Warren, Chief of the Manhattan Project‘s Medical Division, to be their Chief Medical 
Officer, and used him and other scientists to attest to the scientific value of the Operation 
at congressional hearings, media events, and in press releases. By January1947, when the 
AEC took charge of Manhattan‘s resources, military officers had already begun 
gravitating toward those pro-military, or merely ambitious scientists and used them to 
help regain control over the program. As militarization continued, those scientists used 
their own growing authority in positions with the AEC or its affiliates and their seats on 
AEC advisory committees to make decisions about projects, testing, and permissible 
exposures that advanced military goals and subordinated civilian ones.  
The second condition for militarization—Atomic Secrecy—also flowed from the 
Manhattan Project. Groves ensured the military‘s postwar control of atomic information 
ten days after Trinity. On July 26, 1945, he revised Manhattan‘s public relations program 
and situated himself at the top of a regime with authority over all aspects of ―the 
principle.‖ Truman signed off on Groves‘s plan before the Hiroshima bombing, giving 
Groves, and through him, the War Department, control over what could be known about 
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the bomb and its effects ―now and for all time in the future.‖1 Truman surely envisioned 
that he was preventing the possibility that atomic technology—―the secret‖—would leak 
out before a system to manage it was established. Groves, however, used the directive to 
legitimate his own position that the wartime authority he wielded under Roosevelt was 
still in force. It is impossible to know Groves‘s intentions, but he was so forthright about 
his disregard of Truman‘s authority that eight months after his plan achieved the force of 
law through Truman‘s signature, the New York Times reported that Groves was ―still 
bound by the security regulations handed to him by the late President Roosevelt.‖2 
Groves extended the authority Truman gave him to protect ―the secret‖—a national 
security imperative—to justify his own self-interested claim that by virtue of his wartime 
service under Roosevelt he alone was entitled to authority over the program and its 
resources. And, he stood on that authority to conceal, from the president as well as the 
public, information about the program or atomic science that he was not inclined to 
divulge. In the year between the end of the war and the passage of the Atomic Energy 
Act, military officers from all branches anxious to protect the integrity of their 
institutions during demobilization and reorganization used appeals to national security to 
justify withholding information. Those officers interested in using the atomic program to 
secure their postwar future combined secrecy with appeals to national security as self-
interestedly as Groves. After the Act passed, Groves and Nichols used their Manhattan 
expertise and established security protocols within the Military Establishment that, under 
the auspices of protecting ―the secret‖ systematized among military officers the selective 
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withholding of information—from the president as well as the public—to achieve the 
self-interested goal of recovering authority over the atomic program and its resources. 
Officers did more than protect ―the secret‖ in the national interest, they concealed many 
in their own self-interest. Using Michel Foucault‘s formulation, one can view this as an 
expression of ―governmentality,‖ a force that combined totalitarianism with individuality 
that shaped the relationships of state actors and lent direction to state forces. Groves and 
officers who followed benefited from their official status as state actors and used ―tactics 
rather than laws … and [laws] tactics—to arrange things.‖3 This was Atomic Secrecy.  
By combining the opinions of pro-military scientists and Atomic Secrecy, military 
officers created the illusion that radioactivity produced by U.S. bombs or in production 
facilities was manageable. The creation of this fiction began as early as 1945 when 
Strauss proposed to Forrestal that the Navy experiment with atom bombs and it continued 
throughout the era of atmospheric testing. It was, in fact, the only way that military 
officers and their supporters could benefit politically from weapons tests. Atomic secrecy 
combined with the opinions of pro-military scientists gave officers the opportunity to 
create the impression that the U.S. military could successfully fight an atomic war in 
conventional ways while simultaneously generating support for military expansion and 
continued weapons testing by emphasizing the fearsomeness of an enemy‘s bomb blast 
and the radioactive dangers and long lasting contamination that enemy blast would 
produce. The main reason for the illusion was to create the imaginative space for officers 
and their supporters to capitalize on weapons demonstrations, but its influence extended 
beyond the program and the corrosive effect it, and militarization, had on the ability of 
President Truman and congressmen to make informed decisions about nuclear weapons. 
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This was especially important with the atomic program because except for the explosion 
itself, discerning or measuring a success, failure, or even catastrophe, required scientific 
expertise.  
The first section of this chapter focuses on the year following World War II and 
the determinative influence the Manhattan Project exerted on the peacetime program. It 
discusses the relationship between Truman‘s extension of Groves‘s authority over the 
program and Atomic Secrecy and the way the wartime experiences of scientists combined 
with military funding to create the conditions for the re-creation of a scientific 
community of atomic scientists and its effects. It uses examples from Crossroads to 
examine the exploitation of scientists and the subordination of their expertise by Navy 
officers interested in benefiting politically from the operation and how they used Atomic 
Secrecy to enforce their control over scientists and findings that would have been 
detrimental to the Navy‘s political goals. The second section examines how the military‘s 
monopolization of atomic resources and use of Atomic Secrecy marginalized the 
influence of precautionary minded scientists within AEC committees before and into the 
earliest stages of continental weapons testing. The third section follows that process into 
Dean‘s Chairmanship and the beginnings of administratively sponsored, official, 
deference to military desires that is the result of administrative decisions to settle 
disagreements between pro-military and precautionary minded scientists at the program‘s 
advisory and managerial levels. Among the by-products of pro-military advocacy by 
scientists and officials was the way it interfered with the establishment of federal 
standards for permissible radiation exposures. By preventing the adoption of 
internationally accepted standards, pro-military scientists influenced safety standards at 
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program facilities during a time of rapid expansion that dovetailed with the postwar 
explosion in the use of radioactive tracers in medicine and industry and the proliferation 
of x-ray machines from the floors of production plants to those of shoe stores.
4
 As a 
result, U.S. exposure levels remained higher, for a longer period of time, than those 
established by Great Britain, Canada, and other countries throughout the 1950s. The final 
section focuses on the ways that Willard Libby used militarization and pro-military 
scientists to advance his own professional ambitions. Libby, the developer of radiocarbon 
14 dating, exploited his advisory committee authority, his position as an AEC 
Commissioner after 1953, and AEC sponsored fallout surveys to stifle challenges to his 
methodology launched by critics outside the AEC‘s sphere of influence.  
Continental testing for political purposes depended on a cadre of pro-military 
scientists, ones who knew the relationship between radiogenic health effects and 
exposure, and who were willing to use Atomic Secrecy as the military had: to control 
what elected officials and the public knew about radioactive hazards. The goal for 
military officers, pro-military scientists, and their supporters among AEC officials and 
affiliates, was to capitalize on the most deadly effects of radioactivity that an enemy‘s 
nuclear attack would produce while claiming that American atmospheric detonations 
were safe to generate support for the maintenance and expansion of the armed forces. The 
strategy‘s success relied on creating and maintaining the artificial impression that under 
experimental conditions the dangers of an atomic (or nuclear) bomb explosion could be 
managed safety. Admiral Blandy and other Navy officers at Crossroads began 
promulgating this alternative reality in the interests of the Navy‘s postwar vitality, and it 
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became a dominant theme as Groves and Nichols used the MLC and AFSWP to create 
the machinery and protocols within the Military Establishment that provided for the 
suppression of knowledge about the unpredictability of radioactive hazards while 
emphasizing and persistently reinforcing the notion in public and in government circles 
that the dangers were manageable ones. It was the scenario at the heart of the ―re-
education‖ campaign Lt. Gen. Hull started in 1948 and maintaining it had become routine 
for military officers by 1950 when Dean replaced Lilienthal and lent civilian authority to 
the military‘s message. By the time Dean threw the weight of AEC officialdom into the 
creation of the Joint Information Office that consolidated and coordinated DOD and AEC 
resources for managing publicity for continental testing, the notion that radioactive 
hazards were manageable had achieved the status of dogma. Military officers and their 
supporters pulled off the feat by exploiting scientists for their expertise and authority and 
by using Atomic Secrecy to manipulate in self-serving ways scientific information. It was 
a dynamic relationship through which scientists, including those frustrated by Atomic 
Secrecy, generally flourished; and one that provided opportunities for some especially 
cooperative and ambitious scientists to exploit the program and Atomic Secrecy 
themselves, securing in the process influence and prestige that without militarization they 
might never have enjoyed.  
This study provides another dimension to the postwar history of scientists and the 
conditions of their experiences and political activism that made them, in the words of 
Jessica Wang, ―particularly vulnerable to anticommunist persecutions‖ by HUAC and 
anti-communists in Congress.
5
 With a focus on a lower tier of political engagement—the 
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interpersonal political field of the scientific/military relationship—this chapter highlights 
the militarization of the program from the end of the war through 1958 as it was 
modulated and nurtured by scientists in positions of authority as program officials or 
advisors and their engagement with the military, AEC officials, and one another. It 
demonstrates that because of Atomic Secrecy, the authority exercised by pro-military 
scientists, and the tendency for them to use their influence to police the activities of their 
colleagues throughout the network of AEC affiliates, interpersonal political 
accomplishments and defeats were at least as important as those taking place on the 
national stage.
6
 
Truman, the Censorship Directive, and the Peacetime Manhattan Project 
At the end of the war, the nature of public discourse about ―the secret‖ and the 
methods the government employed to keep it contributed to the public‘s inability to 
recognize the pervasiveness of Atomic Secrecy. Though there was much discussion of 
secrecy at the time, the issue was whether ―the secret‖ should be shared as part of an 
international atomic energy agency under the control the United Nations.
7
 Except for the 
scientific particulars of the bomb and its effects, people in the United States had every 
reason to believe that there was not much left to tell—or to hide. In fact, on the day 
Hiroshima was bombed—August 6, 1945,—one of the biggest stories in New Mexico 
was that secrecy would end: ―Now They Can Be Told Aloud, Those Stoories [sic] of ‗the 
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Hill‘‖ as an excited typesetter had it for the headline of the Santa Fe New Mexican.8 And, 
in New York, ―Atomic Bomb Held ‗Best-Kept Secret.‘‖9 Later, on August 12, President 
Truman approved the release of ―The Smyth Report,‖ physicist and Chair of Princeton 
University‘s Department of Physics Henry DeWolf Smyth‘s essay on the Manhattan 
Project.
10
 Groves disapproved of the Report‘s release, ostensibly because of the 
information it divulged but also, perhaps, because of his desire to release only his own 
history of Manhattan, one written by New York Times science reporter William Laurence, 
who Groves brought Laurence on board in an effort to monopolize the history of 
Manhattan. One day later, on August 13, the Office of Censorship issued a press release 
stating that censorship would end ―one hour after President Truman announces victory 
over Japan.‖11 As Manhattan‘s chief, General Leslie Groves, did during the war when he 
thwarted presidential and congressional inquiries into the operation and finances of 
Manhattan under the auspices of national security, he and others continue this same 
strategy after the war. Truman that made it possible for them to do so.  
But censorship, in the form of Atomic Secrecy, did not end. Before the first atom 
bomb was dropped on Japan, President Truman signed security protocols devised on July 
26 by Manhattan‘s Groves that were, under orders from the War Department and 
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President Truman himself, kept secret from the public and from Congress.
12
 The War 
Department circulated the new censorship directive upon the cover sheet of a document 
that, ironically, claimed to reveal the entire atomic story—―The Smyth Report.‖  
The ―Censorship Directive,‖ attached to what became known as the Smyth 
Report,
13
 gave the War Department control over the domestic press and left little doubt 
that it intended to maintain its vitality indefinitely by retaining absolute control of atomic 
weaponry and science. The Directive appeared inconspicuously, as the second to last 
paragraph of the one-page cover sheet that offered standard requirements of release 
(―after 9:00 P.M. EWT, Saturday August 11, 1945,‖ for radio and the day following for 
―morning papers‖): 
The best interests of the United States require the utmost cooperation by 
all concerned in keeping secret now and for all time in the future all 
scientific and technical information not given in this report or other 
official releases of information by the War Department.
14
 
 
A month later, the president (through the War Department) reiterated the Directive, while 
adding euphemistically that the action was ―in the national interest and not with any idea 
of imposing censorship upon the press or radio,‖ yet emphatically advising editors that 
                                                 
12
 On July 26, 1945, Groves revised Manhattan‘s public relations program, placing himself at the top of a 
pyramidical regime covering all aspects of ―the principle‖ that was, itself, to remain secret. ―Memorandum 
to The District Engineer from Major General Groves,‖ TSCMED. Truman seems to have approved 
Groves‘s initiative at the same time he ordered the release of the Smyth report because ―so many fake 
scientists were telling crazy tales about it.‖ Harry S. Truman, Off the Record: The Private Papers of Harry 
S. Truman, Robert H. Ferrell, ed. (New York, 1980), 60.  
 
13
 H.D. Smyth, A General Account of the Development of Methods of using Atomic Energy for Military 
Purposes Under the Auspices of the United States Government 1940-1945. Smyth was the Chairman of 
Princeton‘s Department of Physics and worked as a consultant on the Manhattan Project.  
 
14
 Emphasis mine. ―Future Release‖ TCSMED, [undated]. The Directive was not distinguished in any way, 
even though other elements of the release were underlined or placed in all capitals for emphasis.  
 
548 
 
they were not to share that information with their readers.
15
 The media‘s wartime 
experiences accustomed them to the routine dispatches and restrictions imposed by the 
War Department and the Office of Censorship, but when combined with the additional 
presidential authority, the proclamation could not have been received casually.
16
 That the 
nation‘s newspaper editors took the order not to reveal the existence of the Directive 
seriously seems to be borne out by the fact that its issuance was not reported.
17
 
A simplified three-tier schematic offers a way to visualize the rudiments of a 
system that made room for the extra-constitutional expansion of authority that was 
Atomic Secrecy. At the top of the imaginary diagram were those policy initiatives 
established by the president, legislators, or executive-level officials. President Truman‘s 
approval of Groves‘s plan to protect ―the secret‖ provides an example of an executive-
level initiative. At the lowest, practical level of the diagram, unelected delegates, 
administrators, and officials, devise projects and otherwise go about the business of 
carrying out their duty to implement policy. All the public learned of each tier emerged 
through the middle, communicative level, where officials translated for public 
consumption the policies and their implementation. Ideally, the correspondence between 
the three is precise: policy is made and implemented according to its officially-stated 
purpose, and explained with as much factual integrity and accuracy as possible. 
Realistically, however, disjunctions of varying degrees and consequence occurred across 
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the three levels, the result of simple confusion to outright deception. This highlights a 
paradox embedded in the system designed to protect what most believed was the nation‘s 
most valuable treasure and that has been in evidence through earlier discussions of 
militarization: that its machinery was so easily manipulated that those with national 
security authority who wished to do so could use the system to subvert official national 
security policies. Atomic Secrecy guarded not just one ―secret,‖ but many. It gave 
military officers and their supporters the tool they needed to use the program in pursuit of 
their own self-interested goals. In the process of selecting what would become known 
about the bomb, radioactive health effects, and as occurred during Dean‘s tenure, the 
realistic value of battlefield tactical weapons, they stripped the public of the opportunity 
to engage in any knowledgeable or meaningful way in the political process and withheld 
from Presidents Truman and Eisenhower, and Congress as well, the information they 
needed to carry out their responsibilities under the constitution and to the electorate.
18
  
One of the first public indications that the idealized view of how the Truman 
administration was managing ―the secret‖ was not operating as it should came out in 
April 1946 when no one could answer why McGraw-Hill insisted on submitting a 
graduate level textbook on applied physics to the War Department for clearance when the 
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War Department asserted that it was not in the censorship business.
19
 The authors of the 
book, nine University of Pennsylvania instructors and researchers in chemistry and 
physics, refused to comply with the publisher‘s request that they remove some sections of 
the book because ―two competent critics‖ said they contained ―classified material‖ and 
also refused a request by McGraw Hill that they allow the War Department to review a 
final manuscript draft. A spokesman for the group took a stand in New York at the 
offices of the ―Americans United for World Government‖ and argued that there was 
nothing in their book that had not been published before. He also pointed a finger at the 
Manhattan District for ―exceeding their authority,‖ and engaging in ―thought censorship.‖ 
In a companion article, the War Department denied knowing anything about the book and 
noted that it had not ―insisted on censorship of atomic material‖ since the end of the 
war.
20
 The spokesman for the War Department also pointed to Groves, but only in the 
limited way of mentioning his authority over the Manhattan Project and that he operated 
under regulations he received from President Roosevelt, and to Truman, who back in 
September, asked publishers ―to refrain from printing material concerning the atomic 
bomb‖ without submitting it for review by ―the proper authorities.‖ Though able to say 
only that the War Department had not reviewed the book, the spokesman was quick to 
cast doubt on the integrity of the nine authors: ―‗there must be something wrong‘ with 
anyone who would not be willing to show a book in which the security of the nation 
might be compromised.‖21 The dispute disappeared from the pages of the New York 
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Times and appears to have dissolved with the editor of the collection, William E. 
Stephens, at that time an assistant professor of physics, taking the lead and getting the 
book published by The Science Press in Lancaster, Pennsylvania.
22
 
The Censorship Directive relinquished the civilian executive authority of the 
president to a military officer during peacetime—a move that represented a revolutionary 
turning point in American history. The revelations that emerged because of the bombings 
in Japan, the Smyth Report, the War Department‘s declaration heralding the end of 
censorship, and the imperative to keep ―the secret,‖ all masked a profound, and 
clandestine, transformation. A comment Senator Brien McMahon made seven months 
after the Directive‘s issuance captures its significance within the context of the early 
postwar period. During the congressional debate about whether atomic energy should be 
settled in civilian or military hands, McMahon railed against the possibility that the 
authority the military wielded during wartime might be extended into peacetime: ―for the 
first time in peacetime history … the military would have ‗censorship‘ powers over 
civilians … would destroy the basic concepts on which our government was founded.‖23 
Subsequent events, including the passage of the ―civilian‖ Atomic Energy Act and the 
authority that the military began flaunting in the late 1940s and 1950s, obscured the 
transfer of authority that took place with Truman‘s Directive. Even someone as familiar 
with the workings of government from the administrative and congressional perspectives 
as Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, a proponent of openness and Chairman of the 
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Commission on Governmental Secrecy, pointed to the Soviets‘ 1949 atom bomb as the 
point in time when atomic secrecy became onerous:  
Americans were used to secrecy during wartime. [But] this was wholly 
new. Profound aspects of the culture, even the nature of energy … were 
now to be known by a few but withheld from the rest.
24
  
 
The Directive affected atomic science in three ways: it protected Groves and other 
military officers from oversight; it prevented the public and elected officials from 
scrutinizing the activities of Groves and other military officers in those granted authority 
over atomic science; and, it created a consensus-shaping narrative that channeled all 
authoritative discussion about the hazards of atomic weapons during the year between the 
end of the war and the passage of the Atomic Energy Act into political debates about 
domestic and international control of atomic science.  
From the public‘s perspective, Groves‘s ability to withhold concrete information 
about the effects of the Trinity bomb combined with the supercharged political climate to 
cast doubt on any non-official version of the health effects of an atomic explosion. 
Groves‘s denial that radioactivity had much to do with the deaths and sickness following 
the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombing made it easier for him and others to dismiss the 
disturbing accounts of radioactive hazards contained in the book One World or None as 
nothing more than the alarmist exaggerations of advocates for international control of 
atomic science. And yet, Groves wrote in his memoirs that one of the primary concerns 
before Trinity was to make sure that fallout would not ―pass over any populated areas‖ 
until its radioactivity had ―thoroughly dissipated.‖25 When Stafford Warren investigated 
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the blast‘s effects, he found that the thermal effects were ―several times greater than 
expected.‖ As for the blast itself, it eviscerated jack rabbits more than 800 yards from the 
detonation and caused ―extensive damage‖ to a farm house three miles away. If used in 
battle, he predicted that the bomb would have caused ―severe casualties‖ to any personnel 
within two miles and severe eye damage to any within five miles, enough that it would 
put them ―out of action several days if not permanently.‖ Should another experiment be 
conducted, Warren told Groves that any weapons test of Trinity‘s size, 19-21 kiloton, 
should only be repeated in an area ―free of population‖ for at least 150 miles.26 Truman‘s 
Directive gave Groves the ability to keep Warren‘s report secret from the public and from 
elected officials. As an early expression of Atomic Secrecy, it prevented the public and 
congressmen from learning the sort of information that might have operated against the 
notion that gained momentum in the months following the war that atom bombs 
represented an economic alternative to the burden of maintaining a peacetime military 
force. It is impossible to know whether Groves withheld it because of his desire to 
withhold all information about atomic weapons or whether he believed that it might be 
used politically. Ironically, however, had Warren‘s report been made available to 
authenticate the suppositional scenarios in One World or None, the American public and 
congressmen alike might have been less inclined to consider that atom bombs could 
replace conventional forces and the armed forces would have been saved at least some of 
the energy they spent following the war toward that very end. 
Politically, the Directive bought Truman political breathing room. By continuing 
Groves‘s authority, he avoided the possibility that congressmen would uncover politically 
                                                 
26
 For the report on the Trinity blast, see Stafford Warren to Groves, ―Report on Test 16 July 1945,‖ 21 July 
1945, TSCMED. 
 
554 
 
damaging information about the Project‘s management at the same time he satisfied 
himself that ―the secret‖ would be safe.27 It also relieved Acheson from fulfilling 
promptly his obligation to the Interim Committee to channel their proposal into the hands 
of congressmen for legislation establishing the peacetime program and relieving Groves 
of his responsibility—and authority. Details about the Project‘s scope helped to diffuse 
the moral outrage that erupted after the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
28
 And, the 
controversies about domestic control and international control of atomic science allowed 
scientific information about the bomb and its effects to be marginalized as politically 
motivated.
29
 Such political suspicions made it easier for Admiral Blandy and other 
military officers to invoke the same anti-scientific attitude exhibited by Groves and 
Truman, and to use scientists to achieve their own goals and to use scientific information 
only insofar as it supported those same goals. Truman turned to Groves for scientific 
advice and although he approved the release of ―The Smyth Report,‖ over Groves‘s 
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objections, said that he did so only because ―so many fake scientists were telling crazy 
lies about it.‖30 Despite Groves‘s friendship with Warren and his respect for 
Oppenheimer, he had a general disdain for scientists and demonstrated concern about 
Oppenheimer‘s role in legislation for control of atomic science.31 During a hearing, 
Oppenheimer explained the scientists‘ resistance to regimentation and control, asking for 
the atomic energy bill to be reinforced to assure that a commission would ―not interfere 
with scientific work except when there is a national hazard involved.‖32 The Directive 
ensured that Groves, and Admiral Blandy and other officers and AEC officials after him, 
had sole discretion to interfere—with science and with what elected officials, including 
the president, could know—and used it to reclaim authority over atomic science. The 
following overview analyzes the role of scientists in militarization.  
Scientists: Community, Culture, Discipline 
Like military officers, pro-military scientists used Atomic Secrecy and media 
manipulation to create an illusion of safety that few in the public sphere could, or were 
willing, to contest. One of the reasons for this was that scientists who worked on the 
program who could speak with authority about it did not launch strong public challenges 
during the late 1940s and through 1951 when pro-military scientists asserted their 
dominance. During the height of the fallout controversy after 1955, Atomic Secrecy 
proved insufficient to prevent oppositional opinions of notables such as Linus Pauling 
and Albert Schweitzer from casting doubt on the AEC‘s assertions of safety. The 
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program‘s pro-military scientists worked to maintain the illusion by promulgating 
misleading statistics in the public sphere by averaging exposures across space or 
population to diffuse exposure levels and offering questionable comparisons between 
man-made and naturally-occurring radioactivity. They reinforced these tactics with 
appeals to national security and used their authority to coerce and silence their colleagues 
who expressed doubts. However strong the support they received from AEC 
administrators, these pro-military scientists could not have held sway had their decisions 
not been met by the tacit acceptance of officials such as Shields Warren and others 
throughout the program who did not speak up as clearly as they might to the president, 
other elected officials, or to the public. This complicity allowed the AEC to manage 
testing in a way that hid, rather than prevented, risk. In part, their silence was the result of 
their dependence on the AEC‘s viability and its dependence on military projects. But 
their reluctance to air their disagreement with the scientific validity of the positions taken 
by their pro-military colleagues was also a product of Manhattan Project habitus and their 
membership in a community of scientists who carried their wartime experiences, cultural 
practices, and habits of thought into the peacetime program.  
Though using the concept of a community to explain the behavior of scientists is 
problematic for the reason that it depersonalizes and aggregates individuals of different 
backgrounds, education, ideologies, and political views, it is a useful way to understand 
inter-personal relationships and the decision-making of those who tied their expertise and 
futures directly or indirectly to the peacetime atomic program.
33
 While the elaborate 
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security precautions and compartmentalization of the Manhattan Project have received a 
measure of attention that the peacetime program has not, there was very little difference 
between the insularity and dependence of scientists on the military throughout the 
wartime and peacetime projects.
34
 The peacetime continuation of the Manhattan Project 
meant that there was no interruption in the synergy between the program and the armed 
forces in the eighteen months between the end of the war and when the AEC absorbed its 
resources. After the AEC took on the resources and contractual obligations of the 
Manhattan Project, new funding streams dedicated to military research and production 
provided even more jobs for scientists—and even more reasons for scientists and their 
respective institutions to avoid alienating their benefactors. As Stuart W. Leslie points 
out, in the immediate postwar period, ―military R & D budgets fell off only slightly from 
their wartime peak (itself fifty times higher than prewar levels), and then began to climb 
rapidly.‖35 The value of military funding to affiliated institutions and their scientists 
created the same conditions for group solidarity that the importance of securing, and then 
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maintaining, authority over atomic program generated among the typically compulsively 
competitive Joint Chiefs and upper echelon. Along with the economic incentives that 
bound the community, the political value of atomic science to the military created 
additional incentives for scientists to avoid public disputes. Internal and external 
factors—the national security implications of their work that insulated them and their 
decision-making from colleagues not affiliated with the program; the government‘s 
monopoly over atomic resources and security clearances that made them, and their 
institutions, entirely dependent on federal largesse; and the intrinsic value of their work, 
―impressed by the possibility of advancing his particular field of research‖36—helped the 
community cohere, tempering personal and institutional competitiveness and the 
disciplinary, professional, or philosophical differences among them.
37
  
The similarities between wartime objectives and peacetime ones contributed to 
the reproduction by scientists and professionals who were veterans of the Manhattan 
Project of wartime cultural practices and ways of thinking into the peacetime program. 
Newcomers modeled their behavior on that of Manhattan‘s veterans and ensured its 
replication.
38
 As a product of personal experience and history, this was a function of 
habitus, where  
individual and collective practices [become] schemes of perception, 
though and action, tend[ing] to guarantee the ‗correctness‘ of practices and 
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their constancy over time, more reliably than all formal rules and explicit 
norms.
39
  
 
Another wartime holdover was decision-making by committee. The AEC‘s 
institutional and advisory committees replicated and reinforced Manhattan practices, 
where committees served practical and social functions as an intellectual forum to work 
through scientific and technological dilemmas, where scientists exerted whatever 
influence they could in the compartmentalized structure of the program, and where they 
shared and modulated grievances. Committees insulated atomic scientists, protecting 
their decision making process from review from those outside the committee. As 
militarization progressed, committees became the venues where pro-military scientists 
marginalized their more precautionary colleagues through force of numbers, coercion, or 
by withholding information upon which pro-military scientists based their conclusions. 
During a meeting of the AEC‘s ―Special Advisory Committee on Biology & Medicine‖ 
for example, five scientists argued over the scope of a study being conducted by a sixth, 
Merril Eisenbud, of Strontium 90 concentrations in a North Dakota milkshed. Eisenbud, 
who had been one of the few scientific professionals who worked for the program itself 
as director of its New York Operations Office, was at the meeting but refused to clarify 
his numbers despite his colleagues‘ confusion: 
Dr. Warren: I think that in light of these points the probability is that it 
is closer on the average to the lower end of the range, but I think we will 
have to admit that there could be a possibility of an increase by a factor of 
ten in scattered individuals. 
Dr. Failla: That is not what Eisenbud just said. He is saying for a large 
population it could be 25. So the individual increase will have to be added 
to that. 
Dr. Warren:  No, he is not saying for a large population. As I understand 
it, he is saying for scattered people in a large population. 
Dr. Failla: No. 
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Dr. Dunham: Scattered communities is what he is talking about. 
Dr. Failla: No, he is saying a large population in North Dakota. 
Dr. Marinelli: There is no large population in North Dakota. …  
Mr. Eisenbud: There are relatively few numbers up there. This is very 
complicated.
 40
   
 
Eisenbud‘s statement ended the discussion in a way that prevented anyone in the group 
from evaluating his data and did so dismissively as though the experts who shared 
membership on the committee with him were not qualified to understand it in the first 
place. The insular committee venue and the interdependence of the scientists within the 
program and their complete dependence on the AEC created the conditions for 
authoritarianism and acquiescence among scientists with the AEC. Scientists asked 
questions; but, as the above exchange demonstrates and as was indicative of 
conversations throughout the morning and afternoon sessions of the meeting, those who 
received incomplete answers or who entertained lingering reservations demurred. 
Anti-communism also contributed to defining the boundaries of the community 
and coercing silence, if not obedience, from its members. Loyalty investigations, at least 
400,000 performed by the AEC alone before 1953, kept scientists out and those inside it 
in line—a reason why membership in the Federation of Atomic Scientists dropped from 
3,000 right after the war to fewer than 1,000 by 1950.
41
 Over the same period of time, the 
American Association for the Advancement of Science, an organization ―militantly‖ 
opposed to loyalty oaths during the late 1940s, having formed a ―Special Committee on 
Civil Liberties for Scientists, in 1950 demanded protection for scientists from 
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congressional persecution, reversed course and dropped its calls for rights for scientists 
and scientific openness.
42
 The revocation of Oppenheimer‘s security clearance and 
subsequent hearing pitted some of the most prestigious scientists in the community 
against one another while signaling to them all that their livelihoods depended on 
satisfying the militarist objectives of AEC officialdom.
43
 
Manhattan‘s institutional culture and the continuation of the interdependence of 
atomic scientists and the military contributed to the development of a pro-military 
subculture through which scientists such as Norris Bradbury in 1946, Gordon Dunning 
and Gioacchino Failla in 1951, and Libby beginning in 1953 flourished by reason of their 
support of militarization and experimentation. Scientists belonging to this sub-community 
gave military officers the ability to create the illusion that U.S. radioactive fallout was a 
manageable phenomenon, providing AEC Chairmen Dean and Strauss, along with other 
AEC administrators and managers the institutional and public support necessary to satisfy 
the individual ambitions and institutional goals of AEC administrators and military 
officers. This was a process with wartime origins in Manhattan and the earliest days of 
planning for Operation Crossroads.  
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Although Strauss‘s original proposal to Forrestal was what breathed life into 
Operation Crossroads, it was Truman‘s Directive that made it possible for Navy officers 
to count on scientists with Manhattan to help them get approval for the Operation and to 
manipulate perceptions in such a way that allowed Navy officers to promote the notion 
that radioactivity was a manageable phenomenon—at least by the U.S. Navy—and after 
the maneuver to prevent the publication of any scientific findings that did not support that 
fiction. The significance of Crossroads as the first political use of atom bombs was 
discussed earlier. The examination of the Operation in this chapter illustrates how Navy 
officers exploited Manhattan scientific expertise and resources and Atomic Secrecy for 
political purposes. It reinforces the points made earlier about the significance of 
Manhattan to the peacetime program. It also demonstrates the significance of the 
Operation for the peacetime program at a point in this analysis where the similarities 
between Navy‘s political use of demonstrations and those conducted in Nevada through 
the AEC/DOD partnership are evident. Crossroads established a peacetime model for 
officers interested in using the program and tests to achieve their own self-interested 
political ambitions. And at a time when the political activism of atomic scientists was in 
its infancy, the Navy‘s practice of denigrating not only the positions but the abilities of 
oppositional scientists contributed to the reluctance of some scientists to speak out on a 
national plane as the program matured.
44
 As Robert K. Merton pointed out before World 
War II, scientists were not able to separate their ―human,‖ personal interests from their 
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work, and atomic scientists were as interested in their futures as anyone else during the 
early postwar period.
45
 It is difficult, however, not to see the decline of scientific activism 
as a lost opportunity to temper the enthusiasm for nuclear weapons early in the peacetime 
program‘s history.46 There is, perhaps, no better indication of how thoroughly 
militarization and the insularity of the scientific community influenced the ideas about 
nuclear weapons, warfare, and the effects of fallout than the emergence of a climate by 
1958 where advocating for a peaceful solution to the arms race could make one of the 
nation‘s premier scientists a subject of ridicule and the reasons for the denial of a grant to 
fund his institution. In May 1958 well after the fallout debate had brought calls from the 
international community for the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. to stop testing atmospheric 
weapons, Linus Pauling, Chairman of California Institute of Technology‘s Division of 
Chemistry and Chemical Engineering, joined them. Lee DuBridge, CIT‘s president, 
called Pauling into his office to tell him to stop his public support for peace. Pauling‘s 
notes indicate that DuBridge told Pauling that he had become a ―laughing stock,‖ that the 
Board of Regents wanted him fired, and that his anti-testing position was the reason why 
CIT‘s Development Program had lost out to Harvey Mudd College on a $16 million 
dollar grant.
47
 DuBridge‘s quarrel with Pauling was surely influenced by the lost grant, 
but his actions do reflect on the changes that had taken place not only in his own thinking 
but socially and culturally since 1947 when, even then CIT president, found activism a 
                                                 
45
 Merton, ―The Reward System of Science,‖ The Sociology of Science: Theoretical and Empirical 
Investigations, Norman W. Soter, ed. (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1973), 326-327.  
 
46
 See Wang, ―for a brief, exciting, tumultuous period, atomic scientists moved to the center of American 
politics.‖ American Science in an Age of Anxiety, 9.  
 
47
 Linus Pauling, Notes by Linus Pauling re: Communications with Lee DuBridge concerning Pauling‘s 
peace activities, May 21, 1958. Collection: Linus Pauling and the International Peace Movement. Oregon 
State Special Collections. Online at http://library.oregonstate.edu/specialcollections/coll/pauling/peace 
 
564 
 
virtue, and singled out peace activism especially. Scientists should take an interest in the 
political affairs around them, ―including joining hands with other citizens when called to 
tasks of peace.‖48 And, DuBridge was among those who took a stand against Operation 
Crossroads and spoke out publicly at least three times against the Navy‘s claims that 
Crossroads was necessary to advance scientific understanding.
49
  
Navy officers attacked oppositional scientists in the press and used scientists 
already affiliated with the project to argue for the Operation‘s scientific value. Their 
aggressive defense of Crossroads as a scientific experiment was explained by the 
precariousness of the Navy‘s future after the bombings of Japan. The notion that ships 
were obsolete was one that arose immediately. U.S. commentators even questioned 
imprisoned Nazi officers for their opinion about the Navy‘s future. Hermann Goering 
expressed sympathy, mentioning that it appeared that the atom bomb made ―battleships 
impractical,‖ but added optimistically that technology had always come up with a 
defense.
50
 The optimistic line was one touted by the Navy‘s upper echelon ahead of 
Crossroads. Admiral Chester Nimitz discounted the possibility that navies were obsolete, 
and the Operation was the way he expected to prove that point: ―Let the ‗false prophets‘ 
prepare the headlines in advance, such as ‗atomic bombs sink ships in test‘ or ‗navy is 
doomed‘ but don‘t take them seriously.‖51 Nimitz took issue with the positions of those 
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he called ―false prophets.‖ In fact, the most prevalent arguments by scientists and other 
experts were not that atom bombs would sink ships, which were resilient and designed to 
withstand blast damage, but, that radioactivity would cause the most damage, the effects 
of which could be determined under laboratory conditions.
52
 The Navy‘s problem was 
not keeping their ships afloat after a bombing but that the Navy was not equipped to 
deliver an attack. By twisting the argument of the Operation‘s detractors, Navy officers 
avoided confronting the problem that ships, even carriers, had no role to play in a war 
pursued with air-delivered atom bombs. The Navy was at a crossroads and it bargained 
its future on the survivability of ships at Bikini. The only way to carry out that plan was 
to secure approval for the Operation; and, the only way to overcome the notion that 
intraservice rivalry was the reason for the maneuver was to position it as an experiment: a 
contribution to mankind.
53
  
The Navy began its plan by signing Stafford Warren, Manhattan‘s Chief Medical 
Officer, to organize the experiment(s) and the institutions and scientists who would 
participate. Warren had not only demonstrated that he could abide military authority 
under Groves, but the organizational acumen he demonstrated in mobilizing medical 
personnel and technicians to provide for health and safety across the Project‘s facilities 
continued as he led the first medical teams into Hiroshima and Nagasaki, prepared the 
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assessments of bomb and radiation damage, and continued to direct the survivor studies.
54
 
The Navy could have found no more authoritative scientist to satisfy detractors. Not only 
was he the best one to carry out the scientific experiment officers envisioned for the 
Operation, but he was also the best equipped to guarantee that although the maneuvers 
would be risky, the Operation would be carried out safely. The Navy used Warren to 
mobilize scientific expertise for the Operation and to convince the public and elected 
officials that Crossroads was primarily about scientific discovery, thereby helping to 
secure permission from Congress and President Truman for the maneuver.
55
 And, it was 
Warren who helped the Navy build confidence in the elaborate scientific experiment by 
devising plans for transportation, security, housing for people and thousands of animals, 
and strategies for evacuation of researchers and reporters. The completeness of the effort 
so impressed reporters that one headlined his story of the operational plans as ―ABC of 
the Bikini Test, Milestone of Our Age‖ and pointed to the machine-like quality of an 
operation that, at the time, seemed to be one that would be followed to the letter: ―Bikini 
Gears Mesh in Vast Test Plan.‖56 As with the emphasis AEC officials put on test 
planning and maneuvers in Nevada during their orientations for reporters at the Nevada 
Test Site, military officers and their AEC partners did not always follow those plans and 
they sometimes represented little more than stage props that provided an illusion of 
attention to safety with little intention of following through.  
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In 1945-46 the Navy‘s claim that Crossroads would advance the understanding of 
the effect of radiation on a broad range of systems, while useful as a way to justify the 
operation to elected officials, drew attention away from the disregard for scientific 
opinion the Navy exhibited in the planning and execution of Crossroads after Lee 
DuBridge voiced the warnings of many prominent scientists in May that the radioactive 
spray would be unpredictable at best and potentially lethal.
57
 Navy representatives 
dismissed those concerns, saying simply that the scientists ―had been wrong before.‖58 
Because of statements such as these, Navy officers not only betrayed their disregard for 
the claims they made to get approval for the Operation, they underscored the divisions 
within the scientific community and opened avenues for the marginalization of science 
and scientists. Again, this heralded a practice that would be repeated by pro-military 
scientists with the AEC to silence the program‘s detractors, especially after the fallout 
controversy increased their numbers. Recall that in June 1946 Rear Admiral Albert C. 
Read had already adopted an anti-scientific rationale. Then, Read not only discredited 
scientists, but did so in a way that suggested he had little regard for either scientific 
information or for scientists who—if his words were taken literally—something less than 
―man‖:  
Scientists have their theories and they say this and thus can be done. But 
don‘t ever overlook the capabilities of man. He can do great things and 
undoubtedly he can defend himself against the A-bomb, theories or no 
theories.
59
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Read expressed disregard for scientists who used their expertise to challenge his opinion 
of the Navy‘s ability to weather an atomic attack. Among the ―theories‖ that Read 
disdained were scientific opinions about the dangers of radioactive exposure. Whether 
because the danger was invisible or inexplicable, Warren learned at Crossroads that 
radioactive exposure was something that officers easily dismissed. T  
With the first test, ―Able,‖ Warren found that his authority and those of the 
scientists under him charged with monitoring radioactivity and safeguarding sailors 
compromised by officers and their crews. For him, this was not a new experience. During 
Manhattan, for example, he found that despite his sternest warnings, he had to guard 
against the tendency of workers to ignore precautions that were inconvenient. In 
Hiroshima, he expressed dismay at the methods of occupying military officers who failed 
to understand the value of science. In December 1945 Warren learned from Japanese 
scientists that that the circumstances of military occupation prevented them from 
studying the effects of the detonation on breeding rabbits in a research facility because 
they ―had to be killed for food before the young were born.‖60 After the first bomb, 
officers ignored the safety plan, which was dominated by a concept of ―radiation safety‖ 
and a meticulous precautionary protocol of graduated radiation monitoring, to coordinate 
crew deployments and the orders of Warren and the warnings of his crew of safety 
officers.
61
 Officers and sailors boarded the still hot and crippled submarine Skate to sail it 
around the lagoon, demonstrating for the benefit of reporters assembled to witness and 
issue stories about the resilience of the Navy‘s fleet and its sailors invulnerability to 
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radiation a salute by Admiral Blandy and his flagship.
62
 Such a spectacle no doubt 
influenced the desire of Lt. Gen. Hull to conduct Army maneuvers—for political reasons 
identical to those of the Navy‘s upper echelon—before an admiring audience of reporters, 
and to do so within the continental U.S. where the Army would not have to bear the cost 
of transporting reporters, as the Navy had done, to Bikini. 
The second test, ―Baker,‖ was an underwater detonation and provided an even 
more impressive explosion, throwing so much salt water into the air that the watery 
fallout caused such extreme contamination that even Navy brass had to admit that its 
surveys of damage would be delayed.
63
 Warren ordered the entire area sealed for four 
days—orders that Navy officers promptly disregarded. With no apparent injuries from 
their disregard of Warren‘s warnings after ―Able,‖ officers soon lost patience with 
Warren‘s work time and decontamination regulations and began to disregard them as they 
had before.
64
 The officers‘ rebellion caused overexposures among sailors sent in to work 
on recovering ships and contamination throughout the fleet of support ships. This meant 
that sailors had no escape from radioactive exposure—whether at work on the target 
ships or in their own bunks. Disregard for Warren‘s authority extended from the  officers 
and sailors in Bikini‘s lagoon to Admiral Blandy in Washington, D. C., who failed to 
respond to Warren‘s telegrams asking him to order his officers to listen to Warren and the 
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medical personnel.
65
 Blandy did come to Bikini and after listening to Warren‘s 
explanations about radioactivity decided to leave without stopping the maneuvers as 
Warren requested. He relented only after Warren provided a visual demonstration of 
radioactive phenomena—the self reproduction of a fish scale onto a piece of 
photographic paper.
66
 Warren was only able to convince Blandy to cancel a third, deep 
water, test by telling him that additional contamination would result in casualties.
67
 
Military officers at Crossroads expressed the same disdain for scientific authority as 
Groves had during the war and as Hull and others did during continental testing. Blandy‘s 
goal may have been merely to portray an illusion of danger while avoiding it. But the 
comments he made before Crossroads suggest that he paid attention to at least some of 
the effects. About the third shot that Warren convinced him to cancel, Blandy said it 
might ―set up an endless chain reaction … or radioactivitize the water over large areas.‖68  
The president‘s Directive and the Navy‘s use of Atomic Secrecy prevented the 
public, Congress, and for a time even the president, how vulnerable ships were, though 
less affected by blast effects than fixed military targets, to radioactivity.
69
 Crossroads 
received more media attention that any other story of 1946, yet it would be decades 
before declassification revealed the many facts kept from reporters about what the bomb 
―could do‖ to men and equipment. That the Navy perpetrated this elaborate charade in the 
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presence of 168 of the nation‘s most prominent reporters is testament to the ease with 
which Navy officers employed Atomic Secrecy and the enthusiasm of reporters to 
witness. With only a year between the end of the war and the Operation, reporters—
selected by the Navy as the most senior and influential in the business—easily fell back 
into conditions that required them to report only what the Navy allowed them to see and 
to report. As a result, reporters at Crossroads made little effort to establish what the 
extent or effect of the radioactive contamination of ships might have been. Only after the 
Evaluation Report of Operation Crossroads made it to Truman‘s desk and some of its 
contents circulated through leaks did some government officials and congressmen begin 
to learn how devastating ―Baker‖ had been. That, in turn, caused military officers to 
insert language in reports and in training materials for soldiers participating in Nevada 
tests, that radioactivity had caused no ships to be sunk.  
In 1947 officers refused to allow Warren to publish the results of some 
experiments he conducted there. Warren, then Dean of UCLA‘s medical school, analyzed 
fallout data and found that radioactivity did not demonstrate uniform distribution. 
Instead, it tended to aggregate in hot spots. Warren had been careful to avoid revealing 
any classified information. As a result, he became frustrated when he learned that he 
would not be allowed to submit his article for publication. Warren wrote home to his wife 
that the government refused to allow him to publish his data since it was ―too scary … to 
put out without causing mass hysteria.‖70 Perhaps conceding that if the possibility of 
causing alarm was the reason that he was refused permission to publish, then nothing he 
could write—at least then—about the tests would be cleared, Warren spent time sharing 
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what he knew, and what he could share, during talks he gave to gatherings of medical 
students, social clubs, veterans, mayors, and others. In small venues, he worked to 
emphasize what militarization prevented him from sharing with his colleagues in the 
usual way or with the public at large on a national scale. The texts of those talks provide 
an opportunity to understand the importance of the types of information that the military 
prevented from circulating under Atomic Secrecy.  
In 1947 Stafford Warren asked an audience of Legionnaires at an Optimus Club 
meeting to imagine how insidiously lethal radioactivity could be. In advance of showing 
some film footage he recovered from the military‘s cutting room floor of the ―Able‖ and 
―Baker‖ bombs from Operation Crossroads, he explained to them that when radioactive 
particles were released, they penetrated and then anchored in non-living material and 
living organisms alike. Using the history of the radium dial painters, he pointed out that 
only one microgram of radium lodged for years in the jaws of two of the young women 
later caused them to contract a ―rapidly fatal‖ cancer and die.71 Then Warren struck a 
match while explaining that in only three seconds of burning, it had produced ten to 
twenty-five micrograms of smoke. If that smoke had been radioactive, he continued, its 
dangers would be inescapable: when stored in ―your body,‖ it would threaten ―you not 
today or tomorrow, but sometime between now and the next 25 years of life;‖ it would 
become part of the surroundings, ―in this room, it would be in the carpet, be in all the 
crevices, and you can‘t get it out.‖72 Once contaminated, the area ―couldn‘t be cleaned.‖ 
Environmentally, soil and water would remain radioactive for generations, making 
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breathing, eating, drinking—the most fundamental aspects of human existence—so 
hazardous that the only recourse would be to use Geiger counters to ―measure everything 
that you put in you—milk and water and everything else.‖ Warren portrayed the futility 
of trying to avoid the hazards of radioactive substances as an unwinnable fight with a 
deadly beast: ―This darn thing is just like a bear that you‘ve got hold of by the tail and the 
tail gets shorter and shorter.‖73 As this incident illustrates, by 1947 Warren and his 
colleagues had acquired a rough set of guidelines about radioactive health effects from 
the history of radioactive medicine and the radium dial painters, experience on the 
Manhattan Project and studies of Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and Crossroads.  
These criteria were the ones Dean, AEC administrators, and military officers used 
throughout the era of atmospheric testing to gauge the size and type of weapons 
detonated in Nevada. They selected for continental detonations those types of weapons 
tests that they expected would not result in acute radiation injury but that they believed 
would lead to disease in the long term. In this way, they avoided negative publicity and 
maintained for the benefit of elected officials and the public the illusion that the tests they 
conducted were harmless. It was thus not scientific ignorance, but knowledge, of 
radioactive health effects that gave Dean and his military partners the rough set of 
guidelines to gauge the size and types of weapons detonated to avoid acute radiation 
injury use the continental test site for domestic political purposes.
74
 Military officers and 
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AEC officials who exploited the program and testing for self-interested political purposes 
calculatingly used atomic science and weapons testing to foster fears of nuclear war and 
enemy borne fallout while creating the impression that Nevada weapons tests and the 
fallout they produced were safe. In their alternative reality, the clawed and grasping full-
grown grizzly of Warren‘s imagination became a tame and predictable cub. As John 
Bugher, who collaborated with Dean ahead of the first continental tests in Nevada on the 
skin burns and other injuries that might occur in advance of the first continental tests and 
who succeeded Shields Warren as Director of the Division of Biology and Medicine 
included in an AEC pamphlet that ―low-level exposure could be continued indefinitely 
without any detectable bodily change.‖75 
Pro-Military Scientists and Administrative Sanction 
Scientists who participated in the charade wielded much of their authority through 
the committee process. Bugher‘s successor, Charles Dunham, was the one who signaled 
to Dean before testing began that he was willing to set aside his responsibilities to help 
the AEC/DOD achieve its testing objectives, assuring Dean that radioactive fallout from 
the planned tests could cause ―minor skin burns.‖76 Dunham rose to become Director of 
the Division of Biology and Medicine in 1955, a position he held for more than ten years 
before leaving to join the National Academy of Sciences. While Bugher, Dunham, and 
their like-minded colleagues provided public cover for the AEC to conduct dangerous 
tests, other AEC and affiliate scientists worked from inside the AEC to shape decision-
making at the advisory, committee, and managerial levels. Gioacchino Failla, Chairman 
of the Advisory Committee for Biology and Medicine, and Merril Eisenbud, a committee 
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member who was the AEC‘s first Health and Safety expert, housed at its New York 
office, and who became the first head of New York City‘s Environmental Protection 
Agency, aligned their decision-making with the AEC/DOD‘s pro-military, pro-weapons-
testing, objectives and wielded their influence over more conservative colleagues. As 
they gained ground during the first year of continental testing, precautionary-minded 
scientists such as Shields Warren who opposed their decisions were overruled up the 
ladder of AEC administrators and the impulses to protect participants and civilian 
downwinders that existed under Lilienthal‘s Chairmanship steadily diminished. 
The significance of these pro-military scientists and of committees as a venue for 
policymaking is illustrated by the fact that it was one such scientist who made—as no 
elected official had—an appeal to national security to gain committee approval for a test 
that AFSWP wanted to conduct in Nevada that was certain to cause hazardous levels of 
radioactive fallout. On May 21-22, 1951, following the Ranger series of tests, a group of 
AEC officials and advisors debated whether to approve a Nevada detonation of a sub-
surface weapons test they expected to produce high levels of radioactive fallout. Army 
officers initially planned for Amchitka, a location chosen by upper echelon officers 
because of the large amount of radioactive material that would be lifted out of the bomb‘s 
crater—and that they expected to follow and measure after the test—would fall away 
from populated areas. In fact, the upper echelon still expected to hold the cratering test on 
Amchitka: on the same day that the AEC group—the Committee to Consider the 
Feasibility and Conditions for a Preliminary Radiological Safety Shot for Operation 
‗Windsquall‘—began their meeting, Secretary of Defense George Marshall submitted a 
memorandum for approval of the Amchitka shot to the NSC; and on June 4 his 
576 
 
recommendation for that remote test moved to the president‘s desk.77 Back at the 
Committee meeting, Gioacchino Failla of Columbia University cited national security 
imperatives as a reason to approve the test that AFSWP officers decided could be 
conducted in Nevada instead of Amchitka—the location where General Marshal expected 
to satisfy the national security requirements for the test. Failla was sixty and already 
something of an institution in himself. Born in Sicily in 1891, he arrived in New York 
with his mother in 1906. In 1915, he used the Electrical Engineering degree he received 
from Columbia to begin work at Memorial Hospital as a physicist and began pursuing an 
M.A. degree at Columbia University while studying art at the Cooper Union School of 
Art in Rochester. He later received an honorary doctorate from Rochester University for 
the contribution he made to radiological research as a founder of the Radiological Society 
of North America and taught radiology at Columbia.
78
 Fialla argued that the test should 
be conducted in Nevada and gained committee support by combining the military‘s 
appeal to national security with an appeal to science. In doing so, he persuaded the 
committee to make a decision that no elected official had yet made, or would make, 
during the era of atmospheric testing:  
The time has come when we should take some risk and get some 
information for the future situation. In other words, we are faced with a 
war in which atomic weapons will undoubtedly be used, and we have to 
have some information about these things. With a lot of monitoring, the 
end instrumentation will give us the information we want; if we look for 
perfect safety, we will never make these tests.
79
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Failla‘s support for AFSWP‘s test aligned with Dean‘s vision of the Site as a place where 
the AEC‘s military partners could conduct tests. The support for military tests that Failla 
and Dean shared, however, were antithetical to other scientists, particularly those at Los 
Alamos, who expected to use the Site for their own developmental experiments.  
By citing scientific necessity as the primary reason for the Site‘s creation and then 
subordinating scientific uses to military ones, Dean rejuvenated the tension that had 
existed between scientists and the military during the Manhattan Project. Dean may have 
been honest about his plans with military officers, but he allowed Los Alamos scientists 
to believe that the Site had been created to help them achieve their goals. His sleight of 
hand gave the military carte blanche and frustrated the scientists. In 1953, after the 
meeting of a committee to decide the Site‘s future, Norris Bradbury, the Director of Los 
Alamos, wrote the AEC clarifying what he had been led to believe about why the Site 
was created and how it should be used: 
In view of the primary purpose of the entire NPG setup, I am inclined to 
feel that medical and public relations problems are somewhat 
overemphasized and that the reason for the establishment of the proving 
ground may be overlooked. 
   With regard to the ―requirements and reasons‖ for establishing a 
continental test site, I do not believe that these have changed at all from 
the point of view of the LASL [Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory]. I do 
believe, however, that the picture has changed enormously from the 
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military point of view, and that the AEC has, in fact, accepted a changed 
concept. I regard the tendency to use the NPG for the purpose of weapon 
system tests (the forthcoming gun shot), for civil defense effects tests, for 
troop indoctrination and maneuvers, and for the reportorial press as quite 
outside the original concept of this site. Indeed, this trend, if continued, 
can force us to abandon this site for no other reason than that the military 
have taken it over. Even now the use of the site by other agencies is 
reaching such a level that it may sometime be necessary to recall that this 
area was actually established at the specific request of the LASL for its 
own needs.
80
  
 
Bradbury‘s second-in-command, Darol Froman, also complained about the 
military takeover and reiterated that the Site had been, despite subsequent assertions, 
created for scientific purposes. Froman, a Division Leader at Los Alamos during the war, 
Scientific Director for the Sandstone series, Assistant Director for Weapons Development 
from 1949-1951, and afterward, Los Alamos‘s  Deputy, or Assistant, Director, waited 
until after the meeting to record his objections to the subordination of what he understood 
to be the Site‘s scientific mission. He took aim at the re-naming of the Site and argued 
against any characterization or use of the Site that set it apart as a military facility and 
that interfered with scientific goals. Nomenclature mattered, and for Froman, ―Nevada 
Proving Grounds‖ represented a mischaracterization of the Site:  
The Nevada facility should not be, and was never intended by the AEC to 
be, a proving ground. … The original concept as well as the apparent 
feeling of the Committee is that the facility is a test site similar in concept, 
although of a completely different magnitude, to R Site [where small 
nuclear experiments were conducted] at Los Alamos.
81
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In response, Dr. John C. Bugher, then the AEC‘s Director of the Division of Biology and 
Medicine, re-wrote history, covering for Dean and the ulterior motives that he had used to 
garner congressional and presidential approval for the continental weapons tests. In 
November 1950 Dean told the JCAE the same thing that he told Truman, that Los 
Alamos needed a nearby location to ―go out, make an experiment, shoot it,‖ and then 
―come right back.‖82 Despite this, Bugher claimed that the Los Alamos officials were 
mistaken in thinking that the Site had been developed for scientific purposes. Just as 
Dean‘s diary entries revealed his double-dealing among Truman‘s advisors, Bugher‘s 
response to Bradbury and Froman‘s consternation illustrates the way such operational 
double dealing flowed down the administrative ladder. Bugher did not dispute the point 
made by LASL officials that the Site came into being as a result of their need for a place 
to perform rudimentary nuclear experiments. Instead, and in an example of the type of 
authority he and other AEC officials claimed for themselves and the way that they—
during the early years of testing—disguised their abuses of authority by 
mischaracterizing a historical event, argued that the scientists‘ original request was 
unrealistic from the beginning:  
I would like to have it a matter of record that the oversimplified concept 
which was entertained originally by the Los Alamos Laboratory 
concerning the NPG as a backyard quick-testing area was never realistic, 
and actual operations promptly disproved the soundness of the concept. 
The costs involved, and the magnitude of the issues concerned, give to 
such operations a character that involves far more than the details of 
weapons development. The principle of obtaining the maximum of 
necessary information from each detonation is unquestionably sound, and 
this principle should not be abandoned for reasons of convenience. The 
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principle, re-expressed implies that effects testing, save under the most 
unusual circumstances, will be keyed to the developmental program.
83
 
 
And yet, in official releases, in reports to Congress, and in comments made in connection 
with requests for more funding, the AEC depended on and reiterated Los Alamos‘s 
conceptualization of the site. Following a request for supplemental appropriations in 1951 
and after plans for military maneuvers at the Nevada site were already underway, an AEC 
―spokesman‖ emphasized the Site‘s contribution to nuclear development and reinforced 
the notion that it was nothing more than an out-of-doors scientific laboratory: 
[At] the Nevada continental site, where we can run out the backdoor of the 
laboratory every two or three months to test all kinds of gadgets, has 
accelerated the weapons program more than anything else.
84
 
 
In 1953, after twenty detonations had taken place at the Nevada Site, and in the same 
month that Bugher scolded Los Alamos officials for ―oversimplification,‖ AEC officials 
used the same language in their Thirteenth Semi-Annual Report to Congress to the 
scientific nature of the testing and minimizing the extent to which the Site had become a 
military facility.
85
 In ten short contiguous paragraphs spanning several sections, the AEC 
characterized the Nevada Site as a ―‗backyard‘ test site,‖ (first paragraph, ―Increasing 
Need for Continental Site‖); as ―backyard workshop,‖ (first paragraph, ―Value of the 
Nevada Proving Ground‖); and, after pointing out the cost savings over testing in the 
Pacific, noted that ―military field units‖ had benefited from participation in 
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―developmental and effects tests.‖ Only after the AEC created the impression that the Site 
was primarily a place for scientific tinkering and pointed out that the Site had resulted in 
considerable savings over Pacific experiments, did the AEC mention that the military had 
benefitted too: the scientists‘ experiments provided explosions that military officers could 
use for training purposes. As late as 1957, the AEC characterized the Site as a ―backyard 
workshop.‖86 
Army officers began planning for Buster-Jangle immediately after the first series 
and the process to gain approval resulted in a turning point in the management of 
continental weapons tests. Securing approval for a plan that AEC officials opposed 
signaled throughout the organization that AEC administrators would defer to military 
requests. As had been the case during Crossroads, animal experiments were more 
controversial than human exposures, and were expected to draw the most negative public 
reaction because the public had every reason to believe, particularly during the early 
years of weapons testing and later from repeated assurances from official sources, that 
human health was protected and would not be jeopardized. During planning for Buster-
Jangle, the AEC‘s Test Director objected to the Army‘s plan to use thirty-two dogs and 
twenty-six sheep in thermal burn experiments and to perform ―bio-medical‖ experiments 
on fifteen dogs and ―some rats,‖ arguing that it would result in negative publicity and, in 
any event, would only duplicate data received from previous experiments.
87
 Though 
identified in the AEC Operations Report as a ―difference of opinion,‖ the issue was one 
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that went to the heart of the AEC‘s mission, ―one of concept of responsibility and 
authority of the Test Director.‖ The Department of Defense told the AEC that ―military 
requirements are not matters for decision by either the commission or its test 
organization.‖ The dispute was settled when the AEC refused to support its Test 
Director‘s recommendations and deferred to the military. The Army‘s animal 
experiments remained features of the Buster and Jangle series. The incident was 
significant because it illustrated not only the military‘s autonomous control over atomic 
experimentation, but also because it established a pattern whereby the AEC undertook 
responsibility for managing the public relations problems that military experimentation 
posed. As testing continued, it was not animal experimentation that aroused public 
outcry, but fallout. Using the media to disseminate deceptively reassuring information 
about the safety of radioactive fallout from the military‘s weapons testing became part 
standard operating procedure for the AEC and its managers at the Nevada Test Site and 
elsewhere. Embedded as a reproducible institutional characteristic, test site officials, 
military and civilian, spent energy diffusing public outcry without seeking ways to 
prevent it in the first place. 
The second controversial issue of Buster-Jangle involved the overexposure of 
troops. In a 1951 request from the MLC to use experiments to indoctrinate troops, the 
AEC had backed Shields Warren‘s requirement that troop participation be limited to one 
shot and that soldiers remain at least five and one-half miles from ground zero.
88
 
Disappointed with the results of that conditional exposure, the Army argued that the 
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AEC‘s 3.9r exposure limit was ―unrealistic‖ and planned more extensive maneuvers for 
the 1952 series. When AEC officials turned the issue of maximum exposure limits over 
to the Test Director, Carroll Tyler, Warren made it clear to Tyler that, from his 
perspective, the limit was not negotiable. Conceding in a letter to the Santa Fe Operations 
office on October 11, 1951, that ultimate authority over the military‘s request rested with 
the Test Director, Warren warned Tyler that he would be expected to explain any 
overexposures: ―This Division does not look lightly upon radiation excesses. Only true 
emergencies should be granted special privileges‖ and, should any such emergency arise, 
Tyler would have to provide extensive documentation, including 
[a] full explanation as to why the job cannot be performed in another 
matter, how many people are to be over-exposed, how much over-
exposure, and … the recent exposure history of the individuals and what is 
planned to enable them to pay off the over-exposure.
89
  
 
Warren explained to Tyler that the military should be able to accommodate the 
requirements with only minimal inconvenience and that ―compliance with the permissible 
limit should become a mark of distinction in the exercise of ingenuity, rather than a 
concession to be avoided upon pretext.‖ In a twist on the Army‘s appeal to the 
importance of indoctrinating troops to atomic detonations, Warren added that the AEC 
consider some ―indoctrination‖ of its own: ―Indoctrination of this attitude early in this 
series may save U.S. much trouble, and possible radiation injuries, in the several series to 
come.‖ In October 1951 officers requested permission to over-expose troops by 
stationing them within one mile of ground zero. Warren again recommended that the 
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AEC refuse the request. Rather than confront the Army itself, the Commission turned the 
matter over to Tyler. Warren contacted Tyler to warn him that overexposures of 
servicemen were unacceptable and that Tyler himself—and not the Army—would have 
to explain any non-emergency instances of overexposure. Warren suggested that Tyler 
encourage the Army to comply by employing a little ―ingenuity‖ rather than needlessly 
risk lives. Warren recommended a seven-mile limit—a distance that would provide 
troops with a realistic experience without endangering them. Tyler ignored that 
suggestion and granted the Army permission to deploy at five and one-half miles.
90
 
Despite what must have been his obvious frustration, Warren‘s October recommendation 
illustrated the autonomy over experimentation that the military commanded under Dean‘s 
leadership. Warren ultimately deferred, writing that ―the Division of Biology and 
Medicine recognizes that it is not its function to set standards for the military nor to 
impede the operations of the Department of Defense.‖ At the same time, Warren 
reminded the AEC of its legislative mission by taking note of the apparent collusion 
between the AEC and the military over the issue and the harm it might cause to the 
AEC‘s reputation. The AEC, he wrote, and not the military, was the only responsible 
entity—―both in fact and in the public mind.‖91 As Warren made clear, the military had 
successfully undermined the authority of the intermediate AEC official in charge of 
program safety and had also successfully insinuated itself between the public and the 
only possible guardian of public health issues related to atomic testing, effectively 
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disabling the statutory responsibilities of the AEC. For Dean‘s part, he appears to have 
been relatively unconcerned about the types of safety problems that had plagued his 
predecessor.  
Warren‘s written objections to the military‘s 1952 proposals differed in emphasis 
from those he made in February 1951 to tower shots. By 1952, Warren seems to have 
come to the conclusion that achieving the level of safety that he considered necessary for 
continental testing might best be achieved by appealing not to health hazards but to the 
concern with public relations expressed by his superiors and other AEC officials. In a 
letter Warren wrote to the AEC‘s Division of Military Applications in March 1952 he 
privileged public relations over his concern with safety:  
The Division of Biology and Medicine recommends against permitting 
troops to be closer to ground zero than the seven miles used in the Desert 
Rock [1951] operation for the following reasons. 1. The Continental 
Proving Ground is of great value to the program of the Atomic Energy 
Commission and has been accepted by the public as safe. 2. Accidents 
occurring at the time and place of an atomic explosion are magnified by 
the press out of all proportion to their importance, and any injury or death 
during the operation might well have serious side effects. 3. The explosion 
is experimental in type and its yield cannot be predicted with accuracy.
92
 
 
Though initially supportive of Warren‘s recommendation and reluctant to allow the 
military to station troops closer than the seven mile limit, the AEC‘s resistance broke 
down under a military letter writing campaign that asserted that Warren‘s limit was 
―tactically unrealistic.‖ Warren still considered the Army‘s request to station troops less 
than four miles from the site of the explosion ludicrous.
93
 His primary concern was not 
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the initial burst of radiation, but thermal energy of a blast that he calculated would scorch 
―most anything‖ within two and one-half miles.94 And yet, the AEC found a way to 
accommodate the military‘s request.  
Acting on a suggestion from the AEC‘s Los Alamos manager that the AEC 
simply relieve itself of responsibility, the Commission did just that. Devolving authority 
over safety to the Test Director, the AEC made a superficial gesture toward the 
importance of safety by suggesting that the military prepare and submit a safety plan to 
the Test Director for his approval but simultaneously negated that condition, as well as 
the authority of the Test Director, by noting that if officers wished, they could disregard it 
entirely. Should ―officials of the Department of Defense … still feel that a military 
requirement justifies the maneuver, the commission would enter no objection.‖95 
Additional text drawn from the AEC‘s official designation of authority to the Test 
Director, when considered in tandem with the AEC‘s admission that it would not object 
to any military demands, illustrates that it was not so much a grant of authority to the Test 
Director as it was an abrogation of AEC authority and veiled concession to military 
autonomy: 
The Commission has approved the attendance of a military combat unit … 
for the purpose of indoctrination and training of individuals and 
organizations. … No responsibility was accepted for this administrative 
movement, security control or support of this personnel but the authority 
to impose necessary operational restrictions on their participation was 
reserved. You will set the criteria of time, place, radiological safety and 
security necessary.
96
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The military ultimately stationed troops within 7,000 yards of ground zero in deep 
trenches. Though the AEC maintained its limits for civilian participants, it condoned the 
military‘s decision, admitting that there was ―the necessity for realistic training by the 
military in all fields, often accompanied by serious injuries, and that such training was 
also necessary in the field of atomic weapons.‖97  
The AEC‘s reluctance to interfere with the military‘s desires and the solution it 
ultimately reached to avoid the problem altogether set a precedent for dealing with 
military requests to exceed established safety guidelines. In 1955, the National 
Committee on Radiation Protection (NCRP) sidestepped an Air Force request that the 
maximum occupational standards be relaxed because of the problems the Air Force had 
in meeting those standards for the decontamination of planes that were flown through 
radioactive debris from atmospheric weapons tests. In that incident, the NCRP decided 
not to change the occupational standard or to create a new one that dealt specifically with 
the Air Force‘s problem. Nonetheless, it opened the door for the Air Force to work out its 
own solution. The Committee noted that the Air Force‘s problem was different than the 
laboratory-type conditions for which the standard was set and invited the Air Force to use 
its own devices to arrange for a solution to the decontamination/exposure problem: ―it is 
suggested that expert consultation be obtained for a realistic appraisal of their problem.‖98  
Pro-military scientists used the committee process to influence the establishment 
of radiation standards. When testing began in Nevada, the AEC and its military partners 
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relied on program scientists to explain that experiments were conducted well within 
margins of safety. And yet, the claim at that time was misleading: no standards for 
permissible exposure levels had yet been established for non-occupational exposures to 
radioactive material from nuclear experiments.
99
 As one of the government‘s historians 
put it, ―the whole question of radiation exposure was undergoing critical review during 
the early 1950s.‖100 This is one reason historians and others are able to point with some 
measure of confidence that AEC officials were unaware of the dangers testing posed and 
thus whatever harm that resulted was inadvertent. But during the era of atmospheric 
weapons testing, there was more to the question than whether radioactivity caused harm 
and at what level it did so. In fact, much was known about the hazards of radioactive 
exposure and, in the broadest sense, standards for radiation dose had been reduced, 
becoming more cautious, over time. The history of radiation protection and exposure, 
including data derived from laboratory experiments, exposure-related illness, the deaths 
of the radium dial painters proven by 1927 to have been caused by their occupational 
overexposures, had all contributed to the National Bureau of Standards establishing 
occupational limits for radon and radium exposure. Studies conducted in Nagasaki and 
Hiroshima provided enough additional information by 1946 for the National Committee 
on Radiation Protection and Measurements to recommend that occupational exposures be 
limited to no more than 0.3 rem per week. By 1948, it had issued a finding that there was 
no level below which radiation could be considered harmless.
101
 But by then, radioactive 
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substances had already become so common that a no-tolerance dose standard would place 
what advisors viewed as an intolerable burden on industry, medicine, and even 
shopkeepers who were fitting shoes with fluoroscopes. By 1948 the notion that expert 
advisors could scientifically and collectively compile occupational and non-occupational, 
naturally occurring radiation, standards to arrive with some objectivity at a set of uniform 
standards had already become an impossible ideal. The remaining possibility—that the 
group could agree on a set of standards that balanced technology with worker and public 
safety—was hamstrung by multiple internal and external pressures, not the least of which 
was the interconnectivity between AEC officials, their affiliates, and the advisory 
committees established to set national standards.
102
 By 1949, California was poised to 
adopt radiation exposure standards that were so low that, in the opinion of the NCRP and 
AEC officials, they would disable one of the AEC‘s primary contractors and might leave 
the NCRP and the AEC shamefaced. If adopted, NCRP Chairman Lauriston Taylor wrote 
that it would ―put the University of California out of commission,‖ while Shields Warren 
noted that it ―might be a very embarrassing one.‖103  
The problem was additionally complicated because even close associates 
sometimes contrasted sharply in the way they personally dealt with their own exposures. 
At Ernest Lawrence‘s Radiation Laboratory at Berkeley, for example, some scientists 
expressed what Gregg Herken called a ―disdaining bravado‖ about the well-known 
dangers of exposure to radiation while, at the other end of the spectrum was Ernest 
Lawrence himself, who championed the H-bomb and dismissed those who argued that 
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radioactive fallout was hazardous, but who was so leery of exposure and the cancer it 
might produce that he refused routine and diagnostic x-rays.
104
  
Moreover, the chances that a permissible dose standard could be arrived at 
through the building of a coalition of like-minded advisors was made less likely by the 
fact that the collision of ethical and professional standards created conditions for the 
formation of an unusual alliance between the most pessimistic and most optimistic 
advisors in what might be called the ―wait-and-see‖ camp. Sharing the position that no 
levels for permissible exposures should be set until enough data had been collected that 
safe/unsafe boundaries could be asserted with a measure of confidence, the two groups 
were equally resistant to the setting of exposure standards. For example, Stafford Warren, 
who worried about long-term health effects and who leaned toward adopting a 
conservative approach to radioactive exposure argued as stridently against the setting of 
what he viewed as a premature standard as Gioacchino Failla, who was primarily 
concerned with acute-level exposures and who used his advisory positions with the AEC 
and the NCRP to stall the acceptance of standards that would have resulted in higher 
operational costs or that would have restricted continental weapons testing.
105
 A final 
complication was the possible consequences of exposure to man-made sources of 
radioactivity over the course of generations—a genetic effect. Taken together, this meant 
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that it was not only difficult for people in the field to determine what an acceptable 
guideline might be or who they might turn to in an effort to find out, but that a 
―permissible dose‖ was a malleable concept, dependent on the type and duration of 
radiation exposure as well as whether one was concerned primarily with short-term 
effects, long-term effects, or effects that spanned generations.  
The AEC‘s operational priorities, including limiting costs and positive public 
relations bore directly on the reception of internationally-derived standards in the United 
States. After the Tri-Partite Permissible Dose Conference in Chalk River, Canada, for 
example, where experts from the U.S., including officials and scientists with the AEC, 
the UK and Canada discussed and established exposure standards for radioactive 
isotopes, officials from Los Alamos feared that the adoption of those standards would be 
too costly. They elicited opinions from other AEC scientists who disagreed with the 
Chalk River methodology and values and lobbied Shields Warren (AEC‘s Director of 
Biology and Medicine) to re-evaluate the dose values to ―make certain‖ that they were 
not ―unnecessarily conservative,‖ arguing that their adoption would ―have a drastic 
effect‖ on operations, would ―force‖ present and future alterations to facilities, and would 
add ―millions‖ to the laboratory‘s building program. Los Alamos wanted, instead, 
standards that would provide for ―reasonable and sensible protection of personnel.‖106 
Following the Los Alamos request, Warren authorized a five-fold increase in the Chalk 
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River standard for plutonium—from 0.1 microgram to 0.5 microgram.107 Thereafter, the 
Subcommittee on Permissible Internal Dose of the National Committee on Radiation 
Protection (NCRP) met to discuss a variety of Chalk River values. The attendees were 
AEC advisors who had also participated in the Chalk River Conference. During the 
discussion, one point of contention was the Chalk River recommendation that different 
permissible levels be assigned for occupational and non-occupational exposures. The 
Chairman of the Subcommittee, Karl Z. Morgan, argued that in the absence of studies 
about ―selective absorption‖ of a variety of radioactive materials, it was appropriate to 
have two different values. Workers, he noted, assumed the special risks of their chosen 
occupation while it was ―not right or safe for each member of a large population to be 
subjected to the sum of all … hazards.‖108 Disagreeing with Morgan was Failla, who 
believed Morgan‘s position was not a publicly supportable, because ―such a practice … 
seemed to be influenced by the probabilities of damage being detected rather than on the 
probabilities of causing damage.‖ Failla argued that the Subcommittee needed to decide 
what was safe and apply it across the board. ―We shouldn‘t broadcast two different 
standards, one for people inside the plant and one for people outside.‖109 Though Failla‘s 
solution to decide what was safe and stick to it was logically appealing and, for those 
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who would receive the ―broadcasts‖ that Fialla imaged, theoretically sound, it ultimately 
compromised radiation safety.  
The real-world implication of the AEC‘s adoption of Failla‘s reasoning was the 
sacrifice of public health to operational expediency. Because the AEC ultimately decided 
on a higher set of values for occupational exposures at its facilities than those 
recommended at Chalk River, the maximum permissible dosages established for the 
public were the same as those that the AEC had increased in the interest of expediency. 
The upshot of the AEC‘s decision to factor cost into the equation was that the AEC and 
the NCRP established different standards for non-occupational exposures. Under 
increasing pressure to acknowledge and act on the information that was building about 
the hazards of radiation exposure, AEC officials reduced from 15 r. to 3.9 r. the AEC‘s 
acceptable boundary for public exposures, though it still exceeded the NCRP standard.
110
  
After Lilienthal‘s departure, the NCRP considered his philosophy of minimizing 
exposures altogether but discarded it for the reason that it would be operationally 
expensive and inconvenient. As was the case in 1950, when Los Alamos administrators 
and other affiliates of the AEC successfully argued against the adoption of a set of 
radiation exposure standards that emerged from the international Chalk River Conference 
and that were significantly lower than the guidelines that the AEC and its affiliates had 
been following, the bar that Lilienthal set was believed to be too costly. 
111
 In 1954, the 
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Council, composed of scientists who also worked on AEC programs and served on its 
advisory committees, rejected ―all feasible precautions‖ standard Lilienthal believed 
necessary and moved away from the lowering of exposures that was the trend 
internationally and began working toward a concept for precautionary measures based on 
what laboratory administrators and industry officials (in coordination with the militarized 
AEC) deemed ―reasonable.‖  
The elevation of the status of an operationally efficient approach to radiation 
protection standards into the philosophy of a national committee charged with 
establishing what were expected to be ―safe‖ boundaries was significant in several ways. 
First, it illustrates how thoroughly Dean‘s pro-military—and with it pro-experimentation 
and pro-expansion—ethos penetrated the institutional tiers of the program. Second, the 
speed of the shift in priorities that occurred with Dean‘s chairmanship reflects the latency 
of Manhattan-style wartime culture among program and affiliate managers and advisors 
during Lilienthal‘s tenure. Third, the marginalization of temperate, precautionary, 
advisors within the program‘s administration and within its advisory-level committees 
resulted in a standard considered safe by a consensus of scientific opinion reached in 
national and international forums with one anchored to what AEC affiliated advisors who 
supported and benefited from the program‘s militarization considered operationally 
reasonable. The shift set the stage for (a) the upward adjustment of permissible exposure 
from that recommended during the 1949 Chalk River Conference and an institutional 
disregard for new findings about permissible exposure, (b) the adoption of an industry-
wide standard in America that prioritized industry (and AEC) convenience and 
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productivity over human health, and (c) the ultimate establishment of a maximum 
permissible dose at a level decided to be ―as low as reasonably achievable,‖ a concept 
that became known as ALARA.
112
  
The controversy about exposure standards provided a conceptual corpus of 
―scientific‖ belief that was so malleable that it could be pressed into service to satisfy a 
wide range of foreign and domestic policy goals. In one instance, for example, the State 
Department pressured the delegates to the U.N.‘s World Health Organization to reach an 
agreement on a ―low‖ safe threshold to protect America‘s experimental testing program 
only to reverse course several months later and insist on a ―no‖ safe threshold standard to 
exert diplomatic pressure against the U.S.S.R. and its weapons testing program.
113
  
Shields Warren‘s ability to use his expertise and authority to prevent hazardous 
testing practices withered under Dean‘s Chairmanship as continental weapons testing 
became routine and production of materials and weapons increased. In 1949, for 
example, Warren had established a Biomedical Test Planning and Screening Committee 
as a nexus for experiments carried out in conjunction with nuclear tests. The Committee‘s 
purpose was to establish priorities and criteria for experiments; to provide special 
facilities for experimentation purposes; to coordinate the activities of the many groups 
proposing experiments; and to monitor ongoing experiments to streamline information 
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gathering.
114
 The value of the committee, however, evaporated during Dean‘s 
Chairmanship when MLC Chairman Robert Le Baron refused to allow the military to 
cooperate with the committee in the planning of its experiments.
115
 The use of towers to 
control both detonation and yield of atom bombs provides one example of a conflict 
between what officers desired and the procedures Warren believed were necessary to 
minimize the hazards attendant to continental experimentation. Despite the unrealistic 
nature of tower shots, the military preferred them because they offered greater control 
over both detonation and bomb yield measurement.
116
 But there was a tradeoff to such 
convenience. Because bomb detonations occurred close to the ground‘s surface, there 
was more cratering, more radioactivized material drawn up into the mushroom cloud, and 
a resultant increase in the amount of radioactive fallout and the fissionable products in 
that fallout over compared to that caused by a bomb dropped from an airplane and 
detonated at a higher elevation. Discussing his opposition to a military request for tower 
shots during Buster-Jangle, conducted during October and November 1951, Warren 
recommended choosing a site somewhere other than the desert if tower shots were 
necessary. In doing so, he referenced a ―conclusion‖ reached prior to the 1951 testing 
series that tower shots should not be conducted in desert areas because the aridity caused 
a larger amount of fallout and, additionally, that tower testing in the desert would pose a 
persistent inhalation hazard because radioactivized dust would be constantly stirred up by 
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activity or winds. Warren suggested that an island testing facility—the PPG—would be 
ideal because the ocean would absorb the fallout and limit the risk.
117
 An unnamed 
committee subsequently overruled Warren, approving a test that would lift an 
approximately ―50,000 cubic yards‖ of radioactive material from a bomb crater.118  
In deciding whether to take Warren‘s recommendations, Dean and other members 
of the AEC adopted standards that protected Test Site officials and participants while 
endangering those not affiliated with the program. They did, for example, choose caution 
over convenience when there was a danger that radioactive material for a planned shot 
would not head aloft and become trapped in wind currents to be dispersed elsewhere, but 
would be localized, settling within the area of the shot. Because of this, the AEC 
provided on-site personnel with a greater amount of protection from radioactive 
exposures than it did the unwitting public outside the boundaries of the Site. In 1951, for 
example, after overriding Warren‘s objections to tower shots and approving ones that 
would result in contamination off site, the AEC took Warren‘s advice and refused to 
approve a ―deep sub-surface shot‖ designed to produce a ―low cloud‖ that would have 
localized a considerable amount of radioactive debris.
119
 The intermediate level 
administrative decision-making that precipitated that decision reveals an organization in 
flux. The marginalization of Shields Warren, the AEC‘s own top expert in the health 
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effects of radioactive exposure, in the wake of the climate of military urgency and 
necessity that Dean fostered seems to have operated as an object lesson, generating an 
unhealthy wariness to speak out about risky testing practices. 
At the administrative level, program officials and those affiliated with the 
program were conscious of the fact that the radiological safety criteria they were 
establishing was not determined by ―safety,‖ but rather through a process that identified 
which effects they would avoid and which they would accept. As Gaelen Felt from Los 
Alamos‘s J-Division put it when explaining the criteria he used to predict and compare 
radiation exposures at various distances from ground zero for a sub-surface and surface 
shots, inhalation of radioactive particles should not be ignored:  
Our lack of knowledge of the effects of retention of a given number of 
active particles in the lungs does not permit a dividing line to be set up 
between a harmful and a harmless concentration. We are sure only that a 
zero concentration is harmless.‖120 
 
Felt‘s calculations of the possible exposure levels from a subsurface shot, based in 
part on Stafford Warren‘s Trinity study, caused him to recommend that the series begin 
with a surface shot and that a sub-surface shot be tentatively planned after the results of 
the surface shot were known. Problem studies of proposed tests such as Felt‘s might be 
expected to have been conducted as a matter of course by an organization such as the 
AEC with authority over test administration and safety. Yet, it appears from the cover 
letter transmitting Felt‘s findings  that such expertise was already in danger of being 
considered superfluous to the process of test planning by AEC officials, especially when 
the issue involved military tests, as was the case with Jangle. As if to absolve himself 
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from any activity that might be construed as an interjection into the planning of Jangle, 
Los Alamos‘s Director Norris E. Bradbury explained to then-Director of the Division of 
Biology and Medicine, Shields Warren, that Felt‘s report was an ―informal‖ one but that 
it had produced some ―startlingly different‖ conclusions about the safety of sub-surface 
shots than had been assumed during the planning process. Though Bradbury wanted to 
make Warren aware of Felt‘s study, he was at least equally interested in making sure that 
he would not be perceived as interfering in test planning, mentioning that he was ―not yet 
prepared to make any formal statement‖ from the laboratory about Felt‘s study, and 
added parenthetically, ―nor is it clear that I am supposed to do so‖.121 Since Bradbury was 
unwilling to press the issue of the safety of the sub-surface test, Los Alamos‘s Health 
Division Leader, Thomas L. Shipman, M.D., lobbied another of his colleagues to argue 
against the shot at an upcoming meeting about the test.
122
 Deriding the plan in the 
reference line of his memo as ―Operation Bungle‖ and concluding that the test was 
neither scientifically nor militarily essential, Shipman urged that Felt‘s findings be taken 
seriously. Shipman linked the proposal for the test with the military‘s disregard for fallout 
hazards, mentioning the overexposures at Greenhouse that were ―handled by studiously 
looking the other way‖ and expressing his dissatisfaction with the military‘s desire to 
flaunt exposure standards: they [military groups] may not necessarily be bound by the 
same permissible exposure levels as will be used for other workers‖ and felt they could 
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―get higher exposures if they wish.‖123 Shipman argued that the assumptions that the test 
would be safe were not borne out by experience—his and others—and put a sharper point 
on his argument that approval for the test should be withdrawn by translating Felt‘s 
findings into real-world consequences:  
the deep underground shot would probably be the most dangerous of the 
three, and that it could under proper conditions deposit dangerous amounts 
of activity in populated areas.  
I realize perfectly well that such an opinion cannot be proven beyond 
doubt by any calculations … but I feel strongly that firing the deep 
underground shot represents a possible risk to surrounding population and 
livestock; and that should things go wrong, it could jeopardize the entire 
future of the Nevada Test Site.
124
 
 
In the event, the deep underground shot was not approved. But the gains that the military 
had made, and the deference of scientists in opposing military tests, increased as testing 
continued.  
During one meeting of the Advisory Committee for Biology and Medicine 
(ACBM) in 1953, for example, Warren moved to adopt standards prepared by the AEC‘s 
Biophysical Branch to set guidelines for the release of radioactive materials from power 
plants, suggesting at the same time that they be accepted on the condition that they could 
be revised should findings from the National Committee on Radiation Standards 
warrant.
125
 After his motion died for want of a second, the discussion of establishing 
guidelines for radioactive releases shifted to the cost of implementing them. An 
intervening motion to maintain enough flexibility in the standards that they could be 
reduced should studies into long-term affects warrant a change passed quickly. 
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Gioacchino Fialla pressed for a cost-versus-risk analysis between providing radiation 
protection at 1 percent and at 10 percent of the permissible total established by the 
National Committee on Radiation Standards. Fialla argued that the $100,000 the study 
might cost would be well spent because meeting the criteria that the ACBM ultimately 
adopted would cost ―millions.‖126 In agreement, Elvin C. Stakman, a botanist with the 
Institute of Agriculture at the University of Minnesota and member of the National 
Academy of Sciences, added that the Committee had a ―double obligation … one is to 
human beings and the other is to taxpayers.‖127 Stakman‘s decision to articulate this point 
suggests that although Committee members were accustomed to taking value into 
consideration when choosing which experiments to fund, this might have been the first 
time that the AEC‘s Advisory Committee for Biology and Medicine had decided to factor 
in an ―obligation‖ to taxpayers in their decision making about safety standards. The 
Committee then broadened the scope of the inquiry by substituting ―installation‖ for 
―power plant,‖ a move that gave them the flexibility to apply the study‘s findings to any 
facility for any purpose, and the motion passed.
128
 Warren voted against the measure and, 
although he did not explain his reasoning, his opposition—when combined with his 
earlier (non-seconded) motion suggests that he believed that the Committee should adopt 
safety standards and that safety, and not cost, should be the priority. This represented a 
fundamental difference between Warren, who appears to have favored a deliberation 
based on safety-versus-danger, and his colleagues on the Committee who had voted to 
postpone making a decision about safety pending the results of a cost/benefit analysis. 
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This meant that the Committee would not be adopting safety standards but, instead, 
would be making an altogether different decision: how much risk to justify on the basis 
of cost.  
By 1954, when radioactive fallout from American weapons testing had grown into 
an international controversy, AEC officials, their military partners, and—because of the 
expansion fostered, in large part, by the use of testing for political gain—a larger and 
more influential group of affiliates and stakeholders spoke with one voice. The AEC‘s 
backing of the military‘s testing goals meant that the fallout controversy and the issue of 
continental weapons tests became inseparable from other facets of the program and thus 
drew support from those unaffiliated with weapons development or who had no 
preference about where weapons were tested. In 1953 I. I. Rabi, a man who in 1958 was 
among those who helped persuade Eisenhower to agree to a testing moratorium and, in 
1953, the Chairman of the GAC, a group that opposed pursuing H-bomb development, 
wrote a worried letter to Eisenhower fearing that the program—―so important for the 
advancement and preservation of our institutions‖—would suffer cutbacks and lose hard-
won momentum.
129
 Rabi was an officer at Columbia‘s Physics Department and affiliated 
with Brookhaven National Laboratory for Atomic Research on Long Island, a laboratory 
unlike Los Alamos or Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, that was most interested 
in developing  peacetime applications of atomic energy. Rabi wanted to convince 
Eisenhower to preserve the program‘s funding. From Eisenhower‘s perspective, however, 
during the early days of his administration when he was looking for ways to reduce 
military spending and was aware of the growing concern about the dangers of fallout 
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from continental weapons tests, it was easy to conflate Rabi‘s comments with that 
growing controversy, and to interpret his plea as a call to continue testing. Thus, the 
fallout controversy that threatened atmospheric weapons testing also contributed to 
strengthening the program‘s ability to sustain it, firming up the bonds between the 
program, military officers and networked affiliates and scientists.  
Criticism also opened up avenues for AEC officials and affiliates to use their 
promotional resources to publicize their opinions about the safety and necessity of 
weapons testing. Officials defended weapons testing in the same way that officers at 
Crossroads had, with appeals to national security. These appeals inevitably made way for 
the construction of a false dilemma: If the AEC could not conduct nuclear weapons 
experiments in the way, and at the location, they chose, then, according to AEC/military 
logic, experiments could not be conducted, progress could not be made, the Soviets 
would win the arms race, and the result would be ―annihilation.‖130 The approach 
precluded the possibility that AEC officials would consider any criticism--constructive or 
otherwise. The AEC paired that message with another that reinforced the notion that 
fallout, at least that produced by American weapons testing, was of no greater import 
than natural exposure to background radiation while living in Denver or Reno, or flying 
in an airplane. An enthusiastic proponent of this strategy was Dr. John Bugher, appointed 
by Dean to replace Warren as Director of the Division of Biology and Medicine. In 1954, 
after international attention had been drawn to the problem of fallout because of Pacific 
testing and Newsweek had carried stories about the effect of Strontium 90 on human 
bone, the Division‘s scientists met in special session to discuss the problem, its effect on 
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testing, and whether they should modify the figures they had earlier adopted for a ―safe‖ 
exposure standard.
131
 Bugher directed the afternoon session with the aid of a mortality 
table prepared by the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company charting deaths from ―bone 
cancer‖ incidence in the U.S. since 1954 and combined that information with his own 
estimate of future deaths from Strontium 90. Bugher concluded that ―in terms of 
death…[Strontium 90 exposure] would come in somewhere about half of what we kill 
with automobiles.‖132 One facet of this approach, targeting especially the American 
public, was the use of (unequal) risk comparisons. AEC officials and affiliates equated 
the involuntarily risks of exposure to radioactive tests to voluntary ones, such as driving, 
with the aim of convincing people to become as comfortable with the routines of nuclear 
testing—and routine dispersal of radioactive fallout—as they were with the risks of 
getting in their car and driving to the market.  
The uncompromising dual-pronged strategy, relentlessly delivered by AEC 
spokespersons and their affiliates throughout the era of atmospheric testing, was 
effective. An analysis of polls taken one year apart, in April 1957 and April 1958, for 
example, shows that among those adults who knew of the controversy about fallout 
completely reversed their opinions about whether testing should be stopped. In 1957 69 
percent favored cessation while 29 percent opposed it. By April 1958, 28 percent of those 
polled supported cessation while the majority, 64 percent, opposed halting atmospheric 
                                                 
131
 William F. Newman, [AEC biochemist] Newsweek, November 12, 1956. Transcript, ―Special Meeting 
of the Advisory Committee on Biology and Medicine to the Atomic Energy Commission, November 26, 
1956‖ (―Transcript‖) U.S. DOE Archives: 326 U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Collection Secretariat, 
Box 1271; Folder O&M-7 ACBM BP. For examples of the publicity about Strontium 90, see Newsweek, 
June 25, 1956, 70; Ralph Lapp, The New Republic, July 9, 1956, 5. 
 
132
 Bugher, ―Transcript,‖ 81.  
 
605 
 
weapons tests.
133
 Because a higher percentage of school-age children, those in grammar 
or high school, supported cessation than did adults, the analyst concluded that ―education 
was the most significant variable,‖ with the ―amount of anxiety … directly inverse to the 
level of education.‖ That finding, along with the analyst‘s explanation, provide another 
example of the success of the AEC‘s ―re-education‖ campaign, one that amounted to an 
extension of the military‘s self-interested selective release/withdrawal of information 
about radioactive effects. The author assumed that formal education made the difference 
between those who disapproved and those who approved of continued weapons testing 
based on the ―hysterical‖ reaction of the former and the ―decrease of anxiety about its 
effects‖ expressed by those whose ―educational background enabled [them] to assimilate 
and evaluate the information presented.‖ 134 In this case, however, it may be that 
schoolchildren had a keener sense of the dangers of radioactive fallout than their parents. 
civil defense initiatives in schools, Bert the Turtle in Duck and Cover along with three 
million copies of a sixteen-page booklet entitled Bert the Turtle Says Duck and Cover, 
and companion radio program meant that although both children and their parents were 
made aware of civil defense information in their homes, children received an extra dose 
of education while at school.
135
 It is thus worth considering that children, who expressed 
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preferences for cessation in a higher percentage than groups the study considered highly 
educated adults (and perhaps their parents,) were better equipped to ―assimilate and 
evaluate‖ the issue. More evidence of the effectiveness of the AEC‘s campaign to diffuse 
fears about radioactive fallout emerges from Camp Desert Rock in 1958, when soldiers 
surveyed as part of a psychological study unexpectedly reported more anxiety about an 
upcoming detonation after attending a standard indoctrination lecture on atomic weapons 
and effects than they did before the lecture. The study‘s authors attributed the increase to 
a possible ―shift in attitude‖ about residual radiation and the expectation that they would 
be covering contaminated terrain, and surmised that the lecture had helped soldiers 
develop a ―more realistic and healthy respect‖ for the residual radiation that was one of 
the weapon‘s effects.136  
In a well-known incident, AEC Commissioner Willard F. Libby employed the 
risk versus reward tactic. Libby had been one of the AEC‘s most outspoken, and 
respected, defenders of weapons testing from 1955 when he accepted a seat from Strauss 
on the AEC.
137
 Libby, a chemist, spent the war working for the Manhattan Project from 
Columbia University and after the war moved to the University of Chicago. From that 
position, he served as an advisor to the AEC, on AEC‘s Committee of Senior Reviewers, 
and also on its General Advisory Committee from 1950-1954. Libby gained international 
renown beginning in 1949 with an article in Science about the relationship between 
environmental radiocarbon and the age of biological matter, fully articulated as a 
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technique for radiocarbon dating in 1952.
138
 His discovery caused revisions of dates for 
the Ice Age, the Dead Sea Scrolls, and Stonehenge, an achievement that earned him the 
Nobel Prize in Chemistry in 1960. In 1957 Libby used his status as an AEC 
Commissioner and scientist in responding to a call for an end to testing by Dr. Albert 
Schweitzer, the 1952 Nobel Peace Prize recipient, then in the spotlight after the release of 
a documentary about his life and devotion to his hospital in French Equatorial Africa.
139
 
A member of the Norwegian Nobel Committee read a letter from Schweitzer, appealing 
for an end to nuclear experimentation and fearing radioactive fallout was approaching 
catastrophic proportions. ―Even if not directly affected by the radioactive material in the 
air, we are indirectly affected through that which has fallen down, is falling down, and 
will fall down.‖140 The appeal was not broadcast in the U.S., though it was in fifty other 
countries. It may have resonated strongest among Norwegians, who learned immediately 
after the broadcast that a recent Soviet test had resulted in a radioactive rainout in 
Norway.  
Libby made a foreign policy case for continued testing, framing his response in 
the condescending risk/reward scenario that characterized AEC commentary: Was 
Schweitzer aware of the ―the most recent information‖ about fallout that showed that 
compared with those ―other risks which persons everywhere take as a normal part of their 
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lives,‖ radiation from nuclear tests was ―extremely small‖? He then asked Schweitzer to 
weigh the risk from fallout against the risk ―to freedom-loving people everywhere in the 
world of not maintaining our defenses against totalitarian forces.‖141 It has long been 
understood that Libby‘s promotion of the AEC‘s testing program, as well as his 
participation in Project Gabriel and instigation and shepherding of Project Sunshine, a 
program that studied the global distribution of Strontium 90 by collecting and analyzing 
biological material (including the bones of dead infants and children, from all corners of 
the earth) that—minus the lurid and illicit details—formed the basis for the ―most recent 
information‖ that Libby cited in his response to Schweitzer, was shaped by his position 
on the AEC.
142
 What has been heretofore overlooked is the way that Libby‘s arguments 
about the testing safety were influenced by what might be called a universal mixing 
hypothesis that formed the core of his work on the environmental accumulation of 
Carbon 14 and his interest in defending that work against critics who disputed his 
findings and conclusions.  
Libby capitalized on his authority as a Commissioner to diffuse, and in some 
cases to prevent, critique of the assumptions and methods that formed the basis for his 
radiocarbon dating technique. He not only used Sunshine study results to defend the 
claims for the safety of testing that the AEC had made since Dean initiated continental 
                                                 
141
 ―Schweitzer and Libby on Nuclear Tests,‖ Science New Series 125 (May 10, 1957): 923.  
 
142
 For a study that discusses the relationship of both projects, Libby‘s involvement, and the AEC‘s 
investment in the studies as indicative of scientific understandings about the environment and its ability to 
absorb pollutants, see Laura A. Bruno, ―The bequest of the nuclear battlefield: Science, nature, and the 
atom during the first decade of the Cold War,‖ Historical Studies in the Physical and Biological Sciences 
33 (2003): 237–260, esp. 238, 240-250, 258. For the studies and Libby‘s involvement as an indication of 
the AEC‘s interest in radiological safety, see Hacker, Elements of Controversy, 183; as indicative of a 
larger pattern within the AEC and among its affiliates of an institutional disregard for ethical and moral 
boundaries in the interest of science, see ACHRE, Final Report, Ch. 13.  
 
609 
 
testing, but his position as a bully pulpit to defend his professional reputation. At the time 
he responded to Schweitzer, Libby had already spent several years defending his 
conclusions against critics who found fault with his analyses.
143
 The scholarly debate 
about the validity of his fundamental assumptions seems to have strengthened his 
commitment to the position he had assumed on universal mixing. Libby‘s abuse of power 
operated to the benefit of AEC officials seeking to neutralize the fallout controversy but it 
contributed directly to offsite overexposures by influencing how AEC officials, and other 
government agencies, dealt with contamination. One of the foundational premises of 
Libby‘s discovery was that radioactive carbon was uniformly and completely mixed in 
the air, oceans, and in all living material and organisms.
144
 The premise made its way into 
the AEC‘s internal deliberations preceding the H-bomb and influenced the decisions and 
statements he made about fallout as an AEC Commissioner. On December 7, 1949, for 
example, the AEC concluded on the basis of ―independent calculations‖ that radioactive 
carbon produced by a thermonuclear (H-bomb) bomb would not reach a ―danger point‖ 
unless 500-50,000 detonations had occurred—the difference a function of whether one 
adopted a conservative or ―reasonable‖ estimate. Though Libby was not specifically 
cited, among the AEC‘s advisors he was at the forefront of radiocarbon studies, and the 
two assumptions that formed the basis for the calculations and the AEC‘s conclusions 
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were identical to those that formed the basis of his work: that radioactive carbon would 
be universally mixed and remain in the atmosphere or would be ―completely‖ mixed with 
―normal‖ (naturally occurring) carbon in the earth‘s air and water.145  
Though Libby‘s work on radiocarbon focused on natural, cosmic, sources of 
radiation, and calculations stretching over thousands of years, he applied the same 
theoretical models to evaluate the problem of man-made radioactive isotopes produced 
by nuclear detonations and fallout dispersal in the short term—assumptions that 
contradicted what was already known about hot spots found after the Trinity detonation 
data reinforced by Stafford Warren‘s studies at Crossroads that also revealed the 
concentration radioactivity up the food chain; and, in 1955 at least, by what had been 
learned from the survivors in Japan that radiation dosages differed in ways that were not 
explained by their distance from the bomb‘s center.146 By then, however, Libby‘s views 
were well entrenched among the AEC‘s advisory committees. In 1955, for example, just 
after Libby left the GAC to join the AEC, the Committee received word that data 
collected by Japanese researchers and analyzed by the New York Safety and Health 
Laboratory and an oceanographer hired by the AEC‘s New York Operation Office, 
―suggested that the radioactivity from the Castle series which had fallen into the Pacific 
Ocean or drifted out from the Lagoon was not being diffused evenly.‖ The GAC met this 
challenge to their former colleague‘s position by insisting on a do-over. They absolved 
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the New York Laboratory and the AEC-contracted analysts while faulting the Japanese 
data collectors: ―it would be provident to initiate immediately another oceanographic 
survey to assess and verify the Japanese findings.‖147 
As Commissioner, Libby actively promoted the uniform mixing hypothesis by 
drawing correlations between naturally-occurring and man-made radiation throughout the 
program. He supported Project Sunshine as an unprecedented opportunity to do a 
―radioactive tracer experiment on a world-wide scale‖ and pressed for declassification of 
aspects of the study which would demonstrate that radioactive isotopes from nuclear 
testing would, in fact, spread to every corner of the globe, a finding that would help 
validate his universal mixing hypothesis.
148
 He took advantage of opportunities to review 
papers and presentations from other scientists and analysts and encouraged them to 
include his findings about radiocarbon dispersal.
149
 And, he quieted challenges to his 
studies that emerged from AEC affiliates by reminding scientists who expressed opinions 
that were at odds with his that they pursued their livelihood at his pleasure, in one 
instance indirectly by criticizing a scientist (John Gofman, who became an outspoken 
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critic of the AEC and nuclear power) through his superior for engaging in political 
activity.
150
 From a suppositional standpoint, the consequences of Libby‘s interpretation of 
Sunshine data were becoming evident in 1959. When the study came to light, Ralph 
Lapp, a long-time critic of the methods the AEC used to support its claims that testing 
was safely conducted, pointed out that AEC officials, including Libby and John Bugher, 
then-Director of the Division of Biology and Medicine, used findings from the study to 
underestimate the effects of H-bomb testing, actions that he believed contributed to a 
four-year continuation of potentially life-threatening testing and that, because of their 
global implications, exceeded the limits of their authority 
151
 But there were irrefutable 
effects of Libby‘s defense of his radiocarbon dating technique via the connections he 
made between naturally occurring and man-made radioactive dispersal.  
Libby‘s ideas about uniform mixing, as embedded into advisory committees 
concerned with establishing radiation exposure standards and then deployed throughout 
the program, were directly implicated in the use of averaging to downplay the dangers of 
exposures known at the time to be hazardous. Libby‘s approach made its way into the 
standards ultimately adopted, where workers were allowed to receive a yearly dose that 
could be averaged over their working life—set individually at 5 rem per year, and not 
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more than 15 rem in any one year—and the general population to one-fifth that, as 
averaged over millions of people. Emphasizing that the new standards were not the result 
of information that demonstrated damage from previous radioactive exposures, and 
suggesting that the limits were designed to prevent genetic damage, the AEC estimated 
that its program would result in a .5 rem early average ―per capita dose‖ with ―the total 
dose to the whole population from man-made radiations … not likely to exceed 10 
million rems per million of population up to age 30.‖152 Through Strauss, the averaging 
method directly influenced the decisions that Eisenhower made to approve the Hardtack 
series of tests for Spring 1958 when Strauss pointed out that the yield from two of the 
tests would ―presumably‖ be deposited ―world wide‖ because of the altitude at which 
they would be detonated.
153
  
These arguments also worked to prevent other government officials from carrying 
out their responsibilities. In November 1958 the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)  
considered withholding from distribution and preventing consumption of some produce 
from California, specifically lettuce from El Centro in extreme Southern California and 
spinach and celery from Oxnard, on the coast between Santa Monica and Santa Barbara, 
because it was contaminated with Strontium 90 in levels that approached the maximum 
permissible dose. When Gordon Dunning, then Chief of the AEC‘s Weapons Effects 
Radiation Branch of the Division of Biology and Medicine, learned of the FDA‘s 
concern, he drew on Libby‘s assertions about universal uptake and continuous 
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exposure—as with cosmic radiation—to convince the FDA to take no action. In a 
memorandum for the file that made its way into Libby‘s papers, Dunning reported that he 
―point[ed] out that the ‗maximum permissible level‘ was based on the assumptions that 
the entire diet was at this level of activity and that the exposure be continuous.‖154  
The authority Libby enjoyed as an AEC Commissioner beginning in 1954 
provided him with a venue to combine the AEC‘s appeals to national security with 
promotion of his own opinion about universal dispersal over those of his critics—an 
opinion used to dispute the arguments of those experts who found variations in dispersal 
and non-uniform consequences, even as fallout from atmospheric weapons testing was 
contributing to the erosion of the perceived accuracy of his method and his hypothesis.
155
 
After suggesting that Schweitzer was uninformed about the effects of fallout—as Libby 
interpreted the data—he guarded against the possibility that Schweitzer‘s imagination 
(and those who read Libby‘s published response) would not track in the same direction as 
Libby‘s about what might happen should the U.S. fail to maintain its defenses. Libby 
reinforced his assertion that radioactive fallout was the lesser of two evils. He reminded 
Schweitzer that fallout was relatively insignificant given that it was the only thing staving 
off doomsday:  
Here the choice seems much clearer--the terrible risk of abandoning the 
defense effort which is so essential under present conditions to the 
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survival of the Free World against the small controlled risk from weapons 
testing.
156
 
 
The AEC used the same strategy whether responding to those, like Schweitzer, who 
sought an end to all nuclear experimentation, or to those, like congressmen, who 
expressed no interest in halting weapons testing but who were interested in learning more 
about fallout and the program over which they were entitled to exercise oversight. In 
1957, the JCAE called the AEC‘s Director of the Division of Biology and Medicine, 
Charles Dunham, to explain the disparity between the AEC‘s assurances of safety and the 
opinions of other scientists that radioactive fallout from testing was hazardous.
157
 After 
discussing some of this literature, the Vice Chairman of the Committee, Clinton P. 
Anderson of New Mexico, asked Dunham to explain the contradiction between the 
opinions of outsider scientists and the AEC‘s. Anderson‘s position on the value of the 
program and of testing was as far from Schweitzer‘s as the witness before him. In fact, 
during hearings about radioactive fallout in 1954, then-Chairman Anderson had signaled 
his support for the program by stating that nuclear tests were ―vital to the security of the 
free world‖ and consciously or unconsciously explaining at the outset of those hearings 
that the safety of testing was a foregone conclusion, their purpose being ―to clear up 
‗public misapprehension and unwarranted concern.‘‖158 Despite the history of Anderson‘s 
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support, Dunham‘s first response was to sideline the issue of health effects to emphasize 
the significance of testing: 
Senator Anderson. How do you account for the fact that these people 
can read all this nice literature that the AEC has put out, giving them 
absolute assurance, and still be scientists, and they are still worried? 
Dr. Dunham. I wonder if they are so worried about the fallout as they are 
about the spread of nuclear war? 
 
To be fair, Dunham afterward spent many hours over the course of seven days of 
hearings answering questions about fallout and submitted reams of documents from 
AEC-affiliated scientists supporting the AEC‘s positions about exposure standards and 
radiation protection procedures. Nonetheless, his first reaction was to evade Anderson‘s 
question, making sure that the senator remembered at the outset that the issue was not 
about the dangers of fallout but about the potential for nuclear annihilation. Dunham‘s 
strategy echoed the testing-equals-survival trope that the military used to justify 
experimentation during Crossroads, when the ships anchored in Bikini‘s harbor were 
―doomed in the nation‘s defense to atomic death or devastation.‖159 It was the same 
strategy that the AEC‘s supporters in Nevada used to chastise opponents when testing 
came to Nevada in 1951, ―Ditch Those Rosy Glasses—Russia Really has the H-Bomb‖ 
and later in 1955, when the fallout controversy seemed poised to threaten future tests: 
―There are a lot worse things than death. Trying to live in a communist-dominated 
country is most of them.‖160 
To augment his own claims, and to speak authoritatively about the safety of the 
atmospheric program, Strauss relied more and more on the network of militarily 
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supportive AEC spokesmen such as Commissioner Libby, lower-level program officials 
such as Dunham, and AEC affiliated scientists who had risen to prominence with Dean‘s 
Chairmanship. As Marshall Brucer, a Tucson, Arizona M.D., remarked in a 1976 
memorial tribute to Charles L. Dunham, a Director of the AEC‘s Division of Biology and 
Medicine under Strauss, Dunham helped the AEC weather what Brucer derogatorily 
referred to as the ―Great American Radiation Hysteria‖ by enlisting a cadre of AEC 
affiliates in support of the program and atmospheric testing. Dunham, he reported, was 
unperturbed in the late 1950s at the prospect of testifying before the JCAE in 1959 about 
radioactive hazards. Brucer said ―It was easy for Chuck to do this on very short notice. 
He just called in the project directors he had been supporting for the past ten years.‖161 
Under Strauss, the program mobilized sufficient scientific authority to keep public fears 
at bay and to soothe the concerns of congressmen who might have placed restrictions on 
the AEC to limit, or eliminate, continental (and possibly even Pacific) weapons tests. It 
was the combination of all three of these resources, all deriving directly or indirectly 
from the Manhattan Project‘s influence over the peacetime program—wartime strategies 
of control, the militarization of the program, and the influence that Strauss wielded in the 
Eisenhower administration and over his cabinet—that gave Strauss the ability to protect 
his position and atmospheric testing from 1954 when fears of radioactive fallout began 
circulating on the national stage through the end of his term in 1958.  
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CHAPTER TEN 
 
THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST DISARMAMENT 
From 1953 through June 1958 Lewis L. Strauss successfully defended the militarized 
structure of the program re-created under Dean against threats from the arms control 
initiatives and the fallout controversy of the Eisenhower years. As Eisenhower‘s Atomic 
Energy Advisor and AEC Chairman, Strauss used the strategies of control that became 
commonplace after Operation Crossroads set a precedent for the military‘s use of the 
bomb and the program to achieve self-interested political goals and encouraged their use 
by program administrators and managers. He also used his position and friendship with 
Eisenhower to strengthen the authority he enjoyed under the Act over other arms of 
government, eliminating possibilities for diplomacy that could have slowed or stopped 
the nuclear arms race and thwarting budget cutting initiatives that Eisenhower himself 
endorsed.
1
 And, in a move that illustrates the relationship between the Manhattan Project 
and the militarized peacetime program and that also sheds light on Strauss‘s ambitions 
for himself and for the program during his tenure, Admiral Strauss set himself up as a 
latter-day General Groves, appointing Groves‘s ―backup and shadow czar,‖ Brigadier 
General Kenneth Nichols to be his General Manager. Nichols, then in his mid-forties and 
engaged in a joint position as AFSWP‘s Deputy Director of Guided Missiles and as the 
Army‘s Chief of Research and Development, was unable to help Strauss as he had 
Groves under conditions that required him to accept civilian authority. In 1955, after 
having ―difficulty in concealing his distaste for his obligation to respond to inquiries‖ 
                                                 
1
 For an interpretation of the Act as granting Strauss (and AEC Chairman generally) authority over State 
and Defense, see John McCone, former Secretary of the Air Force and AEC Chairman, ―Interview with 
John McCone,‖ July 26, 1976, 22. Oral Histories, DDE Library.  
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from JCAE staff members, Nichols resigned.
2
 Strauss then appointed another of Groves‘s 
special assistants and a veteran of the MLC and one-time Director of Military 
Applications, Brigadier General Kenneth E. Fields.
3
 Fields was adept where Nichols was 
not, practiced at downplaying the effects of fallout from Nevada testing and smoothing 
the feathers of congressmen such as Utah‘s Douglas Stringfellow. Apparently nonplussed 
by their demands, he testified thirty-one times over a three month period.
4
 Because the 
AEA required the General Manager to be a civilian, Nichols and Fields each resigned 
their Army commissions to serve Strauss. To complement his own authority within the 
administration and in support of this militarized managerial structure, Strauss drew on the 
expertise of scientists among the program‘s network of affiliates to speak out against the 
claims of outside experts that testing was producing harmful levels of fallout. Had 
Eisenhower purposefully set out to strengthen the Military-Industrial Complex that he 
famously derided as he left office, he could have done no better than in choosing Strauss, 
who had been the first to recognize and exploit the domestic political potential of atom 
bombs. He had directed his postwar energies to militarization and expansion, increasing 
as time went on the numbers of stakeholders affiliated with the program and the stake of 
influential affiliates such as E.O. Lawrence in military projects and expansion.  
Strauss, like his predecessor, took the AEC far beyond the official post-1949 
concept of the AEC as a ―producer‖ for the DOD, protecting AEC/DOD autonomy 
                                                 
2
 Allardice and Trapnell, The Atomic Energy Commission, 66-67, 165. For a biographical sketch of Nichols 
(1907-2000), see John W. Simpson‘s description of his achievements in Memorial Tributes, National 
Academy of Engineering 10 (Washington, D.C.: National Academies Press, 2002), 183-187.  
 
3
 Time, ―Personnel: Changes of the Week,‖ April 25, 1955.  
 
4
 Fradkin, Fallout, 123. For Nichols, and Fradkin‘s observation that under Strauss, the illusory notion of a 
―civilian‖ commission under Strauss, 122. 
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through weapons testing and emphasizing the potential of the Soviets to use nuclear 
weapons to obliterate the United States—a use of program resources that allowed him to 
secure a level of appropriations equal to the partnership‘s ambitions.5 As the editor of the 
Las Vegas Review Journal wrote in 1955 when defending testing despite the claims of 
radioactive hazards, the blasts helped everyone ―understand the horror,‖ adding ―there are 
a lot worse things than death. Trying to live in a communist-dominated country is most 
[sic] of them.‖6 Strauss used bomb-fueled fear of nuclear war to keep defense budgets 
high and helped enlarge the military industrial complex that Eisenhower argued might 
lead the nation to ruin. And, it appears likely that it was Strauss‘s influence that 
prevented Eisenhower from recognizing that the AEC and its military partners were using 
atmospheric weapons tests for their domestic political value as generators of fear, 
political support, and funding. Eisenhower, for example, seems not to have made a 
connection between military demonstrations such as flyovers or Navy Day ceremonies 
that he derided and the promotional activities that officers made part of every exercise or 
maneuver in Nevada. Similarly, although he had an ―aversion‖ to the tendency of the 
military (and others) to whip up fear and create ―hysteria,‖ he failed to appreciate how the 
AEC and its military partners used Nevada tests for that very purpose.
7
 Early in his term, 
Strauss received Eisenhower‘s permission to launch a five-year, five-billion-dollar 
expansion of AEC facilities to increase military production by an amount nearly three 
                                                 
5
 For the elaboration of the AEC as a producer and the DOD as a consumer, see February 6, 1952 
Memorandum to Secretary of Defense [Lovett], and ―State viewpoints,‖ June 11, 1952. Foreign Relations 
of the United States, NSC Affairs Atomic Energy Regulations, Vol. II.  
 
6
 ―Banning the Nuclear,‖ Las Vegas Review Journal, March 23, 1955, 4.  
 
7
 ―Interview with General Andrew J. Goodpaster,‖ by Dr. Maclyn P. Burg, Oral Historian, June 26, 1975, 
81; for Eisenhower‘s aversion to fear mongering, see continuation of Goodpaster‘s interview, January 16, 
1978, 108. Oral Histories, DDE Library.  
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times the federal government‘s 1953-1958 budget for health and nearly half that spent 
over the same period for international affairs.
8
 For a time, Strauss‘s comprehensive 
approach to maintaining AEC/DOD authority and autonomy allowed him to prevent 
diplomacy and the fallout controversy from interfering with atmospheric weapons testing. 
The significance of his influence in the Eisenhower administration is illustrated by the 
fact that it was only in April 1958 as Strauss‘s term was coming to an end that 
Eisenhower agreed to respond in kind to a Soviet decision to halt weapons testing. On 
October 31, 1958, thirteen years after Strauss proposed Operation Crossroads, seven 
years after testing began in Nevada, six years after the first H-bomb exploded in the 
Pacific, and four months after Strauss stepped down as AEC Chairman, the U.S. 
temporarily suspended atmospheric testing. Before the suspension, however, Strauss 
exerted tremendous influence: he created the conditions for the bomb to be used after the 
war as an instrument of military entitlement, fostered the militarization of the program, 
and helped engineer Cold War mobilization. More than a participant in the construction 
of the Military-Industrial Complex, Strauss was one of its architects.  
This chapter examines Strauss‘s Chairmanship from the operational levels of the 
program to the influence he exerted in the Eisenhower administration. First, it discusses 
the importance of the managerial and operational continuities between Dean‘s regime and 
Strauss‘s and the changes that Strauss encouraged at the program‘s managerial level that 
prevented the fallout controversy from interfering with atmospheric weapons testing. 
Second, it explores the methods Strauss used to secure his authority over cabinet 
                                                 
8
 For the expansion, see Richard W. Cook, AEC Director of Production during Strauss‘s chairmanship. 
Interview conducted by Maclyn P. Burg, October 27, 1975. Oral Histories, DDE Presidential Library. For 
the budgetary figures, see Table ―Outlays by Superfunction and Function: 1940-2006 (in billions of 
dollars).‖ Online at http://home.att.net/~rdavis2/outlays.html. 
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members and AEC commissioners who opposed his authoritarian rule. Third, it shows 
how Strauss used that authority to stifle diplomatic opportunities for arms control. The 
history in this chapter demonstrates that the two most important factors in this process 
were the AEC/DOD partnership and Strauss‘s use and endorsement of wartime strategies 
of control.  
From Dean to Strauss: Continuity and Change 
Though Dean and Strauss brought different talents and personalities to the 
Chairmanship, they both served President Eisenhower during the first six months of his 
administration and shared similar ambitions. Because of this, the transition from one to 
another was not institutionally significant. At Eisenhower‘s request, Dean stayed on as 
AEC Chairman until the end of June 1953, presiding over the completion of Upshot-
Knothole and giving Strauss time to settle in to his position as Atomic Energy Advisor. 
Dean fulfilled many of the same goals, especially militarization, for the program that 
Strauss had pursued as the military‘s stalking horse on the Commission. The expansion 
that Dean shepherded increased the program‘s footprint and the number of affiliate 
stakeholders with an interest in the program‘s continued expansion. As the military ethos 
that he fostered spread through the managerial and operational tiers of the program, 
militarization gained structural integrity. Militarization also influenced the decision-
making of advisors and the work of advisory committees. Perhaps no example better 
illustrates this phenomenon than the way a Director of the Advisory Committee for 
Biology and Medicine, E. C. Stakman, opened a March 1954 meeting of the Committee. 
Assembled twelve days after Bravo’s unexpectedly high yield ignited fires on islands 
twenty miles distant from the explosion, forced the emergency evacuation of personnel 
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and Marshallese from three islands in the path of its fallout cloud, and sickened the 
fishermen aboard the Lucky Dragon, Stakman opened the meeting of experts in 
radioactive effects by welcoming the group with a paraphrase of Confederate General 
Nathan Bedford Forrest‘s motto: ―Victory goes to the nation that gits there fustest with 
the moistest and bestest weapons.‖9  
Strauss‘s methods for influencing policy did differ from Dean‘s, reflecting their 
different personalities and the challenges each overcame. Dean was astute and affable, 
but instead of putting himself in the spotlight, he took an indirect approach to 
policymaking. As evidenced by the success he had in working through subordinate-level 
officials to secure approval for continental testing, the strategy was successful. It also had 
the added benefit of allowing him to keep his own hands clean and beyond criticism 
when his plans did not pan out, as with his efforts to re-package the bomb as a tactical 
weapon. Dean also enjoyed cordial relations with the JCAE through his term despite the 
death during his last year as Chairman of his friend and JCAE Chairman, Brien 
McMahon. One of the most influential congressional supporters the militarized AEC had, 
McMahon succumbed to cancer in July 1952 during a short-lived campaign for the 
presidency on a platform ―to ensure world peace through fear of atomic weapons.‖10  
Unlike Dean, Strauss was unable to cultivate much support from the JCAE, and their 
relationship became increasingly confrontational after the 1954 elections when the 
                                                 
9
 See Memoranda and notes of Special Meeting of Advisory Committee for Biology and Medicine, held 
March 13, 1954. U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, RG 326 Division of Biomedical and Environmental 
Research Meetings ACBM 21-33 to Meetings ACBM 41-50, Box 104, Folder ―Meetings 
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fallout exceeded predictions about quantity and direction, 1.  
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Democrats regained control of Congress. In personal and professional relationships, 
where Dean relied on persuasion and reassurance, Strauss was direct, condescending, and 
insensitive. Strauss‘s response to a woman who lived near the site and wrote him about 
the possibility that radioactive fallout had caused the cancer and death of her first-grade 
son and the deformities of a still-born child she delivered, is illustrative: ―Former 
President Truman … said that any dangers that might result from fallout were a small 
sacrifice.‖11 By turns prickly or emotional and sensitive when frustrated or unable to get 
his own way, Strauss‘s authoritarian manner alienated other administrative officials, 
congressmen, and AEC Commissioners alike.  
Only to Eisenhower did Strauss appear to show respect. By all accounts, Strauss 
was austere and unyielding—tough and scrappy with ―more elbows than an octopus‖ 
according to his opponents.
12
 In the most generous light, he comes across as self-
righteous and idealistic, adept at chicanery, and not above lawbreaking; less generously, 
he is portrayed as a ruthless and egotistical scoundrel.
13
 He is best known for stripping 
Oppenheimer of his security clearance, the culmination of a vendetta that stretched back 
to Oppenheimer‘s opposition to development of the H-bomb; 14 for deceiving Congress 
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 Martha Laird to Peter Jennings, ―Coverup at Ground Zero,‖ Turning Point, aired during 1994 on ABC.  
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 Cited by Duncan Norton-Taylor, ―The Controversial Mr. Strauss, Fortune, January 1955, 110.  
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about AEC responsibility for the Lucky Dragon incident and his handling of the fallout 
controversy that then erupted,
15
 and for pursuing an anti-arms control agenda until his 
Chairmanship ended in 1958.
16
 Of these, only his attack on Oppenheimer is understood in 
light of a history that predated his tenure under Eisenhower, and all seemed to reflect that 
with Strauss‘s ascension, the AEC had changed course. As Herbert York, then-Director 
of the Livermore Radiation Laboratory, recalled, when Strauss took over from Dean he 
―proceeded to clean up the loose ends with a vengeance.‖17 Despite the impressions left 
by Dean and Strauss and the difference between Dean‘s congenial public persona and 
Strauss‘s condescending one, the administrative transfer made little difference in the 
program‘s operation. The militarization that occurred under Dean freed Strauss from 
much of the burden of administering the program, allowing him to direct his energies on 
the policymaking front. 
Because of Strauss‘s history with the program and the repertoire of strategies of 
control from which he was comfortable drawing, he adjusted to and exploited the changes 
that had occurred in the years since he stepped down as one of the first five AEC 
Commissioners. When he assumed responsibility for the program in 1953, continental 
weapons testing was commonplace and AEC directors and personnel were adept at 
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 The earliest account is Ralph Lapp‘s The Voyage of the Lucky Dragon (New York: Harper & Brothers 
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managing tests and public relations in and around the Site. The first H-bomb was already 
eight months old, and the impasse over arms control between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. 
made nuclear war seem closer than ever. Having fueled those fears since the end of the 
war when he and Forrestal used the possibility of nuclear war to secure permission to 
conduct Operation Crossroads, Strauss knew how to exploit them. In March 1954 after 
fallout from ―Bravo‖ put him in the uncomfortable position of explaining to reporters the 
blast‘s higher-than-expected fallout and the unanticipated cloud trajectory, Strauss 
concluded the press conference by mentioning that an H-bomb could ―take out‖ New 
York City. As historian Robert Divine long ago pointed out, he ―raised the spectre of 
nuclear holocaust‖ to diffuse a conversation about fallout.18 More than the fast footed 
way to downplay fallout and avoid fallout-related support for arms control, however, 
Strauss‘s response was a practiced one. Portending nuclear cataclysm alongside a 
narrative that nuclear weapons, developmental testing, and a muscular nuclear-armed 
military offered the nation its only chance for survival was one of Strauss‘s favorite 
tropes. It combined national security and military urgency, and Strauss used them and 
other wartime strategies of control during his service under Eisenhower to strengthen and 
expand the militarized structure that he inherited from Dean. He continued the practice of 
deluding other officials in the Eisenhower administration and the public about the hazards 
of radioactive substances and fallout, using media manipulation as an integral part of this 
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process.
19
 When the controversy over fallout erupted, Strauss and other AEC officials 
managed public relations around the Nevada Test Site with even more care.  
Only after the public‘s concerns about the hazards of radioactive fallout began to 
gain enough political traction to potentially threaten continental weapons testing 
altogether did Strauss take an interest in limiting offsite fallout. The first concerted plan 
was adopted by the AEC and its affiliates and initiated with the 1955 Teapot series. 
Officials built flexibility into the testing schedule by including a variety of different types 
of tests in the series and having each bomb ready as the series got underway. The plan 
was that weapons expected to produce little in the way of off-site fallout could be tested 
on days when the weather either precluded or made more dangerous the detonation of a 
weapon expected to produce large amounts of radioactive fallout.
20
 The second plan was 
devised during an AEC meeting in 1955 while the Teapot series was underway. New 
Mexico‘s Senator Clinton P. Anderson, the JCAE Chairman, provoked it with a letter he 
wrote to Strauss asking that the AEC re-evaluate testing in Nevada. Anderson suggested 
that the AEC consider detonating only ―very small yield devices‖ after having learned 
from a meteorologist he talked to in Nevada (waiting to witness a detonation delayed 
because of weather) that the probability of having weather conditions that met ―all‖ 
safety criteria for detonation was ―about one day in twenty-five.‖21  
                                                 
19
 For a discussion of how Strauss isolated himself from the Commission and how little he shared about 
nuclear hazards with the administration, see former deputy chief of the U.S. Delegation to the U.N. and 
Ambassador Gerard C. Smith, ―Interview with Gerard C. Smith,‖ May 8, 1990, 1-3. DDE Library. 
 
20
 See William R. Kennedy, Jr., ―Fallout Forecasting—1945 through 1962,‖ Los Alamos National 
Laboratory, LA-10605-MS, UC-11, issued March 1986, CIC-14 Report Collection.  
 
21
 For the discussion of the Anderson‘s conversation and the letter, see Udall, Myths of August, 245 
 
628 
 
The AEC discussion about Anderson‘s letter illustrates that Strauss and at least 
two AEC commissioners disagreed not only about why continental testing was necessary 
but also whether it was even necessary at all. Strauss, primarily interested in the use of 
atmospheric testing to maintain support for AEC and military expansion, made the case 
for moving nearly all testing back to the PPG. Commissioners Willard Libby and Thomas 
Murray objected. Libby‘s response was a prideful one, based almost certainly on the fact 
that he had used his status as a scientist and reputation as the developer of radiocarbon 
dating that fallout from weapons tests was sufficiently diluted that it posed no hazards 
and also his view that tests were so necessary that people would ―have to learn to live 
with‖ fallout. Libby‘s position differed little from that of a pro-testing argument by NSC 
staff that took exception to statements by administration officials about disarmament for 
the reason that it left the ―peoples of the world‖ unprepared for the ―realities‖ of the 
international situation.
22
 For his part, Murray argued that moving the series to the PPG 
would delay the series by sixty or ninety days. Murray‘s motivations were less clear than 
Libby‘s. During the August 1954 meeting where commissioners were expected to vote on 
Teapot, Murray indicated that he thought that the president had decided to ―discontinue 
the use of the Nevada Proving Grounds.‖ Once assured that Eisenhower had not, Murray 
added his assent to those of his fellow commissioners and the 1955 testing series—
Operation Teapot—was officially underway.23 His subsequent reluctance to have the 
tests conducted anywhere but Nevada is thus less understandable, but was likely related 
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to his support for the development of tactical weapons and the fact that Teapot included a 
number of tests designed to perfect lightweight thermonuclear (H-bomb) weapons, 
nuclear missiles, and contained an assortment of military effects tests.
24
 Murray‘s 
tendency to position himself against Strauss may also have influenced his decision. 
Murray did, for example, go around Strauss to Eisenhower, writing him with ideas about 
arms control, with explanations of his objections to Strauss‘s decisions, and with 
arguments against the concept of Mutual Assured Destruction on moral and practical 
grounds.
25
 Despite the support for the Nevada tests expressed by Murray and Libby, 
Strauss persisted with commentary that addressed both arguments. He did so in a way 
that suggests he was making an case for moving the tests based on the accumulating 
dangers of radiation exposure for residents in Eastern Nevada and Southern Utah. Strauss 
said that fallout patterns for Nevada tests were well established—―East over Pioche and 
over St. George, which they apparently always plaster‖—and feared that Anderson‘s 
letter was the first in a salvo that would threaten atmospheric testing altogether. He said 
he had ―always been frightened that something would happen which would set us back 
with the public for a long period of time.‖ He also reassured Libby and Murray that the 
move would not hinder development, telling them that Al Graves and Herbert York, Los 
Alamos‘s Test Director and the Director of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, 
were also ―talking‖ about moving everything except ―little‖ tests to the Pacific. Their 
comments suggest that they may have preferred testing at the PPG—it was ―easy to 
do…you can do them one a day practically.‖ After Murray interjected with another 
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complaint about the time Pacific testing would take, Strauss discredited the objection 
with a simple solution that had gone unmentioned as long as continental testing generated 
political benefits: ―Fly them out.‖26 That option failed and Teapot began in February 
1955 and continued through mid-May, with its shots justified through appeals to national 
security and military urgency, and their effects portrayed as innocuous through media 
manipulation.  
Because Teapot was approved after fallout from Upshot-Knothole stirred up 
controversy about continental testing, the AEC‘s Office of Information reconfigured its 
public relations strategy, launching an ―educational‖ campaign in December 1954 to 
preempt complaints before the series began:
27
 
Developments since Upshot-Knothole have recently been reviewed. 
Events have intensified the need for a pre-series educational program … 
[to] keep public misunderstanding or apprehension over use of the Nevada 
Proving Ground at a minimum level.
28
 
 
One strategy included in the AEC‘s public relations portfolio was the comparison 
between Pacific and Nevada tests that Dean had emphasized and reinforced in his last 
Report to Congress. In a January 1955 flyer entitled ―Atomic Test Effects in the Nevada 
Test Site Region,‖ the AEC and its military partners reduced its national security and 
relative safety message to elementary-level statements that indirectly ridiculed the 
complainants and cast doubt on their patriotism. After reinforcing the impression that the 
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AEC and its military partners were nothing more than servants to the national interest by 
invoking the authority of the president over a matter as rudimentary as the increased 
magnitude of nuclear weapons, they re-emphasized the points made in a cover letter 
issued by the AEC/military Joint Test Organization from Camp Mercury, Nevada, that 
fallout was an inconvenience, not a hazard. Above a sketch of a bald man, presumably a 
scientist, with a bushy halo of hair and equally bushy eyebrows standing atop a 
mushroom cloud and peering down through a telescope, the officials and officers 
dismissed the complainants with cartoonish simplicity:  
Our large fission bombs, the President has said, are more than 25 times as 
powerful as the weapons with which the atomic age dawned … and 
hydrogen [fusion] weapons are in the range of millions of tons of TNT. …   
Despite their relatively low yield, Nevada tests have clearly demonstrated 
their value to all national atomic weapons programs. Because of them we 
now have big bombs, and smaller ones too; in fact, a whole family of 
weapons. Because of them our Armed Forces are stronger and our Civil 
Defense better prepared. 
An unusual safety record has been set. No one inside Nevada test site has 
been injured as a result of the 31 test detonations. No one outside the test 
site in the nearby region of potential exposure has been hurt.
29
 
 
The curiously worded cover letter that was reprinted on the face of the flyer 
betrays the underlying current that for the AEC and its military partners—here, the Joint 
Test Organization [JTO]—safety was not a product of any effort by the testing 
organization to reduce the hazards of testing for people living off-site, but was, instead, a 
function of the impressionability of people downwind. In other words, the JTO‘s attempt 
to thank those who did not complain about testing revealed that it measured ―safety‖ by 
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the extent to which people living off-site expressed satisfaction with AEC reassurances. 
The JTO effectively transferred the burden for safety to Americans themselves: 
Some of you have been inconvenienced by our test operations. At times 
some of you have been exposed to potential risk from flash, blast, or fall-
out. You have accepted the inconvenience or the risk without fuss, without 
alarm, and without panic. Your cooperation has helped achieve an unusual 
record of safety.
30
 
 
As one of the AEC‘s stakeholders, the Las Vegas Sun followed suit. After State 
Senator Edward Leutzinger of Eureka County in North Central Nevada proposed moving 
tests, the Sun ridiculed him so severely that the comments can only be seen as an effort to 
dissuade others from making similar recommendations and to convince its readers that 
the only ones who feared testing were unintelligent and insensible:  
another of our sterling members of the legislature has made an ass of 
himself for all the world to see … this isn‘t the first crackpot who has 
voiced such sentiments without taking the trouble to learn the facts. …The 
friendly people of the AEC have spared no effort nor expense to insure 
public safety … yet all sorts of wild rumors circulate over back fences. … 
These gossipy individuals who spread witch tales … succeed only in 
frightening old ladies and simple-minded citizens … sensible people of 
Nevada … are glad for the fine publicity the state receives. … We might 
suggest [the senator] take a vote of the more intelligent majority.
31
 
 
Promotional efforts that relied less on claims of safety and more on ridiculing testing‘s 
opponents may have been necessary, at least from the AEC‘s perspective, given that the 
tests planned for Teapot were expected to be especially dirty.  
The tests of tactical weapon prototypes and maneuvers for Teapot that AEC 
officials and military officers used to enhance their political influence were themselves 
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responsible for the production and offsite dispersal of some of the highest levels of fallout 
of any tests conducted in Nevada. The March 23, 1955, shot ―Satchel,‖ a cratering effects 
test detonated despite the fact that observations from Pacific testing and experience with 
a similar cratering experiment in Nevada demonstrated that such shots produced harmful 
levels of offsite fallout, offers one example of the sidelining of safety in the interests of 
military objectives.
32
 Also known as ―Teapot ESS,‖ ―Satchel‖ was six feet long and 
weighed four tons with an expected yield of one kiloton. Like the 1951 cratering test that 
Shields Warren opposed, the below ground detonation of ―Satchel‖ increased the chance 
that it would produce a large amount of radioactivized earth that would descend while so 
hot it might cause ―external beta burns.‖ In that instance, a committee overruled Warren 
because tracking the test‘s fallout cloud was one of the objectives and it would be easier 
to trace it over land.
33
 The 1951 test produced a highly radioactive low-level cloud that 
settled in and around Elko, Nevada, while a higher-level cloud crossed over the 
Continental Divide.
34
 Between that shot and granting approval for ―Satchel,‖ AEC 
officials received additional information about the hazards of surface, or underground, 
tests. In 1954 I. I. Rabi, an AEC advisor and Chairman of the GAC, advised Strauss that 
the Castle series of tests in the Pacific substantiated the problem of high levels of 
localized fallout from tests conducted at or near ground level and advised that because of 
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the differential decay rate and distribution, the AEC should continue to study the problem 
but remain mindful of a cumulative risk from such studies. Rabi made clear that although 
he derived his data from thermonuclear testing in the Pacific, his findings were equally 
appropriate for continental tests, representing a difference in area only and ―scaled up 
from the results of tests already made in Nevada from much smaller weapons.‖35 ―It is 
almost inevitable that an atomic explosion,‖ Rabi wrote,  
where a substantial portion of the fireball reaches the surface, will result in 
a heavy and lethal fall-out over an area much greater by a factor up to 10 
than the area of blast damage. Therefore, weapons exploded at an altitude 
of 1 ½, or greater, times the radius of the fireball will not result in a high 
degree of local fallout, but in a wide distribution of fall-out over a long 
period of time. … The Committee further suggests that the Commission 
… study the longer-range problem of what would happen to the 
environment, and to plant and animal life, which had been subjected to 
intense fall-out amounting to 500 r. in 50 hours over an area of 
approximately 5000 square miles, as occurred over the Pacific in the 
[redacted] test. 
 
Neither Warren‘s warnings during the first year of testing nor Rabi‘s were enough for the 
AEC to prevent the military from detonating ―Satchel,‖ a test that carved a crater 300 feet 
wide and 128 feet deep, scattering significant levels of fallout in and around Las Vegas.  
Militarization caused the subordination of precautions advocated by Warren and 
Rabi and was the primary reason why the AEC allowed the Army to detonate ―Satchel‖ 
in Nevada. The test itself was expected to produce results similar to the cratering event 
originally planned for Amchitka but held in Nevada in 1951. For officers interested in an 
exercise scenario, the smallish ―Satchel‖ offered yet another opportunity to demonstrate 
the nuclear readiness and versatility of ground troops and their commanders. For 
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AFSWP, the underground blast provided an opportunity for it to expand its influence, 
broadening the concern of its Directorate of Weapons Effects Tests from the damage 
nuclear weapons did to equipment to the medical and biological effects of radioactive 
fallout.
36
 While admitting that the AEC‘s Division of Biology and Medicine had already 
conducted these studies, producing ―well documented‖ results and contractor laboratories 
were also continuously engaged in such studies, AFSWP reported that ―it was felt‖ that 
the military should conduct its own studies.
37
  
The goal of those studies seems to have been to use fallout readings from the 
Teapot tests to create a data set that was unencumbered (as others were not) with the 
potential for exposures to cause injury in the long term—the objective being to study the 
effects of ―short-term fallout-of immediate military importance.‖ AFSWP arranged with 
armed forces medical and veterinary personnel to collect every twenty-four hours 
throughout the fourteen-week series samples of milk, portions of calves from 
slaughterhouses, and urine samples from personnel at locations throughout the U.S., 
Hawaii and Alaska, Greece, Panama, Japan, Germany, and Africa, and directing that they 
be shipped immediately thereafter to the Army‘s Medical Service Graduate school. Air 
Force officers also conducted less sophisticated studies in conjunction with the cloud 
sampling following ―Satchel‖ and other shots of the Teapot series. After its sampling 
planes landed and without decontaminating them, the Air Force instructed servicemen to 
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rub their hands on the fuselages. When the men appeared to suffer no physical injuries 
from the contact, the Air Force determined it had scored an economic and psychological 
victory. The results showed that the contamination on returning planes was due primarily 
to the concentration of radioactivity around the fittings and seams of aircraft and not on 
the planes‘ smooth skin. Because it was all but impossible to decontaminate those areas, 
the Air Force decided that decontamination of planes used for cloud sampling and 
tracking was unnecessary. Additionally, officers concluded that the absence of injury to 
the men who rubbed their hands on the still-hot planes was an effective way to counteract 
any psychological reluctance Air Force personnel might have about boarding or working 
on and around planes that had not been decontaminated.
38
 Though Los Alamos scientists 
and researchers complained that the Air Force‘s conclusions were at odds with the 
fundamental principles of radiation safety and permissible exposure levels, and that if 
they were adopted would jeopardize the accuracy of the findings derived from samples 
taken by non-decontaminated aircraft—the reason for sampling in the first place—those 
complaints led only to a compromise and further experiments of the Teapot variety by the 
Air Force during Operation Plumbbob in 1957.
39
  
For their own institutional reasons, AFSWP and the Air Force alike benefited 
from the fallout of the 1955 series. AFSWP built a scientific imperative into Teapot to 
extend its sphere of influence. The Air Force used its responsibility for sampling to 
justify a decision that decontamination was unnecessary—creating the impression for its 
personnel that radioactive exposures below those that would cause skin burns were safe 
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and, on that basis, that nuclear missions could be conducted at less expense that 
previously believed. In this way, military officers laid claim to deriving scientific 
information from ―Satchel‖ and other Teapot tests, tests that were expected to produce 
high levels of radioactive fallout nationwide and, based on the extent of AFSWP‘s 
sampling network, globally too, in the midst of the fallout controversy. 
One reason that Strauss and the militarized AEC had no difficulty garnering 
Eisenhower‘s approval for a test that the AEC expected to produce high levels of fallout 
was that Strauss was as competent as Dean at focusing on the magnitude of tests in the 
Pacific to minimize the nature of tests conducted in Nevada. In August 1954 when 
Strauss requested Eisenhower‘s permission for the 1955 Teapot series, he included in the 
routine request a paragraph explaining that those tests would be of ―small enough energy 
yield and fired under such conditions as to reduce hazard to the public to a minimum,‖ 
acknowledging that although fallout from the tests might be hazardous, the AEC would 
work to limit them.
40
 As reassuring as was Strauss‘s promise to limit the dangers from 
Nevada after his admission to Eisenhower that they ―might‖ be hazardous, it appears in 
comparison with his explanation of the precautions to be taken with an underwater 
Pacific test—one that in terms of yield would be thirteen kilotons smaller than a tower 
shot planned for Nevada as part of the Teapot series—that Strauss intentionally framed 
the requests to reinforce the difference in significance between Nevada and Pacific 
testing. In December 1954 while Strauss was still answering to complaints about fallout 
from the Bravo test and the death of Aikichi Kuboyama, one of the Japanese fishermen 
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from the Lucky Dragon, that was fresh in his critics‘ minds, Strauss was careful to 
explain to Eisenhower that an underwater test the Navy planned for the Pacific would 
produce no harmful effects to people or to fisheries. Strauss explained that both the 
Scripps Institute of Oceanography and the Office of Naval Research were conducting 
studies to locate an ideal spot for the thirty-kiloton shot, that the general area was free of 
commercial fish, that currents and winds were such that contamination would not migrate 
and cause contamination problems, and, that the nearest people lived on Guadalupe 
Island, some seventy-five miles from the site. Strauss anticipated that no evacuation 
would be necessary and personnel would ensure that the area affected would be secured 
from ―random shipping and aircraft.‖41 In contrast, Strauss did not inform Eisenhower 
that AEC/military planners for Teapot expected that the tests would produce enough 
fallout that it would be detectable in the urine of people across the globe and in milk from 
such distant places as Japan and Germany. 
Featured in two New York Times articles accompanied by a picture of the ―desert 
eruption,‖ the four-ton ―Satchel‖ was touted by AEC officials and military officers as a 
―highly portable‖ device designed to be planted by a ―small combat team.‖ A ―hit-and-
run raiding force‖ of 5,000 soldiers from the Second Infantry Division participated in an 
exercise that simulated the use of the weapon to destroy an enemy‘s guided missile site. 
The newspaper reported that it was ―believed maneuverable enough to be handled by one 
man in a sneak raid.‖42 The coverage of the first sub-surface shot to be conducted at the 
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Site since 1951 in the Las Vegas Sun was accompanied by four images of the shot, 
mentioning also that along with the foot soldiers participating in the exercise, an 
additional 280 military men observed the spectacle from five miles away. The Las Vegas 
Review Journal noted that thirty-five aircraft including jet planes of the Tactical Air 
Command also participated. The Sun emphasized that the AEC postponed the blast 
because of weather conditions until ―the last possible minute‖ when the conditions were 
finally favorable to steer the radioactive debris away from Las Vegas.
43
 And yet, those 
predictions were wrong, and may have been known to be wrong by the paper‘s reporter at 
the time they were written: fallout from the ninety-six foot deep crater that ―Satchel‖ 
created did descend on Las Vegas, in other areas of Clark County, and Northeastern 
Arizona, while a higher-elevation cloud of material continued in a southeasterly 
direction.
44
 The fallout contained the third-highest ratio of radioactive iodine—I-131—of 
any continental weapons test and the cities of Las Vegas, Dallas-Fort Worth, and 
Houston remained ―hot‖ after the March 23 shot through March 24.45  
A sister exercise to ―Satchel‖ produced no radioactive fallout. Exercise Surfboard 
used conventional explosives to simulate a nuclear missile and a ―satchel‖ in exercises 
conducted along the California coastline. Its scenario was more involved, but its objective 
was similar to the ―live‖ nuclear maneuvers in Nevada, with a small raiding force armed 
with a small simulated nuclear weapon expected to use it to destroy an enemy missile 
site. A joint Navy-Army exercise, Surfboard involved 12,000 Navy personnel and 8,000 
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soldiers, with 5,000 from Ft. Lewis, Washington, alone. Though two planes collided in a 
cloud of artillery smoke and debris, the pilots parachuted to safety. The simulated losses, 
however, were high—with 700 men counted as ―casualties‖ because of their proximity to 
the one atomic missile fired by the ―Aggressor‖ forces. After three hours, the men 
returned to the exercise as ―replacement‖ troops and succeeded in planting the ―satchel‖ 
and achieved the objective of demolishing the target missile site.
46
 Officers publicized the 
maneuver in the same way that they did exercises in Nevada, with coverage before, 
during, and after the exercise, complete with pictures. Stories about Surfboard appeared 
in the same issues as those reporting the ―Satchel‖ exercise. With no mention of the 
residual activity that would, in a real battle with real nuclear weapons, contaminate the 
battlefield for friendly and enemy soldiers alike, readers were left to imagine that a 
nuclearized Army was ready for action.  
Though typical of earlier exercises and little different from the pattern Army 
officers and others set in the use of nuclear weapons to secure political support for 
maintaining high troop levels, ―Satchel‖ is significant because it, along with others in the 
Teapot series, seems to have shaped Eisenhower‘s thinking about nuclear weapons and 
their utility. The detonation of tactical-style devices at Teapot, the publicity about 
―Satchel,‖ and the practice of omitting any mention about residual radiation and its 
potential to injure U.S. soldiers almost certainly influenced Eisenhower‘s comment 
during a news conference just before ―Satchel‘s‖ detonation that he would use atomic 
weapons ―just exactly as you would use a bullet or anything else.‖47 Seven days later, on 
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March 23, the same day that the Army conducted the ―Satchel‖ exercise, he reiterated his 
position along with a concept of ―measured retaliation‖ to fight ―limited wars‖ that would 
not call for the intensive nuclear bombing that under the doctrine of ―massive retaliation‖ 
would be used in a larger, world war.
48
 Additionally, with so much emphasis by outsiders 
as well as Strauss about the radioactive hazards of H-bombs and other weapons detonated 
in the Pacific and so little about the hazards of fallout from the Nevada tests, it was easy 
for Eisenhower to reason that nuclear bombs, missiles, and shells, of the sort tested in 
Nevada were, as he wrote in 1956, ―smaller & of less danger to humanity‖ with the 
ancillary benefit of reducing the amount of fissionable material for H-bombs.
49
 Unlike 
Truman, who remained noncommittal when asked whether he would approve the use of 
atomic weapons while refusing to rule out that possibility,
50
  Eisenhower expressed no 
qualms about the use of nuclear weapons and even before ―Satchel‖ did not hesitate to 
say that they should be used in the same way as any other armament in the arsenal.  
At a February 11, 1953, meeting of the NSC convened to consider a strike against 
the Chinese at Kaesong, Eisenhower was unequivocal: ―We should consider the use of 
tactical atomic weapons.‖ Dulles agreed, and while the Pentagon began to assess the 
danger to friendly forces and consider other targets, the NSC Planning Board developed 
―contingency plans‖ for war.51 According to then assistant, later Ambassador, Gerard C. 
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Smith, it was around this time that Dulles found reasons to veer away from Eisenhower‘s 
position on the use of nuclear weapons. After Smith learned of the military‘s plans about 
Quemoy-Matsu and an attack focused on Amoy [Xiamen] harbor, he arranged for ―some 
military people‖ to meet with Dulles and explain their plan and its consequences: 
And they were very glib about surgical strikes and I finally said, ―Well, 
now what is your estimate of casualties?‖ And I will never forget, this 
Major said, ―Well, we think about 186 thousand casualties.‖ Dulles never 
mentioned the use of nuclear weapons for that purpose again.
52
   
 
Eisenhower, however, maintained that nuclear weapons should be used—a position that 
he expressed after transferring in early 1953, with Strauss‘s blessing, custody of nuclear 
weapons to the military. The move institutionalized the possibility that nuclear weapons 
would become a routine component of the arsenal.  
The decision remained contentious from that moment forward, with debate among 
the Secretaries of Defense, State, and Chairman Strauss filtering up to Eisenhower 
periodically for clarification. As with maneuvers involving ―live‖ nuclear weapons, the 
objective was more difficult to achieve in practice than it was to put down on paper. The 
core of those disagreements were fundamental differences between tactical and strategic 
uses—the same distinction that Dean had tried to overcome in 1951—and the way 
Eisenhower dealt with them illustrates the he was confident that various types of nuclear 
weapons were available for tactical and strategic use.  
On December 5, 1953, two days after Eisenhower explained to Churchill in 
Bermuda that he did not think nuclear strikes to take out planes or troops would cause the 
Soviets to bomb London, the NSC took up the issue of responsibility for the use of 
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nuclear weapons.
53
 During that meeting, the DOD expressed its opinion that distribution 
of weapons to commanders under NSC 162/2, ―Basic National Security Policy,‖ meant 
that commanders could use them as they would any other weapon. This seemed to 
indicate that the weapons they would have at the ready would be ―tactical‖ weapons—
arms that could be deployed at a field commander‘s level. Dulles disagreed with the 
DOD‘s position, using the word ―tactical‖ to explain that although the military had 
physical custody of the weapons and the responsibility for planning for their use, their 
deployment would be up to the president. Strauss also opposed the DOD‘s ideas and 
without reference to weapons types, avoiding the word ―tactical,‖ and without explaining 
whether his position was based on a philosophical difference of opinion or on his 
understanding of the radioactive consequences of nuclear weapons use, disapproved of a 
commander‘s option to deploy a nuclear weapon tactically: ―There was no thought 
expressed that their use could be arbitrarily decided upon by a local commander.‖ He 
suggested that a phrase be added to clarify that nuclear weapons would be ―considered‖ 
in the event of hostilities ―with the specific prior approval of the President as 
Commander-in-Chief.‖54 For his part, Eisenhower attempted to settle the disagreement by 
reiterating that the fundamental dilemma was not about who would use them, but what 
they would be used for:  
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a distinction should be made between tactical and strategic use. … The 
decision on tactical use might be left up to the commander in the field, but 
the decision on strategic use, particularly retaliatory, should be made here 
in Washington.
55
  
 
It is impossible to know whether in 1953 Eisenhower was aware of the 
rudimentary nature of the most advanced tactical weapons; but it seems that either he had 
little understanding of the residual radioactive effects that set nuclear weapons of any sort 
apart from their non-nuclear counterparts or he believed that the radioactivity would not 
present insurmountable problems. The reader will recall that by December 1953 the 
military had detonated a shell-type weapon, ―Nancy‖—or ―Nevada Zombie‖—in Nevada. 
The canister, three feet in diameter and ten feet long resembled a common shell, but at six 
and one-half tons it was not easily portable and no chamber had yet been devised to 
propel it forward. ―Nancy‖ was detonated after being hoisted to the top of a tower. And in 
May 1953 soldiers detonated a state-of-the-art 280 mm shell—the 803 lb. ―Grable‖—
from an eighty-five ton cannon that was shipped to the Site between two semi-trucks. 
―Grable‘s‖ range was approximately twenty miles. By 1957, when then-Secretary of 
Defense Radford recommended that Eisenhower allow nuclear cannon to be deployed 
into South Korea, he had two models from which to choose: one was a 280 mm Grable-
type weapon and the other was the ―Honest John,‖ a 762 mm rocket, fired from a truck-
mounted cannon, with a rage of twenty-two miles.
56
 Dulles repeatedly objected, arguing 
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that the weapons were of a type that would breach the armistice and, with some sense that 
he felt repugnance at the thought of their use, said they were of little value apart from 
their ―psychological‖ significance: ―why in the world‖ is it ―essential that we be able to 
haul these great monsters around.‖57 Though Eisenhower initially agreed with Dulles, 
preferring that nuclear armed aircraft be sent into South Korea instead, he ultimately gave 
in under persistent pressure from the JCS. In January 1958 Eisenhower allowed the 
military to situate nuclear cannons in South Korea; a year later the Air Force installed 
nuclear cruise missiles with a 1,100 kilometer range.
58
 
Delegating responsibility for the use of nuclear weapons was a thornier issue. In 
1954 the problem was preliminarily addressed by the Secretaries of State, Defense, and 
Strauss with a decision to add language about the diplomatic implications of the use of 
weapons without waiting for a specific presidential directive. The compromise did not 
specify whether the weapons were tactical or strategic. The problem emerged again in 
March 1955 and a year later in March 1956, with the result in each instance that the 
president retained authority to decide on the use of weapons. In 1956 a provision was 
added for advance authorization.
59
 At that time, Eisenhower was still working through the 
military‘s implementation plans, discussing the issue at an NSC meeting before 
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committing himself to advance authorization.
60
 As the president was mulling over ways 
that nuclear weapons might be deployed, the AEC and its military partners planned for 
the 1957 series in Nevada, including warheads, tactical-type weapons, and military 
exercises—―Desert Rock VII‖ and ―Desert Rock VIII.‖  
International anxiety about fallout, the number of tests planned, and the types of 
shells and weapons to be detonated, made planning 1957‘s Operation Plumbbob more 
complicated for AEC officials than usual. Plumbbob involved twenty-nine tests, 
including warhead prototypes, smaller devices that concentrated yield, and troop 
exercises in conjunction with the seventy-four kiloton ―Hood,‖ a thermonuclear warhead 
developed by Lawrence Livermore Laboratory and detonated from a balloon. The AEC 
adjusted is public relations campaign stateside to gin up support nationwide for continued 
atmospheric testing while also directing its message abroad. For Strauss and other AEC 
officials, the goal was to convince Britain and France, alienated by the failure of arms 
control negotiations and continued atmospheric testing in the face of evidence that 
radioactive fallout was causing global contamination, that the U.S.‘s atmospheric 
weapons tests would benefit them, too.  
AEC information officials added an ―educational‖ campaign that portrayed testing 
as internationally significant. The campaign extended from the time the public relations 
plan was formalized in the winter of 1957 until the end of the series in October 1957 and 
                                                 
60
 ―Briefing Note‖ for ―Meeting in the President‘s Office‖ June 27, 1958; ―Memorandum for the Secretary 
of State, Secretary of Defense,‖ Subject: Policy regarding use of atomic weapons‖ July 1, 1958. Folder: 
Atomic Weapons, Correspondence and Background for Presidential Approval and Instructions for Use of 
(1953-1960) (2), NSC Series, Subject Subseries, Box 1: Atomic Weapons, Presidential Approval and 
Instructions for use of (1), DDE Library. 
 
647 
 
was tailored as a countermeasure to the international outcry over fallout.
61
 Alongside an 
umbrella claim to national security, the idea was to assert that weapons tests had value 
that extended beyond the U.S., with plans to announce routinely throughout the operation 
that the tests would ―serve in the defense of the United States and the Free World.‖62 
AEC officials ensured that the national press would cooperate in the dissemination of its 
message by opening up eight of the shots to representatives of the national media selected 
on the basis of their significance in nationwide media markets and to press, radio, and 
television, along with reporters from Nevada and its bordering states. As an indication of 
how seriously the AEC took international pressure for a moratorium on atmospheric 
nuclear testing and how critical Strauss and other officials believed it was to mobilize 
political support for testing, the AEC targeted especially those areas where the it had 
significant operations and large numbers of employees who might be expected to become 
politically active to protect their jobs, especially around Hanford, Oak Ridge, Savannah 
River, and Paducah.
63
 To generate support around the Nevada Site, the plan combined 
notification of officials with face-to-face lobbying of state, county, and local, officials in 
Nevada, Arizona, Utah, and California to convince ―opinion leaders‖ that the tests would 
be safe. Additionally, meetings between officials with the AEC‘s Division of Biology and 
Medicine officials and ―veterinarians, physicians, and public health officials‖ were 
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expected to gain the support of local respected authorities.
64
 Finally, the AEC planned to 
distribute a variety of self-promotional material to the media, schools, and at each 
personal encounter or meeting with state and local officials, community members, 
doctors, and veterinarians, including the booklet ―Atomic Test Effects in the Nevada Test 
Site Region‖ and a motion picture, ―Atomic Tests in Nevada.‖ And, to complement these 
AEC-produced materials, officials worked to offset any impressions that the Commission 
was engaged in a promotional exercise by distributing an article that appeared in the 
Journal of the American Medical Association and lent an authoritative air of impartiality 
to the issue of testing hazards. The article, ―Protecting the Public During Weapons 
Testing at the Nevada Test Site,‖ was written by Gordon Dunning, the Director of the 
AEC‘s Division of Biology and Medicine.65 The National Cancer Institute later estimated 
that the I-131 released during Plumbbob, twice as much as any other series in Nevada, 
caused approximately 38,000 people to contract thyroid cancer and 1,900 to die from the 
disease.
66
  
Strauss and Eisenhower: Authority and Executive Sanction 
 
The imperative to use atmospheric testing for domestic political gain that was at 
the heart of militarization and the authority Strauss exercised in the Eisenhower 
administration enabled Strauss to prevent the president from achieving two of the goals 
he set for his administration: improving world opinion toward America and her policies 
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and slowing or halting the arms race.
67
 Both of these ambitions were embodied in 
Eisenhower‘s December 1953 ―Atoms for Peace‖ speech before the U.N. General 
Assembly. In his famous speech, Eisenhower denigrated the logic of the arms race and 
made a commitment to developing benevolent uses for nuclear energy. Eisenhower‘s goal 
was much the same as Secretary of State Acheson‘s had been in 1951 when he directed 
Ambassador Benjamin V. Cohen to present the initial proposal for disarmament before 
the General Assembly: to give the U.S. an advantage in world opinion over the Soviets.
68
 
Eisenhower hoped to smooth over the disenchantment among America‘s U.N. partners 
that developed after the expansion of weapons production and experimentation 
dramatized by thirty-one atomic detonations, troop maneuvers in Nevada, and the six 
tests in the Pacific, including the 10.4 megaton thermonuclear ―Mike‖ that made the U.S. 
position on the nuclear arms race increasingly incoherent, especially to the European 
allies. Weapons testing and mobilization made America‘s diplomatic efforts seem feeble 
in comparison. Additionally, anti-communist rhetoric also had a negative effect on the 
ways that European allies and others perceived the United States. Because of this, the 
support from the international community that Truman and Eisenhower expected in 
response to their persistent attempts to discredit the communists failed to emerge. In its 
1953 annual report to President Eisenhower, the Psychological Board reported that 
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Western Europe had become heavily, and increasingly, critical of U.S. foreign policy. 
Europeans feared a trend toward ―isolationism‖ based upon intensified polarization 
between the America and the Soviets and they decried the United State‘s anti-communist 
―hysteria.‖ By contrast, the Soviet‘s ―peace initiatives‖ seemed more rationally 
motivated.
69
 
The ―Atoms for Peace‖ program was Eisenhower‘s bid to recapture the good will 
that had been lost since the Marshall Plan and Berlin Airlift and he hoped to generate 
solidarity among America‘s allies in the UN against the Soviet Union. By the time he 
delivered it on December 8, 1953, support from European allies had weakened to such an 
extent that Eisenhower put his honor on the line in an effort to reverse the trend:  
the United States pledges before you—and therefore before the world—its 
determination to help solve the fearful atomic dilemma—to devote its 
entire heart and mind to find the way by which the miraculous 
inventiveness of man shall not be dedicated to his death, but consecrated 
to his life.
70
  
 
He responded to complaints that the U.S. was a disingenuous diplomatic partner 
by emphasizing that the complaint was fundamentally untenable. Eisenhower expressed 
frustration with the possibility that any reasonable person could expect that even the 
world‘s largest arsenal could be decisive should war break out: ―The expenditure of vast 
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sums,‖ Eisenhower stated, could not ―guarantee absolute safety for the cities. … The 
awful arithmetic of the atomic bomb does not permit such an easy solution.‖71  
Because Strauss, one of Eisenhower‘s most powerful advisors, disagreed with the 
president‘s objectives and used all the resources and tactics he could muster to prevent 
military resources from being diverted to peacetime use and to discredit diplomatic 
overtures that posed threats to continued weapons testing, the plan failed to produce more 
than a short term turnaround. Instead, because of militarization of the program and 
Atomic Governance, the same pattern of aggression backed by weapons tests and 
inflammatory rhetoric that characterized the final years of Truman‘s presidency 
continued—as did the Soviets‘ use of the UN as a forum to blame America for relying 
too heavily upon weapon superiority. Soviet representatives argued that the U.S. blocked 
all reasonable attempts to develop workable solutions. As Eisenhower said later, U.S. 
policy was increasingly being made on the basis of world opinion as shaped by Soviet 
declarations.
72
  
Strauss was a significant factor in the process that kept the program funded and 
atmospheric testing alive through the fallout controversy and disarmament standoff. It 
was to Strauss that Eisenhower turned for assessments of the foreign policy implications 
of atomic energy proposals. As Benjamin P. Greene notes, Eisenhower did not really 
know what to make of the different opinions he received about weapons testing and 
development and was thus unsure about how to translate those opinions into his thinking 
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about arms control—Strauss provided that ―broad‖ view.73 Strauss parlayed Eisenhower‘s 
uncertainties and the trust that he placed in him to wield authority over other cabinet 
members. This extended to the ways that other cabinet members kept their diaries. 
Strauss, for example, received Eisenhower‘s permission to advise them that they should 
refrain from dictating the contents of their diaries, a nineteenth-century habit as Strauss 
explained the practice to Eisenhower, to prevent ―recurrent leaks.‖74 He also wielded 
power over Eisenhower by virtue of his authority to review the evaluations , 
recommendations, or suggestions, submitted to Eisenhower about atomic energy or 
foreign policy. Strauss used that responsibility as a license to veto any proposal that 
might jeopardize atmospheric weapons testing.
75
 
Strauss‘s desire for autonomy could not have fit more perfectly with 
Eisenhower‘s administrative style, one designed to ―maximize responsibility‖ among 
strong and opinionated advisors.
76
 Strauss was mindful, however, of the need to create 
the impression of subservience. After Eisenhower had apparently discussed with Strauss 
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the ―degree of independence‖ the AEC Chairman wielded, he wrote a letter to 
Eisenhower on May 4, 1953, that itemized fourteen different avenues through which the 
president could assert control over the Chairman aside from appointing him.
77
 As 
Strauss‘s authority within Eisenhower‘s administration grew, he lost credibility among 
members of Congress and, with it, his ability to sway public opinion. His biographer 
explains that Strauss was ―ill-suited to leadership in a politicized environment,‖ inflexible 
in his positions, and most comfortable with acting under the mandate of ―an executive 
authority.‖78 And while that may be, what seems more likely is that it was not the 
political environment that discomfited Strauss. As his backchannel maneuvering with 
Forrestal and Hicklenlooper to destabilize Lilienthal‘s authority at Chairman illustrated, 
he was very much a political animal. It was not politics, but criticism, that Strauss could 
not abide: his preference for having an executive mandate under which to operate was 
important to him not only for the authority he derived from the mandate but also because 
he expected to use that mandate as a shield against criticism; and, as his relationship with 
Eisenhower demonstrated, used that expectation to his advantage. Strauss easily 
displaced responsibility for criticism about his performance to Eisenhower.  
An example from early in Strauss‘s regime illustrates how Strauss used criticism 
about his performance as a means of cementing his relationship with Eisenhower and 
maintaining his authority within the administration. This was a valuable tactic for Strauss, 
who was a political liability almost from the outset because of the Oppenheimer affair, 
the fallout controversy, and disregard for congressional authority. Strauss successfully 
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deflected Eisenhower‘s attention away from significant criticism about his administration 
of the program by directing it to petty issues that he magnified and used to elicit the 
president‘s support. On April 2, 1954, for example, India‘s prime minister Jawaharlal 
Nehru issued the first strong international challenge to U.S. atmospheric testing following 
the ―Bravo‖ incident. Eisenhower responded to Nehru‘s call by telling Secretary of State 
John Foster Dulles that the U.S. should ―propose‖ a moratorium on the testing of nuclear 
and thermonuclear weapons. Dulles formed an ―interdepartmental committee‖ that 
included Strauss to study the president‘s plan, which Strauss opposed. On June 23, 1954, 
he convinced the National Security Council to table the plan using the argument that the 
Soviets would find ways to avoid treaty restrictions—the verifiability issue that Strauss 
persistently used as a reason for rejecting diplomatic overtures for disarmament.
79
 But 
Strauss‘s objections overstated the content of Eisenhower‘s proposition, which did not 
actually call for a moratorium. Eisenhower had suggested to Dulles that the U.S. merely 
use Nehru‘s call as an opportunity to float the possibility of a moratorium internationally 
and to open avenues for discussion with the Soviets. Apart from the opposition he 
pressed within the committee, Strauss worked to ensure that Eisenhower would not raise 
the moratorium idea to the diplomatic level in advance of the NSC meeting.  
In early June, Strauss picked up on a report in the press that he had secretly taped 
conversations conducted in his office and used that incident to manipulate Eisenhower 
into a position where he would be reluctant to disagree with Strauss‘s position that even 
broaching the possibility of a moratorium on atmospheric testing was not in the national 
interest. Strauss (―upset and subdued,‖ as a note in the file indicated) first tried to see the 
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president in person, he then hand-delivered the clipping along with a letter to the 
president denying that he had a tape recorder in his office. In the letter, Strauss noted that 
when he took over the office from Dean, he had the one ―recording device‖ that he found 
removed from its location behind the fireplace along with the wires connecting it to a 
control at his desk. To impress Eisenhower with the gravity of the newspaper article, he 
equated his situation with Forrestal‘s breakdown and suicide, where the ―constant 
repetition of slander … destroyed our poor friend, James Forrestal.‖ Strauss attached a 
note to the letter to Ann Whitman, Eisenhower‘s secretary, asking that it be brought to 
the president‘s attention and mentioning that he only wanted to be sure that Eisenhower 
saw it and that ―it was not written to obtain any letter of reassurance from him for I do 
not need that.‖ After taking the matter up with ―The Boss,‖ Whitman passed along 
Eisenhower‘s suggestion that he (Strauss) consider ―the whole matter a great 
accomplishment.‖ As an indication of the emotional drama that Strauss had shown to 
Eisenhower‘s secretary when he delivered the message, she added to the president‘s 
words her own note of encouragement: ―I hate to see you as upset as you were this 
morning. Please don‘t be!‖80  
Six months later, Strauss was embroiled in controversy, having brought down 
Oppenheimer and in the middle of the Dixon-Yates contract scandal. Strauss shared 
enough of his frustrations with Eisenhower that the president penned an encouraging note 
to him on December 29. Eisenhower wrote that he had every confidence in Strauss‘s 
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ability and believed he was doing a ―superb‖ job.81 At the time Eisenhower sent those 
words of encouragement, however, Strauss had already bared his soul to a New York 
Times reporter. In an interview that Eisenhower learned about only as it was going to 
press, Strauss explained that he was beleaguered: ―for the first time in his life, I have 
enemies.‖ He also told the reporter that he would never again accept a public job, that he 
was looking forward to the day when his term ended, and dejectedly added that he might 
―not have been the man‖ for the job. When Eisenhower learned via teletype the content of 
Strauss‘s comments, he wrote him another letter. It illustrates that Strauss had 
successfully shifted the responsibility for his mental wellbeing to the president. 
Eisenhower clearly felt that he had not done enough to relieve Strauss‘s anxiety the 
previous day.  
I am a little disturbed. I well realize that this has been a rough year for 
you, and I want you to know that the calm fortitude with which you have 
faced your difficult problems has excited my admiration. … I can only 
repeat that despite the arrows of outrageous fortune that sometimes seem 
to come our way, I hope most devoutly that the satisfaction – which you 
must have – of a good job done in the best interests of our country will 
keep your spirits high.
82
 
 
Strauss manipulated Eisenhower‘s attention away from criticism about his performance 
by dramatizing how the criticism itself had wounded him.  
And, Strauss reciprocated in ways that cemented the bond. Strauss cultivated 
Eisenhower‘s friendship through little notes of encouragement and approval, and with 
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gifts. Eisenhower‘s support and protection was an especially important asset for Strauss, 
who rankled many, particularly congressional Democrats and the three Truman 
appointees on the AEC who objected to his authoritarian, ―one-man-rule‖ style, during 
his first year as Chairman.
83
 In May 1958, as Strauss‘s term as Chairman neared its end, 
New Mexico‘s Senator Anderson criticized the AEC‘s claim that a ―clean‖ bomb was 
near production and Strauss‘s support for military weapons testing, calling Strauss the 
―modern apostle of McCarthyism.‖ The attacks produced a tense round of criticism and 
rejoinder between Strauss and Anderson over the radio and in newspapers. Between those 
incidents and a June 5 letter that Strauss wrote to Eisenhower discussing the expiration of 
his term, he presented Eisenhower with a one-third interest in a prize bull, Brockmere 10. 
Eisenhower was delighted: ―I am so overwhelmed by your generosity … that I have 
discarded as completely inadequate all the conventional phrases of appreciation.‖84 
Strauss combined his administrative influence to modulate opinions emanating 
from the administration and coming into it. When AEC Commissioner Thomas Murray 
disagreed with a Commission decision, he received permission from Strauss to contact 
the president. Murray believed, as his fellow Commissioners and Strauss did not, that the 
AEC should invite a UN observer to attend the upcoming Castle series of tests. Murray 
believed it would serve as a signal to the UN and member nations that Eisenhower was 
serious when he said that he desired a shift in the course of America‘s atomic program. 
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When Eisenhower received Murray‘s explanation via letter, he sent it to Strauss along 
with a note that he did not know what to make of the request because, in Eisenhower‘s 
words, he had ―not been informed as to the character and nature of the forthcoming tests‖ 
and thus could not determine whether a UN observer was appropriate. Strauss met with 
Eisenhower and subsequently drafted a reply to go out under the letterhead of Sherman 
Adams, Eisenhower‘s Assistant, and had one of Adams‘s secretaries finalize it for his 
signature. The letter was so dismissive that the secretary attached a note to the final 
version just to be sure that Adams approved of it—―This seems awfully strong.‖ Adams 
resolved the secretary‘s misgivings by jotting ―this is ok‖ on her note, signed the letter, 
and informed Murray tersely that the president would not ―intervene‖ in a Commission 
decision, ―particularly since the majority included the Chairman of the Commission.‖ 
The letter continued dismissively, explaining to Murray that he use ―the privilege of 
appeal to the President … with restraint‖ because ―it would be impossible to cope‖ with 
appeals from the government‘s many commissioners who held minority opinions.85 
Undaunted, Murray persisted in trying to get the president to work through the UN. In 
early February 1954 and in line with his support for atomic weapons and distaste for 
large yield weapons, he proposed to Eisenhower that the U.S. consider a limited 
agreement. Murray suggested trying to reach a limited agreement to halt large scale 
testing—those that could not be kept secret—while continuing negotiations about smaller 
nuclear weapons. Again, Strauss drafted the letter for Eisenhower‘s signature and, 
misinterpreting Murray‘s suggestions by ignoring his phased-in approach, pushed Murray 
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aside by mentioning that the issue was one that would be discussed with the Secretary of 
State and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission.
86
 
His control over insiders went beyond his position at the top of the atomic energy 
empire and his efforts to control public opinion about testing. At the time of the 
Oppenheimer investigation, Eisenhower granted Strauss authority over the public 
comments made by all officials in his administration.
87
 In 1956 and 1957, an NSC 
directive reinforced Eisenhower‘s previous order and extended Strauss‘s authority, 
adjusting a requirement that Strauss ―check‖ all information to one requiring instead that 
Strauss first ―clear‖ all statements. This gave Strauss additional power to influence 
foreign and domestic policy.
88
 It extended Strauss‘s authority across all forms of public 
speech by other government officials, including articles, comments to journalists, 
speeches, and even the testimony they might deliver in open congressional hearings. At 
the same time, he and the Secretary of Defense became official partners, charged with 
working in ―close collaboration‖ with the Operations Coordinating Board.89  
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Strauss also sought legislative cover for the authority he enjoyed as Chairman of 
the AEC and members of its advisory-level committees and affiliates, who supplied the 
image of detached respectability upon which the AEC and its military partners had 
consolidated their authority and expected to maintain it. As part of a plan to ease the 
Act‘s security provisions to provide for private development of nuclear energy, Strauss 
recommended amending the Act to exempt ―members of advisory boards, … consultants, 
and employees who receive no Government compensation‖ from conflict of interest laws, 
an exemption the military already enjoyed. In Strauss‘s explanation of the amendment, he 
noted that it would make it easier to attract ―technical and management personnel of the 
highest caliber,‖ a comment that referred to a goal to privatize nuclear energy. It also 
suggests that Strauss anticipated continued expansion of the program and its influence, 
creating ever wider avenues of networked affiliates financially dependent on the 
AEC/military partnership.
90
 Before the proposal made it to the hill, Strauss reacted to 
opposition from Commissioners who objected to his authoritarian methods and added a 
provision to prevent the AEC from holding a meeting without the Chairman. Another 
provision elevated the AEC Chairman to a cabinet level appointment, on a par with the 
Secretaries of Defense and State. This would eliminate the Act‘s five-year term limit for 
the Chairman and allow him to serve at the pleasure of the president.
91
 In the end, 
Congress was more adept at W. H. Riker‘s heresthetic, ―gaining political advantage by 
                                                                                                                                                 
National Security Affairs: Records, 1952-1961, NSC Series, Subject subseries, Box No. 6, A67-50 & A 67-
64. DDE Library.  
 
90
 ―Statement on Proposed Changes in the Atomic Energy Act,‖ 3, attached to letter from Lewis L. Strauss 
to The President, November 18, 1953, Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers as President of the United States, 
1953-61, Ann Whitman File, Administration Series, Box No. 4, A75-22, Folder Atomic Energy 
Commission 1953-54 (2). DDE Library. 
 
91
 See ―G.O.P. Aims to Ease Fight on Atom Rule,‖ New York Times, May 21, 1954, 1. 
 
661 
 
structuring the world so you can win,‖ than Strauss and Eisenhower.92 Congress delivered 
Strauss a Pyrrhic victory. 
Congress did amend the Act‘s security provisions to allow for private industrial 
interest in nuclear power and also for some defense-related exchanges of military 
information; but instead of expanding the president‘s (and Strauss‘s) authority over 
atomic policy, it reduced it while strengthening the JCAE‘s ability to monitor AEC 
activities and to review projects, initiatives, and its budget. In 1957, the JCAE struck 
again: taking more control over AEC spending by changing its appropriation procedures 
and securing ―project-by-project authorization.‖93 While there were political reasons 
behind this forced shift in power, the most important was Strauss‘s inability, despite his 
influential connections, to broker a truce after he lied to Congress in 1954 following the 
Bravo fallout incident.  
Militarization enabled Strauss to withstand congressional ire for the duration of 
his Chairmanship. The AEC‘s partnership with the military and Strauss‘s 
uncompromising support for military weapons testing ensured support from the military‘s 
backers in Congress. Additionally, program affiliates dependent on the AEC and on 
military projects readily supplied scientific authority to contradict the findings and 
assertions from outside scientists that cast suspicion on Strauss‘s assertions. Strauss could 
thank Dean for these benefits. Dean solidified the AEC/military partnership and 
shepherded program expansion, increasing numbers of scientists from public and private 
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universities throughout the nation he and other officials encompassed under a generous 
AEC/military funding umbrella. When Strauss could no longer stand on his own 
authority, he mobilized that army of experts that Dean assembled to re-educate the 
American public so that they would be no more fearful of fallout than they were of 
driving. Strauss exploited his administrative authority to interfere with arms control 
negotiations even as he counted on the loyalty of AEC officials to keep the program 
operating in the military‘s benefit. When necessary, he called on influential leaders 
among the program‘s affiliates and stakeholders such as E. O. Lawrence and Edward 
Teller to lend authority to his assertions, to bolster political support for his Chairmanship 
and to argue for continued atmospheric testing.
 94
 
The fallout controversy was the most serious challenge to Strauss‘s authority and 
to the AEC/DOD partnership that occurred during his Chairmanship. The illusion that the 
AEC and its military partners had created that nuclear weapons detonations could be 
managed began to melt away in 1954 along with their monopoly over information about 
the effects of radioactive exposure. In early March, Strauss admitted that fallout from the 
H-bomb ―Bravo‖ had unexpectedly descended onto an atoll and exposed twenty-eight 
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Americans and 326 ―natives‖ to where the AEC believed would be out of harm‘s way.95 
The revelation cast doubt on the confident assertions that AEC had circulated since 
testing began in Nevada. ―Bravo‖ was three times larger than expected, and that 
underestimation of its yield was compounded by a failure to predict accurately the wind 
currents in the area of the test.
96
 When the Lucky Dragon crew sickened by fallout from 
―Bravo‖ returned home on March 14 and Japanese doctors familiar with radiation 
sickness identified the cause of their illness, Strauss denied that the men suffered from 
acute radiation syndrome.
97
 But Strauss‘s words carried no weight: public opinion shifted 
so decisively after the ―Bravo‖ incident that it caused what one historian called a ―fatal 
collapse‖ of the AEC‘s propaganda machine.98 Strauss continued to deny that the men 
had been harmed by radioactive fallout while the CIA, perhaps at Strauss‘s request, 
investigated a claim that the fishermen had been in the area on a spying mission.
99
 In late 
March he refused to provide Japanese officials with testing schedules they requested to 
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prevent future incidents and to guard against harvesting radioactivized fish. 
100
 And, as 
late as December, several months after Aikichi Kuboyama died and the U.S. Ambassador 
paid an indemnity to his widow, Strauss and the DOD continued to deny that radiation 
had caused the man‘s death.101 Strauss circulated deceptive information among AEC 
Commissioners, who had every reason to know better, that ―we have, of course, long 
understood … it was hepatitis from antiquated medical techniques‖ that was responsible 
for his death.
102
 Weeks later, U.S. and Japanese officials agreed to settle the injury and 
property claims for two million dollars.
103
  
By that time, Strauss had already been responsible for giving people outside the 
program reasons to believe that H-bomb experimentation had gone too far. On the same 
day that the New York Times reported that Strauss refused to provide the Japanese with 
testing schedules, American newspapers reported that the Soviets described their 
hydrogen bomb as a tactical weapon  ―eight or ten times‖ the power of an atom bomb.104 
Strauss‘s response came on March 31, and the New York Times reported it in its April 
Fool‘s Day edition. Instead of explaining the significance of the Soviet bomb by 
comparing the potential yields of American and Soviet H-bombs, Strauss emphasized the 
Soviet bomb‘s potential for destruction with a word-picture of its capacity to destroy 
New York City. He then sought to limit its significance by pointing out that an American 
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H-bomb was much more destructive: it could level cities with a destructive capacity ―600 
to 700 times that of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.‖105  
On the surface, Strauss‘s response, coming as it did in the middle of his personal 
campaign to downplay the effects of H-bomb testing, appears to have been a boastful and 
careless misstep. But from the perspective of militarization and the deployment of 
strategies of control to generate a combination of fear and confidence in military 
solutions, Strauss‘s comments emerge as one piece of a deliberate ploy to generate even 
more support for American H-bombs and military superiority. The other piece of the 
equation can be found in an NSC decision made in the wake of the our-bomb-can-
destroy-more-cities-than-your-bomb dialogue to supply film footage of the Mike 
thermonuclear blast to television networks. Dean supplied the film, already edited to 
remove sensitive information,
106
 and may have expected that it would be released for 
public consumption.
107
 But it was held in reserve, perhaps until it could serve AEC/DOD 
goals. It is impossible to know why the film was released a year after it was ready for 
public viewing; but given the routine media manipulation practiced by the AEC and the 
DOD, it seems likely that the NSC decision to release a film of an American H-bomb 
explosion at the very time that Strauss, AEC officials, and officers, found themselves 
defending H-bomb development was not coincidental. The film removed any supposition 
about the power of an H-bomb and provided a moving image to accompany Strauss‘s 
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discussion of an H-bomb destroying New York City. The combination of Strauss‘s 
comments, the film, and Soviet claims, all helped Strauss hammer home his view that 
continued H-bomb development was essential for national survival by providing the vivid 
argument against arms control and generating even more support for AEC/DOD projects. 
The message certainly raised fears; but in some circles generated calls for diplomacy and 
for a halt to testing. Strauss‘s saber rattling and the advances in nuclear weapons that had 
brought about hundreds-fold increases in destructive capability formed the basis for an 
argument that civil defense was not enough. Readers of  the New York Times wrote to the 
newspaper demanding renewed diplomatic overtures. The CDA responded to the Soviet 
bomb and mounting anxiety by stepping up its operations, bringing home the possibility 
of nuclear Armageddon to people in communities throughout the United States.
108
 
Scientists outside the U.S., free of the AEC‘s fetters, pressed for a suspension of 
atmospheric weapons tests. On May 5, 1954, the same day that the AEC detonated 
―Yankee,‖ a 13.5 megaton thermonuclear bomb, in the Pacific, a group of scientists and 
engineers in Great Britain called for an end to testing.
109
 Sir Winston Churchill joined 
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them in November, commenting that he had learned that radiation exposure was 
cumulative and could pose serious problems for the earth for as long as 5,000 years.
110
  
Of all the complaints about weapons testing and fallout, however, one of the most 
worrisome for AEC officials and program affiliates was the threat to atmospheric testing 
by a proposal from the Federation of Atomic Scientists (FAS) for a United Nations study 
of radioactive contamination. The way that Strauss and the AEC met that challenge 
presents a snapshot of the importance of militarization for supplying the resources 
necessary to keep the fallout controversy from interfering with the AEC/military goals. In 
February 1955 the FAS circulated among its members a ―Proposal for a UN Commission 
to Study the Problem of H-Bomb Tests,‖ that it planned to submit to the UN‘s Political 
and Security Affairs and to the UN Ambassador. The FAS made the appeal public in 
early March.
111
 The scientists‘ call caused considerable concern among military officers 
and AEC officials, especially Commissioner Libby and Admiral Paul F. Foster, Special 
Assistant to the AEC‘s General Manager. The two were among the first to devise a plan 
to avoid the possibility that a committee put together by the UN would end up with a 
―packed jury‖ against the AEC and atmospheric testing. 112 Libby and Foster proposed to 
avoid the negative publicity that resisting the proposal would draw in a way that would 
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allow the AEC to work from the inside to situate cooperative scientists on the committee. 
Their plan would ―assure participation by competent and objective scientists.‖113 That 
proposal evolved over time into one that generated positive publicity for the AEC, 
satisfying even the FAS, and was all-but-guaranteed the sort of ―objectivity‖ that Libby 
and Foster expected.  
The final product appears to be a Strauss creation. In April, the National Academy 
of Sciences, which relied on AEC affiliated scientists for nuclear expertise, announced 
that it would be ―undertaking an appraisal of radiation effects.‖114 The study would be 
financed by the Rockefeller Foundation, which had supplied funding for other AEC 
projects and whose Director for Medical Sciences and Vice President was a member of 
the AEC‘s Advisory Committee for Biology and Medicine.115 The NAS‘s announcement, 
reported in the FAS April 18 newsletter, proclaimed that the AEC approved the study and 
stopped just short of praising Strauss for his support: ―Chairman Strauss has given 
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assurances that the AEC will extend its full cooperation.‖ The Christian Science Monitor 
also expressed its pleasure, pointing out  that this was the study that so many had longed 
for, ―a definitive study of the effects of radiation.‖116 A little more than a year later, 
Strauss used the study‘s findings to validate his previous claims about the safety of 
weapons testing. He penned a confident, positive, and reassuring letter to Eisenhower, 
writing that a ―distinguished committee of medical people and other scientists with whom 
we have been cooperating for about a year‖ had issued a report that radioactive fallout 
was small ―compared with background [naturally occurring cosmic, earth, and air] 
radiation, or as compared with the average exposure in the United States to medical X 
rays.‖ Emphasizing that the study vindicated him, Strauss added that the findings 
confirmed the public statements he had made the previous February.
117
 
The consolidation of program resources and the dedication of those resources to 
military weapons testing prevented the fallout controversy from gaining sufficient 
political traction to bring about an end to testing for as long as Strauss exercised authority 
as Eisenhower‘s chief advisor. But, unable to monopolize completely the flow of 
information about the hazards of fallout, the AEC/military partnership remained under 
attack from above by administration advocates for arms control and diplomacy and from 
below, where oppositional scientists within the U.S. continued to press for test 
suspension. And yet, the AEC and DOD officials effectively defended their ability to 
conduct atmospheric weapons tests and, in fact, escalated the pace of testing, by 
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mobilizing the program‘s affiliates and exploiting their scientific credibility in the 
interests of atmospheric weapons testing. 
Strauss overcame the suspicions that weakened the AECs credibility in the eyes of 
some members of the public and in Congress by capitalizing on the professional and 
political capital of scientists whose projects depended on AEC support but who also 
enjoyed independent status because of their own achievements or their affiliation with 
public or private universities. In addition to administering the program in ways that 
benefitted the laboratories, Strauss reciprocated by using his influence to intervene 
personally for the program‘s affiliates. When Time prepared a story that did not suit 
Edward Teller, for example, Strauss drew on his authority as AEC Chairman to have the 
article ―anesthetized.‖118 Strauss‘s most important ally on the Commission was Willard F. 
Libby, who was among the first persons that Strauss turned to when he noticed public 
commentary unfavorable to the AEC‘s stance.119 Libby was more affable than Strauss, 
but he was no more willing to change his mind than Strauss was and no less willing than 
him to use coercion when persuasion failed.  
This process brought into the public sphere one side of the debates that took place 
behind the scenes among AEC advisors before the era of continental testing. Those who 
took a conservative approach to permissible exposure levels were outnumbered by those 
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who used creative calculations to make higher doses appear safe. Where those early 
conversations had focused on approximations of risk on an individual scale, with 
scientists who pressed for higher exposure standards averaging the effects of exposure 
over the life span of an employee or soldier, the fallout controversy sparked a change in 
that reasoning. Increases in the numbers of exposed people brought about by increased 
levels of fallout made averaging on a global scale the reasonable next step—and one that 
was possible to do with some accuracy because of Projects Gabriel and Sunshine that 
produced data about worldwide isotope dispersal.  
As an AEC Commissioner, Libby used data derived from AEC sponsored studies 
in support of continued atmospheric testing. During a meeting of scientists, for example, 
he channeled the discussion away from the fallout hazards and focused the conversation 
instead on estimating future exposure levels should testing continue unabated. When 
William F. Neuman signaled his desire for the committee to consider how much exposure 
had already occurred and to then evaluate on the basis of exposure whether testing should 
be terminated, Libby eliminated Neuman‘s issue as a topic for consideration by the 
group. Knowing from prior correspondence that Neuman was not only interested in the 
issue but concerned that by one measure of dose, an international agreement to control 
testing was ―immediately necessary,‖ Libby quickly silenced Neuman. He dismissed his 
concerns by pointing out that he (Neuman) was not a ―specialist in bone cancer,‖ and 
declaring that the committee was more competent to discuss other problems. Libby then 
directed the committee to discuss what he called the ―most important‖ thing: the ―matter 
of trying to estimate as best we can what the eventual human body burden will be for 
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continuation of testing at the past rate.‖120 From Libby‘s perspective, it was relatively 
simple step to produce global averages and use them to downplay short and long term 
hazards.  
This was not an entirely successful strategy, particularly when compounded in the 
public sphere by a history of Strauss‘s exaggerations. Libby‘s arguments based on 
universal mixing of radioactivity and global averaging could backfire. On one occasion, 
Libby claimed that the increase in deaths caused by radioactive fallout was ―so small that 
it cannot be detected,‖ and that ―testing could be increased 15,000 times without hazard.‖ 
The comment fueled the arguments of grassroots anti-testing organizations such as SANE 
that AEC officials exhibited a ―blithe disregard for human welfare.‖121 Because claims 
supportive of testing that emerged from AEC officials or other outspoken proponents 
such as Edward Teller became more suspect as time went on, scientists not so readily 
connected with the program became more important to the AEC as the fallout debate 
matured. This resulted in a bifurcated approach to dealing with the controversy. 
One strategy was for AEC scientists to quell the immediate concerns of 
Americans by equating man-made radiation with naturally occurring radiation, a 
comparison that drew attention away from isolated pockets of contamination—such as 
that which was left on California produce in mid-November 1958 from testing conducted 
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in Nevada the month before
122—and made the risks from fallout seem innocuous 
compared to the risks of driving, or living in Denver. Scientists backed by the authority 
of private and public universities and laboratories rationalized the hazards from fallout 
with the same national defense arguments and anti-communistic rhetoric as the AEC, 
while complementing those arguments with assertions that risks from fallout were 
negligible when balanced against common risks to health.
123
 One ambitious report from 
Harlan B. Jones with the University of California Radiation Laboratory at Berkeley 
reported that although fallout had a ―deleterious effect upon man‘s health‖ it was small 
compared to the ―life-span loss per person,‖ figured in days, caused by smoking, being 25 
percent overweight, having 25 percent elevation in lipoproteins, driving an automobile, or 
working in industry.
124
 Another approach—the one preferred by Libby—carried the 
problems well away from the everyday concerns of most Americans. In private 
discussions and public pronouncements, he buried the connection of testing to fallout in 
statistical debates about genetics, global population figures, and environmental capacity 
for dilution of Strontium 90 and other radioactive isotopes. Both avenues provided AEC 
experts and spokespersons an opportunity to calculate away in the abstract what they 
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knew was impossible to do in the real world: to test nuclear weapons without producing 
hazardous levels of fallout. The AEC attempted to negate the public response to the 
growing evidence of radiobiologic hazards with appeals to national security or, as Libby 
did with Schweitzer, by discrediting the opinions of outside researchers as founded on 
incomplete information.  
Predictably, however, as the controversy heated up and more independent 
opinions entered the public sphere, AEC advisors made a strategic adjustment and 
recommended that health issues be avoided altogether. Their fear was that, as with 
adverse reports of genetic damage, they might say something ―that the newspapers could 
pick up as a matter of disagreement between the AEC and a scientific paper.‖125 So, to 
the policy of reminding the public that testing was essential to preserve national security, 
the AEC tried to negate adverse publicity about radioactive contamination by 
demonstrating that it was a temporary condition, leaving the impression that even highly 
contaminated areas became livable in time. This was one of the reasons that the Advisory 
Committee of Biology and Medicine decided in 1956 to allow islanders from Rongelap to 
return to their island despite dangerous levels of radioactivity there. They reasoned away 
the ethical and moral compromises of their decision, finding it relatively insignificant 
because ―of the already relatively high exposure to which these natives had already been 
subjected.‖ The Committee added a caveat to the recommendation that provides another 
illustration of their dedication to the AEC as an institution and their willingness to 
abandon their professional responsibilities in favor of providing advice on how to avoid 
future threats to the program‘s vitality. In deciding to allow the AEC to return the 
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Rongelese to their home, the Committee warned the AEC that should they then begin to 
suffer adverse health effects, re-evacuation would not be in the AEC‘s best interests. Any 
re-evacuation, they advised, would affect ―world opinion‖ and jeopardize the 
―continuation of weapons testing.‖126 While AEC officials calculated ways to protect the 
program, neither the fallout controversy nor Eisenhower‘s personal aversion to the 
continued detonation of H-bombs caused him to direct Strauss to stop producing or 
testing them.  
President Eisenhower‘s subdued response to the domestic and international 
clamor against continued H-bomb testing illustrates the effectiveness of strategies of 
control that Strauss used to deflect Eisenhower‘s attention away from the dangers of 
weapons testing. While Strauss persistently downplayed the fallout controversy as 
overblown, he exploited the offers of advice about approaches to arms control that 
Eisenhower received as the controversy heated up as opportunities to reinforce his no-
arms-control agenda.
127
 After Eisenhower discussed with Strauss the possibility of 
limiting H-bomb testing on April 5, 1954, for example, Strauss responded to those 
comments with a letter that both trivialized the complaints and exaggerated the 
importance of continued H-bomb tests. Strauss turned the H-bomb size issue into a public 
relations matter and, ensuring that the president would be receptive to his conclusions, 
used language from a speech that Eisenhower gave about massive retaliation to press his 
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own argument for the national security imperatives of continued H-bomb testing. Strauss 
first informed Eisenhower that he had discussed the president‘s concerns with Admiral 
Radford (the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) and they had agreed to issue a 
statement that ―under the circumstances‖ the U.S. did not envision testing ―larger and yet 
ever larger weapons.‖128 In the letter‘s second paragraph, Strauss implicitly connected 
weapons testing with national survival and subtly characterized as ―suicidal‖ 
Eisenhower‘s interest in limiting weapons tests while crediting him with having had the 
foresight to understand, and publicly announce, that position in the first place: 
The unacceptable alternatives of an agreement for atomic disarmament 
which is unenforceable on the one hand and, on the other, of a unilaterial 
determination to limit our armament, which could be suicidal, are of course 
the reason why, as you have said in your December 8
th
 address, that the 
―defense capabilities of the United States‖ must be such that they ―could 
inflict terrible losses upon an aggressor. … So great that such an 
aggressor‘s land would be laid waste.129 
 
Disarmament Intercepted 
 
On New Year‘s Eve 1953, Eisenhower drew on the Psychology Board‘s 
evaluation of world opinion the previous June to consider the objections of Strauss, the 
JCS, and their affiliates and supporters to arms control.
130
 Eisenhower wrote to his 
assistant, C. D. Jackson, that the verifiability argument was ―academic‖ and the notion 
that there could be ―no complete disarmament without inspection‖ was a product of the 
―hysterical fear‖ aroused by the Soviet bomb, a fear that Eisenhower concluded could be 
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overcome only with ―intellectual analysis … rather than the screaming support of 
positions already taken.‖131 The accuracy of the Psychology Board‘s report was validated 
in 1956 when the United Kingdom and France expressed their discomfort with their tense 
geographical position between two atom-rattling giants. During UN disarmament 
negotiations, the two nations refused to join in the U.S. proposal, submitting instead a 
joint ―working paper‖ of their own that synthesized the American and Soviet 
proposals.
132
 The public separation of America‘s two most important NATO allies 
strengthened Soviet resolve and prestige. The conditions for this circumstance were ones 
that Eisenhower himself, despite his desire for a diplomatic solution to the arms race, put 
in play initially by granting Strauss an outsized portion of authority within his 
administration.  
In May 1954 Eisenhower tried to resolve the fallout controversy and thereby 
improve U.S. standing with its allies by appointing both Strauss and Charles E. Wilson, 
Secretary of Defense—the most ardent proponents of atmospheric weapons testing and 
supporters of the verifiability argument against arms control, an argument that 
Eisenhower had decided was a ―hysterical‖ position—to study the implications of 
curtailing H-bomb testing. He reconstituted the special committee of the NSC composed 
of the Secretaries of Defense, State, and the Chairman of the AEC, to ―consider the 
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question of possible suspension of thermonuclear weapons test operations.‖133 Because of 
the militarization of the atomic program, this group was even less likely to consider 
diplomatic alternatives to the status quo than the Special Committee had under Truman 
when Secretary of State Acheson aligned with Defense against AEC Chairman Lilienthal 
and discarded alternatives to the H-bomb to mend political fences between the Truman 
administration and congressional Republicans. In August 1954 Eisenhower‘s Special 
Committee--Strauss, Dulles, and Wilson—discussed an ―urgent‖ review of policies. They 
decided that advocating disarmament had been ―detrimental to the security of the United 
States.‖134  Among their arguments was one that derided proponents of disarmament by 
praising the wisdom of those who opposed it: ―more sophisticated among the public 
consider advocacy of disarmament hypocritical … or unrealistic.‖135 In February, during 
a discussion of the review conducted in advance of a NSC meeting, Strauss used his 
objections to State and Defense presentations to expand his authority and that of the 
committee beyond the H-bomb testing and fallout issue to include disarmament. He 
argued that the need to prepare quickly for NSC meetings compromised studies and 
limited the value of the information brought before the NSC.
136
 Both Robert Bowie, the 
Deputy Director of the CIA, and Robert Anderson, Secretary of the Treasury, objected to 
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Strauss‘s proposition and suggested instead that the president appoint an outside person 
with ―outstanding qualifications‖ to review disarmament policy. The result was a 
compromise that kept Strauss and the Secretaries of State and Defense in charge through 
a recommendation to the president that he appoint an outside individual to conduct the 
review, designate the three and a representative from the CIA as assistants, permitting 
that individual to select a panel of consultants. Publicly, the review would be unfettered; 
secretly, Eisenhower was to direct the reviewer that the result should place no limits on 
production of nuclear material and should take no positions that could ―limit later 
options.‖137  
After their appointment, the three men worked together as an internal counterfoil 
to the diplomatic options that Bernard Baruch and Harold E. Stassen were formulating at 
Eisenhower‘s behest outside the administration. Stassen, former Governor of Minnesota 
had served on the NSC and became Eisenhower‘s Special Assistant for Disarmament 
Policy, and Baruch was a long-time personal friend and unofficial advisor.
138
 Neither 
Strauss nor then Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson was amenable to restrictions on 
production or experimentation of nuclear weapons. Their alliance was well known. In 
1954, the JCS opposed a Department of State ―working group‖ proposal for disarmament 
because it was based on an ―invalid‖ conclusion that disarmament was ―feasible‖ and ―in 
the national interest.‖ In a breakdown of DOD disagreements with State‘s proposals, the 
JCS agreed with only one other submitting agency, the AEC. Strauss considered 
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verification of the Soviet atomic stockpile an ―impossibility.‖139 On June 27 and 28, 
1955, the JCS and the Secretary of Defense objected to a proposal for disarmament.
140
 In 
response, Stassen, Eisenhower‘s special envoy for disarmament, gathered the JCS 
together to inform them that their refusal to agree to any discussion of disarmament 
absent a solution to the ―world‘s political problems‖ was entirely unrealistic.141 But it was 
not just the JCS that was working against Stassen. Eisenhower‘s appointment of Stassen 
contributed to the emergence of a DOD/AEC/State coalition against disarmament.  
Dulles, who tended to defer to Strauss on nuclear issues, was keen to protect his 
status as Secretary of State against Stassen.
142
 Dulles especially objected to Stassen‘s 
informal title as ―Secretary for Peace‖ and resented the possibility that he would be 
overshadowed by Stassen‘s diplomatic efforts. Stassen‘s outsider status strengthened the 
alliance between Dulles and Strauss, who took Dulles‘s side over the issue and criticized 
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Stassen as someone ―seeking to serve personal ambitions and build himself up.‖143 In a 
May 20, 1955, memorandum summarizing a meeting with Stassen, Dulles rejected 
Stassen‘s explanation that the media was primarily responsible for the use of the term, 
reiterating that ―however that may be, I did not care for it.‖ He also recorded that he told 
Stassen that he should work independently until the U.S. had taken a position on 
disarmament, at which time the State Department would take control of the negotiations 
and Stassen would be expected to ―take policy guidance‖ from State.144  
Dulles‘s antipathy caused Eisenhower to engage in some double-dealing of his 
own, with the result that Dulles became even more disenchanted with Stassen‘s value and 
with disarmament. On June 23, 1955, and in advance of the mid-July 1955 Geneva 
Summit between the U.S., U.S.S.R, Great Britain, and France, Stassen gave a policy 
report on disarmament to the NSC that was vehemently opposed the following day by the 
JCS (in a document that was ―instructed to be burned‖ and has since disappeared).145 Five 
days after Stassen‘s presentation, the JCS registered its ―unanimous‖ position that 
―dealing with arms regulation‖ before ―settlement of major political issues‖ was not only 
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―unrealistic‖ but ―contrary to national security.‖146 Dulles subsequently told Eisenhower 
that he did not want Stassen at the Geneva conference for fear that it would indicate that 
the U.S. was interested in disarmament. Stassen recalled that Eisenhower told him of 
Dulles‘s position not long before the Geneva Summit and for that reason did not want 
him part of the official delegation. He told Stassen, however, to go to SHAPE (Supreme 
Headquarters Allied Powers Europe) in Paris to stand by with General Gruenther and 
Admiral Radford so that they would all be nearby if Eisenhower wanted them to be at the 
conference. When in Eisenhower‘s opinion the Soviets were receptive and opening up the 
issue of disarmament, Stassen, Gruenther, and Radford left Paris for Geneva.  
Then, in the presence of all of them, of Dulles and everybody else, this 
whole delegation, he [Eisenhower] told me what he learned since he 
arrived and he asked me to prepare a speech on the subject for the next 
day.
147
  
 
Dulles was surprised by Stassen‘s arrival and might reasonably be assumed to have been 
frustrated during the course of writing the speech with Eisenhower who, according to 
Stassen‘s recollections, tended to side during the process with Stassen. 
After Geneva, Dulles actively worked to undermine Stassen, a task that Stassen 
made easier by conscientiously reporting on his activities to Dulles. Dulles thus had 
opportunities to develop oppositional strategies and, in consultation and coordination 
with Strauss, to lobby other members of the NSC, the JCS, and on occasion even the 
president, with arguments that attacked Stassen‘s positions before Stassen officially 
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presented them.
148
 By nurturing Dulles‘s insecurities and working with him against 
Stassen, Strauss brought the AEC, the DOD, and State, together in a coalition that 
blocked disarmament possibilities and that thus protected the autonomy that Strauss and 
his military partners exercised over atmospheric weapons tests. Because of that coalition, 
Strauss‘s goals could be advanced in areas where he ordinarily would have been without 
influence. 
Dulles‘s alignment with Strauss and the DOD against Stassen also gave him 
reasons to interfere with the work of the disarmament group of the president‘s Science 
Advisory Committee. Because of his opposition to disarmament, he prevented the two 
State Department representatives on the committee from advancing their own opinions 
about arms control. According to Hans A. Bethe, the eminent scientist who chaired the 
group, State Department representatives on the committee personally supported a 
temporary suspension of H-bomb testing as a show of good faith to the Soviets that they 
expected would lead to some breakthrough in arms control negotiations. It was a position 
that the DOD staunchly opposed, arguing that any suspension of weapons testing in the 
absence of a parallel agreement by the Soviets and mechanisms for verification would 
endanger national security. Bethe believed that a system of verification was not only 
possible in the long term, but knew that one had been demonstrated to work and could be 
employed immediately should the U.S. and U.S.S.R. agree to suspend testing. He thought 
that the information about the proposed system of verification would bring the parties 
closer together and allow the committee to make headway. As it failed, however, Bethe 
realized that despite the support for the system expressed by the two State Department 
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representatives, they were unable to commit because of Dulles‘s opposition. Dulles 
provided the DOD with an ally they would not otherwise have had because the AEC did 
not have a representative on the Committee. Dulles thus contributed to complicating the 
committee‘s work at a time when the verifiability issue had been solved and there was 
general agreement among scientists that violations of any test ban would be detected.
149
  
Once the dangers of fallout gained more traction in the U.S., the reality of arms 
escalation caused a shift in the terms of the debate over disarmament. Public opinion 
about test suspension and arms control changed dramatically between 1956, when Adlai 
Stevenson campaigned on a platform that called for an end to H-bomb tests because of 
radioactive fallout, and 1957, after thousands of scientists joined the outspoken Nobel 
Prize winning scientists Albert Schweitzer and Linus Pauling in their calls for an end to 
testing. A poll conducted during the Stevenson campaign found only 24 percent of the 
respondents in favor of stopping testing, with another 30 percent opposed to a ban and 
one-fifth, 20 percent, who had no opinion one way or another. By May 1957, a Gallup 
poll found that 63 percent of those asked supported a suspension of H-bomb tests.
150
 As 
an indication of the prominence of the issue, the New York Times decided to cover the 
poll‘s results in a multi-day series of articles and, despite noting that people on the street 
did not have enough information to determine the military necessity for weapons testing, 
encouraged people to discuss and act on what they learned about the hazards of fallout: 
―In the final analysis…the decision on whether or not to continue the testing of H-bombs 
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will have to come from the people of the United States and the world.‖151 As more and 
more scientists added their names to the lists of those opposed to testing and as their 
arguments increasingly resonated in the public sphere, Strauss and other AEC officials 
lost ground. The scientist upon whom Strauss relied most, Willard Libby, began to step 
out of the limelight and distance himself from the controversy. Testifying before a 
congressional subcommittee in 1957, Libby reiterated his standard argument that fallout 
posed very little risk compared to the ―risk of annihilation‖ before remarks that suggested 
he was becoming increasingly uncomfortable with the findings about dispersal of 
radiocarbon from weapons testing provoked by Pauling and other scientists that cast 
doubt on his own arguments about the environmental dilution of radiocarbon 14. At the 
end of his testimony, Libby tried to discount the mountain of scientific opinion that 
contradicted his own statements about fallout by claiming that scientific information (and 
thus also Schweitzer, Pauley, and other scientists) was irrelevant: ―the questions under 
debate are really largely political and sociological.‖152  
In 1957, as Strauss and the AEC lost ground in the fallout debate and 
congressional hearings raised accusations of negligence and deception on behalf of the 
AEC and questions about the military‘s continued growth, Strauss and his military 
partners relied even more on influential AEC affiliates for support. Edward Teller tried to 
quell the growing fears, but ended up causing some confusion among insiders and 
congressmen with his promises of a ―clean‖ bomb that he claimed was already in the 
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works.
153
 Teller‘s unfounded comments regarding a fallout-free bomb took Ernest 
Lawrence, his boss, by surprise. Drawing attention away from Teller‘s remarks, 
Lawrence de-emphasized the ―clean‖ bomb concept, focusing during the hearings and in 
a meeting with Eisenhower on the importance of nuclear progress to national security. 
The presence of Lawrence and Teller appeared at first to have reversed the momentum 
building for test suspension. Strauss wrote to Lawrence that his responses to reporters had 
been critical to attracting advocates for continued testing.
154
 The congratulatory mail he 
received from the AEC upon his return to California demonstrated the incestuous 
relationship among members of the commission, military officers, and (at least one) 
influential industrialist. Strauss‘s special assistant, J.H. Morse, Jr. (Captain, USN) 
gushed:  
Everything has gone beautifully. Most important for all is the President‘s 
mental approach, vitally altered by the fact that for the first time he sees 
real reason for continued tests … he is not likely to accede to deceptive 
Russian offers to stop. … Furthermore, Congress will not accede if the 
President does.
155
 
 
Morse‘s postscript illustrates that he was not shy about using deception as a strategy of 
control to achieve his goals:  
I explain wherever possible that weapons can be made so clean that 
radioactive fallout is no longer an important factor in determining their 
application. Militarily speaking, they are then ―completely‖ clean.156 
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(Admiral) Paul A. Foster, Assistant General Manager for AEC International Activities, 
drew allusions to 1920s pacifists and ―women‘s group clubs‖ who had been swayed by 
British and Japanese propaganda before praising Lawrence. As AEC officials had done 
since the beginnings of the fallout controversy, Foster ignored the possibility that 
weapons could be developed without atmospheric testing, elevating the importance of 
atmospheric tests above every other means for nuclear superiority or diplomacy. He 
praised Lawrence for his patriotism, equating the atmospheric tests Lawrence advocated 
as the key to national survival: 
I devoutly wish that our national leaders preached less about the horrors of 
war and more about the horrors of defeat at the hands of a cunning and 
Godless Communism.
157
 
 
While Foster was working from the center of the program out to firm the AEC-industry 
alliance and praising Lawrence for the role he played in the campaign against 
disarmament, Strauss was focusing up, on the executive tier, to prevent Eisenhower from 
considering the opinions of scientists outside the AEC umbrella.  
Militarization and Diplomacy 
Atomic Governance prevented both Truman and Eisenhower from understanding 
the consequences of the weapons testing that Dean and Strauss and other AEC officials 
and affiliates advocated, compromising the diplomatic process and contributing to the 
escalation of the arms race. Militarization allowed Dean, Strauss, and military officers to 
generate the energy necessary to outmaneuver well-meaning individuals in the Truman 
and Eisenhower cabinets (and perhaps also their peers in the Soviet Union,) and those in 
the UN General Assembly who put their energies to slowing the arms race by negotiating 
limits to adventurous weapons development and atmospheric weapons testing until 1958.  
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Eisenhower‘s official ―conventionalization‖ of nuclear weapons had a paradoxical 
effect upon arms negotiations. On the one hand, the transfer of nuclear weapons into the 
regular arsenal routinized them and devalued persistent qualms about the use of atomic or 
nuclear weapons. This gave U.S. negotiators reasons to insist on the maintenance of 
logistical and numerical superiority.
158
 On the other hand, the devaluation of the 
significance of nuclear weapons carried over into the thermonuclear realm, and the 
resulting tendency to experiment with them by the U.S. and the U.S.S.R; and, comments 
such as Strauss‘s that the American hydrogen bomb could destroy a city with 600 to 700 
times the energy of the bombs used on Hiroshima and Nagasaki escalated the importance 
of a diplomatic solution to the arms race.
159
 After the Soviets‘ thermonuclear detonation 
in 1954, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. moved closer to the parity that would make an 
agreement possible. Just as Kennan had expected that the Soviets would be more willing 
to negotiate an arms control agreement once they had developed their own atom bomb, so 
too did Stassen see the Soviet‘s development of an H-bomb as offering a window of 
opportunity. In a 1955 televised address, Stassen sought to bring some clarity to the 
rhetoric from Strauss and Molotov that had filled the headlines by reminding those who 
tuned in to CBS on November 26 that although it would appear from the papers that the 
two nations were at an irreconcilable impasse, the leaders of both governments, with 
access to top level intelligence, and the people of both countries, armed only with 
common sense, had developed not only a better awareness of the dangers posed by 
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nuclear war but also an understanding of the benefits to be derived from peaceful 
development of nuclear energy.  
The peoples and leaders under various forms of government and on both 
sides of the division between East and West are coming to see clearly that 
the peaceful use of atomic energy has very great potential for an advance 
in the well-being of the peoples of every nation, and that, in cruel contrast, 
a new world war would bring destruction beyond previous experience and 
make it certain that every nation would lose as a result of such a war. The 
H-bomb test by the Soviet Union should finally convince their leaders 
beyond all doubt that what the United States leaders have told them is 
true.
160
 
 
Because of the AEC/military partnership Dean forged, the AEC and DOD 
combined the weight of their influence as principal members of the National Security 
Council to reject platforms for negotiation formulated by the State Department staffers or 
by others in Eisenhower‘s circle of advisors. In a 1954 review of U.S. disarmament 
policies, for example, the NSC rejected even the possibility of diplomacy: ―for the 
foreseeable future the achievement of international armament regulation will not be in the 
best interest of the security of the United States and the Free World.‖161 As Eisenhower‘s 
advisor, Strauss exploited the president‘s friendship and trust; and, while careful to make 
distinctions between weapons testing as a military imperative and disarmament, or testing 
cessation as a political issue, he nevertheless rejected limits on atmospheric weapons tests 
by characterizing experimentation as an imperative in the absence of a diplomatic accord 
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with the Soviet Union.
162
 Testing served not only a military, but also a political purpose, 
and it was because of militarization that Strauss objected to diplomatic initiatives, and 
through Atomic Governance that he was able to mobilize the resources necessary to 
protect the autonomy the AEC and DOD exercised over the program and experimentation 
until April 1958. 
By 1958 the fallout issue added potency to the arguments of those who favored 
disarmament, and competing articles in popular journals by prominent scientists coupled 
the two issues, bringing them to the forefront together. Teller objected to disarmament in 
a Foreign Affairs article, arguing that any possible system of verification would be 
inadequate. Conversely, Isidor Rabi asserted that inspection and verifiability were 
scientifically possible. The sharp distinction between these two positions also divided 
Eisenhower‘s advisors in the NSC. Strauss favored Teller‘s position, but Stassen believed 
Rabi was correct. The division prompted Eisenhower to reconsider his original position 
and the NSC to order the first study on ―losses consequent‖ to a ―total suspension of 
nuclear tests‖ since the beginning of the atomic age.163 But it was not only the scientists 
and diplomats who were divided. Fissures emerged that separated the DOD from the 
AEC. When Dulles met with his committee on disarmament to discuss the upcoming 
agreement to cease testing, General Alfred M. Gruenther told him that the AEC had 
opposed the agreement because they were ―just beginning to tap possible new 
developments for testing in higher latitudes.‖ Then Gruenther dismissed the AEC‘s 
                                                 
162
 For a typical expression of this assertion, see Strauss to Eisenhower, July 23, 1957, Folder: Atomic 
Energy Commission 1957 (4), Administration File, Administration Series, Box No. 5, A75-22, Dwight D. 
Eisenhower Papers as President of the United States, 1953-1961 (Ann Whitman File), DDE Library.  
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 ―Memorandum of Discussion at the 350th Meeting of the National Security Council‖ January 6, 1958, 
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opposition, saying that he believed there was not much ―glitter‖ on the AEC promise.164 
For Eisenhower, Gruenther trumped Strauss and Dulles. In the words of William B. 
Ewald, who as one of Eisenhower‘s speechwriters worked closely with the president, 
there was no one Eisenhower admired more. Gruenther was an  
intellectual kind of companion, a real relaxing sort and yet a man whose 
brilliance and grasp of what was happening in the world Eisenhower really 
respected. He didn‘t have a higher opinion of anybody than he had of Al 
Gruenther.
165
 
 
The breakdown of the AEC/military coalition, divisions among scientific 
advisors, and mounting international pressure to address in some meaningful way the 
problems posed by fallout from nuclear weapons exerted just enough leverage to push 
Eisenhower closer to agreement. On April 4, 1958, Khrushchev publicly announced that 
the Soviet Union would unilaterally cease nuclear and atomic weapons tests while 
waiting for agreement on the UN Resolution. Four days later, on April 8, 1958, 
Eisenhower agreed that the U.S. would cooperate in an unofficial moratorium.
166
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CHAPTER ELEVEN 
 
CONCLUSION 
This analysis of the nation‘s atomic program argues that the institutional and domestic 
political ambitions of military officers and their supporters exerted more influence on the 
evolution of the peacetime atomic program during the atmospheric era than did foreign 
policy or national security imperatives. It has also illustrated the significance of the 
organizational expertise, institutional connections, and strategies of control, of the 
wartime Manhattan Project that gave military officers the tools they needed to assert their 
authority and autonomy over the program and nuclear weapons at the end of World War 
II. Military planners and program managers consolidated and extended their authority 
through appeals to national security and military urgency, by devaluing oppositional 
scientists and misapplying scientific opinion, and employing secrecy and deception to 
obscure their extra-constitutional acts. Officers and their supporters combined their 
authority and organizational capacity with political influence to manipulate foreign and 
domestic policymaking. This culminated in Atomic Governance: the shift in 
constitutional prerogatives that limited the ability of the American people to participate 
politically and denied presidents and congressional leaders alike the opportunity to gauge 
the effectiveness and consequences of weapons production and experimentation. While 
postwar ideological and political disputes between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. may have 
been inevitable, the escalation of the nuclear arms race into one that was so 
phenomenally destructive of human life and the environment was not.  
The institutional focus of this investigation has revealed the national security 
rationalizations of the atmospheric testing era for the exaggerations and deceptions that 
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they were. In the process, it has invalidated the ex post facto assertions that have been 
used in the years since by the DOD, Justice Department officials, and veterans of the 
AEC program to excuse the self-interested use of the program and the opportunistic 
exploitation of anti-communism and international events by military officers and AEC 
officials that interfered with the decision-making and policy-making authority of elected 
officials.
1
 It has also demonstrated that it was not ignorance of radioactive health effects, 
but knowledge of the relationship between exposure levels and short- and long-term 
disease that AEC officials and military officers used to make claims about the safety of 
detonations that they believed would not cause acute injury but that had reason to expect 
would lead to illness long after the political benefits they derived from those tests faded 
into history. The deceptions they generated created a culture of institutional 
defensiveness and protectionism that exists to this day.  
Because that culture ignores or pays scant attention to the consequences of 
continental weapons tests and high production to meet military demands, it has 
strengthened the triumphant Cold War Narrative by adding a ―happy ending.‖ It is 
reflected in continued celebration of nuclear weapons superiority and ongoing promotion 
of the national security contribution of continental weapons testing that ignores or 
subordinates the consequences of weapons tests and obscures the self-interestedness of 
the program to celebrate the Nevada Test Site at the Atomic Testing Museum in Las 
Vegas and in publications such as the Battlefield of the Cold War.
2
  
                                                 
1
 See Robert [W.] Seidel‘s formulation in his essay review of critical histories of the program, ―In the Cold 
War risk-benefit analysis, the demonstrable dangers of losing the nuclear arms race far outweighed the 
uncertain angers of radioactivity from fallout.‖ ―Books on the Bomb,‖ Isis 81(1990):533.  
 
2
 For a discussion of the one-sided Cold War narrative of the Museum and the relationship between 
museums and polarizing controversy, see Matt Wray, ―A Blast from the Past: Preserving and Interpreting 
the Atomic Age,‖ American Quarterly 58 (2006): 467-483.  
694 
 
At the end of World War II, military officers and their supporters used wartime 
strategies of control and nuclear weapons tests to persuade the public and politicians that 
permanent mobilization was the only alternative to nuclear Armageddon. The rhetoric, 
weapons demonstrations, and descriptions of nuclear warfare that they used to gain 
domestic political influence and policymaking authority put the atomic program at the 
center of postwar militarization and mobilization. Their concept of continual conflict 
meshed with the ideological positions of realists and generated fears that elected officials, 
program affiliates, and boosters in Nevada and elsewhere used to achieve their own self-
interested goals. Military officers and their supporters successfully undermined 
international control of atomic energy and diplomatic alternatives to the arms race largely 
because of their organizational capacity and their use of Atomic Secrecy and media 
manipulation to generate acceptance for the solutions they proposed. But at least part of 
the reason why their predictions resonated from official circles through to people across 
America was that they reflected and promulgated a narrative anchored deep in Western 
culture: a centuries-long tradition of cataclysm/salvation scenarios where the world was 
made anew as good triumphed over evil.
3
 Films geared for nuclear-age American viewers 
reflected this tradition and lent cultural support to the arguments for mobilization by 
combining variations of the doomsday-and-survival theme.
4
 It was this cultural tradition 
                                                                                                                                                 
   Terrence R. Fehner, F. G. Gosling, Battlefield of the Cold War, Volume One, The Nevada Test Site, 
Atmospheric Nuclear Weapons Testing, 1951-1963, Office of History and Heritage Resources, Executive 
Secretariat, Office of Management, Department of Energy, September 2006. 
 
3
 Jerome F. Shapiro, Atomic Bomb Cinema: The Apocalyptic Imagination on Film (New York, London: 
Routledge, 2001), 25-35.  
 
4
 Shapiro cites films such as The Beginning or the End (1947,) Rocketship X-M (1950,) The Day the Earth 
Stood Still, Unknown World, and The Thing from another World (1951,) Them! (1954,) It Came From 
Beneath the Sea (1955,) The Incredible Shrinking Man (1957,) and On the Beach (1959). Atomic Bomb 
Cinema, 62-91.  
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that was embedded in Forrestal‘s conceit that the American armed forces alone held the 
keys to world salvation and that he exploited in the anti-Soviet studies he commissioned 
and circulated before and after the war, and used to secure permission for Operation 
Crossroads; that military officers and their congressional supporters used to attack 
Truman and Lilienthal; and that Dean and his military partners promulgated after the 
creation of the Nevada Test Site.  
The extent to which they achieved their goals can be measured by the sense of 
inevitability about the nuclear arms race that shaped foreign and domestic policymaking 
throughout the atmospheric era. By December 1950, insiders such as David Lilienthal 
mulled over the possibility that the hopes for international regulation of atomic weapons 
and diplomatic solutions to a nuclear arms race that existed at the end of World War II 
had been lost. One month before Dean Acheson advised Truman to proceed with the 
hydrogen bomb, he told Lilienthal that if U.S. military policy remained resistant to 
international arms control while U.S. leaders continued to declare their backing for such 
control, then America would be committing ―a fraud upon ourselves.‖ Lilienthal agreed 
with Acheson‘s analysis, concluding that the government would end up ―in the soup.‖5 
Within the context of the conversation, Lilienthal‘s colloquialism summed up his view 
that the contradictory behavior would lead to budgetary or political problems down the 
road. But because Lilienthal routinely used ―Campbell,‖ ―Campbell‘s Soup,‖ or simply 
―soup,‖ to encode references to the H-bomb—the Super—in his diaries, and because he 
had lost his ability to manage the program so that it would serve primarily civilian ends, 
his comment may also be understood as expressing a parallel anxiety: that the nation was 
                                                 
5
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headed for atomic or nuclear catastrophe. In 1951, Truman placed responsibility for 
diplomacy in the hands of Soviet leaders while pinning U.S. solutions to military 
strength: ―We will match the U.S.S.R. in honest balanced reduction of armaments or we 
will outmatch them in military strength.‖ 6 Similarly, Eisenhower‘s conventionalization 
of nuclear weapons and his dependence on Strauss led to the privileging of military 
solutions over diplomatic ones. While Eisenhower argued before his election that Truman 
―bungled us perilously close to World War III,‖ (ignoring the role he played in helping 
the military monopolize the program,) he was unable to overcome the leverage military 
officers wielded over the program and the possibility of nuclear catastrophe they used to 
secure influence since World War II. He failed to slow significantly the mobilization that 
by the end of his first year in office had three-quarters of the U.S. budget consumed in the 
interests of national security and one-third of the nation‘s business dedicated to the 
defense industry.
7
 And, even after the fallout controversy made atmospheric testing 
politically disadvantageous, others made use of the images and scenarios of nuclear 
Armageddon that energized Cold War mobilization. In 1960 RAND analyst Herman 
Kahn capitalized on the popularity of the supposedly objective calculations of game 
theory and the still-vivid memories of nuclear detonations to advocate for continued 
militarization. The title of one chapter in his book On Thermonuclear War—―Will the 
Survivors Envy the Dead‖—exemplifies the ongoing power of the promotional use of 
                                                 
6
 ―Report to the American People on International Arms Reduction‖, November 7, 1951. Cited in ―Minutes 
of the Meeting of the Secretary of State with the Panel of Consultants on Disarmament‖ April 28, 1952, n. 
4. FRUS 1952-1954, Vol. II, National Security Affairs, 898. 
 
7
 Eisenhower, ―Philadelphia Address‖, September 1952, in Martin J. Medhurst, Dwight D. Eisenhower, 
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focus of numerous studies. See Martin J. Medhurst, ed., Eisenhower’s War of Words. For defense and 
military spending, see Hogan, A Cross of Iron, 473.  
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weapons testing to generate support for strengthening military resources. Finally, the 
remembrances of one officer, Lt. Gen. James V. Edmundson, who served as Strategic Air 
Commander for the U.S. Air Force, reveal the extent to which the notions of an inevitable 
nuclear war that officers had worked so hard in the immediate postwar period to generate 
had become a self-fulfilling prophesy. Their opportunistic exploitation of international 
conflicts for domestic political and institutional ends fueled antagonisms, increasing Cold 
War tensions and U.S. insecurity. Ultimately, they boxed in not only elected officials but 
officers, too. Noting that the fears of a surprise Soviet attack were so persistent that SAC 
remained on continual atomic alert for years, Edmundson added that ―We couldn‘t think 
of any other way to keep it from happening.‖8  
But history might have turned out quite differently. Congressional investigation of 
Groves‘s management of the wartime program might have given elected officials insight 
into military overreach and information that they could have used to improve peacetime 
oversight. Such an investigation might also have spawned the sort of deliberation that 
would have brought more information about the hazards of residual radioactivity to bear 
on the decision to approve an ―experiment‖ on the scale of Operation Crossroads; 
maneuvers that established the precedent for the use of nuclear demonstrations and 
reckless testing practices that lasted throughout the atmospheric era. Had such knowledge 
about radioactive hazards that was known at the end of the war and that scientists learned 
over time not been buried by military officers ostensibly protecting the ―atomic secret‖ or 
preventing public ―hysteria,‖ it is likely that neither the American public nor 
policymakers would have endorsed either routine experimentation or the casual addition 
of nuclear weapons to the nation‘s arsenal. Weapons tests that were necessary to preserve 
                                                 
8
 As recorded in the PBS documentary, Race for the Superbomb. 
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national security might thus have been conducted at the PPG, a location so inconvenient 
that the expense of testing there would have prevented conducting any but the most 
critical of experiments. And that, in turn, would have significantly limited the amount of 
radioactive fallout produced to circle the globe. Given the history recounted here, such 
assertions are not as impressionistically naive as might be claimed by program apologists 
from the 1950s forward. 
The lasting narrative anchored to the institutional rationalizations that masked the 
harm done to people and the environment by the AEC and the DOD shapes contemporary 
decisions about nuclear weapons use and experimentation. In 2006 Department of Energy 
historians writing a history of the Site to commemorate the opening of the Atomic 
Testing Museum in Las Vegas used the media event ―Charlie‖ to illustrate the 
significance of testing in Nevada. Using the same persuasive techniques that were routine 
for 1950s AEC officials, the authors explained that ―Charlie‖ provided a ―spectacular 
display‖ that was ―a relatively small device compared to the megaton weapons that would 
follow.‖ It gave ―the American people [a] clearer notion of the significance of the events‖ 
taking place in Nevada. The authors‘ retelling of the conventional narrative continued, 
And significant they were. … These tests directly contributed to the 
creation and manufacture of bigger, smaller, better, and safer nuclear 
weapons that greatly enhanced the capabilities of the nation‘s security 
forces and helped deter an all-out hot war. Warheads from a few kilotons 
to multi-megaton yields, warheads for bombs, guided missiles, ballistic 
missiles, depth charges, and hand-held bazookas were developed, refined, 
and stockpiled.
9
 
 
As Dean might have done, the agency‘s historians discussed radioactive fallout as a 
public  
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relations problem:  
 
On the downside, nuclear weapons testing also produced airborne 
radioactivity that fell outside of the test site and, as the decade progressed, 
a worldwide uproar and clamoring for a ban on all tests. This combination 
of off-site radioactivity and an increasingly wary public ultimately would 
prove to be the undoing of atmospheric testing.
10
  
 
By validating the disingenuous claims and practices of historical actors, official and 
agency historians have done more than to supply their own interpretation to historical 
events. Their downplaying of radioactive health effects influences contemporary thinking 
about the present-day value of nuclear weapons in war.
11
  
This was the case in 2005 when David Samuels published a thirteen page article 
about the Nevada Test Site in Harper’s Magazine.12 Samuels included atmospheric era 
photographs, interviews with Test Site workers, and wrote about what he learned about 
the as-yet-unopened Atomic Testing Museum in Las Vegas, recounted the purpose of a 
top-secret meeting Donald Rumsfeld scheduled, coincidentally, for September 11, 2001, 
with retired and current DOE administrators to discuss—according to one of the retired 
administrators—ways to reorganize the testing program to re-start nuclear tests in 
Nevada.
13
 Samuels discussed what he learned about the nature of plutonium and weapons 
from Los Alamos veterans; shared anecdotes from employees who tracked the edges of 
fallout clouds in cars by holding their meters out the window and who laughed about 
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 Fehner, Battlefield of the Cold War, 8.  
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 As Wray notes of the Atomic Testing Museum‘s portrayal of the history of the site as though it were 
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from the Past,‖ 473. 
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 David Samuels, ―Buried Suns: The Past and Possible Future of America‘s Nuclear-Testing Program,‖ 
Harper’s Magazine, June, 2005, 56-68. 
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their hair being radioactive and who told him that ―fears of radiation and atom bombs are 
so much nonsense,‖ and that ―small amounts of radiation are beneficial to humans.‖14 His 
themes included regret at the possibility that the practical expertise necessary to restart 
testing in Nevada was dwindling away with the retirement and death of those scientists 
and technicians once responsible for conducting those tests and a thinly veiled appeal to 
national security.
15
 What Samuels omitted from his article was information about the 
risks of nuclear weapons testing. Samuels also failed to include even the most casual 
mention to the radiogenic illness and diseases caused by Cold War era weapons 
production and weapons tests that have been recognized by Congress in the Radiation 
Exposure Compensation Act.  
This national security mantra of official, DOE, historians has caused others to 
misread, or doubt documentary evidence that operates against it. President Clinton‘s 1994 
Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments, for example, allowed their 
assumptions about the pull of the Cold War on historical actors to outweigh 
countervailing evidence. Over the course of its year-long investigation into the Human 
Radiation Experiments, and with unprecedented access and resources to investigate and 
gather records from the program, the DOD, and all of its affiliates, the Committee and its 
staff found relatively found few references to national security—and none in defense 
related documents—to justify secret research (or atmospheric testing practices) while 
discovering that officials routinely insisted on secrecy to avoid legal liability, 
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embarrassment, or public ridicule.
16
 The Committee‘s operational focus, however, 
limited its ability to understand the legislative responsibilities and boundaries of authority 
under which officials and officers operated. By ignoring the Atomic Energy and National 
Security Acts, they were unable to make sense of the relationship between the AEC and 
the DOD, representing it as an ad hoc negotiation between two actors operating 
independently and responding to forces beyond their ability to control. In the 
Committee‘s words, there were no ―rules governing nuclear weapons tests,‖ and that 
―they had to be created in ongoing interplay between the new Atomic Energy 
Commission and the new Department of Defense.‖17 This notion made it easier for the 
Committee to excuse as unavoidable the excesses that they uncovered about weapons 
                                                 
16
 Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments, The Human Radiation Experiments: Final 
Report of the President’s Advisory Committee (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 16-17. ―With 
regard to defense-related documents, in none of the memorandums or transcripts of various agencies did we 
encounter a formal national security exception to conditions under which these human subjects may be 
used.‖ 120. This was the subject of one discussion of the Report: See Trudo Lemmens, ―In the Name of 
National Security, European Journal of Health Law 6 (1991): 7-23, esp. 10-11.  
   Despite the Committee‘s efforts to get to the bottom of human radiation experimentation, it has drawn 
considerable criticism for an approach that completely sidestepped the issue of responsibility. The study‘s 
emphasis on operational evidence tended to absolve AEC administrators and military officials while the 
decision to compensate only those experimental victims who could demonstrate that they had suffered 
physical harm from the experiments had the effect of excusing the ethical violations committed by 
scientists, clinicians, and professionals involved in the experiments. As Allen Buchanan has argued, the 
Committee‘s reluctance to lay blame has implications for the present and the future: ―it will be very hard if 
not impossible to explain and to justify effective proposals for institutional or professional reform without 
making clear references to particular instances of culpable action performed by identifiable individuals. 
Unless this is done, the specifics of reform proposals may appear unmotivated or of dubious relevance. For 
these reasons, we should make judgments of individual culpability about wrongdoings in the past, if we 
have sufficient evidence to do so responsibly.‖ Italics in original. For Buchanan‘s critique of the 
Committee‘s investigative approach, the assumptions underlying its task, and its failure to find fault, see 
―Judging the Past: The Case of the Human Radiation Experiments,‖ Hastings Center Report, 26:3 (May-
June, 1996), 25-30, 30.  See also Danielle Gordon who critiqued the panel and its conclusions, decrying 
especially the decision to award compensation on the basis of the consequences of the experiments instead 
of the ethical violations committed. ―The Verdict: No Harm, No Foul,‖ Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 
(January-February 1996): 32-40, 37. 
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Available on the World Wide Web at 
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testing. For example, they stated because of ―the exigencies of the Cold War,‖ a ―50-
kiloton‖ upper boundary for testing in Nevada was sometimes ―deliberately exceeded,‖ 
and that despite a dispute among AEC advisors about the hazards of weapons testing and 
fallout, ―pressure of the Cold War determined that continental testing would continue.‖18 
In its Final Report submitted in 1995 and published in 1996, the Committee routinely 
genuflected to national security imperatives and insisted that national security drove 
classified research: ―The history of human experimentation conducted in the interests of 
strengthening and protecting national security that the Advisory Committee has examined 
demonstrates how the rights and interests of citizens can be violated in secret research.‖19 
It is time to move beyond the national security, Cold War narrative.  
Though written more than a century ago, Friedrich Nietzsche‘s insights transcend 
time to serve as an atomic age reminder to look for ulterior motives and to consider how 
an overarching goal can be perverted to serve other interests: 
[T]he actual causes of a thing‘s origin and its eventual uses, the manner of 
its incorporation into a system of purposes, are worlds apart; that 
everything that exists is periodically reinterpreted by those in power in 
terms of fresh intentions. … But all pragmatic purposes are simply 
symbols of the fact that a will to power has implanted its own sense of 
function in those less powerful.
20
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 Advisory Committee Staff, Memorandum, September 7, 1994, to Members of the Advisory Committee 
on Human Radiation Experiments, re: Historical Background on U.S. Nuclear Testing, 2, 3. Tab F, Part III, 
ACH1.000006.006c. 
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This was a lesson not lost on Presidents Truman and Eisenhower, who during their terms 
each echoed variations of Nietzsche‘s abstract observations in discussing atomic science. 
In 1950, Truman spoke of the need to build a ―moral and legal‖ framework to ―insure that 
his [man‘s] new powers are used for good and not for evil.‖ ―Man has opened the secrets 
of nature and mastered new powers. If he uses them wisely, he can reach new heights of 
civilization. If he uses them foolishly, they may destroy him.‖21 As if to complement 
Truman‘s invocation of generalities to situate atomic science in a historical stream of 
innovation and progress, President Eisenhower constructed a more down-to-earth version 
that dealt with people, with their inventions and intentions. In September 1953 after 
nuclear war had become even more terrifying with the H-bomb, Eisenhower jotted down 
a sentence he had thought to include in an upcoming speech: ―Every invention is 
susceptible of good or bad use,‖ he wrote, ―depending on the intentions of those using 
it.‖22 Both Truman and Eisenhower may have been most interested in how their words 
resonated on the international stage and foreign policy, but their insights are equally 
applicable to domestic policy, the political instrumentality of the bomb, and the process 
and personalities that together shaped the history of the program.
23
  
 This study offers new avenues for future historical research. Its findings 
encourage continued historical investigations of the relationships that existed in what 
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 Harry S. Truman, State of the Union Address, 1950. Public Papers of the Presidents.  
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 Dwight D. Eisenhower, 9-28-1953, ―Handwritten by President to be included in atomic speech,‖ DDE 
Diary, Ann Whitman file, Papers of President Dwight D. Eisenhower, DDE Library. 
 
23
 As Patrick J. McGrath‘s analysis demonstrates, political and scientific militarism evolved as the product 
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might have been the largest public-private partnership of all time. Much more could be 
learned about the lives and motivations of the scientists who served on advisory 
committees. Additionally, examinations of the interactions between individual scientists, 
advisory committees, and the establishment of workplace or safety standards, would 
contribute to historical understanding as well as contemporary problems faced by federal 
and state agencies.  
This dissertation also makes an argument for the utility of historical 
understanding, opening up a number of avenues of inquiry for those interested in 
narrowing the gulf between the formation of policy and its administration. As a case 
study of institutional resilience, it demonstrates how structural and cultural resistances to 
change, including the tacit or intentional reproduction of institutional practices, may 
operate to impede an agency‘s or an organization‘s ability to respond to adjustments in 
policy goals and changes of circumstance. Additionally, this examination of decision 
making illustrates the extent to which participants aligned themselves with organizational 
norms and goals, sublimated personal ethical standards, and ultimately misled presidents 
and congressmen in the interests of those goals. Understanding how the tensions between 
regulatory oversight and institutional loyalty developed in this historical instance may, 
perhaps, guide policymakers as they evaluate mechanisms to preserve regulatory 
integrity. Finally, evaluating the interplay of favorable scientific opinion to hazardous 
experimentation highlights the needs for vigilance to guard against the unintentional 
narrowing of the advisory field of expertise and the muting of alternative approaches. 
This analysis reflects my experiences as a duck-and-cover kid, an understanding 
that began to develop in 1972 through my work as a legal assistant helping Test Site 
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workers pursue their claims against the government, and what I have learned in archives 
and from historians who fleshed out the institutional and political contexts of the Cold 
War. As my study concludes, I like to think that it provides insight into the issue that 
most terrified E. B. White in 1954 about the atomic era: ―the speed of man‘s adjustment 
to it.‖  
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